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Abstract 
 
 
 
Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace?  
This study explores the complex notion of implied readership in Wallace’s 
short fiction collections by constructing a theoretical basis for discussing 
‘readers’ in Wallace’s work and reception. Wallace’s self-reflexive and 
characteristically self-conscious relationship to his readers is well-noted 
within contemporary scholarship. However, the estranging extent to which 
this literary self-consciousness repeats, re-imagines and re-abstracts very 
particular (and often very Freudian) ideas about reading and criticism has 
received comparatively little attention to date. Accordingly, the key 
methodological resource that this study proposes is psychoanalytically-
informed reader-response theory, especially that of Peter Brooks, which 
attunes the study to significant Freudian and post-Freudian anxieties in Girl 
with Curious Hair (1989), Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), Oblivion 
(2004).  
The central contention of this study is that, of all the possible reading-
positions suggested in Wallace’s psychoanalytically-aware metafiction and 
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adopted in influential interpretations of that work, certain ‘readers’ repeat. 
Responding to the critical rhetoric of contemporary Wallace Studies, the 
dissertation proposes a typology consisting of literalistic readers who identify, 
imaginative readers who critique, abstract readers who narrate and 
performative readers who negate, and locates these reading-positions at the 
margins of Wallace’s short fictions and essays. These four ‘readers’ are 
subsequently modelled as instances of transferential-neurotic (self-reflexive 
and repetitive) discourse. Through close attention to theme of performance 
in Wallace, the study investigates the ways in which Wallace’s texts perform 
or act-out the response of psychoanalytically-informed readers, and models 
this performance in terms of self-reflexivity and repetition. On this basis, the 
study provides a novel interpretation of Wallace’s short fiction in terms of its 
own estranging performances of ‘reading’ and ‘readers’.   
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Ask me how I am, ask me how I've been / And then stand and 
watch and hope and wait and with any luck/ I'll be an 
earthquake, and I'll clear a space here/ Where you can put 
pictures and silence and sleep/ And you can stop asking, 'cause 
you'll be / You'll be / You'll be/ Down in the centre of the earth 
with me 
 
- Paul Dempsey (2001), Manmade Horse. Melbourne: Murmur 
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Introduction:  
Performing the ‘Fiction-Writer’s Reader’ 
 
Fiction for me is a conversation for me between me and 
something that May Not Be Named – God, the Cosmos, the 
Unified Field, my own psychoanalitic cathexes, Roqoq’oqu, 
whomever. I do not feel even the hint of an obligation to an 
entity called READER – do not regard it as his favour, rather as 
his choice, that, duly warned, he is expended 
capital/time/retinal energy on what I’ve done.  
(Wallace, in Max 2012: :145, sic) 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship between literary works 
and their critical reception, and the way in which certain critical paradigms 
become defined through specific interactions between readers, authors, critics 
and texts. The thesis explores the theoretical continuities between David 
Foster Wallace's work and the works of major Wallace scholars, and 
comments on the emergence of "David Foster Wallace Studies" as a critical 
paradigm. In essence, this thesis argues that David Foster Wallace’s 
understanding of his own work has significantly delimited the interpretive 
options available to contemporary Wallace scholars. To explore this claim, the 
thesis juxtaposes close readings of Wallace's short fictions and close 
engagements with contemporary Wallace scholarship, whilst highlighting a 
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particular shared dimension of these texts - namely, their problematisation of 
the word 'reader' in relation to activities such as interpretation, criticism and, 
more generally, reading.  
This focus on critical paradigms and their emergence situates the thesis 
as a form of reader-response criticism, which describes and theorises the text 
in relation to specific reception contexts. In Formalist Criticism and Reader-
Response Theory, Davis and Womack define the theoretical paradigm of 
reader-response criticism as consisting of three questions: "do our various 
responses to literary works produce the same (or similar) readings?; can 
literary texts genuinely enjoy as many meanings as readers are able to create?; 
are some readings essentially more valid and justifiable than others?" (2002). 
To address these questions, reader-response criticism produces "models for 
understanding the reading process itself", alongside "mechanisms for 
exploring the ways in which the construction of literary works shares in the 
production of meaning" (2002). A successful reader-response model reflects 
on particular modes of reading or 'implied readership', whilst relating these 
modalities to broader literary-critical paradigms. Davis and Womack 
moreover highlight the heterogeneity of contemporary reader-response 
criticism, and point to the fields of "rhetoric, structuralism, history, 
psychology, and feminism" as precursors for such criticism (2002). In the case 
of this thesis, the goal is to relate particular modes of reading in Wallace's 
texts to the broader paradigms of psychoanalytic literary theory and David 
Foster Wallace Studies. 
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A cornerstone mechanism for reader-response theory is the notion of 
an 'implied reader', which identifies specific modes of reading represented 
within or inferred through the literary text. In the work of Wayne C Booth, 
this notion correlates with that of the 'implied author', and pertains to 
normative discourses of reading and writing revealed in particular literary 
contexts: 
In any reading experience there is an implied dialogue among 
author, narrator, the other characters, and the reader. Each of the 
four can range, in relation to each of the others, from 
identification to complete opposition, on any axis of value or 
judgment; moral, intellectual, aesthetic, and even physical [...]  
The elements usually discussed under 'aesthetic distance' enter in 
of course; distance in time and space, differences of social class or 
conventions of speech or dress — these and many others serve to 
control our sense that we are dealing with an aesthetic object, just 
as the paper moons and other unrealistic stage effects of some 
modem drama have had an 'alienation' effect. But we must not 
confuse these effects with the equally important effects of 
personal beliefs and qualities, in author, narrator, reader, and all 
others in the cast of characters. (Booth 1987: 276) 
The concept of the implied reader is particularly useful when considering the 
relationship between literary texts and their critical reception, calling our 
attention to the paradigmatic language used within texts (both literary and 
critical) to describe particular reading experiences. Wolfgang Iser contrasts 
the theorisation of the implied reader with a more generically empirical 
"history of responses" - i.e. the reported experiences of real readers, including 
critics  (1978: 28). Drawing on psychoanalytic theories of response, Iser posits 
two hypothetical processes for reconstructing a non-empirical 'reader', "the 
first constructed from social and historical knowledge of the time, and the 
second extrapolated from the reader's role laid down in the text" (28). 
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Accordingly, the ‘implied reader' is a form of idealisation of the competence 
required for a reader to sufficiently understand a given text or utterance. 
As a paradigmatic field of enquiry, Wallace Studies is arguably fixated 
on the first of these hypothetical 'readers', at the expense of the second - for 
every textual and structural reading of Wallace's texts written today, there are 
at least two more readings overtly premised on the author's own historically-
specific and normative critique of postmodernity. By reading this paradigm 
through a transferential-neurotic 'author-reader' model, the thesis 
distinguishes  further between the 'ideal' (which is to say normative) reader of 
Wallace and the various reading-activities implied within Wallace's texts. 
These latter activities – which the thesis terms identification, critique, 
narration and negation - can be understood in both their paradigmatic aspect 
(i.e. their utility to historical readers of Wallace) and, as I will argue here, in 
their repetition and reprisal throughout Wallace's self-reflexive short fictions.  
More specifically, the thesis explores these particular reader-response 
discourses from the perspective of psychoanalytic literary theory, and reviews 
iterative variations of the term 'psychoanalytic reading' in relation to the 
David Foster Wallace text. This approach emphasises the constructed-ness of 
particular terminologies about reading, whilst locating specific continuities 
and variations between Wallace's works and a psychoanalytically-informed 
reception context. Following existing scholarship, I explore the extent to 
which Wallace's works posit the literary encounter as an "act of 
communication between one human being and another" (Wallace 1997; 144), 
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and examine the self-reflexive strategies which support this contention within 
those works.  A psychoanalytic reader-response model is thus deployed to 
shed new light on these strategies, and their avowed concern for what this 
thesis terms the ’author-reader relationship’. Though Wallace's works appear 
to invite an infinite number of interpretations of this relationship, the 
recurrence of psychoanalytic reading-tropes in these work lends a degree of 
consistency to certain significant claims made about the Wallace 'reader' in 
contemporary scholarship. These claims, viewed through the concept of 
acting-out (transference-neurosis) in Freudian metapsychology, can help us 
understand the complex discourse of reading and interpretation set forth at 
the margins of Wallace's fictions and reception. Through the concept of 
transference-neurosis, detailed below, I want to investigate the complex 
critical ideas which underpin Wallace’s conception of the author-reader 
relationship, highlighting the specific ways in which ‘readers’ are constructed 
in his short fictions, essays and interviews.  
The study proceeds from the assumption, widely canvassed and 
theorised in contemporary scholarship, that the American author and essayist 
framed his literary project in terms of that project’s ‘readers’, that his works 
“reconfigure the writer-reader relationship” as part of their response to the 
epistemological and ontological dilemmas posed by late postmodernity (Kelly 
2010: 146). To explore these issues, the thesis investigates Wallace’s short 
fictions, focusing on the major collections Girl with Curious Hair (1989), Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men (1999) and Oblivion (2004).  Responding to these 
texts, and their contested theorisation within the field of Wallace Studies, the 
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present study distinguishes between four unique reading-positions in relation 
to Wallace’s formally-inventive and rhetorically-engaged body of work. 
Drawing on the terminologies of contemporary Wallace scholars, these 
positions are termed readers who identify, readers who critique, readers who 
narrate and readers who negate. The four 'readers' defined in this thesis 
represent four differing views on the relationship between literary criticism 
and psychoanalytic theory. Notably, these psychoanalytic perspectives also 
present variations on the idea of a literary 'cure', which is pertinent to the 
therapeutic and cathartic aspects of the reader-author relationship articulated 
within Wallace's works. My model views therapeutic catharsis in terms of 
specific reading outcomes - the successful identification, critique, narration or 
negation of textual meaning within a given literary paradigm. 
However, this thesis views the recurrence of particular reader-response 
discourses in Wallace's work and reception as a form of 'estrangement-effect'. 
This effect is commonly understood through the Brechtian metaphor of 
'breaking the fourth wall', in which the theatrical performer breaks with realist 
convention to acknowledge both the presence of an audience and, self-
reflexively, the constructed-ness of their own performance. However, I wish 
to argue for a more radical form of estrangement in Wallace's writings, which 
acknowledges the author's engagement with and subversion of this prevailing 
performative model. In this reading, Wallace's repeated invocations of the 
'author-reader relationship' represent a form of resistance to interpretation, 
which this thesis investigates through a psychoanalytically-informed reader-
response model. To explain this resistance, the study traces the idea of the 
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transference-neurosis as performance, a textualised acting-out of the past as a 
“present-day force” (Freud 1916), drawing on major works by Paul Ricoeur 
(1978), Peter Brooks (1992; 1986) and Shoshanna Felman (2012) in this regard. 
These works represent an intersection of a wide range of literary concerns, 
including hermeneutic philosophy (the philosophy of interpretation and 
exegesis), structural narratology (the study of narrative logic and structured 
intentionality), and post-structural or deconstructive criticism (the critique of 
narrative and intentional logic). Through this novel psychoanalytic reading, I 
consider the case that Wallace’s texts perform or act-out their ‘readers’, 
through the estranging mechanisms of repetition, re-imagination and re-
abstraction. 
In this sense, this study remains concerned with the broader impacts 
of resistance and repetition in metafictional texts like Wallace’s, and with 
exposing the strange extent to which these ‘fictions about fiction’ engage and 
disrupt our own ways of thinking about ‘reading’. There is, I think, something 
quite estranging about this repetitious rhetoric of the ‘reader’ in Wallace, a 
strangeness which can arguably help illuminate the interpretive difficulties at 
stake in Wallace’s more challenging writings, and point the way to a more 
sophisticated understanding of readers, reading and interpretation within 
those writings. From a psychoanalytic position, repetition always discloses the 
presence of unconscious content. Therefore, when Wallace's texts repeat, 
particularly when they repeat anxieties about psychoanalytic reading as such, 
it is legitimate to view these repetitions through a psychoanalytic framework. 
Of course, 'repetition' is undoubtedly one of the most over-determined terms 
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in classical Freudian theory, pertaining to a whole host of psychodynamic and 
metapsychological processes, along with the numerous interpretive 
discourses which attend these processes in Freud's writings. I have restricted 
my use of the term to the contexts of transferential-neurotic repetition, acting 
out, though there are inevitable and productive connections to be made 
between this form of repetition and related modes of psychoanalytic reading. 
Through the language of transference-neurosis, the thesis models four major 
forms of repetition: 
1. the repetition of particular affective and identificatory 
frameworks, revealed via transference;  
2. the repetition of particular neurotic critiques in relation 
to these frameworks, revealed via transference-neurosis 
and related obsessional discourses;  
3. the repetition of particular self-conscious attitudes 
towards psychoanalysis as an explanatory framework 
unto itself;  
4. and, finally, the repetition of the transference-neurosis, 
revealed via the self-reflexive interpretive dialogues 
performed by analyst and analysand in the traditional 
Freudian clinic.  
To distinguish between these forms of repetition, the thesis makes use of the 
new terms 're-imagine' and 're-abstract', which respectively highlight 
textualised examples of the transference-neurosis and overt returns to 
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Freudian interpretive tropes in Wallace's works. A fourth term, 'perform', is 
also used, to describe the blurring of metapsychological and metafictional 
discourses in Wallace's works as a whole. These terms denote four broad 
relationships between Wallace and psychoanalytic reading, and describe the 
complex relationship between Wallace's works and the literary transference-
neurosis. They also allow for the articulation of a psychoanalytically-informed 
reader response model, the foundations of which are outlined in subsequent 
chapters of this study.  
The goal of this analysis is to develop a more detailed understanding of 
the so-called author-reader relationship in Wallace, by investigating the limits 
and vicissitudes of this idea in Wallace’s own texts. Formally, these fictions 
are taken to represent paradigm instances of the author’s self-reflexive 
concerns with readership and reception, which Wallace typically expresses in 
terms of the encounter between ‘texts’, ‘authors’ and, most significantly, 
‘readers’. Whilst the significance of this encounter is certainly not lost on the 
author, or on contemporary studies thereof (See Chapter 1), its idiosyncratic 
presentation in Wallace’s texts remains something of a challenge for the 
critical interpreter of Wallace. In fact, there are points at which this rhetoric 
is not engaging at all, but rather estranging – in the author’s characteristically 
dense and hyper-referential style of storytelling, there is often little to 
distinguish the reader of the Wallace text from the self-reflexive ‘readers’ 
imagined or abstractly implied within such texts. Of course, there are bases 
upon which such a distinction can be made – we can distinguish, for example, 
between the ‘readers’ implied by Wallace’s texts and those theorised in 
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influential studies of the author; we might also distinguish between the idea 
of empirical readers (or in Wallace’s terms, “human beings”) and the 
hypothetical representation of such ‘readers’ within Wallace’s texts. The 
problem with such distinctions, as we shall see, is that they appear 
characteristically obscured or collapsed at key points in the author’s own 
rhetorically-engaged fictions.  
Accordingly, the search for a Wallace ‘reader’ requires close attention 
to those strange points at which the Wallace text conflates the activities of 
readers, authors, narrators, characters and texts. In order to understand this 
strangeness, this study repeats the simple question: Who is the ‘reader’ of 
David Foster Wallace? The answer, in this study, is itself a peculiar kind of 
repetition – repetition of ‘readers’, of rhetoric about readers, of abstract and 
even deconstructive performances of particular and specific author-reader 
relationships. Through these readings, I am interested in the ways in which 
Wallace’s texts repeat particular persuasive ideas about how we, the supposed 
‘reader’ of Wallace, can and perhaps even should read texts. Moreover, 
Wallace's self-reflexive treatment of Freudian reading-tropes raises questions 
about the relationship between psychoanalysis and literary theory, ostensibly 
challenging the legitimacy of psychoanalysis as an explanatory framework for 
texts. To understand and address these questions, I have investigated their 
precedents in psychoanalytic literary theory, whilst also highlighting the self-
reflexive dimensions of psychoanalysis as an interpretive paradigm. 
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Through this mode of investigation, the thesis demonstrates that 
certain types of ‘reader’ repeat in Wallace’s texts, and that this repetition is 
usually marked by an estranging escalation of interpretive stakes. In 
describing the evolution of Wallace's technique over time, the thesis makes 
reference to the author's 'escalation' of particular reader-positioning strategies 
- for example, when examining the shift from readers who identify to readers 
who critique in Wallace's early-middle period fictions. These evolutions in 
style tend to make visible the explicitly transferential-neurotic connotations 
of earlier strategies, and thus represent an escalation of the reader response 
model canvassed herein. Wallace's literary treatment of 'love' involves this 
kind of escalation, as the author visibly substitutes the language of 
transference-neurosis in place of naive questions about the author-reader 
relationship; Wallace's relationship to David Lynch is another case in point, 
to the extent that this relationship also discloses Wallace's focus on 
'psychoanalytic reading' as a form of literary communication. Escalation also 
connotes a raising of stakes, dramatic or conceptual, and thus helps this thesis 
to punctuate Wallace's literary engagement with Freudian ideas, and to 
explore the story of that engagement over time.   
This argument aims at extending the insights of contemporary Wallace 
scholarship by observing the paradigmatic connections between literary and 
critical performance and the concept of transference-neurosis in Wallace’s 
short fictions. Whilst the ubiquity of Freudian terminology and ideas in 
Wallace’s works has been recognised and theorised by key works within the 
field – particularly Marshall Boswell’s Understanding David Foster Wallace 
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(2003) and Mary K Holland’s essays ‘Braving the Narcissistic Loop of David 
Foster Wallace’s Infinite Jest’ (2006) and ‘Mediated Immediacy in Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men’ (2013) – I believe that the significance of the 
Freudian transference, and the co-location of that significance in what we call 
‘psychoanalytic literary theory’, has yet to be fully considered in Wallace’s 
works. Freudian theory has been used by scholars to describe the 
psychological 'realism' of Wallace's texts, particularly in terms of 
characterisation and the representation of consciousness. Building on these 
readings, this study places a greater emphasis on the interpretive and 
explanatory dimensions of psychoanalytic thought, which are explored here 
through the self-reflexive theorisation of the author-reader relationship in 
psychoanalytic literary theory.  
Nevertheless, these concerns can be productively theorised through 
close attention to the transference-neurosis, in a way which reflects and 
reflects upon the specific forms of psychoanalytic interpretation at stake in 
Wallace’s metafiction.. As my extended readings of Wallace Studies and 
psychoanalytic literary criticism in Chapters 1 and 2 indicate, the transference-
neurosis can provide us with a substantial heuristic and theoretical model for 
talking about the ‘reader’ in contemporary Wallace Studies, especially in 
relation to ideas like empathy (or literary “love”), suspicious hermeneutics (or 
“Theory”, as theorised by Adam Kelly [2010] and Clare Hayes-Brady [2010; 
2013]) and the ‘implied author’ of Wallace’s texts (the strange figure of the 
author “himself”, as theorised by critics such as Toon Staes [2014] and Mike 
Miley [2016]). This analysis demonstrates that when Wallace writes about the 
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author-reader relationship, he more often than not broaches the subject of 
performance, and that when he does, he frames this latter subject in a 
decidedly transferential-neurotic way. The result, for this critic at least, is 
estranging. In the chapters that follow, I’d like to draw out this estrangement 
across four “levels” – the literal, the imagined, the abstract and the 
performative – which correlate with the four types of ‘reader’ established here 
and in subsequent chapters. Through this modelling, this study provides an 
effective reading of acing-out in Wallace’s challenging metafiction, whilst 
considering that term’s strange definition and re-definitions within 20th-
century psychoanalytic criticism.  
Nevertheless, the intriguing thing about Wallace’s metafiction is that 
it self-reflexively anticipates this kind of investigation, providing visible 
attempts at a psychoanalytically-aware account of its own escalatory anxieties. 
A compelling example of this anticipation occurs towards the end of Wallace’s 
short essay ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, when he offers his summary thoughts on 
D.L. Hix’s Morte D’Author: An Autopsy and Roland Barthes’ ‘death of the 
author’ thesis: 
It’s finally hard for me to tell predict just whom, besides 
professional critics and hardcore theory-weenies, 226 dense 
pages on whether the author lives is really going to interest. 
For those of us civilians who know in our gut that fiction is an 
act of communication between one human being and another, 
the whole question seems sort of arcane (Wallace 1997: 144, 
emphasis mine) 
I repeat and return to this claim – the characteristic idea of fiction as “an act 
of communication between one human being and another” – throughout this 
thesis, because I think it exemplifies the rhetorical and critical uncertainties 
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at stake in Wallace’s literary project as a whole. However, the thesis argues 
that the repetition of this claim, the return to the idea of “communication” 
between “human beings”, needs some working-through if it is to serve as an 
adequate accounting of Wallace’s significance for new readers and new 
audiences. By considering this rhetoric, and its impact on our own critical 
rhetorics about Wallace and his fiction, the study provides a new basis for 
thinking and talking about the Wallace ‘reader’, and for examining those 
instances in Wallace’s fiction and reception where the role of this ‘reader’ can 
appear most uncertain or paradoxical.  
As we shall soon find, there is nothing simple about repetition in 
Wallace, nor indeed about the ‘readers’ or ‘readings’ which proliferate and 
compound upon one another in his works. In fact, I think that close attention 
to the dynamics of reading and repetition can yield vital insights into the 
uniquely psychological strangeness of the David Foster Wallace text, 
particularly when it comes to questions about interpretation in the wake of 
postmodernity. Like the scholars canvassed and conversed with in this study, 
I believe that Wallace’s texts do achieve something like an “act of 
communication” with their reader; by charting the extent to which this kind 
of rhetoric repeats in Wallace, the present study reflects on the literalistic, 
imaginative, abstract and performative bases for this kind of claim. However, 
this study builds on existing research because it theorises the estranging 
dimensions of this rhetoric, by taking into account the extent to which 
Wallace’s short fictions repeat, re-imagine and re-abstract their ‘reader’. If 
Wallace’s texts do provide an effective discourse on how they are to be read, 
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it is nevertheless important to observe how this discourse premises itself on 
repetition, and to consider the impacts of the repetition on paradigmatic 
criticism of the author and his works.  
 This introduction repeats, introducing the author twice – first, 
through a specific and strange interview with the Boston Globe’s Matthew 
Gilbert, and second, through the idea of the ‘fiction writer’ in Wallace’s 
seminal short story ‘Octet’ (1999). The purpose of this introduction is to 
establish the broad idea that Wallace is an author concerned with the idea of 
fiction as “an act of communication between one human being and another” 
(1997: 144). By revisiting this concern, whilst also questioning the acting-out 
of empirical and hypothetical ‘readers’ in Wallace’s metafiction, we are thus 
poised to discover a discover a rhetoric which is at once literal, imaginative, 
abstract and performative, when it comes to the simple enough question of 
how that rhetoric is or is ‘supposed to be’ interpreted. Who, then, is the ‘reader’ 
of David Foster Wallace? Who are we in relation to this ‘reader’, especially 
given the proliferation of ‘readers’ in virtually every aspect of Wallace’s literary 
project? To answer these questions, we need to understand how Wallace’s 
fiction supposes or simply poses and positions its ‘readers’. I believe that 
Wallace’s shorter writings provide an effective field of enquiry for answering 
these kinds of questions, whilst remaining beholden to the constraints of the 
traditional dissertation format. I want to share with you my estrangement 
with and from Wallace’s fictions, by observing the various forms of 
estrangement which those fictions suggest, and investigating the (almost) 
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unlimited amount of author-readers relationships that get spoken about 
within such contexts.  
But first, another not-so-simple question: who is David Foster Wallace?  
 
“first a pre-response and then a gaggle of responses”:  
Four Rhetorics of the ‘Reader’ in Wallace 
In an interview with Matthew Gilbert in 1997, Wallace is asked a simple 
enough question – having lived a year inside the “American hype machine”, 
following the publication of his watershed novel Infinite Jest, how does he 
“feel” (77)? “Do you want a univocal answer?” asks Wallace in return, “Because 
I can pretend as if I feel one way about it. But, of course, the reality is that at 
last count I feel about fifty-three different ways” (77). As a compromise – and 
for the sake of “journalistic concision” – Gilbert allows Wallace to answer the 
same question four times, getting four distinct responses. These responses are 
worth repeating in full, because they exemplify the kinds of rhetorical 
positions investigated in this study, and the specific sense of estrangement 
that attends such positioning. The first reads thus: 
– Feeling No. 1, edited down: “I think the book is the best thing 
I’ve ever done, and I’m proud of it, and it was an extremely 
pleasant surprise to have it get a lot of attention, and some of 
that is absolutely great” (77) 
Plain-spoken, yet “extremely” and “absolutely” enthusiastic about Jest and its 
reception, this rhetoric sees Wallace in the familiar position of literalistic 
interlocutor – an author who first and foremost a human being, both 
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responsible for and “proud of” his own literary utterance, and the kinds of 
“attention” those utterances receive from other readers. This kind of rhetoric 
suggests an un-ornamented appeal to the reader’s empathy, their attentive 
identification with the author’s own explicit statements of ownership and 
intention. Accordingly, I use the term 'literal' to describe non-figurative 
discourse in relation to Wallace's work - specifically, discourses which 
nominate an extrinsic or 'real-world' referent for the Wallace text. This usage 
follows in part from Hayes-Brady, who identifies "the recurrence of literalised 
or embodied problems" in Wallace's works, which are "part of a process of 
investigation: Wallace presents a hypothesis in narrative or structural form, 
testing the literalised hypothetical product to retrospectively postulate 
causality" (2016: 12-13). In other words, literal reading involves the claim that 
the Wallace text 'is about' one subject or another - for example, the claim that 
Wallace's fictions literally refer to certain kinds of reader-author relationship. 
In a psychoanalytic idiom, these claims can also evoke what Shoshanna 
Felman calls 'vulgar' psychoanalytic reading, the "literalisation of textual 
sexuality" (1978: 108). As I suggest in Chapter 3, Wallace's literalistic concerns 
for the 'reader' are often accompanied by overtly sexualised and erotic 
hypotheses about reading. 
This rhetoric is somewhat ambivalent, however, equivocating on how 
“great” our attention might be. We see this ambivalence translated into 
Wallace’s second “Feeling” about his literary fame: 
– Feeling, No 2: “I’m also someone who has problems with self-
consciousness. There’s a part of me that craves attention, but 
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it’s an increasingly small part. I’ve seen attention [mess up] 
writers I admire. I’m leery of it, and a great deal of the hype 
occurred at a time when rudimentary arithmetic yields the 
result that most people haven’t read the book. So it’s hard to 
take it seriously at the same time that it’s gratifying” (77, sic) 
This second rhetoric reads like a reversal or rejoinder to the first – perhaps 
cynically, Wallace suggests that many of his most vocal proponents had not 
even read his works by the time those works became well-known. In other 
words, Wallace appears suspicious of his “attention”, quietly imagining that 
attention as a kind of pretence or façade. But this sense of suspicion is also 
directed inwards, towards the author’s own craving for attention and 
“problems with self-consciousness”. Notably, Wallace doesn’t even mention 
the reader in his first rhetoric, but by the time he does, we are already engaged 
with a sense of ambivalent “self-consciousness”, in which the idea of literary 
attention is both “gratifying” (or “absolutely great”) and, in the final 
estimation, “hard to take seriously”. I use the term 'imaginative' to describe 
figurative (i.e. non-literal) discourse in relation to Wallace's works, specifically 
as it relates to classical psychoanalytic interpretation - that is, to the 
construction and testing of analytic hypotheses in the Freudian clinic. This 
discourse remains connected to the literalistic technique established in 
Wallace's early works, insofar as it involves "perspective and values, 
negotiated between speakers" (Holland 2013: 119), whilst placing an increased 
focus on the critical activity of readers in relation to the Wallace text. The 
anticipation of psychoanalytic critique in Wallace is an example of 
imaginative discourse par excellence, to the extent that Wallace re-imagines 
particular forms of psychoanalytic reading, and presents these forms as a 
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matter of characterological and narratological significance. The term should 
be distinguished from the Lacanian term 'Imaginary', which designates pre-
verbal or prototypical ontologies drawn from the subject's early childhood - 
while such ontologies are no doubt in play at the literal level, they are at this 
stage superseded by the symbolic (or Symbolic) questions raised in the 
classical psychoanalytic dialogue, and the mutual re-imagination of that 
dialogue which takes place under the sign of transference-neurosis. 
Between these two responses, then, we have encountered a certain 
kind of rhetorical antagonism – moving from a sense of literal communication 
to one of self-conscious imagination, Wallace’s rhetoric provides us with at 
least two conflicted senses of the ‘author’ in relation to his ‘reader’. Gilbert’s 
article also highlights this tension, when he describes Wallace “qualifying his 
statements and simultaneously conducting a review of his interviewer’s 
interviewing style, which he calls ‘psychiatric’” (77). Wallace, seemingly 
caught between two variations of the same respondent – what this study 
would call a reader who identifies and a reader who critiques – keeps alerting 
us to how he is being read, or indeed whether he is being read at all. Following 
our own rhetorical scheme, we might expect to see this dilemma complexified 
further in the answers to follow (this is indeed the case). But in Wallace’s own 
choice of words, we can already detect a certain essential tension, which is not 
so much ambiguous as it is antagonistic, resistant to straightforward 
interpretation. As I will proceed to show, this self-reflexive antagonism is most 
evident in, and in fact a crucial component of, the author’s conflicted rhetorics 
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of fame, reading and literary critique. But the lure is there –  Wallace, 
repeating himself, appears to be repeating ‘readers’ as well. 
 At this point in the interview (or rather, at this point in the same 
question), Wallace’s responses expand dramatically in scope, reframing 
certain interpretive encounters – in this case, both the interview and the 
reception of Jest – through additional layers of self-conscious rhetoric. In this 
third response, Wallace ends up recounting the experience of his own first 
interview, in a way that reflects back on the encounter at hand: 
-Feeling No. 3: “I had never been interviewed before. In the first 
interview I did, I was talking about old girlfriends and who I 
didn’t like. And the guy shut off the tape recorder halfway 
through and said ‘I need to explain a few things to you.’ He put 
a couple of embarrassing things in his story, but 90 percent of 
the horrible stuff he didn’t put in out of his own decency. So 
big feeling number three: This” – his finger points back and 
forth between us – “is hard” (77). 
This mini-narrative, of a curated interview with a younger (and from the 
sounds of it, nastier) version of David Foster Wallace himself, recontextualises 
the scene at hand, as helpfully indicated by the author’s exuberant hand 
gestures –consider for a second the movements implied by a finger pointing 
“back and forth”. These gestures (rhetorical and actual) present a curiously 
abstract version of the preceding responses. On the one hand, this rhetoric 
imagines a narrative of interruption, of an interviewer critically intervening to 
“explain a few things”, and intervening again to keep out “90 percent of the 
horrible stuff” said by Wallace. On the other hand, this rhetoric 
enthusiastically refers back (through the recounted gesture) to the literality 
of the interview “at hand”. Accordingly, the term 'abstract' is used in this thesis 
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to distinguish further between literalistic and imaginative approaches in 
Wallace's texts, and to qualify the use of the term 'narration' in relation to 
specific critical paradigms. For our purposes, 'abstracted' or 're-abstracted' 
discourse will involve the use of psychoanalysis as an explanatory discourse - 
the most notable evidence of this discourse in Wallace comes from his 
relationship to American director David Lynch, and the indisputably Freudian 
reading of the director's work provided in the essay 'David Lynch Keeps his 
Head' (1997). Likewise, abstract narration is shown to occur in the contexts of 
Wallace Studies, specifically with regard to the relationship between readers, 
authors and texts. It is at this level of discourse that the role of psychologically-
informed literary criticism, and psychoanalytic criticism in particular, become 
clear. 
Nevertheless, it also appears that we are dealing with another kind of 
rhetoric here, a fourth mode of response which alerts us to a further range of 
autobiographical and editorial stakes. At the level of abstraction, Wallace 
appears to be translating some of the essential conflicts between the literal 
and the imagined in his previous responses. So it is no surprise to find these 
conflicts repeated in Wallace’s final response to literary fame: 
–Feeling No. 4: “Exquisite irony, because a lot of the book is 
about hype and spin and position. So it’s really an enormous 
cosmic joke. It’s like, OK kid, you want to learn a little bit about 
hype? Have a taste from the big boy’s drinking fountain. And 
not a big gulp, because I’m well aware of where books exist in 
the consciousness of the culture. I thought I was very 
sophisticated and had learned a lot about hype from TV. But 
it’s entirely different. The cliché that getting a lot of attention 
is not the same as getting a lot of affection takes on new 
dimensions when you learn it through experience.” (77) 
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In this final rhetorical turn, Wallace highlights the strangely self-referential 
nature of his whole experience with literary fame, describing it as a symptom 
of Infinite Jest’s own games with “hype and spin and position”. Wallace 
describes this as drinking from the “big boy’s drinking fountain” – though, he 
immediately equivocates, he knows exactly “where books exist in the 
consciousness of the culture”. Despite (or perhaps because of) this self-
awareness, Wallace finally expresses his experience in the form of an 
ambivalent “cliché” – in his words, the idea that “getting a lot of attention is 
not the same as getting a lot of affection”. This cliché effectively brings us full 
circle, in the sense that it repeats all of the preceding responses in the form of 
intertextual reference, equivocation and abstracted self-narration. In fact, this 
entanglement reads like a kind of short-circuit of the preceding responses, a 
strangely compelling rhetoric of “experience”, “Exquisite irony” and “the 
consciousness of the culture” in one.  
In other words, Wallace’s four-fold response to the question of literary 
fame contains a kind of performative escalation, a distinct and visible 
movement through layers of critical and rhetorical uncertainty. As I will argue 
here, this kind of performance ultimately gestures in two directions – 
outwards, towards the literal readers of an imagined or ‘implied author’ (Staes, 
2014), and inwards, towards the imagined, abstracted and implied ‘readers’ 
suggested within Wallace’s texts.  So in less than 350 words (though no less 
than four responses), Wallace has managed to traverse a complex and 
involved discourse on how his texts are to be read, a discourse which appears 
to depend on a particularly anxious escalation of stakes – referring at once to 
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the literality of reading, the imagination of readers, the abstraction or 
implication of ‘readers’ and, at the extreme, the performative uncertainty of 
the ‘reader’ as an organising concept. The term 'performative' is used in this 
thesis to describe the self-reflexive enactment of particular author-reader 
relationships within metafiction. On this reading, a metafictional text 
anticipates various interpretations of its own contents, and reproduces or 
'performs' these readings at the level of text. However, these performances 
arguably take on new significance under the transferential-neurotic model. 
The estranging repetition of specific psychoanalytic reading-tropes, coupled 
with the performative complexity and self-referentiality which has defined 
Wallace's work to date, demands closer attention to the dynamics of acting-
out, which arguably shape Wallace's own views on literary dialogue as an "act 
of communication" between author and reader. Building on prior readings of 
Freud in Wallace, the term 'performance' thus highlights the extent to which 
author-, character- and reader-focused criticism depends on the recognition 
of particular psychoanalytic tropes, most notably in relation to the 
transference-neurosis and related metapsychological ideas. 
All of this brings us back to our central question: Who is the ‘reader’ of 
David Foster Wallace? This question is significant because it challenges the 
insistence of Wallace’s own rhetorics on reading and interpretation, in a 
manner which investigates the various kinds of reader-identity or interpretive 
agency at stake therein. In the chapters that follow, I thus provide an effective 
heuristic typology for understanding Wallace’s rhetoric of the ‘reader’, which 
can help shed light in our own use of the term in Wallace scholarship. Whilst 
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this typology highlights four unique and recurring types, it does not claim to 
exhaust the possibilities of Wallace’s discourses on reading – as Wallace 
suggested to Gilbert, there could be as many as fifty-three different ways to 
approach the problem, or perhaps the possibilities are as indefinite and 
infinite as those suggested in Wallace’s own fictions. But while there may be 
a near-infinite number of referents for the term ‘reader’ in Wallace’s texts, it 
remains entirely fair to say that some references repeat, in ways which 
illuminate and impact upon our understanding of the term in relation to 
Wallace’s works.  
Given the viability of our model, its extensions within contemporary 
Wallace Studies and psychoanalytic literary theory (See Chapters 1-2), and the 
productive application of this model to all major phases of the author’s literary 
career (See Chapters 3-6), the thesis makes a case for at least four Wallace 
‘readers’. By providing a substantive account of these ‘readers’, their role, and 
their repetition, the study thus investigates the curious and complex 
relationship between critical rhetoric and the fictions of David Foster Wallace. 
Wallace's texts famously question the idea of literature as an "act of 
communication" (1997), and pursue elaborate definitions of the term 'act' in a 
postmodern literary context. This approach is often viewed by scholars as a 
creative synthesis of Wittgensteinean linguistics and JL Austin's speech act 
theory (Boswell, 2003; Burgess, 2014) - in this sense, Wallace's texts are 
thought to devise normative language-games through the proliferation of 
performative and constative speech acts, while of course problematising the 
conditions under which such utterances take place. This model is explored 
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thoroughly in Chapter 1, and taken to define the essential self-reflexivity of 
Wallace's literary project. The thesis augments this self-reflexive speech act 
model through a specialised focus on psychoanalytic reader-response 
theories, within which the idea of a literary-critical 'act' is fraught with 
transferential-neurotic connotations. The term acting-out is used to contrast 
instances of transferential-neurotic discourse with the more generically self-
reflexive speech acts canvassed in Wallace's texts; a full elaboration of this 
model is provided in Chapter 2.  However, an illustrative example of this 
strategy occurs in Wallace’s short story ‘Octet’, which already contains at least 
one metalanguage about how it is supposed to be read. In highlighting the 
psychoanalytic theme of acting-out, we can thus gain a fuller (albeit stranger) 
sense of David Foster Wallace the author, the metafictionalist implicated in a 
whole a range of post-theoretical and transferential-neurotic schemes.  
 
“an act of communication” and acting-out:  
Transference-Neurosis and Reader-Response  
In the essay ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, David Foster Wallace famously 
refers to “those of us civilians who know in our gut that fiction is an act of 
communication between one human being and another” (1997: 144). This kind 
of common-sense, plain-language appeal to the ‘reality’ of fiction is one of the 
hallmark characteristics of Wallace’s broader literary project, particularly 
when considered against the more hyper-real parameters of that project. 
Despite this appeal’s tongue-in-cheek placement – within an essay about the 
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‘Death of the Author’, no less – there is something almost over-familiar in 
Wallace’s references to “us civilians”, to communication “between one human 
being and another”, to knowing “in our gut” what fiction is and should be. We 
are dealing, after all, with an author who saw postmodernity as a sort of moral 
and communicative dead-end, “a world of lurkers and starers who fear gaze 
and ridicule above imprisonment without law” (1997: 81-82), and who took 
every opportunity to remind his readers of this diagnosis, particularly in his 
more overtly ‘metafictional’ works like ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes 
its Way’ (1989), ‘Octet’ (1999) and ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’ (2004).  
Meanwhile, in more psychoanalytically-inclined texts such as ‘Here 
and There’ (1989), ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’ (1997) and ‘Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature’ (2004), the question of artistic and literal performance 
arguably becomes a question of tremendous psychological import: nowhere is 
this better exemplified than in Wallace’s enthusiastic appreciation of David 
Lynch, which appears to be an index for his appreciation for Freudian indices, 
the “anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, Oedipally arrested, borderlinish parts of 
the director’s psyche presented with very little inhibition or semiotic layering” 
(Wallace 1997: 166). Arguably, Wallace’s more abstract theories of 
“Expressionistic” cinema bear a striking similarity to the theories imagined 
and abstracted in his own works. The Lynchian ambit of Wallace’s fiction is 
certainly apparent in his seminal late work ‘Oblivion’, which arguably seethes 
with transferential themes and neurotic discourse (See Chapters 5-6). 
However, whilst we have suggested a correlation between Wallace’s works and 
psychoanalytic interpretive themes, and located this correlation somewhere 
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within Wallace’s fraught discourse on the author-reader relationship, we have 
yet to properly define the meaning of ‘transference’, ‘transference-neurosis’ 
and acting-out in a properly psychoanalytic sense. By establishing these 
concepts here, we can begin to see the ways in which a psychoanalytic literary 
perspective addresses the literalistic, imaginative, abstract and performative 
tensions suggested in Wallace’s discourse of the ‘reader’, and consider the 
author’s uniquely metafictional relationship to Freudian themes and tropes.  
Laplanche and Pontalis define psychoanalytic transference as "a 
process of actualisation of unconscious wishes", typically occurring in the 
context of the analytic situation (1973: 454). The transference "uses specific 
objects and operates in the framework of a specific relationship with these 
objects" (454) - in a more general sense, it involves the expression of a 
particular, unconsciously-determined relationship between the analysand in 
treatment and the 'object' of the analyst. Through the transference, "infantile 
prototypes re-emerge and are experienced with a strong sense of immediacy" 
(454) - under the conditions of transference, the analysand thus attributes 
particular, prototypical qualities onto the analyst, whilst experiencing their 
relationship to the analyst as an immediate, manifestly present-tense 
phenomenon. While the transference is classified as a form of resistance to 
the psychoanalytic work, it is also characterised as the principal dynamic of 
the psychoanalytic 'talking-cure', the "terrain on which all the basic problems 
of psychoanalysis play themselves out" - in classical metapsychology, "the 
establishment, modalities, interpretation and resolution of the transference 
are in fact what define the cure" (454). The transference can thus be described 
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as a relationship in which certain forms of reading and reader-construction 
play out. But how do these relationships come to be expressed through 
discourse, particularly literary discourse? And how do response-oriented 
terms like ‘identification’, ‘critique’, ‘narration’ and ‘negation’ find expression 
within this discourse? 
To answer these questions, it is helpful to situate the transferential 
discourse of the analysand – which can itself take on many guises – as a form 
of self-reflexive response to psychoanalytic interpretive technique. In defining 
the transference as a clinical phenomenon, Laplanche and Pontalis make the 
following crucial distinction between the empirical experience of the 
analysand (their historical past or life history) and the hypothetical and 
discursive nature of their relationship to the analyst: 
when Freud speaks of the transference repetition of past 
experiences, of attitudes towards parents etc., this repetition 
should not be understood in the literal sense of that restricts 
such actualisation to really lived relationships. For one thing, 
what is transferred, essentially, is psychical reality - that is to 
say, at the deepest level, unconscious wishes and the 
phantasies associated with them. And further, manifestations 
of transference are not verbatim repetitions but rather 
symbolic equivalents of what is being transferred. (Laplanche 
& Pontalis 1973: 459) 
In other words, the transferential relationships enacted in the Freudian clinic 
are built on a kind of symbolic equivalence between “really lived relationships” 
and a constructed psychical reality, which expresses “unconscious wishes and 
the fantasies associated with them”. This latter, hypothetical reality is akin to 
the discourse of an obsessional neurotic, insofar as it represents a sort of self-
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reflexive of the analysand’s experience within the clinic. In the Introductory 
Lectures, Freud defines obsessional neurosis thus: 
Obsessional neurosis is shown in the patient's being occupied 
with thoughts in which he is in fact not interested, in his being 
aware of impulses in himself which appear very strange to him 
and his being led to actions the performance of which give him 
no enjoyment, but which it is quite impossible for him to omit. 
The thoughts (obsessions) may be senseless in themselves, or 
merely a matter of indifference to the subject; often they are 
completely silly, and invariably they are the starting point of a 
strenuous mental activity, which exhausts the patient and to 
which he only surrenders himself most unwillingly. (Freud 
1966: 320-321) 
“Certainly,” Freud goes on to say, “this is a crazy illness" (321). For Laplanche 
and Pontalis, obsessional neurosis is "expressed through symptoms which are 
described as compulsive-obsessive ideas - obsessive ideas, compulsions 
towards undesirable acts, struggles against these thoughts and tendencies, 
exorcistic rituals etc. - and through a mode of thinking which is characterised 
in particular by rumination, doubt and scruples, and which leads to 
inhibitions of thought or action' (1973: 280). The difficulty of the obsessional 
neurotic, it seems, is their inability to relate their delusional frameworks to 
the task of analysis; whilst vigorously recounting their experiences of 
compulsive and obsessional acts, the neurotic is held back by resistance 
insofar as they neglect to answer to the transferential dynamics of their 
treatment.  
 In Freud's "theory of the talking cure"), the transference-neurosis 
"refers to an artificial neurosis into which the manifestations of the 
transference tend to become organised" (Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 461). This 
follows from Freud's earlier classification of the transference neurosis, 
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"characterised by the libido's always being displaced on to real or imaginary 
objects", as opposed to the patient's ego. (461). In the context of 
metapsychology, however, the transference-neurosis is structured such that 
"the whole of the patient's pathological behaviour comes to be re-orientated 
around his relationship with the analyst" (462), a process which "coordinates 
formerly disparate transference reactions" and "allows the whole of the 
symptoms and pathological behaviour of the patient to take on a new function 
by becoming related to the analytic situation" (462). The transference-
neurosis is thus expressed through the analysand's self-conscious relationship 
towards the analytic situation itself, a situation which is masked by the 
immediacy of the transference for both the analysand and their discourse. 
In Freud, the term 'acting out' designates a wide range of verbal 
behaviours, through which the transference-neurosis is both expressed during 
the course of the psychoanalytic treatment. In The Introductory Lectures, 
Freud distinguishes acting out and the "intellectual resistance" exhibited by 
obsessional neurotics (1966: 358), on the basis that the transferential-neurotic 
"knows how to put up resistances, without going outside the framework of the 
analysis" (359). By contrast, the obsessional-neurotic "fights by means of 
arguments and exploits all the difficulties and improbabilities which normal 
but uninstructed thinking finds in the theory of analysis" (258); "he is quite 
ready to become an adherent of psycho-analysis - on the condition that it 
spares him personally" (358). By situating their discourse within and in 
relation to the psychoanalytic dialogue, the transferential-neurotic enjoys no 
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such distance from their experience – as a result, the descriptive and 
behavioural arc of transference-neuroses is more extreme: 
From the descriptive point of view, the range of actions 
ordinarily classified as acting out is very wide. At one pole are 
violent, aggressive and criminal acts - murder, suicide, sexual 
assault, etc - where the subject is deemed to proceed from an 
idea or tendency to the corresponding act [...] at the other 
extreme we find much more subdued forms - although the 
impulsive aspect must still be evident: the act is ill-motivated 
in the subject's own eyes, constituting a radical departure from 
his usual behaviour even if he rationalises it after the fact. 
(Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 4). 
As Freud writes, "We must be prepared to find, therefore, that the patient 
yields to the compulsion to repeat, which now replaces the compulsion to 
remember, not only in his personal attitude to his doctor but also in every 
activity and relationship which may occupy his life at the time"(1914: 149). By 
acting out, the analysand "repeats instead of remembering, and repeats under 
the condition of resistance" (149). Nevertheless, it is within this complex 
sphere of repetition, in which the verbal and actual behaviours of the 
analysand are fraught with transferential-neurotic significance, that the self-
reflexivity of the classical Freudian dialogue arguably becomes clear. Under 
the conditions of transference, the analysand is given to overt repetitions of 
their empirical past, via their hypothetical relationships with the analyst. 
However dissociative and dysphoric those relationships may appear to be, 
they remain part of the “terrain” of psychoanalysis, and inform "the 
establishment, modalities, interpretation and resolution of the transference”, 
which is the verbal and material “cure” promised by Freud’s classical method 
(Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 454). 
38 
 
 Chapters 1 and 2 establish two interconnected models for reading 
Wallace. The first model is inductively derived from major Wallace 
scholarship, and highlights the self-reflexive nature of Wallace's relationship 
to the reader - it is from this model that the critical terms 'identification', 
'critique', 'narration' and 'negation' are derived in relation to Wallace's texts. 
The second model augments the first, introducing psychoanalytic correlates 
for the critical terms used in Wallace scholarship - by problematising these 
terminologies as a form of transferential-neurotic discourse, an acting-out, the 
thesis investigates the metafictional and metapsychological dimensions of 
Wallace's fiction, whilst responding to major readings of that fiction in 
contemporary scholarship. In the chapters that follow, this narrative of the 
transference-neurosis and its resolution – which is in effect a self-reflexive 
narrative of the psychoanalytic dialogue as such – will be explored in relation 
to key themes in Wallace’s work and reception. These themes correlate closely 
with the reader-response models suggested above – identification, critique, 
narration and negation – whilst infusing each of these terms with a more 
concrete psychoanalytic significance. This study uses 'performance' as a 
cognate for acting out, to help indicate the theatrical, dramaturgical and 
metafictional margins of my enquiry into Wallace's short fictions. The key 
focus of this study, however, is to establish the psychoanalytically-informed 
nature of these fictions, and the various means by which Wallace translates 
transference-neurosis into literary performance. When I say that Wallace's 
texts 'perform their reader', I mean four things - they solicit that reader's 
identification in a particular empathetic or moralistic framework; they 
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provide obsessional corrections and re-interpretations of those frameworks; 
they posit new mediations of those frameworks in relation to the reader; and, 
finally, they enclose all of the above dynamics in the language of transference-
neurosis, a language which is predicated on the subject's self-conscious 
relationship to analysis and interpretation. 
 In classical psychoanalysis, identification refers to a "psychological 
process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, property or attribute of the 
other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model that the other 
provides" (Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 204). Identification is related to a variety 
of psychological concepts including "imitation, Einfuhlung (empathy), 
sympathy, mental contagion, projection, etc" (205), but is distinguished by its 
structural significance for psychoanalytic theory as a whole.  
"It has been suggested for the sake of clarity that a distinction 
be drawn within this field, according to the direction in which 
the identification operates, between an identification that is 
heteropathic (Schleler) and centripetal (Wallon), where the 
subject identifies his own self with the other, and an idiopathic 
and centrifugal variety, where the subject identifies the other 
with himself. Finally, in cases where both these tendencies are 
present at once, we are said to be dealing with a more complex 
form of communication, one which is sometimes invoked to 
account for the constitution of a 'we'." (Laplanche & Pontalis 
1973: 206) 
As a theoretical precursor to Freud's theory of the Oedipus complex, and his 
general theorisation of the psychical apparatus and its development, 
identification is viewed as "the operation itself whereby the human being is 
constituted" (205). Under the conditions of transference, the analysand's 
prototypical identifications with others (parents, siblings, authority figures et 
al) are expressed in the form of a present-day relationship with the analyst. 
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Through this repetition, the subject assimilates aspects of the other's 
personality (real or imagined) into pre-existing and prototypical frameworks 
of identification. Chapter 3 considers the relationship between empathetic 
and erotic forms of reading in relation to Wallace, grouped under the category 
of readers who identify. The chapter considers how empathetic identification, 
a theme defined throughout Wallace's work and reception, lends itself to a 
form of psychoanalytic reading which Peter Brooks calls "textual erotics" 
(1986: 8). Following this model, to read Wallace empathetically is to engage 
with eroticised ideas about the author-reader relationship, and to view the 
text as a site of interplay between and identification with these ideas. 
 Meanwhile, psychoanalytic critique is premised on the recovery of 
unconscious materials - wishes, desires, memories and so forth - from these 
materials' distorted expression within the analytic situation. The prototypical 
form of such critique is Freudian dream-work - "that of examining and tracing 
the relations between the latent dream-thoughts and the manifest dream-
content, and the process by which the latter has grown out of the former" 
(Freud 1901: 169). In this sense, psychoanalytic critique is a form of exposure, 
a translation of idiomatic expression into new and constructive discourse. 
Under the conditions of transference, the analyst's work consists "in replacing 
[the analysand's] ordinary neurosis by a 'transference-neurosis', of which he 
can be cured by the therapeutic work" (Freud 1914: 153). This emphasis on 
recovery and reconstruction, and the distinction between 'latent' and 
'manifest' contents reinforced thereby, places classical psychoanalysis 
alongside many of the emancipatory social discourses of the 20th century - 
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Paul Ricoeur writes that "the distinguishing characteristic of Marx, Freud, and 
Nietzsche is the general hypothesis concerning both the process of false 
consciousness and its deciphering" (1978: 34). Similarly, Freud writes: 
"The delusions of patients appear to me to be the equivalents 
of the constructions which we build up in analytic treatment - 
attempts at explanations and cure […] Just as our construction 
is only effective because it recovers a fragment of lost 
experience, so the delusion owes its convincing power to the 
element of historic truth which it inserts in the place of the 
rejected reality" (Freud 1938: 386) 
Chapter 4 considers the relationship between critical and diagnostic forms of 
reading in relation to Wallace, grouped under the category of readers who 
critique. The chapter considers how theoretically-informed critiques of 
Wallace, such as psychoanalytic criticism, must contend with the overt 
critiques of "Theory" dramatised throughout Wallace's works. To read 
Wallace critically, in this sense, is to diagnose particular aspects of Wallace's 
texts from a pre-defined theoretical position, whilst accounting for the 
anticipation of such a position within those texts. 
 For literary theorists such as Peter Brooks, psychoanalysis is "a 
primarily narrative art, concerned with the recovery of the past through the 
dynamics of memory and desire" (1992: xiv). In Brooks' narratological model, 
Freudian concepts such as identification and critique are used to understand 
the dynamic structure of texts, specifically in relation to the interpretive 
faculties of the reader. Through this model, Brooks explores "that which 
moves us forward as readers of the narrative text" (35), presenting a form of 
psychoanalytic reading which "promises, and requires, that in addition to such 
usual narratological preoccupations as function, sequence, and paradigm, we 
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engage the dynamic of memory and the history of desire as they work to shape 
the recovery of meaning within time" (36). For Brooks, the psychoanalytic 
modelling of transference offers a dynamic model for understanding the 
author-reader relationship: 
When, as analysand or text, you call for interpretation from the 
analyst/reader, you put yourself into the transference. Through 
the rethinkings, reorderings, reinterpretations of the reading 
process, the analyst/reader 'intervenes' in the text, and these 
interventions must also be subject to his suspicious attention. 
A transferential model thus allows us to take as the object of 
analysis, not author or reader, but reading, including of course 
the transferential-interpretive operations that belong to 
reading (Brooks 1986: 14) 
Brooks’ model is discussed further in Chapter 2, but can be defined here as a 
counter-transferential reader-response theory, which models the reading 
process in terms of transference-related themes and concepts. Accordingly, 
Brooks’ model also applies Freud's theorisation of the analytic situation to the 
paradigm-building activities of the literary critic. "If narrative indeed has to 
do with the recovery of the past," he writes, "and more generally with the 
attempted rescue of meaning from passing time, the psychoanalytic model of 
remembering is invaluable since it reaches out to include repeating, working-
through and reconstruction" (1992: 321).  
By incorporating these textual and critical dynamics, Brooks' model, 
and its self-reflexive extensions in Wallace's works, this study suggest new 
ways of engaging with the 'author-reader relationship' in contemporary 
criticism. Chapter 5 considers the relationship between author-centred and 
symptomatic reading in relation to Wallace, grouped under the category of 
readers who narrate. The chapter considers the extent to which Wallace 
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defines the 'author' in psychoanalytic terms, and the way in which this 
definition mediates certain tensions between identification- and critique-
oriented forms of reading. Following this model, authorial intention is 
partially derived through a mediation of the text's erotic and diagnostic 
dimensions - positively, through the text's identification of particular reader-
author relationships, and negatively, through the text's critique or subversion 
of those relationships. Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis connect Wallace's 
discourse on the author-reader relationship to the films of David Lynch. 
Lacanian critic Todd McGowan describes Lynch's cinematic approach as one 
which "breaks down the distance between spectator and screen" (2007: 2),  
self-reflexively exposing the relationships between fantasy and desire which 
inform the spectator's cinematic experience. In Wallace's essay on Lynch, 
these relationships are explored through a discourse on authorial 
"Expressionism" , which arguably elides the role of the implied spectator in 
relation to  Lynch's films. However, the return to Lynchian reading-tropes in 
Wallace's Oblivion suggests a more sophisticated treatment of the author-
reader relationship, and  open new avenues for investigating the 
psychoanalytic themes addressed by both artists.  
One of the difficulties in reading Wallace's works is distinguishing the 
voice of the 'author' from the myriad narratorial and authorial personae 
presented within the text (Staes 2014). Similarly, it can often be difficult to 
distinguish the perspective of Wallace scholars from the implied 'readers' 
presented in their writings. The Wallace-Lynch intertext provides a new 
perspective for discussing this ambiguity, particularly in relation to the 
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psychoanalytic reader-response theories explored in this thesis. Wallace's 
texts reprise the themes of ghostly and literary 'possession' as part of their 
broader investigative discourse on the author-reader relationship (Staes 2014; 
Hering 2016). The thesis links this thematic preoccupation in Wallace to the 
dialogic workings of the psychoanalytic transference, following Felman's 
description of the transference as "a love-relation that both organises and 
disguises, deciphers and enciphers [narratives], turning them into their own 
substitute and their own repetition" (2012: 178). This dynamic relationship 
between the themes of love and possession is discussed in Wallace's essays on 
David Lynch and autobiographical narrative, which are investigated in 
Chapter 5. Wallace's intriguing reading of David Lynch's work, and the 
concurrence of this reading with a psychoanalytically-informed reader 
response model, enable new inter- and intra-textual readings of Wallace's own 
works, particularly the short stories collected in Oblivion (2004). Through the 
full extension of the transferential-neurotic model, the thesis provides a close 
engagement with these late-period fictions, presenting them as a culmination 
of the author's self-conscious experiments with psychoanalytic reader-
positioning.  
The thesis responds to the Wallace-ian theme of negation - particularly 
ironic or dialectical negation of particular reading schemes - by locating this 
negation in Wallace's own reprisal of Freudian reading-tropes (coupled with 
decidedly Lynchian themes and motifs). Chapter 6 considers the value of 
transferential-neurotic discourse in relation to Wallace, following from the 
author's engagement with psychoanalytic interpretation in his late-period 
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fiction, to establish the category of readers who negate. Laplanche and Pontalis 
define negation as a "procedure whereby the subject, while formulating one 
of his wishes, thoughts or feelings which has been repressed hitherto, 
contrives, by disowning it, to continue to defend himself against it" (1973: 
260).  
"In German, 'Verneinung' denotes negation in the logical and 
grammatical sense […] but it also means denial in the 
psychological sense of rejection of a statement which I have 
made or which has been imputed to me e.g. 'No, I did not say 
that, I did not think that'. In this second sense, 'verneinen' 
comes close to 'verleugnen' (or 'leugnen'), to disown, disavow, 
refute." (Laplanche & Pontalis 1973: 261) 
Negation is a characteristic tool of the obsessional neurotic - in the 
Introductory Lectures, Freud paints an entertaining picture of the neurotic 
who says "Yes, that's all very nice and interesting, and I'll be very glad to go on 
with it further if it were true. But I don't in the least believe that it is true; and, 
so long as I don't believe it, it makes no difference to my illness" (1917: 358-
359).  Negation holds an "indicative value" for psychoanalytic thought, 
"signalling as it does the moment when an unconscious wish begins to re-
emerge, whether during the treatment or outside it" (Laplanche & Pontalis 
1973: 262). Freud performs a similar negation in 'Remembering, Repeating and 
Working-Through', describing a transferential-neurotic who says (whilst 
acting out) "See what happens when I give way to such things. Was I not right 
to consign them to repression?" (1914: 151-152).  
From this reading-position, earlier heuristic concepts such as empathy, 
suspicion and authorial intentionality are shown to be determined by the 
theme of transference-neurosis - under this model, Wallace's self-reflexive 
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appeals to the 'reader' are viewed primarily as forms of acting-out, performed 
through an overt juxtaposition of metapsychological and metafictional 
reading-tropes. This position allows for a retrospective grounding of the 
positions preceding it, insofar as each of Wallace's engagements with 
psychoanalytic reading involve a self-reflexive problematisation of 
transference-neurosis in literary terms. From this vantage-point, we are able 
to prosecute the claim Wallace's counter-transferential animus towards 
psychoanalysis is itself a symptomatic aspect of his texts, which represents an 
estranging form of resistance to interpretation. These symptoms can be 
interpreted through a psychoanalytic reader-response model, provided that 
this model also accounts for the self-reflexive dimensions of Wallace's writing.  
The thesis model distinguishes between two forms  of psychoanalytic 
self-consciousness - obsessional-neurotic utterance and transference-neurotic 
performance. The initiation of the psychoanalytic treatment, according to 
Freud, "brings about a change in the patient's conscious attitude towards his 
illness" (1914: 151). This change in consciousness takes different forms in the 
Freudian  clinic. For example, the obsessional neurotic (See G24) is liable to 
prolong their self-conscious relationship to treatment indefinitely, through 
self-reflexive verbal strategies: "he is anxious to get us to instruct him, teach 
him, contradict him, introduce him to the literature [...] He will often allow 
the analysis to proceed on its way uninhibited, so that it is able to shed an 
ever-increasing light upon the riddle of his illness" (1917: 358). Transference-
neurosis, however, is a form of self-consciousness developed within the 
clinical dialogue, "an intermediate region between illness and real life", an 
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"artificial illness" which makes visible the analysand's unconscious resistances 
to treatment (1914: 152). The obsessional mode is monologic; the transferential 
mode, meanwhile, is grounded in a dynamic and dialogic series of 
relationships. 
The thesis distinguishes between two "act[s]" of communication 
relative to Wallace - a self-reflexive verbal act (which is often figured as 
dialogue or communication 'between human beings' in Wallace's work and 
reception) and a hyperbolic written act, through which Wallace's texts 
overdetermine particular ideas about reading and interpretation. This 
distinction necessitates the alternating expression of readers and 'readers' in 
relation to the Wallace text - while both terms nominally refer to the same 
(real or imagined) agent, the latter indirectly highlights the complex textual 
and interpretive work that must take place before such an agent is identified. 
The thesis highlights texts in which the role of the 'reader' is problematised by 
Wallace, typically through the author’s self-reflexive appropriation of 
particular (psychoanalytic) interpretive schemes. By distinguishing between 
four such schemes at the outset, the thesis is able to demonstrate how these 
texts establish literal, imaginative, abstract and performative ideas about 
psychoanalytic reading, whilst  interpositioning these ideas to produce 
specific literary effects. By examining these effects, and the conceptual 
connections which inform them, the thesis provides a broader exegesis on the 
relationship between Wallace's texts and psychoanalytic literary theory. 
Under this reading, Wallace's attempts to surpass the self-reflexive limits of 
postmodern writing are shown to involve a complex return to Freudian 
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theories of dialogue and interpretation, within which the 'author-reader 
relationship' is theorised as a form of transferential-neurotic performance - an 
acting-out of particular literary anxieties within the text. 
Wallace's texts are concerned with forms of otherness and alterity, 
particularly when it comes to the relationship between readers, authors and 
texts (Hayes-Brady 2013). As such, Wallace is prone to using gendered and 
eroticised language when referring to his own 'reader'. While this is not an 
explicit focus of the thesis, the transferential-neurotic and obsessional 
discourses canvassed by this model may raise productive questions for 
feminist scholars within the field. I would moreover agree that Wallace’s 
estranging rhetoric of the ‘reader’ is, or at least appears to be, obliquely 
gendered (Hayes-Brady 2013), and potentially reveals a great deal more about 
Wallace’s framing of themes like love, male anxiety, narrative intentionality 
and post-critical Theory. Whilst there are certainly male ‘readers’ in Wallace’s 
fiction, it is nevertheless a fact that Wallace’s extemporised ‘readers’ are 
female, at least in his own statements on the matter. This becomes a strange 
fact when we consider the adjacency of male anxiety and metafictional 
performance in Wallace, for example in a text like ‘Octet’ (1999), which 
exclusively imagines the ‘fiction writer’s reader’ as female, or the story cycle 
‘Brief Interviews with Hideous Men’ (1999), which disclose and repurpose the 
identity of an anonymous, female ‘interviewer’ (See Chapter 4). I think that 
the Freudian and post-Freudian dimensions of Wallace work reveal this 
gendered ambivalence quite Directly. Nevertheless, my study indirectly 
highlights the extent to which gendered or ambivalent rhetoric plays out in 
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Wallace, particularly in light of more erotically or paradoxically-inclined 
readings of the author and his works. Having canvassed an essential 
strangeness in David Foster Wallace’s rhetoric of the ‘reader’, it is important 
that we consider that rhetoric’s estranging effects through the vast and 
heterogeneous field of Wallace scholarship, so that we might effectively 
address our question: Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace? Subsequent 
parallels are drawn in this study between Wallace and Lynch in this regard 
(See Chapter 5),   
The thesis models four types of psychoanalytic reading in Wallace's 
fictions, and demonstrates the complex relationships between these 'readers' 
across different stages of the author's literary career. By presenting these 
reading-positions in a typological manner, the thesis demonstrates the 
distinct paradigmatic approaches which inform Wallace's work, and suggests 
new theoretical connections between these interpretive discourses and the 
work of prominent Wallace scholars. In so doing, the thesis effectively 
addresses the limits of a Freudian reading of Wallace, tracing the necessity of 
such limits within Wallace’s own repetitions and working-through of Freud, 
as indicated by his repetitions, re-imaginations and re-abstractions of the 
‘reader. For this reason, a thoroughly reasoned post-Freudian reading of 
Wallace would incorporate a suspicious awareness of gendered speech and 
dynamics in Wallace’s texts, particularly as those texts veer towards, repeat, 
re-imagine and re-abstract certain increasingly suspect reader-rhetorics. This 
may be the transference-neurosis lurking at the heart of David Foster 
Wallace’s “framed tales”, which are at once other-directed and other-
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exposing, other-repeating phenomena – there’s a great deal of conflict at stake 
in this author-reader relationship,, and when we turn our attention to 
contemporary readings of Wallace, we are bound to find this conflict 
translated onto broader areas of concern). Nevertheless, and however fraught 
the process, this ambivalence matters in Wallace’s fiction – it forms a partial 
basis for the more ‘paradoxical’ elements of Wallace’s rhetorics on reading, 
particularly in texts like the McCaffery and Miller interviews, and even in texts 
like ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (See Chapter 1).  
In this study, I find that the repetition of ‘readers’ in Wallace’s fiction 
yields a peculiar kind of fourth-person address, which – like the study itself, 
and the terminologies it investigates – might be effectively described as a New 
Hyperbole. The term 'New Hyperbole' is a sonorous pun on Adam Kelly's term 
'New Sincerity' (2010), which is simply intended to highlight the parallels 
between an elaborative and hyperbolic form of literary exegesis (such as mine) 
and the kinds of sincere and reader-focused forms found in contemporary 
Wallace Studies. The connecting point for these approaches is Wallace's own 
work, of course - to the extent that these works achieve sincerity through 
hyperbolic themes and techniques, they remain objects of intense interest and 
scrutiny for contemporary scholars, and a worthwhile launching-point for any 
sustained consideration of critical rhetoric in the 21st century. 
Earlier readings of Wallace in relation to psychoanalysis stress the 
author's paradigmatic focus on self-reflection, personal identity and 
subjective experience. However, Shoshana Felman distinguishes between two 
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forms of the term "Freudian Reading",  which "can refer to refer either to 
Freudian statements or to Freudian utterance: a reading can be called 
'Freudian' with respect to what it reads (the meaning or thematic content it 
derives from a text) or with respect to how it reads (its interpretive 
procedures, the techniques or methods of analysis it uses)" (2012: 164, original 
emphasis). This distinction is pertinent to both Wallace's work - which is  full 
of overtly Freudian contents and meanings - and to this thesis - which is 
moreover concerned with Wallace's response to psychoanalytic procedures 
and methods. Wallace scholars have noted the author's engagement with 
psychoanalytic themes and concepts (Boswell 2003; Holland 2006; Tracey, 
2010). These readings tend to utilise psychoanalytic theory in an explanatory 
fashion - identifying Freudo-Lacanian metaphors within Wallace's texts, 
engaging with the author's normative critiques of primary narcissism, 
traumatic recollection, and so forth. However, the relationship between 
Wallace's texts and psychoanalytic literary theory is comparatively 
underdeveloped in these readings - while there are many Wallace-ian 
critiques of Freud to be found in the existing literature, there has yet to be a 
sustained critique of Wallace's texts from the perspective of Freudian literary 
theory.   
“the dramatist himself, coming onstage” 
The paradigmatic language used by critics - from author-specific 
terminologies to overt reader-response rhetorics - necessarily frames the way 
in which we think and speak about the 'meaning' of a given text. In Wallace's 
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texts, this dynamic is figured self-reflexively, to the extent that these texts 
incorporate overt critiques of their own modernist and postmodernist 
"inheritance" (Boswell 2003: 1), effectively questioning the situation of authors 
and readers within the cultural, theoretical and linguistic paradigms of 
contemporary postmodernity. Responding to this critique, Wallace scholars 
are engaged in the development of new paradigmatic approaches, which 
appear to be primarily concerned with what Adam Kelly calls the "writer-
reader relationship" (2010: 146). However, these approaches remain arguably 
dependent on the terminologies established in Wallace's own writings, a claim 
which this thesis demonstrates through close consideration of key Wallace-
ian terms such as 'empathy', 'suspicion', 'narration' and 'negation'.  Moreover, 
the use of response-oriented rhetoric - the recourse to claims about 'readers' 
in relation to Wallace - is shown to be a worthwhile topic in its own right, to 
the extent that this rhetoric frames the paradigmatic dimensions of Wallace's 
work for contemporary audiences. 
Wallace's short fiction collections, released at crucial stages in the 
author's literary career, provide clear working insight into the challenges of 
writing the reader, and provide innumerable examples of the author's 
experiments with narrative, tone-of-voice, authorial presence and related 
interpretive tropes (C.f. Boswell 2003, Holland 2013, Staes 2014). By examining 
these works through the theme of transference-neurosis, and establishing the 
necessary conditions for a psychoanalytically-informed reader response 
theory of Wallace, the thesis lays the groundwork for further engagement with 
Wallace's three novels and related criticism. This approach differs from the 
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vast majority of extant scholarship on Wallace, insofar as critics have started 
from the novels - and, as Adam Kelly has noted, from influential statements 
in 'E Unibus Pluram' and the McCaffery Interview (Kelly 2010) - to define the 
character of Wallace's short fiction. By contrast, the thesis seeks to highlight 
marginalised or hitherto under-represented ideas about reading in a body of 
work that, compared with the critical acclaim of a novel like Infinite Jest, has 
not yet received the attention it deserves. The reader-oriented nature of this 
thesis, and its concomitant focus on critical paradigms in relation to Wallace, 
allows for a more direct engagement with existing scholarship on the author 
and his works. While the thesis incorporates terminologies from a broad range 
of sources within Wallace Studies, it also stresses those sources' reliance on 
alternate reader-response discourses; these discourses function in a similar 
way to their literary counterparts in Wallace, insofar as they work to identify, 
critique, narrate and negate certain aspects of the reader's experience. To 
demonstrate this, the thesis engages in close readings of influential works in 
the field, juxtaposed with close readings of the transference-neurosis in 
Wallace's short fictions. 
The thesis omits discussion of Wallace's major novels - debut The 
Broom of the System, acclaimed masterwork Infinite Jest and posthumously-
compiled-and-released The Pale King - to provide scope for considering the 
marginal and arguably under-theorised dimensions of Wallace's short 
fictions, particularly these fictions' relationship to the author-reader models 
discussed in contemporary criticism. Greg Carlisle's typological guide to the 
themes, motifs and techniques used in Infinite Jest is an aspirational model 
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for this kind of criticism. The thesis' focus on the limits of the author-reader 
relationship, and the ways in which these limits are described in Wallace's 
heterogeneous short works, form the basis for an alternative perspective on 
the author and his work, which may yet be applied to a more comprehensive 
consideration of the novels in future research. However, if the thesis of 
transferential-neurotic reading can be demonstrated in Wallace's short 
fictions, then it is possible that a great deal of assumptions within novel-based 
Wallace criticism may need to be rethought. By reformulating these 
assumptions through psychoanalytic literary theory, the thesis raises four 
questions that novel-based criticism ought to continue answering. What does 
it mean to identify with a David Foster Wallace text? What do theoretically-
based critiques of Wallace's texts share in common with this identificatory 
mode? How do tensions between explicit and implied modes of readership 
become translated in scholarship on the novels? And, finally, how do the 
novels approach the theme of performance, and how might this theme relate 
to the psychoanalytic reader-response models considered in this thesis? 
By asking these questions, this study provides a substantive account of 
what Wallace meant when he spoke of fiction as “an act of communication 
between one human being and another” (1997). This kind of rhetoric is 
pursued throughout Wallace’s body of work, from watershed novels such as 
Infinite Jest (1996) to complex accounts of postmodernity and audience in 
essays such as ‘E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction’ (1997) and 
‘Joseph Frank’s Dostoevsky’ (2005), and of course in the author’s numerous 
interviews on the broad subject of ‘fiction-writing’ (C.f. Burn, 2012). Again, 
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Wallace’s various references to the ‘reader’ are rhetorical in the simple sense 
that they are persuasive – they compel some form of interpretive action, even 
if that action is simply a change in perspective on the part of their intended 
recipient. But given the author’s polymathic involvement with the fields of 
literary criticism, cultural theory and the philosophy of language, we often 
find Wallace’s ‘reader’ referred to in more abstract terms, as in the following 
well-known excerpt from the author’s interview with Larry McCaffery: 
We still like to think of a story ‘changing’ the reader’s 
emotions, cerebrations, maybe even her life. We’re not keen on 
the idea of the story sharing its valence with the reader. But the 
reader’s own life ‘outside’ the story changes the story. You 
could argue that it affects only ‘her reaction to the story’ or ‘her 
take on the story’. But these things are the story. This is the 
way Barthian and Derridean poststructuralism’s helped me 
most as a fiction writer: once I’m done with the thing, I’m 
basically dead, and probably the text’s dead; it becomes simply 
language and language lives not just in but through the reader. 
(Wallace, in McCaffery 2012: 40, original emphasis) 
In case the emphasis isn’t clear, Wallace continues: “The reader becomes God, 
for all textual purposes” (40). In other words, ‘the reader’ is a figure of decisive, 
“God”-like textual significance for Wallace, a figure whose reactions and 
interpretations can often be assumed to define the ultimate meaning of the 
text in question. On this basis at least, we might think that the Wallace ‘reader’ 
simply cannot be defined within the text itself – that they are necessarily 
anterior to the text, their reaction unpredictable, their interpretation their 
own; hence Adam Kelly’s powerful description of Wallace’s works as indicative 
of a ‘New Sincerity’ in fiction, “structured and informed” by their “dialogic 
appeal to the reader’s attestation and judgment” (2010: 145).  
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In this sense, the implied identity of Wallace’s reader is both literal and 
shockingly effective: the ‘reader’ of Wallace is us, the readers holding his 
books and responding to their various claims upon our attention and 
investment. In contemporary ‘Wallace Studies’, this idea is most commonly 
understood in the form of a dynamic “conversation” between the reader and 
the text, what Marshall Boswell calls an “intimate zone of communication, of 
subjective interaction” (2003, p17). In other words, Wallace’s rhetoric of the 
reader has had a major impact on the way his texts are read and spoken of, an 
impact which has enabled powerful insights into ideas such as literary 
empathy, suspicious hermeneutics, narrative self-reference and, at the 
extreme, metafictional self-reflexivity (See Chapter 1). Though Wallace's texts 
canvass an enormous array of topics and themes, they are arguably framed by 
and oriented towards the 'subject' of the reader. Reading and interpretation 
are explicit themes in Wallace's texts, and inform those texts' self-reflexive 
investigations of postmodern life and culture. Moreover, the subjective 
experience of the reader - specifically, their experience of reading the Wallace 
text - is addressed time and time again in the author's writings, and forms a 
major part of his rhetoric on the author-reader relationship more broadly. 
By reviewing and investigating this impact, the present study sheds 
new light on the complex rhetoric of criticism at stake in Wallace’s works, and 
in our so-called “conversations” with the author and his complex literary 
legacy. But what do we talk about when we talk about the ‘reader’ of a literary 
text, or of ‘meta-fictional’ texts such as Wallace’s? In this study, that question 
is in fact bound up with multiple, differing ideas about what we might call the 
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literary encounter as such – for example, the idea of fiction as an “act of 
communication” between “human being[s]”, also described by Wallace as a 
“deep, significant conversation with another consciousness” (Miller, 2007). It 
seems here that Wallace is referring to the reader in a literalistic sense, as 
literally “another consciousness” for the text to engage itself with. This kind 
of rhetoric comports with our common-sense, generalist sense of ‘reading’ as 
communication with the text; to this end, we are most likely to find literal 
‘readers’ referred to in reviews, cultural criticism (particularly reader-response 
theory) or even political journalism. But while this reference to a reader 
beyond the text is one thing, we might also consider the kinds of readers 
imagined within the text itself, for example in Wallace’s various fictional 
narratives of reading, dialogue and communication. In this second-order or 
imaginative sense, the experience of reading is effectively ‘written-into’ the 
various acts of reading dramatised or recounted within a given text; consider 
also the various letter-writers and correspondents at stake in a text like Henry 
James’ The Turn of the Screw (C.f Felman, 2012), or the culprits, schemers and 
investigators in virtually any kind of detective-fiction. David Hering has 
identified "a recurrent oscillation between narrative models of monologism 
and dialogism" in Wallace's fictions (2016: 7), which he describes as "a 
continual modification and clarification of the mode of authorial presence, an 
ongoing attempt to establish an author persona that interacts dialogically with 
the text" (8). In my psychoanalytic reading of the dialogic model, Wallace's 
texts can be said to function as analysand, susceptible to the dialogic and 
reconstructive intervention of the reader as analyst. In the monologic model, 
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however, the analyst/analysand relationship is reversed - on this reading, 
Wallace's texts become the analyst, monologising and indeed pathologising 
the anticipated response of the 'reader' as analysand. This tension represents 
two sides of the transferential reading model advanced by Peter Brooks, which 
"allows us to take as the object of analysis, not author or reader, but reading, 
including of course the transferential-interpretive operations that belong to 
reading" (1986: 14). 
Wallace’s texts certainly play on this kind of “logicking work” (Holland, 
2013), creating unique distinctions between the empirical reader ‘of’ the text 
and the hypothetical reader ‘in’ the text – or indeed collapsing those very 
distinctions, as in the seminal short fiction ‘Octet’ (1999). In any account 
highlighting this distinction, we see a third possible extension to the term 
‘reader’, which this study describes as an abstracted ‘reader’. This kind of 
‘reader’ is helpfully illuminated in texts such as ‘Greatly Exaggerated’, 
particularly when Wallace considers the abstract nature of ‘reading’ in the 
wake of postmodernity. Speaking again to the influence of thinkers like 
Foucault and Barthes, Wallace writes: 
writing is a better animal than speech because it is iterable; it 
is iterable because it is abstract; and it is abstract because it is 
a function not of presence but of absence: the reader’s absent 
when the writer’s writing and the writer’s absent when the 
reader’s reading. (140) 
We also see this kind of abstraction at stake in Wallace scholarship, for 
example when Boswell refers to Wallace’s “desire to build a text that treats its 
reader like a lover” (2003), or in Kelly’s account of a “spiraling search for the 
truth of intentions” in Wallace’s fiction (2010: 139) – in the uncertain spaces 
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created between Wallace’s literal and imagined ‘reader(s)’, we discover clear 
bases for speaking of an implied reader, similar to Toon Staes’ idea of an 
‘implied author’ (2014). Our use of the term ‘reader’ thus refers in at least three 
ways – literally (as in the case of empirical readers), imaginatively (as in the 
case of culturally-hypothesised ‘readers’) and abstractly (as in the case of 
literary analysis and critique). As we can see, each usage of the term ‘reader’ 
represents a distinct variation on the one preceding it – a self-conscious turn, 
a complexification, an expanded sense of reference – suggesting several 
distinct ‘layers’ to the act we call reading.  
For Wallace, this sort of reader-positioning could be thought of as an 
encounter with metafiction itself, or, as he once put it, “trying to expose the 
illusions of metafiction the same way metafiction had tried to expose the 
illusions of the pseudo-unmediated realist fiction that came before it” 
(McCaffery 2012: 40). Though he describes this approach as a “permanent 
migraine” (40), it is clear that Wallace’s texts remain concerned a certain kind 
of metafictional exposure, the limits of which are explored clearly in texts such 
as ‘Octet’.  “With the now-tired S.O.P. meta-stuff”, writes Wallace,  
it’s more the dramatist himself coming onstage from the wings 
and reminding you that what’s going on is artificial and that 
the artificier is him (the dramatist) and but that he’s at least 
respectful enough of you as reader/audience to be honest 
about the fact that he’s back there pulling the strings [… ] viz. 
not interrogating you or having any sort of interchange or 
really even talking to you but rather just performing in some 
highly self-conscious and manipulative way (Wallace 1999: 135, 
FN2, emphasis original) 
Wallace’s dramaturgical metaphor for metafiction, as an effect of a “the 
dramatist himself” addressing his “reader/audience”, is particularly pertinent 
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for its placement within ‘Octet’, a text which appears to exhaust the various 
literal, imaginative and abstract extensions of the term ‘reader’ at stake in 
Wallace’s work more broadly (See Chapter 3). Moreover, it alerts us to the 
uniquely performative nature of Wallace’s rhetoric on readership, something 
which Kelly has highlighted in terms of the “age of theory”, specifically the 
“interrogation and re-evaluation of basic concepts of selfhood, intention, and 
performativity” (2010: 135). Following Ricoeur, Adam Kelly defines 'suspicious' 
interpretation as an approach which "emphasises what it sees as the 
blindnesses caused by ideological investment, historical ignorance, and 
psychological repression" (138). The latter term, psychological repression, is of 
clear significance to our psychoanalytic model - suspicious psychoanalytic 
reading, in terms of the recovery of latent and/or unconscious materials, is 
considered in detail in Chapters 2 and 4. 
In our final count, then, our use of the term ‘reader’ can refer to at least 
four different levels of literary utterance. The first encounter is literal, quite 
simply an “act of communication”. The second encounter is imaginative, as 
the events of writing and reading are creatively re-imagined within the literary 
text. The third encounter is abstract, referring to various rhetorical and 
imaginative limits, such as the idea that “the reader’s absent when the writer’s 
writing and the writer’s absent when the reader’s reading”. The fourth 
encounter is something else entirely – it is at once an intersection of the 
preceding levels and a self-conscious expansion thereupon. We see this kind 
of rhetoric at stake throughout Wallace’s body of work, particularly as the 
author grapples with his own sense of “audience” in overtly metafictional texts 
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such as ‘Octet’ and Oblivion (See Chapter 6). Boswell characterises Wallace's 
final collection, Oblivion, as an exploration of solipsism - "the multiple ways 
in which his characters are not only alone inside their heads but also 
controlled, sometimes to the point of madness, by the layered, nested, 
entropic workings of their interiors" (2013: 151). Boswell goes on to read this 
strategy as a "pessimistic" rejection of authorial empathy in favour of textual 
"enclosure", "a form of dense description without redemption" (168).  
My reading substitutes the term 'performance' for enclosure, whilst 
detailing the extent to which earlier forms of the author-reader relationship 
in Wallace court the positive themes of madness, possession and nested 
interiority. And by taking a broader view on the subject of the mind in 
Wallace’s works – and recommending a more transferentially-aware reading 
of those works – the thesis explores a range of negative and liberating 
perspectives on the author-relationships theorised above. The main question 
remains as to whether one benefits from a  psychoanalytically-informed 
reading of Wallace. On the topic of reading literature via psychoanalysis, 
Shoshanna Felman writes: 
‘There is often something radically strange in the language of 
others,' writes an American critic. But doesn't writing about 
madness involve, precisely, the necessity of encountering - in 
language - something radically strange? Taken by itself, each 
language is auto-familiar: it has its own concepts, its own 
system of thought which, within it, conditions the unthinkable. 
The way we think and speak arises out of decisions our 
language has already made for us: language discreetly dictates 
to its users - in an invisible manner - self-evident assumptions 
and proscriptions that are inscribed in its grammar (which is, 
by definition, imperceptible from inside the language). In order 
for grammar to appear as such, one must dislodge one's 
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language from its self-presence, from its assumptions and 
proscriptions, by subjecting them to the otherness of a 
different grammar, by putting them in question through the 
medium of a foreign language. (Felman 2012: 18-19) 
By retracing the sorts of ‘readers’ referred to, imagined within and implied by 
Wallace’s fictions, the present study is thus poised to provide a thorough 
analysis of Wallace’s rhetoric of reading. If Wallace’s texts indeed represent 
an “act of communication”, conveyed in a foreign language, and if the reader 
of Wallace is indeed supposed to “act upon” what they have read, it is clear 
that we are dealing with live materials, which presuppose an actual event of 
reading – the recurrence of the term “conversation” in contemporary 
scholarship is an index for this sort of rhetoric (Cunningham, 2016). But close 
attention to this rhetoric reveals a fourth, decidedly Wallace-ian extension to 
the term ‘reader’, which exemplifies the complex rhetorical stakes of his 
literary project as a whole. Wallace’s texts are, by and large, fictions about 
fiction – self-reflexively refer to their own status and identity as ‘texts’, and the 
complex paradigmatic movements between literality, imagination, 
abstraction and performance at stake in this identity.  
 
Structure of the Thesis, Notes on Style 
These stakes inform the title of the present study, ‘Performing the 
‘Fiction Writer’s Reader’: the apostrophic framing of the term ’reader’ in 
relation to an implied or imagined “fiction writer” says something about the 
way we approach Wallace’s texts today, as best evidenced when we consider 
the ways in which those texts approach “us”, the reader. With a nod to the 
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author’s love of pop-cultural paraphrase, my study outlines four kinds of 
‘Close Encounter’ with Wallace’s texts, predicated on the movement between 
the literal, the imaginative, the abstract and the performative within those 
texts. Wallace arguably appropriates Freudian metapsychology to explore 
different forms of author-reader relationship. This dynamic helps to situate 
Wallace's work as a form of postmodern metafiction. Linda Hutcheon defines 
postmodern poetics in terms of "the paradoxes set up when modernist 
aesthetic autonomy and self-reflexivity come up against a counterforce in the 
form of a grounding in the historical, social, and political world" (1998: ix).For 
Hutcheon, the primary genre of postmodernism is historiographic 
metafiction, defined as texts "which are both intensely self-reflexive and yet 
paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and personages" (1988: 5). The 
primary object of such a poetics, for Hutcheon, is "the humanist assumption 
of a unified self and an integrated consciousness", an assumption further 
reflected in liberal humanist notions such as "authorial originality and 
authority" and "the separation of the aesthetic from the political" (xii). While 
this dynamic is typically applied to theories of authorship in Wallace (Staes 
2014), the humanistic assumption of a unified 'reader' of Wallace has yet to be 
fully explored. Indeed, the incorporation of Freudian metapsychology - which 
disputes  the idea of self-identical, humanistic subject - presents new 
challenges for the reader of Wallace, which are explored throughout this 
thesis. 
The study begins with a review of scholarship, highlighting the self-
reflexive significance of the term ‘reader’ in Wallace’s work and reception 
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(Chapter 1). Following the idea of an “act of communication”, this chapter 
outlines four distinct interpretive acts presupposed by Wallace Studies, 
expressible as intentional claims about the author in relation to the 
contemporary reader. In the first encounter, “Wallace identifies (with) the 
reader” – from the author’s discourse on literary “love”, to the erotic 
significance of the “reader/lover” in Boswell (2003), we see the persistence of 
Wallace’s appeal towards fiction as a literal “act of communication” between 
the text and its reader. This claim highlights the unique centrality of 
empathetic identification to Wallace’s literary project as a whole, and to his 
early short fictions in particular (See Chapter 3). In the second encounter, 
“Wallace critiques the reader” – from trenchant diagnoses of the postmodern 
condition in “E Unibus Pluram”, to the kinds of “logicking work” explored by 
Holland (2013) and Clare Hayes-Brady (2013), we can begin to see the value of 
suspicious hermeneutics for Wallace’s project as a whole, particularly when it 
comes to that project’s “unflinching critique of narcissism as an impediment 
to empathy and sincerity” (Holland, p107). This claim highlights the value of 
suspicious critique to Wallace’s literary project, particularly when it comes to 
middle-period texts such as Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (See Chapter 
4). In the third encounter, “Wallace narrates the reader” – in Wallace’s cultural 
essays, journalistic works, reviews and interviews, there is a kind of abstract 
substitution at work, particularly as the author imagines “himself” as reader 
in essays such as ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’ (1997) and ‘How Tracy Austin 
Broke My Heart’ (2005). Through this work of abstraction and implication, 
Wallace’s cultural journalism effectively narrates the abstract event of 
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reading, in a way which highlights the value of critical abstraction for the 
author and his works (See Chapter 5). Oblivion 
In this final sense, Wallace’s works become less of an “act of 
communication” and more of a metafictional acting-out, in which the author 
continually revisits and revises his texts’ relationship to the ‘reader’, 
progressively escalating that relationship with each major short fiction 
collection. By approaching Wallace’s rhetoric of the reader in this way, we are 
thus poised to ask the question: Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace? 
This question is apostrophic as well, placing the ‘reader’ a step removed from 
literality – given the complex entanglement of the term’s meaning for Wallace, 
and the sense of rhetorical urgency purported thereby, I believe it necessary 
to consider the various kinds of “bracketing” and structural paraphrase which 
attend our use of the term, particularly when we ask the question “Who are 
we in relation to Wallace’s texts?” If we interpose a third question “What kind 
of ‘readers’ appear in Wallace’s texts?” – an authorised move, given the 
ubiquity of such accounts in contemporary Wallace Studies – then we are 
positioned to investigate the abstract, literal and imagined sense of the term 
‘reader’ in Wallace’s work more broadly.  
This question is explored in Chapter 2, which provides a post-Freudian 
reading of the term transference-neurosis in relation to Wallace’s rhetoric of 
the ‘reader’. In Freud, the transference is often described as a kind of 
estranging spectacle, premised on the uncanny repetition of past relationships 
and investments. For this study, the key methodological significance of the 
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transference is that it allows for such acting-out to take place within a specific 
discursive context – that of the transference-neurosis, which is premised on 
“a change in the patient’s conscious attitude towards his illness” (151), and the 
subsequent construction and negotiation of a “new transference meaning” (an 
“artificial illness”) through the course of the analytic treatment (153). In my 
reading, the transference-neurosis is a self-reflexive phenomenon, because it 
necessarily implicates the analysand’s conscious (or self-conscious) attitude 
towards their own treatment. Nevertheless, this self-consciousness towards 
treatment is primarily explicable in terms of repetition – it represents an 
escalation, in the form of discourse, of the transferential behaviours being 
acted-out in the therapeutic dialogue. This tension between self-reflexivity 
and resistance, particularly when it comes to question of psychoanalytic 
interpretation, is particularly significant for critics such as Ricoeur, Brooks 
and Felman, who have each responded to the idea of psychoanalytic literary 
criticism by theorising the literary text in transferential or performative terms. 
In the subsequent demonstrative/analytic chapters, the question of 
Wallace’s reader proceeds through key ‘phases’ in the author’s literary project, 
typically marked by a major short story collection. Chapter 5 is distinct in that 
focuses on two marginal Wallace essays, both focused on the autobiographical 
and rhetorical significance of reading. The thesis investigates direct and 
indirect references to psychoanalytic literary theory in Wallace's short 
fictions, and relates these references to the paradigmatic language used by 
Wallace scholars. The thesis suggests a progressive arc in Wallace's literary 
project, in which the author's self-reflexive response to psychoanalysis 
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becomes increasingly visible with the release of each major short fiction 
collection. On this view, problems introduced in Wallace's early works - most 
notably, the idea of an empathetic author-reader relationship - are returned 
to and revised in later works. The idea of a theoretically-determined reader 
response model - in essence a model of 'reading' shaped by adherence to one 
theoretical paradigm or another - can open this thesis to the charge of 
schematism. In defence of this approach, I would point out that a wide 
majority of terminologies used in this thesis are inductively derived from their 
usage in Wallace Studies - terms like ‘empathy’, ‘identification’, ‘suspicion’, 
‘critique’, ‘literalisation’, ‘enclosure’ and ‘performance’ already carry 
significant theoretical weight in discussions about Wallace, and are used here 
to investigate the paradigmatic contours of Wallace's work and reception.  
The thesis' construction of four 'readers' or reading-positions - readers 
who identify, readers who critique, readers who narrate and readers who negate 
- is also performed inductively in the thesis chapters, each of which 
demonstrates a new aspect of Wallace's relationship with psychoanalytic 
reading, and the positioning strategies which make this relationship visible in 
Wallace's texts. These terms are deductive insofar as they demarcate new 
concepts, but they by no means foreclose or exhaust the possibilities for other 
theoretically-determined models of the 'reader'. 
In Chapter 3, I ask: What is the significance of readers who identify in 
Wallace’s early fiction? This chapter revisits the theme of empathetic 
identification in Wallace’s works, highlighting the extent to which texts such 
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as Girl with Curious Hair (1989) reimagine this theme as a kind of complex 
“love” towards the reader. By exploring the erotic significance of this theme in 
Wallace’s early works (C.f. Boswell, 2003), I find that we are better able to 
account for the intentional claim that “Wallace identifies (with) the reader”, 
i.e. that his works enable new forms of empathetic identification of and with 
their contemporary ‘reader’. The thesis responds to the predominant theme 
of empathetic identification in Wallace's works by suggesting a Freudian 
correlate for this theme- namely, the transference. Following Hayes-Brady, I 
thus explore "Wallace's repeated invocation of love as a kind of primary force, 
a catalyst in the transaction of communicative exchange" (2016: 9), viewing 
this "repeated invocation of love" as form of transferential-neurotic discourse 
in the collection Girl with Curious Hair. This reading is contrasted with the 
reader-response models of Marshall Boswell, and the curious idea of the 
Wallace reader as "reader/lover". 
In Chapter 4, I contrast this literalised idea of “love” with the kinds of 
antagonism imagined within Wallace’s middle-period fiction, through the 
positioning of readers who critique. This chapter investigates the complex 
status of suspicion and suspicious hermeneutics in texts such as Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), highlighting the intense ironies at stake 
in the author’s ‘mature’ literary style. In this ambivalence, the theme of literary 
“love” is voiced through the suspect discourses of “hideous men”, who can be 
defined by their self-conscious (and antagonistic) relationship to the 
suspicious reader. By charting this ambivalence, and its impact on 
contemporary Wallace Studies, we may thus investigate the claim that 
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“Wallace critiques the reader”, i.e. that his works provide critical insight into 
the assumptions and expectations of their own ‘postmodern’ audience. Having 
admitted a Freudian hypothesis about Wallace, the thesis questions the utility 
of 'psychoanalytic reading' in relation to the literary text, noting the 
proliferation of psychoanalytic reading-tropes (and their metafictionalised 
equivalents) in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999). The thesis highlights 
the recurrent themes of transference and transference-neurosis in Wallace's 
formulation of the reader-writer relationship, and notes the predominantly 
obsessional nature of these formulations in Wallace's middle-period writings. 
This reading responds to the theme of suspicious critique in Wallace's works 
by considering the relative compatibility of reader-response models in Mary 
Holland, Clare Hayes-Brady and Adam Kelly. 
Through our psychoanalytic reader-response model, we are moreover 
situated to parse the various abstract and metafictional readers presupposed 
by Wallace’s texts, and to consider the various movements between these 
levels in Wallace’s own rhetorics on reading and interpretation. To wit, 
Chapters 5 and 6 each explore a meta-rhetorical ‘solutions’ to Wallace’s 
ambivalence, provided by Wallace’s essays on authorship and autobiography 
on the one hand, and his late-period fictions such as Oblivion (2004) on the 
other.  
In Chapter 5, I ask: What is the significance of readers who narrate in 
Wallace’s essayistic works? This chapter explores the self-conscious 
presentation of the persona “David Foster Wallace” in the essays ‘David Lynch 
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Keeps his Head’ (1999) and ‘How Tracy Austin Broke My Heart’ (2005). These 
marginal works highlight the significance of the “narrative contract” (Staes, 
2014), and the complex autobiographical and intentional stakes of this 
contract for Wallace and his works. In this sense, Wallace’s performance of 
“himself”, as author or ‘reader who narrates’, represents one solution to the 
kinds of textual and rhetorical ambivalence at stake in his discourse of the 
‘reader’. By reviewing the scope and limits of this solution, we may thus 
contend with the claim that “Wallace narrates the reader”, i.e., that his works 
negotiate their own legitimating conditions by engaging with the ideas of 
reading and narrative as such. Having raised the significance of psychoanalytic 
reading within Wallace's fiction, the thesis considers the author's own 
attempts to articulate the terms of a Freudian reading as such, and finds 
further confirmation for a psychoanalytically-informed reader response 
model in the essays considered. As with more prominent essayistic examples, 
these works reflect on the writer-reader-text relationship in great depth; more 
strikingly, they develop transferential-neurotic claims about this relationship, 
while reflecting on the cinematic and autobiographical dimensions of these 
claims at great length. By exposing these claims, the thesis responds to the 
predominance of authorship (and authorial intentionality) as organising 
themes for Wallace criticism, exploring the novel idea of an author-response 
model in the works of Toon Staes and Mike Miley. 
Conversely, Chapter 6 asks: What is the significance of readers who 
negate in Wallace’s late-period fiction? This chapter explores the 
sophisticated re-imagining of metafiction and the metafictional dialogue in 
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the collection Oblivion (2004), a text which effectively repeats, replays and 
works-through the diverse rhetorical strategies deployed by the author 
throughout his career. In this approach, Oblivion self-consciously reprises the 
kinds of ‘reader(s)’ imagined in Wallace’s earlier works, particularly in its 
metafictional treatment of empathetic identification, suspicious critique and 
narrative understanding. But in so doing, Wallace effectively displaces the 
significance of such ‘reader(s)’ onto the various ‘language-games’ performed 
by the text itself. It is within such games that the transferential (and indeed 
metafictional) significance of Wallace’s literary project is made explicit in 
transferential-neurotic terms. By highlighting this significance, we are thus 
able to consider the threshold claim that “Wallace negates the reader” – i.e. 
that his texts effectively de-legitimise (or at least irreducibly complicate) our 
sense of that reader’s agency and authority.  At the extreme limits of Wallace’s 
rhetoric of the reader, we have effectively navigated from the abstract to the 
metafictional, at once elaborating on Wallace’s literalistic “conversation”, and 
exposing the kinds of schematic transference (or performance) at stake in 
Wallace’s late fictions. Along the way, we will have engaged key Wallace 
scholars on core Wallace questions, whilst investigating those questions 
through their literal, imaginative, abstract and performative extensions in 
Wallace’s own works. 
Wallace arguably appropriates Freudian metapsychology to explore 
different forms of author-reader relationship. This dynamic helps to situate 
Wallace's work as a form of postmodern metafiction. Linda Hutcheon defines 
postmodern poetics in terms of "the paradoxes set up when modernist 
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aesthetic autonomy and self-reflexivity come up against a counterforce in the 
form of a grounding in the historical, social, and political world" (1998: ix).For 
Hutcheon, the primary genre of postmodernism is historiographic 
metafiction, defined as texts "which are both intensely self-reflexive and yet 
paradoxically also lay claim to historical events and personages" (1988: 5). The 
primary object of such a poetics, for Hutcheon, is "the humanist assumption 
of a unified self and an integrated consciousness", an assumption further 
reflected in liberal humanist notions such as "authorial originality and 
authority" and "the separation of the aesthetic from the political" (xii). While 
this dynamic is typically applied to theories of authorship in Wallace (Staes 
2014), the humanistic assumption of a unified 'reader' of Wallace has yet to be 
fully explored. Indeed, the incorporation of Freudian metapsychology - which 
disputes  the idea of self-identical, humanistic subject - presents new 
challenges for the reader of Wallace, which are explored throughout this 
thesis.   
This thesis' specific focus on psychoanalytic reading in Wallace echoes 
my concerns with existing psychoanalytic readings of Wallace, particularly in 
the works of respected critics Marshall Boswell and Mary K Holland. Though 
the relationship between Wallace and Freud is undoubtedly proven in these 
works, particularly in relation to concepts like primary narcissism, literary 
diagnosis and cure, there remains a question around the validity of 
psychoanalytic concepts in relation to Wallace's texts - the sheer self-
awareness that these texts display towards psychoanalytic theory (and 
psychoanalytic literary theory in particular) has typically warned critics away 
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from attempting a full-scale psychoanalytic reading of Wallace's texts. To 
explore this dilemma, and the fraught relationship between psychoanalytic 
reading and literary criticism that it arguably presupposes, this thesis draws 
on the insights of Peter Brooks, Shoshanna Felman and Paul Ricoeur, each of 
whom has considered the links between psychoanalytic thought, critical 
paradigms and the art of interpretation. By highlighting the productive theme 
of acting-out (transference-neurosis) for these thinkers, I suggest new ways of 
interpreting Wallace's texts through psychoanalysis, which take into account 
the inherent self-consciousness and self-reflexivity of those texts towards 
Freudian ideas. 
Finally, some notes on the style of this thesis. The term 'reader' (in 
scare quotes) is used to highlight instances of constructed or overdetermined 
forms of reading in Wallace's texts, which are alternately described in this 
thesis as 'reading-positions'. This usage typically involves contrasting the 
hypothetical 'readers' of Wallace (as defined under our model) with pre-
existing discourses about reading and interpreting Wallace's works. These 
discourses necessarily involve claims about empirical readers, which are 
figured without scare-quotation to the extent that they comprise assumed or 
as-yet-unexamined reading-positions in relation to Wallace. Italicisation is 
employed to highlight specific usages of thesis terminology, particularly in the 
formulation of readers who identify, readers who critique, readers who narrate 
and readers who negate the David Foster Wallace text. Like the governing 
conceptual term acting-out (also italicised), these terms refer to a range of 
processes and subject-positions, which this thesis canvasses in Chapters 1 and 
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2; italicisation highlights the fact that these are composite terms, 
reconstructed through their initial theorisation to their complex appearance 
in Wallace's texts. Though effort has been made to limit the use of first-person 
rhetoric, the thesis occasionally deploys first-person statements ('I think 
that…', 'I want to explore…') to distinguish thesis-specific claims from their 
counterparts in Wallace's work and reception. Moreover, the thesis uses 
inclusive phrasings such as 'We have seen...' and 'How are we to...?', primarily 
as a means of orienting readers to specific aspects of an argument or text. 
Given the proliferation of subject- and reader-positionings at stake in 
Wallace's works, it is helpful to keep one's own positionings as simple and 
readable as possible. 
 
Conclusion: The ‘Fiction-Writer’s Reader’ 
This thesis aims to provide a meta-rhetorical analysis of the term 
‘reader’ as it appears in the works of American metafictionalist David Foster 
Wallace, which takes into account the author’s own complex relationship with 
what this study calls critical rhetoric. This latter term suggests a rather wide 
field of study, which might potentially include everything from hermeneutic 
philosophy – the philosophy of interpretation and exegesis, as embodied and 
exemplified in theorists such as Paul Ricoeur – to more theoretically-inclined 
and deconstructive forms of criticism and critique. In order to narrow this 
field, and provide an effective account of Wallace and critical rhetoric in ‘the 
time we have together’ (that is, within appropriate limits of the dissertation 
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style), I have elected to focus on a simple, yet arguably illuminating, piece of 
critical rhetoric: the complex construction of ‘reader(s)’, the reference to, 
imagination of or abstract theorising of what literary criticism often calls, 
quite simply, ‘the reader’. This study highlights the effective ubiquity of this 
terminology within contemporary David Foster Wallace Studies, and 
investigates the extent to which critical statements about Wallace depend on 
concomitant statements about the ideal or implied Wallace ‘reader’.  
Moreover, this approach builds on this research by considering the 
extent to which Wallace’s own rhetoric about reading and interpretation – for 
example, his famous maxim that fiction should function as “an act of 
communication between one human being and another” (Wallace 1997: 144) 
– have helped shape our use of the term ‘reader’, particularly given the 
complex imagination of readers, writers, critics and texts demonstrably at 
stake in Wallace’s texts. It is no secret that David Foster Wallace idealised his 
readers, through statements which sometimes elevate the ‘reader’ to a 
position of “god”-like meaning and significance (in McCaffery 2012). In 
response, this study enquires as to whether Wallace’s texts ‘imply’ their reader 
as well, and whether this process of implication or enclosure can serve as an 
adequate descriptive basis for Wallace’s broader hermeneutic or post-
theoretical ambitions. This enquiry is significant, I think, because it highlights 
those aspects of Wallace’s texts which tend to defy description, to resist easy 
articulation or explanation, whilst also exploring the extent to which Wallace 
scholarship observes and represents this resistance as a matter of critical 
significance. However, as I argue herein, the ‘reader’ is not only implied, but 
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explicitly and effectively performed in Wallace’s fictions – despite their far-
reaching theoretical ambitions, it can often appear as if all Wallace is trying 
to do is repeat his reader on the page, as often and as complexly as possible. 
To read Wallace’s rhetorics about reading, then, is to observe repetition in 
Wallace’s texts and extra-literary utterances (including, of course, his 
essayistic and journalistic works). When I observe this repetition, I become 
estranged from the Wallace text, and become curious about my own supposed 
status as ‘reader’.  
Under my psychoanalytic model, literary 'estrangement' is refigured as 
resistance to interpretation, theorised here as a form of acting-out. It is this 
dizzying effect of estrangement, whose basis lies in a strange kind of 
repetition, which I am committed to observing in the time we have, and of 
demonstrating through close readings of Wallace’s three major short story 
collections, Girl with Curious Hair, Brief Interviews with Hideous Men and 
Oblivion. In order to read these works, the study suggests an alternative 
critical rhetoric, which views repetition (in this case, of the ‘reader’) as a kind 
of “acting-out”, which I model here through a post-Freudian critical 
perspective which emphasises the connections between metafictions (fictions 
about fictions) and the theoretical phenomenon of transference. The thesis 
uses the term 'post-Freudian' to describe a critical paradigm in which 
Wallace's relationship to classical psychoanalysis has been fully considered. 
However, this usage it at least partially ironic, since it presupposes the 
question of psychoanalysis as an explanatory discourse, and proposes some 
kind of ironic ‘return to Freud’ in any event. As Felman writes: 
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how Freudian is a Freudian reading? Up to what point can one 
be Freudian? At what point does a reading start to be 
'Freudian enough'? What is a Freudian reading, and in what 
way can it be defined and measured? (Felman 2012: 103) 
When Wallace wrote or spoke about performance, he invariably wrote or 
spoke about the transference, which Sigmund Freud  artfully described as an 
acting-out of the analysand’s past as a literal “force” in the present. Likewise, 
and perhaps despite Wallace’s sophisticated relationship to Freudian theory, 
and indeed with virtually every kind of literary “Theory” under the sun (Kelly 
2010), I think that there is something left to be said about the persistence of 
Freudian tropes in Wallace’s short fictions, particularly Oblivion, which has 
been taken as evidence that “Wittgenstein’s solution” – in Wallace, that of an 
enclosed language-game between predetermined or over-determined 
‘speakers’ – “might not be enough” to solve the interpretive dilemmas of 
Wallace’s late-phase fictions about fiction (Boswell 2013: 155). Yet if this is the 
case, if Oblivion represents an apotheosis or antithesis to Wallace’s avowed 
literary project – a counterpoint, in other words, to ideas like literary empathy, 
suspicious hermeneutics and interpretive abstraction already at stake in 
contemporary Wallace scholarship – then it remains to be seen whether such 
ideas hold up inside the ‘Nightmare of Consciousness’ diagnosed by Boswell 
(2013).  
If Wallace’s texts can comprise such nightmares, then I believe that the 
Freudian ambit of Wallace can be theorised further, in ways which expose the 
literalistic, imaginative and abstract rhetorics at stake in Wallace, and 
whether the idea of performative acting-out ultimately supplants or 
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supersedes the kinds of “act of communication” argued for in Wallace’s earlier 
fictions. Moreover, this counterpoint reading, which is conscious of existing 
readings of Freudian and Lacanian psychology in Wallace (Boswell, 2003; 
Holland, 2006), and of Wallace’s relationship to ‘suspicious’ or exposure-
oriented hermeneutics (Kelly, 2010; Hayes-Brady, 2010), but which 
nevertheless sees the strange pertinence of Freud for Wallace’s short fictions, 
particularly when it comes to themes such as performance and transference. 
If Wallace’s texts constitute a kind of ‘game’ with their reader, then I would 
argue that this game is transferential – it depends, in other words, on 
Wallace’s estranged (yet also estranging) relationship to Freudian themes and 
tropes, particularly in later texts like Oblivion. To further the case for 
psychoanalysis in relation to Wallace’s broad-ranging and rhetorically-
complex works, the present study considers the intentional and rhetorical 
mysteries posed by Wallace’s treatment of the transference, that is, of acting-
out. What is ‘acted-out’ or repeated in Wallace’s fiction? More often than not, 
the ‘reader’ – at least, that is the case I intend to make clear in the following 
chapters, by providing a versatile review of Wallace’s statements about 
‘readers’, his critical rhetoric of the ‘reader’. Of all the possible reading-
positions suggested in Wallace’s psychoanalytically-aware fictions, and 
adopted in influential interpretations of that work, certain ‘readers’ repeat.  
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CHAPTER 1  
“an act of communication” 
 
  
It’s the familiar love-hate syndrome of seduction: ‘I don’t 
really care what it is I say, I care only that you like it. But since 
your good opinion is the sole arbiter of my success and worth, 
you have tremendous power over me, and I fear you and hate 
you for it.’ This dynamic isn’t exclusive to art. But I often think 
I can see it in myself and in other young writers, this desperate 
desire to please coupled with a kind of hostility to the reader. 
(Wallace, in McCaffery 2012: 25) 
 
Introduction: Critical Paradigms in David Foster Wallace Studies 
 This chapter investigates key areas of concern in contemporary David 
Foster Wallace scholarship, in order to highlight the complex significance of 
the term ‘reader’ in relation to Wallace and his works. By reviewing 
antecedent claims about the relationship between Wallace and the reader, the 
present chapter provides a preliminary working account of self-reflexivity in 
Wallace scholarship, as indicated by the field’s complex treatment of three 
concepts – empathetic identification, suspicious critique and critical 
abstraction. These concepts are, I think, essential to the way we talk about 
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Wallace, especially when considering the self-reflexive nature of the author’s 
rhetoric on reading and interpretation. Nevertheless, as the critics engaged 
with in this chapter have all pointed out, these self-reflexive aspects of 
Wallace’s fictional project remain ambiguously defined in relation to the 
author’s plain-spoken insistence that fiction is (or should be) “an act of 
communication between one human being and another” (Wallace 1997: 144). 
While empathy is undoubtedly the most prominent angle for discussing this 
kind of ambiguity, close attention to the scholarship reveals a far more 
complex critical paradigm, which expresses a diverse range of theoretical and 
post-theoretical discourses on criticism and reading (and which incorporates, 
of course, Wallace’s more overt ventures into these subjects in numerous 
articles, essays and interviews). Following from the concerns with 
paradigmatic language outlined in the introduction, my aim here is to provide 
a foundational sense of this self-reflexive ambiguity in Wallace’s texts, 
particularly as it impacts on contemporary critical narratives around those 
texts. In so doing, this chapter provides further elaboration of the term ’reader’ 
within contemporary Wallace scholarship.  
On this basis, it is of course pertinent to begin the present study with 
a recapitulation of Wallace research to date, especially when that research is 
itself highly concerned with what the author had to say about the practice and 
reception of fiction. It is no secret that Wallace had ideas on how texts 
(including his own) were to be read, and that many of these ideas have been 
thoroughly canvassed already in Wallace Studies, particularly in major 
contributions from Marshall Boswell (2003; 2013; 2014), Adam Kelly (2010a; 
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2010b; 2014; 2015), Mary K Holland (2004; 2013), Clare Hayes-Brady (2010; 
2013), Lee Konstantinou (2012), David Hering (2010; 2016), Toon Staes (2014) 
and Stephen Burn (2012a; 2012b; 2013). In these works, and in the burgeoning 
field influenced by these works, Wallace’s articulations of the reader-text 
relationship have inspired a wide range of self-reflexive interpretive 
approaches, within which the role of the critic, and the functions of criticism 
as a communicative practice, are placed into decisive question.  Meanwhile, 
Wallace’s forceful arguments for ideas like literary empathy, the critique of 
postmodernity, the role of the author and the nature of metafiction are 
notoriously complex, and remain difficult to disentangle from their 
presentation in his equally-complex fictions. This particular sense of difficulty 
is a motivating focus for the present study – like the critics considered here, I 
am interested in the ways that Wallace’s texts have anticipated or impacted 
upon their own critical reception, and the ways in which scholarship to date 
has effectively responded to this dynamic.  
By retracing the paradigmatic language of contemporary Wallace 
Studies, and the kinds of interpretive difficulties raised by this language, this 
chapter thus lays the essential groundwork for the close analyses of Wallace 
to follow. As suggested in the introduction, the overt self-reflexivity of Wallace 
literary project can be effectively described as a form of repetition – 
specifically, a return to or reprisal of psychoanalytic discourses about the 
reader-text relationship. As this chapter demonstrates, the key index of such 
repetition is the extent to which ‘readers’ are discussed and contested in 
Wallace’s work and reception. While reviewing the baseline idea of self-
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reflexivity in Wallace, then, I have also sought to connect this idea with the 
diverse reader-positioning strategies that this idea makes possible, whilst 
observing the repetition of particular psychoanalytic reading-tropes within 
the works of prominent Wallace scholars. The idea that there is already a 
critical rhetoric in Wallace’s fiction, and that attempts to reconfigure that 
rhetoric end up repeating it in strange ways, is described here as an escalation 
of interpretive stakes. The foundations of this claim are established through 
this chapter and its methodological counterpart, which take up the question 
of the Wallace ‘reader’ from two different angles. By retracing the idea of an 
“act of communication” through prominent works within the field, this 
chapter considers the self-reflexive rhetoric at stake in Wallace’s fiction, and 
the literalistic, imaginative and abstract possibilities suggested by that 
rhetoric. But having connected this self-reflexivity to a particular critical trope 
– reference to or repetition of the ‘reader’ – this chapter also frames the 
psychoanalytically-informed discussions about repeating, reading and 
transference-neurosis which follow in Chapter 2.If Wallace’s texts are as 
concerned with the ‘reader’ as they repeatedly say they are, then there is a case 
to be made that certain concerns repeat. by locating specific repetitions, and 
considering what it is for a ‘fiction about fiction’ to repeat itself, this study will 
subsequently ground its finding in the Freudian idea of acting-out, whilst also 
gesturing, perhaps by way of exhaustion, towards the limits of a 
psychoanalytic reading of Wallace. I have said that Wallace’s metafictional 
works appear uniquely conscious of their ‘reader’, whilst maintaining that this 
literary self-consciousness is an estranging literary phenomenon, whose 
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effects may be better described as a kind of acting-out, a performance of the 
‘reader’ in place of actual critical dialogue with actual readers. 
By reviewing the specific kinds of repetition at stake in Wallace’s 
rhetoric of the ‘reader’, and the complex theoretical language used to justify 
this repetition, we can better understand the self-reflexivity of Wallace Studies 
as a critical paradigm. Broadly, this study argues that the field of literary 
criticism involves making significant and persuasive claims about texts, about 
authors and about readers. Wallace’s texts, which are paradigmatically aware 
of their situation ‘as’ texts, amplify and exemplify this particular critical 
situation, whilst exploring and challenging that situation’s preconditions in 
postmodern literary theory (‘Greatly Exaggerated’, 1997), televisual irony (‘E 
Unibus Pluram’, 1997), biography (‘Joseph Frank’, 2005) and so forth. As a 
consequence of this sophisticated, far-ranging and self-conscious literary 
project, the field of Wallace Studies is also uniquely aware of its own status as 
literary criticism. Whether advocating the author as herald for a new literary 
vanguard (Boswell 2003: 1), investigating the significance of “Sincerity” (Kelly 
2010), “hyperawareness” (Hayes-Brady 2013) and narcissistic ambivalence 
(Holland 2013) in his works, or considering pertinent theoretical and 
ideological frameworks in which those works can be understood 
(Konstantinou 2012; Staes 2014; Hering 2010), major scholarship on Wallace 
has seen the acts of reading and critical exegesis placed into question time and 
time again, in a manner which both indicates the complex interpretive 
challenges at stake in Wallace’s texts. This critical self-awareness is one of the 
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most interesting things about contemporary Wallace Studies, and is also 
particularly suited to an author like Wallace, whose self-reflexive 
engagements with cultural, theoretical and philosophical paradigms are also 
considered here. On this basis, this chapter connects these major works with 
the preliminary concerns of this thesis, with each section highlighting a 
particular question around the concept of an author-reader relationship in 
Wallace’s works and reception. Like Wallace’s texts, Wallace scholarship is 
often explicitly concerned with what it takes to ‘make a claim’, whether that 
claim is about the world we live in, the various worlds imagined in fiction, or 
the more abstract and theoretical worlds suggested by literary criticism and 
the metafictional text. However, in order to investigate the vast wealth of 
claims at stake in contemporary Wallace Studies, it is arguably important to 
take a step back and distinguish between different paradigmatic approaches 
to the author and his works, particularly as indicated or implied by the works 
of major scholars in the field. By retracing these approaches, this chapter 
outlines four effective senses of the ‘reader’ in relation to Wallace and his 
literary project, which are investigated further in Chapters 3-6 of the present 
study.  
Taken together, these ‘readers’ provide insight into what Wallace 
meant when he described fiction as “an act of communication”, and what 
scholars mean when discussing the ideas and commitments at stake in the 
author’s expansive works. Viewed apart, these ‘readers’ can help us 
understand the complex paradigmatic and rhetorical stakes of those same 
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works. By distinguishing between literal readers who identify, imaginative 
readers who critique, abstract readers who narrate and transferential-neurotic 
readers who negate, this study presents a meta-rhetoric for the Wallace reader, 
which reflects and reflects upon the games with literality, imagination and 
abstraction at stake in Wallace’s short fictions and essays. The plurality of 
reading-positions at stake in Wallace’s fiction borders on the hyperbolic, but 
close attention to existing scholarship on the Wallace ‘reader’ indicates that 
these are specialised areas of concern. Whether discussing the idea of an “act 
of communication”, challenging this notion or considering its more abstract 
bases, I find that the most estranging thing about the Wallace’s rhetoric of the 
‘reader’ is that rhetoric’s reprisal of certain Freudian ideas about reading, 
repetition and transference-neurosis. In advance of this psychoanalytic 
account, I have elected to highlight the ways in which estrangement – 
alternately figured as interpretive uncertainty, ambiguity or antagonism – has 
been most effectively dealt with in existing Wallace scholarship. Crucially, this 
approach allows for a more direct articulation of the typology put forth here, 
concerning statements or rhetorical claims about the ‘reader’.  
The present chapter provides substantive weight to these ideas by 
considering their complex articulation by Wallace and Wallace scholarship, 
and by specifically highlighting the significance of the term ‘reader’ in these 
same discussions. With Boswell and Kelly, I revisit the theme of empathetic 
identification in Wallace’s early rhetorics on fiction, whilst considering the 
forms of immediacy, immanence or common-sense understanding revealed 
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therein. With Holland and Hayes-Brady, I take up the question of suspicious 
critique in Wallace’s works, with a particular focus on narrative, thematic and 
characterological analysis of texts in a postmodern context. Finally, with Staes, 
I consider the kinds of critical abstraction conveyed by Wallace’s works, 
particularly when examined alongside more abstract contexts of critical 
rhetoric and reader-response theory established in the introduction. Here I 
note that the theorisation of the ‘implied author’ (Staes 2014) provides both a 
preliminary abstract basis for contemporary Wallace Studies (allowing for 
more broad-ranging engagements with the field), whilst also repeating certain 
escalations or anxieties from precedent analyses of the Wallace ‘reader’. It is 
at this point that our concern with the ‘implied reader’ becomes viable, and 
our escalatory move towards a fourth reading position – which recognises and 
reflects on such repetitions of such ‘readers’ in critical rhetoric – becomes 
significant. 
  
“Wallace identifies (with) the reader” –  
Literality, Reference and Repetition 
 Who are ‘we’ in relation to David Foster Wallace and his texts? This is 
a question that gets asked often, albeit indirectly, by scholars in the field of 
Wallace Studies. We are, after all, the nominally-intended audience of 
Wallace’s fictions – the readers buying his books, actually reading, thinking 
about and talking about them and so forth. But we are also led to ask this kind 
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of question by Wallace’s own texts, particularly when those texts remain 
involved with complex questions of identity, agency and response, and 
especially when considering the significance of terms like ‘reader’, ‘reading’ 
and ‘readership’. For one paradigmatic example, we could consider an essay 
like ‘E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction’ (1997), which contains 
many of the author’s most strident and compelling statements about “a 
certain subgenre of pop-conscious fiction, written mostly by young 
Americans” (49), as well as postmodern irony and ‘millennial’ attitudes 
towards reading and interpretation. These statements are couched in the 
language of television and “televisual culture” (49), and threaded through 
Wallace’s famous critique of same – for the author, the evolution of television 
as both medium and cultural mediator had made it “invulnerable to […] 
transfiguring assault” (50), that is, insusceptible to the kinds of suspicious and 
abstract ironies deployed in metafiction or postmodern “Image-fiction” (51-
54). In ‘Pluram’, this ironic invulnerability has something to do with the 
attitudes and expectations of readers, and the ways in which television 
“managed to become its own best analyst” (30), by repurposing these 
expectations for the viewing audience: 
‘Television’, after all, literally means ‘seeing-far’; and our six 
hours daily not only helps us feel up-close and personal at like 
the Pan-Am Games or Operation Desert Shield but also, 
inversely, trains us to relate real live personal up-close stuff the 
same way we relate to the distant and exotic, as if separated 
from us by physics or glass, extant only as performance, 
awaiting our cool review […] Television has pulled the old 
dynamic of reference and redemption inside out: it is now 
television that takes elements of the postmodern – the 
involution, the absurdity, the sardonic fatigue, the iconoclasm 
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and rebellion – and bends them to the ends of spectation and 
consumption (64, original emphasis) 
There is quite a lot to unpack in this sort of statement – the reference 
to television’s ‘literal’ meaning, the idea of feeling “up-close and personal” 
whilst distancing ourselves from “real live personal up-close stuff”, and the 
complex implied links between ideas like reference, redemption, spectation 
and consumption. But for now, it is sufficient to highlight that these issues, as 
presented by the author, are in some way supposed to be our issues. In the 
versatile essayistic style of ‘Pluram’, Wallace makes it clear that the various 
attitudes of television and fiction being considered are extensions of audience 
expectation – from routine use of the third-person, to the imagining of “fiction 
writers as a species”, “oglers” and “viewers”, to figures like “Joe Briefcase” – 
“the average U.S. lonely person” (23) – who effectively personifies the kinds of 
consumption and spectatorship avowed by the essay. In his oft-cited 
concluding remarks to ‘Pluram’, Wallace suggests that “the new rebels” of 
avant-garde literature “might be artists willing to risk the yawn, the rolled 
eyes, the cool smile, the nudged ribs, the parody of gifted ironists” (81) – that 
is, artists who are defined by their “willingness to be suckered by a world of 
lurkers and starers who fear gaze and ridicule above imprisonment without 
law” (81-82). But this strange televisual polemic, of lurkers, starers, oglers, 
viewers, yawners, eye-rollers, nudgers and “ironists”, remains ultimately 
concerned with the act of the interpreter, as Wallace concludes the essay on 
an ambivalent note: “I guess that means we all get to draw our own 
conclusions. Have to. Are you immensely pleased” (82).  
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 When Wallace talks about the ‘reader’, there is always an element of 
identification at stake. But what is being identified? Or rather, who is being 
identified with? These kinds of questions have animated Wallace scholarship 
for well over a decade, particularly in major works by Marshall Boswell and 
Adam Kelly, which investigate complex questions of empathy, sentimentality 
and sincerity within Wallace’s fictions and broader literary project. In the 
influential Understanding David Foster Wallace (2003), Boswell aligns 
Wallace’s project with a kind of “third wave modernism” (1), whose 
characteristics are drawn from the complex strategies of modernist and 
postmodernist fiction in the 20th century. For Boswell, Wallace’s literary 
innovations stem from his attention to the epistemological and ontological 
consequences of postmodernity for the fiction writer (10), particularly when it 
comes to issues like empathetic identification and suspicious irony. On the 
one hand, Wallace’s texts partake in a modernist “valorization of individual 
subjective experience” – hyper-complex and intentionally indeterminate, 
Wallace’s texts play on epistemological questions of definition, sense and 
meaning (10). On the other hand, these texts also partake in a decidedly 
postmodernist shift of emphasis “from epistemology to ontology, the study of 
metaphysical grounds, essentially of being” (11). In this latter sense, the 
Wallace text operates in a curious intellectual space, whose grounds appear 
essentially uncertain – this is certainly borne out by a text like ‘Pluram’, which 
places postmodern and televisual ontology squarely within its sights, whilst 
deliberately failing to conclude itself outside of those frameworks. This sort of 
uncertainty has been noted by critics like A.O. Scott, who asks “Are 
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[Wallace’s] harangues against the tyranny of irony meant to be taken in 
earnest, or are they artfully constructed simulacra of what a sincere anti-
ironist might sound like?” (2000: Para 10).  
Responding to Scott, Boswell suggests that Wallace’s texts are indeed 
earnest in some sense – whilst repeating key strategies from modernist and 
postmodernist literature, and partaking heavily in the theoretical discourses 
of his time, Wallace is unique in his attention to “the delusion that cynicism 
and naiveté are mutually exclusive” (in Boswell: 16), a focus which enables the 
author to examine and potentially get beyond certain generic and intentional 
restrictions through effective communication with his reader. The result, for 
Boswell, is that Wallace’s texts “succeed in creating a special, surprisingly 
intimate zone of communication, of subjective interaction, that is unlike 
anything else in contemporary literature” (19). For Boswell, this sense of 
communication is surprising because it inheres in a context of sophisticated 
uncertainty, of the kind frequently represented in fictions like Infinite Jest 
(1996). Nevertheless, it is there, plain as day, in Wallace’s texts, for example 
when the author speaks to the differences between “good art” and “so-so art” 
in the McCaffery interview – the key difference, Wallace suggests, has 
“something to do with love”, or rather “with having the discipline to talk out 
of the part of yourself that can love, instead of the part that just wants to be 
loved” (2012: 50). 
Wallace’s unvarnished emphasis on literary love indicates just how 
seriously the author took the idea of literature as a vehicle for empathetic 
91 
 
identification, or what Boswell terms “subjective interaction” (2003: 17). 
Moreover, it arguably highlights the author’s strident sense of the literal – in 
our rhetoric, the sense of a reader ‘beyond’ the text, a non-figurative identity 
to whom the text might address its various declarations of love (See Chapter 
3). I believe that Boswell’s work highlights literalistic and figurative dilemmas 
which are central to Wallace’s fictions, and is a necessary resource for talking 
about empathy, identification and literality in those fictions. These dilemmas 
often hinge on the idea that Wallace’s texts are, in a paraphrase of his own 
words, “both diagnosis and cure” (Boswell 2003: 17) – that is, they are in one 
sense an epistemological (or modernist) diagnostic tool, and in the other a 
kind of ontological or postmodern “cure” for the various symptoms thus 
diagnosed. In other words, Boswell’s work helps inform the idea that Wallace 
both identifies and identifies with his reader, and explores these ideas through 
the theoretical lenses of modernist and postmodernist theory. Understanding 
David Foster Wallace proceeds to unpack this doubled sense of the Wallace 
text through the twin themes of “ironic awareness” and “gooey” sentiment or 
sentimentality (17), in following complex claim about the author and his 
intentions: 
Wallace’s work, in its attempt to prove that cynicism and 
naiveté are mutually exclusive, treats the culture’s hip fear of 
sentiment with the same sort of ironic self-awareness with 
which sophisticates in the culture portray ‘gooey’ 
sentimentality; the result is that hip irony is ironized in such a 
way that the opposite of hip irony – that is, gooey sentiment – 
can emerge […] He does not merely join cynicism and naiveté; 
rather, he employs cynicism – here figured as sophisticated 
self-reflexive irony – to recover a learned form of heartfelt 
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naiveté, his work’s ultimate mode and what the work ‘really 
means’, a mode Wallace equates with the ‘really human’ (17) 
Notably, Boswell is quick to distinguish this claim – that Wallace really means 
to recover a sophisticated “form of heartfelt naiveté” in fiction – from the idea 
that cynicism and naiveté are “merely” conjoined themes in Wallace’s texts. 
The ambivalent juxtaposition of the cynical and the sentimental in Wallace’s 
works, particularly his early fictions, does appear geared towards this sort of 
identification – that is, a progression from sophistication to earnestness, from 
the literary and complex to the literal and ‘really human’ dimensions of fiction. 
This dynamic is of course reflected in Wallace’s own rhetoric, particularly 
when the author suggests things like “Really good fiction could have as dark a 
worldview as it wished, but it’d find a way both to depict this dark world and 
to illuminate the possibilities for being alive and human in it” (in McCaffery 
2012: 26), or that “fiction’s about what it is to be a fucking human being” (26, 
original emphasis). Suggesting a ‘reader’ is one thing, and referring to them is 
another; this is something that Boswell’s work, in its readings of the 
sentimental, the sophisticated and the human in Wallace, sets out to 
accomplish.  
In Boswell’s works, particularly Understanding David Foster Wallace, 
this author-reader relationship can be effectively described as erotic. From his 
complex articulations of love and dialogue, to articulations of the reader as 
“lover” of the text, to thorough readings of Freudian and Lacanian psychology 
in Wallace’s works, Boswell arrives at certain psychologically-informed claims 
about Wallace ‘reader’, whose significance is often framed by human sexuality 
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and the theory of mind. Sex forms a kind of substitute literality in Boswell’s 
reading of Wallace, for example when he speaks of the author’s “desire to build 
a text that treats its reader like a lover” (2003: 113), reflecting the exegetical 
impulses of (in Wallace’s words) an “architect who could hate enough to feel 
enough to love enough to perpetrate the kind of special cruelty only real lovers 
can inflict” (in Boswell: 114). These are complex referential statements. They 
certainly equate the act of reading and the act of sex, even if that latter appears 
bound up in Wallace’s ambivalent feelings about hating, feeling and loving 
“enough” to perpetrate a “special kind of cruelty” towards the reader. 
Nevertheless, this approach provides Boswell with the tools to understand 
Wallace’s early approaches to empathy and identification, particularly in 
instances of doubled or dichotomous meaning. This approach appears again, 
in a more refined form, in Boswell’s contributions to A Companion to David 
Foster Wallace Studies, a collection which he edited alongside Stephen Burn. 
Here, Boswell posits that: 
The intrinsic complexity of Wallace’s books demands close 
attention to their unique organization and verbal density; but 
at the same time, these works insistently reach outside 
themselves, through layered allusions, metaleptic jumps, and a 
thematic obsession with connection (2013, xi) 
While this appears to have much less to do with sentimentality, the idea of a 
text “reach[ing] outside” of itself is crucial to how we understand Wallace’s 
works, and their peculiar claims upon our attentions, investments and 
identifications. The thematic “obsession with connection” theorised by 
Boswell help us understand the epistemological and ontological ambit of 
those works as well – Wallace’s texts appears eternally caught up in a 
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performative contradiction, calling the reader’s attentions inwards (towards 
self-consciousness and complexity) and outwards (towards allusion, 
metalepsis, and literal ‘reality’) “at the same time”, perhaps ambivalently. 
These references ‘beyond’ the text, and more often than not to readers outside 
of or beyond the text, are a crucial part of Wallace’s own complex rhetoric on 
reading, something which I consider much further in Chapter 3 . For now, 
suffice it to say that Boswell’s subtly erotic approach to interpreting Wallace 
has proven particularly valuable to the present study – though my approach 
to Freudian hermeneutics differs somewhat (See Chapter 2), I can thank 
Boswell for illuminating some of the gooier sophistications of Wallace and his 
literary project, and suggest that there is more to his textual erotics than meets 
the eye.  
 Through this sustained emphasis on identification, often conveyed in 
the more metaphoric form of what we might call ‘literal literary love’, 
Wallace’s complex rhetoric on fiction anticipates a range of interpretive 
issues, including issues around the identity and empathetic agency of the 
reader. In the dual epistemological/ontological model advanced by Boswell, 
we can begin to highlight areas of concern for contemporary scholarship. The 
first is an insistence on reference– that is, epistemological identification or 
location of a term in its proper contexts. With their expansive sense of place 
and detail, Wallace’s texts exhaust what Stephen Burn and Matt Tresco have 
called the “encyclopaedic” dimensions of metafiction (Burn 2012: 27; Tresco 
2012: 121), whilst also exposing the ideas of definition and encyclopaedic 
containment as “an impossible, elusive quest” for semantic and 
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epistemological certainty (Tresco: 114). In one sense, then, to identify is to 
refer, even if this act of definition occurs in contexts of maximal 
epistemological uncertainty. Wallace’s texts consistently repeat and refer to 
this kind of dilemma, and often break down complex issues into questions 
about the meaning of words, as in the essay ‘Authority and American Usage’ 
(2005), a review of modern American lexicography.  
On this basis, the present study is partly premised on the idea that the 
act of definition is certainly at stake in Wallace’s ontological critique of 
postmodernity, particularly when placed into juxtaposition with the literal 
fact of reading – more often than not, with the strangely literalistic experience 
of reading Wallace’s texts. In other words, I see a significant parallel between 
the ways in which Wallace talks about reading (as a “human” or even “really 
human” exchange) and the ways he writes about ‘readers’; one of the defining 
characteristics of Wallace’s fictional project is that project’s strange insistence 
that reading is a non-figurative event, or rather that it cannot be exhaustively 
figured or defined by the writer. Again, this sense of literality comports with 
Wallace’s idea of fiction as “an act of communication between one human 
being and another” (1997: 144). Notably, Clare Hayes-Brady’s work challenges 
this sense of the literal in Wallace’s works when by highlighting the extent to 
which, in the “act of communication” claim, “Wallace was not so much fine-
tuning the craft of storytelling as he was investigating the reality of 
communication” (2010: 34, emphasis mine). Before turning our attention to 
this work, however, it is pertinent to consider whether the question of 
literality – with all of its erotic, definitional and intentional uncertainties – can 
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resolve itself on its own terms, and whether those terms are not in fact 
anticipated in Wallace’s own rhetorics about reading and interpretation.  
When we are what we call readers ‘of’ Wallace, we are inevitably 
repeating certain attitudes and assumptions about the ‘reader’ suggested by 
Wallace, particularly around empathising with the text in the experience of 
reading. At the same time, however, this sense of ‘literal reading’ is not exactly 
subtle in Wallace’s works – we can always consider a text like ‘Octet’ (1999), 
whose exhaustive style defines and over-defines the activities of the reader to 
a point of near-absurdity (See Chapter 4). But when conveyed in the various 
forms of empathy, erotic connection or subjective interaction, Wallace’s 
claims about identifying with and within the text take on a kind of plain-
language or common-sense authority, one which propels his texts beyond 
epistemological questions of identity towards ontological questions of agency 
and even intentionality. Two questions arise from this trajectory. First, when 
we talk about the ‘reader’ of Wallace, or of any literary text, are we simply 
referring to our own reading experiences in a generic sense? And second, are 
we making particular claims about the identity and agency of ‘other’ readers 
as well?  
These kinds of questions are taken up in the works of Adam Kelly, as 
in the influential essays ‘David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in U.S. 
Fiction’ (2010) and ‘David Foster Wallace and the Novel of Ideas’ (2014). Like 
Boswell, Kelly is concerned with the capacities of the Wallace text to appeal 
beyond itself, specifically through the discovery and indirect recovery of 
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sincerity as a meta-literary theme. Kelly’s modelling of sincerity highlights the 
existential and intentional stakes of Wallace’s literary project, and the 
complex presentation of these stakes in texts such as ‘Octet’. For Kelly, 
traditional sincerity is a mode which communicates the intentions and 
identity of a speaker, which is to be distinguished from authenticity, which 
figures communication in a more performative or non-identical sense (2010: 
132-135). This distinction is, perhaps by design, rendered highly unstable in 
Wallace’s texts, which offer any number of conflicting and conflicted 
perspectives on the role of the Wallace speaker, more often than not the 
narrator(s) of respective Wallace texts (139). Addressing this uncertainty, 
Kelly locates the author’s style alongside French critical theorist Jacques 
Derrida, highlighting the theme of ontological paradox as a defining 
characteristic of both writers: 
[Wallace and Derrida] both develop a writing that relentlessly 
interrogates its own commitments, and a logic that reflects back 
on itself to the greatest degree possible. In doing so they aim to 
offer a critical alternative to what Paul Ricoeur has termed a 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, the prevailing approach to 
literature and culture that emphasizes what it sees as the 
blindnesses caused by ideological investment, historical 
ignorance, and psychological repression (2010: 138) 
For Kelly, this critical alternative is thus framed as a kind of self-reflexive 
paradox. Kelly highlights ‘Octet’ as an instance where the Wallace text, despite 
or perhaps because of its anxious “self-conscious pre-empting of its own 
reception” (144), succeeds in gesturing beyond its own highly-fraught 
reception contexts, paradoxically accommodating sincere intentions amidst a 
maximally insincere style. Bound by their own self-reflexive utterances, 
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Wallace’s narrators and interlocutors provide ample evidence of this 
paradoxical sense in the author’s project as a whole, particularly when it 
comes to questions of authorship and intentionality. By retracing these kinds 
of themes, Kelly’s work provides unique insights into ontologies of authorship 
and spectatorship in those fictions, as “structured and informed” by the 
judgment of an empirical and/or hypothetical reader, whom Kelly identifies 
as “the text’s true other”, and whose agency and identity are a limiting 
threshold for the workings of the Wallace text more broadly (144-145).  
Kelly is a key influence on the present study, particularly when it comes 
to locating the epistemological and ontological questions posed by 
contemporary Wallace Studies. Whilst I have differing opinions on the 
meaning of ‘Octet’ (Cunningham, 2015), and on the value of Ricoeur and 
suspicious hermeneutics to Wallace scholarship more broadly (See Chapter 
2), I’d say that Kelly’s work does provides a number of essential insights into 
the dilemmas posed by Wallace’s texts, particularly when it comes to post-
critical theories around the themes of “love, trust, faith and responsibility” 
(139). In this sense, his works can help us understand the complex questions 
posed by empathy and empathetic identification in Wallace’s works as well. 
Like Boswell, Kelly is concerned with the strange intentionality of the Wallace 
text, and with the identification and definition of these intentions within 
contemporary scholarship. This is to say that both scholars investigate the 
ways in which empathetic intentionality ‘appears’ in Wallace’s works, 
particularly in light of the author’s more literalistic statements on fiction and 
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interpretation, and particularly despite the proliferation of insincere, 
inauthentic and indeterminate discourses within Wallace’s texts. I think this 
paradox is best expressed when Kelly in the 2012 sincerity essay, where he asks 
the following questions about Wallace and the idea of literary performance: 
If, according to Wallace, a writer must anticipate how his work 
will be received by readers in a complex culture, and thus about 
communicating what sounds true, rather than simply what is 
true, is he really being fully sincere? Is this a ‘congruence of 
avowal and actual feeling,’ or even an endorsement of ‘single-
entendre principles’? Is there not a schizophrenic and/or 
manipulative quality at work here that counteracts the good 
intentions of the artist as a communicator of truth? (2010: 135) 
To understand this kind of intentional paradox, it is important to consider the 
distinctions drawn in Kelly’s work between “suspicious” hermeneutics and 
what we might call sincere reading. These distinctions emerge out of Wallace’s 
broad-ranging departures from particular discourses of academia, 
postmodernity and critical “Theory” (138), which appear to anticipate the 
more reflexively-figurative nature of contemporary critical exegesis. These 
concerns are comparable to Boswell’s concern with “sophisticated irony” 
(2003: 17, see above), which contrasts Wallace’s “use of irony and self-
reflexivity” (18) with the other-directed and metaleptic dimensions of his 
works – again, their effective questioning of “what it is to be a fucking human 
being” (Wallace, in McCaffery 2012).  
While Kelly questions some of the performative bases for this contrast, 
his work is nevertheless concerned with the idea of an empirical ‘reader’ 
beyond the text, something which can be effectively demonstrated by 
considering the functions of suspicion and suspicious reading diagnosed in 
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the New Sincerity essay (2012). For Kelly, the major dynamic of suspicious 
reading is that of a “surface and depth model conventionally assumed to 
characterize secrecy” (143). This model is premised on the discovery of a 
“conditional secret” within the text, that is, an ulterior meaning or “motive” 
(141) whose expression is conditioned by forces such as those named above 
(ideological investment, historical investment and psychological repression). 
The authentic “exposure” of such depths is, on Kelly’s reading, a 
predominantly epistemological gesture, which treats the literary text like a 
puzzle to be solved, typically through the interpolation of critical theories of 
the subject and discourse. Building on the work of Lionel Trilling, he argues 
that “authenticity conceives truth as something inward, personal, and hidden, 
the goal primarily of self-expression rather than other-directed 
communication” (132), and in which traditional ideas of sincerity – such as 
Trilling’s definition of sincerity as a “congruence of avowal and actual feeling” 
(in Kelly: 132) – come to be understood as forms of “bad faith” or “artificial 
dishonesty” in practice (133). The authentic author recognises and exploits the 
gaps between avowal and feeling; the sincere author, at least on the traditional 
reading, aims at a form of public and “other-directed” communication of 
intent. As interpretive themes, sincerity and authenticity thus concern the 
intentional identity of a given author or reader – that is, the kinds of meaning 
or knowledge that might be deduced from authentic (or insincere) discourse 
versus sincere (or inauthentic) utterance.  
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The issue, for Kelly, is that Wallace’s works appear to inhabit and exploit 
both of these definitions at once. Though there is undoubtedly an element of 
paraphrase in Kelly’s reference to “the good intentions of the artist as a 
communicator of truth”, there is also little doubt that we are looking to 
discover such intentions or truths in Wallace’s texts, even as those elements 
remain uneasily juxtaposed with the “schizophrenic and/or manipulative” 
qualities of those same texts. By investigating this paradoxical juxtaposition of 
sincere “good intention” and “bad faith” authenticity, Kelly makes a strong 
case for a New Sincerity in relation to Wallace’s fictional project, thus 
providing a complex intentional model for identifying with and interpreting 
Wallace’s works.  Like Boswell’s “third wave modernism” (2003: 1), the 
sincerity thesis provides both a context and a trajectory for Wallace’s literary 
project – the context being postmodernity, the “age of theory” or suspicious 
hermeneutics, in which epistemological and ontological certainty has been 
effectively displaced by the interpretive interventionism of the academy; the 
trajectory, then, being a movement through and beyond this interpretive 
“double-bind”, towards a “complex, contemporary logic” of the text and its 
intentions. In the introduction to the New Sincerity essay, Kelly lays out the 
problem thus: 
Both sincerity and authenticity, as Trilling defines them, assume 
a wholeness to the inner self, a lack of internal division 
regardless of what shows on the outside. The force of 
appearance/reality and surface/depth distinction is fully at work 
in both concepts, so that when Andre’ Gide famously remarks 
that ‘One cannot both be sincere and seem so’, this rejection of 
outward sincerity still involves a commitment to the wholeness 
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of inner being that remains a characteristic of authenticity (135-
136) 
This preliminary reference to “appearance/reality” and “surface/depth” 
distinctions (of a kind with the critical strategies of interpreters like Ricoeur) 
is particularly significant for understanding Kelly’s work. The problem he 
identifies, I think, is that of conditional identification, following the various 
conditions suggested or imposed by discourses of “ideological investment, 
historical ignorance, and psychological repression” (2010: 138). The ‘depth’ 
identified in a literary text is always in some sense a conditioned depth, related 
in Wallace’s works to the activities of suspicious interpreters – “the America 
Wallace depicts in his fiction has exactly this character”, writes Kelly, “is 
already radically over-exposed, with many secrets appearing in open view” 
(138). This context informs the intentional trajectory of Wallace’s literary 
project, as articulated by Kelly: 
David Foster Wallace’s fiction, in contrast, asks what happens 
when the anticipation of others’ reception of one’s outward 
behavior begins to take priority for the acting self, so that inner 
states lose their originating causal status and instead become 
effects of that anticipatory logic. Former divisions between self 
and other morph into conflicts within the self, and a recursive 
and paranoid cycle of endless anticipation begins, putting in 
doubt the very referents of terms like ‘self’ and ‘other’, ‘inner and 
‘outer’. (136) 
Kelly’s reference to “the acting self” is also pertinent for the present study. 
However, whilst I am also concerned with conflict and anticipation in 
Wallace’s body of work, I have elected to highlight the semantic complexity 
of terms like “the acting self” as well, and the strange interposition of these 
terms in Wallace’s rhetorics of fiction and reception. Nevertheless, we can see 
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already that this rhetoric provides the basis for a new theorisation of 
identification in metafiction, and indeed of sincere metafiction as per Kelly’s 
analysis.  
 One corner of Wallace Studies, then, is specifically and effectively 
concerned with the idea that “Wallace identifies (with) the reader”, in the 
doubled sense that his texts pose complex empathetic and intentional 
questions to the reader, and – I argue – in the sense that they are concerned 
with literal/empirical readers who identify. The issue, of course, is that while 
Wallace’s texts can indeed be erotic or sincere, their language is seldom plain, 
as suggested by Boswell’s reference to “reader/lover[s]” (2003) and “metaleptic 
jumps” (2013), or Kelly’s theorising of conditional and unconditional speech in 
Wallace. Subsequently, if there is anything literal in Wallace’s texts, it is 
supposed to be our experience of reading them. For this reason, when Wallace 
writes about empathy and literary love, he does so with a particular experience 
of reading in mind, and very often projects this experience outwards or 
towards a particular sense of the ‘reader’. It is the gesture beyond the text that 
interests me the most, particularly as that gesture – particularly in Wallace’s 
short fiction – is always performed through broader conflicts, including those 
of authorial intention and definition, ontology and epistemology, empathy 
and irony, sincerity and suspicion and (in ‘Pluram’) “reference and 
redemption”. Yet whether taken as one big paradox, or a series of smaller 
escalating paradoxes, it is clear that Wallace’s body of work presents a unique 
and complex intentional disposition towards readers who identify, a 
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disposition which is arguably reflected in Wallace Studies’ utile deployment 
of the paradoxical as an interpretive mode. Again, this claim will be taken up 
further in Chapter 3:, which investigates the literality and eroticism of 
Wallace’s early fictions in further conversation with Boswell.  
For now, it suffices to say that Wallace’s rhetoric of the reader has had 
a clear and effective impact on the way his works are read today, as evidenced 
through the theorisation of empathetic identification as a meta-literary theme 
in contemporary Wallace Studies. In fact, I would go as far as to say that 
empathy, as read and spoken about in Wallace’s fiction, forms a kind of 
common-sense or plain-language basis for our contemporary conversations 
with the author and his works. This is obviously highly important for our own 
reader-response analysis of Wallace, since it provides the motive for plain 
language wherever possible – when talking about something as complex as the 
‘reader’ in Wallace’s works, it is thus prudent to ask ourselves precisely how 
literal our statements about such ‘readers’ can be, despite the characteristic 
drive to understand ‘literal literary love’ and ‘really human communication’ in 
our readings of Wallace.   
 
“Wallace Critiques (with) the Reader”  
Imagination, Suspicion and Re-Imagination 
This brings us back to the key claim under consideration – the positing 
of fiction as “an act of communication between one human being and another” 
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(1997: 144). In one sense at least, this idea is literalistic – it goes to the idea of 
Wallace’s texts as a literal conversation, an empathetic act, a diagnosis and a 
cure, etc. “To describe Wallace’s texts as interested in connection or 
communication or alleviating sadness through fiction may already be a cliché” 
write Samuel Cohen and Lee Konstantinou, “but it also happens to be a true 
cliché” (2012: xii). Nevertheless, this kind of clichéd claim for identity and 
agency in relation to Wallace’s works is caught up in broader, conflicting 
contexts – Cohen and Konstantinou’s The Legacy of David Foster Wallace 
offers a complex representation of these contexts, in which “Everyone 
everywhere is mediating, re-mediating, intermediating, disintermediating, 
and hypermediating everyone else” (xvi). Whilst claiming the literal in this 
fashion, it is important to observe the movement beyond literality in Wallace’s 
own works as well – that is, their imaginative reappropriation of ideas like 
identification, like empathy and like literary love – because we will soon find 
those kinds of ideas drastically re-imagined, refigured or even hideously 
“disfigured” (Holland, 2013) in texts like Brief Interviews with Hideous Men 
(1999). The idea of literary imagination, or of re-imagination is of particular 
interest to me here – what is the difference between, say, an actual or literal 
reader referred to by Wallace, and the kinds of hypothetical readers, 
interpreters and interlocutors referred to by Wallace’s fiction?  
This question is important, I think, because it helps to indicate certain 
movements or evolutions in Wallace’s rhetoric of readership, particularly as 
those texts appear to become increasingly invested in the identity and agency 
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of the ‘reader’. Hence this study’s return to the idea of suspicion, particularly 
suspicious and exposure-oriented critique – in the works of Mary K Holland, 
Clare Hayes-Brady and others, we will be poised to restate the counter-claim 
that Wallace’s texts do indeed have hidden depths, that their ploys for surface 
meaning (and for the recognition that surface meaning ought to be the 
dominant way of reading things, that it is in fact the ‘really human’ way of 
going about it) can be effectively translated through counter-intentional 
themes like literary and cultural narcissism, gender politics and gendered 
linguistics, and of course Wallace’s own highly-suspicious critiques of 
postmodern life and culture. In the essay ‘Joseph Frank’s Dostoyevsky’, 
Wallace casts a critical eye on the typical postmodern reader, or at least 
repeats the kind of person who he would take to be such a ‘reader’. 
Considering the ideological intentionality of an author like Dostoyevsky, 
Wallace at one point compels us to:   
Ask ourselves why we seem to require of our art an ironic distance 
from deep convictions or desperate questions, so that 
contemporary writers have to either make jokes of them or else 
try to work them in under cover of some formal trick like 
intertextual quotation or incongruous juxtaposition, sticking the 
really urgent stuff inside asterisks as part of some multivalent 
defamiliarization-flourish or some such shit (271) 
It is uncanny, of course, that this question – ostensibly posed by critic Joseph 
Frank, and his literary biography of the Russian author “FMD” (258) – is 
virtually identical to the kinds of critique posed in ‘E Unibus Pluram’, those of 
reference and redemption turned inside out, or of the postmodern “ironist” 
who is “impossible to pin down” by any concerned or suspicious observer (1997: 
67, original emphasis). But then again, we are accustomed to finding this sort 
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of repetition within Wallace’s texts, even his expansive para-literary 
utterances (interviews et al).  
Though these statements about the hypothetical reader are often 
difficult to ‘pin down’ – Wallace is a gifted ironist himself – they are 
nevertheless pre-exposed in Wallace’s fictions, more often than not presented 
through suspicious frameworks like misogyny, toxic masculinity and 
regressive self-consciousness. In other words, though these elements of 
Wallace’s texts are expressible in the form of an erotics (as in Boswell) or a 
hermeneutics (as in Kelly), they are also indicative of an aesthetics.. We know 
this because of the work of scholars like Mary K Holland, who has certainly 
taken the lead in exposing the narcissistic structures of Wallace’s novels 
(2004), and indeed of the author’s subsequent critiques of narcissism in texts 
such as Brief Interviews (Holland 2013). Building on this work, Clare Hayes-
Brady has effectively diagnosed the ambivalent gender politics of Wallace’s 
fiction more broadly, through research which actually exemplifies (perhaps 
contra Kelly) the value of suspicious, depth-oriented or exposure-centric 
exegesis in and for those fictions.  
In contrast to his early-period fictions – whilst maintaining certain 
estranging proximities to the idea of fiction as literal literary love – Wallace’s 
middle-period works irreducibly complicate our understanding of the 
author’s intentions with regards to the ‘reader’, even as those intentions are 
(arguably) brought increasingly closer to the reader’s attention over time. This 
dynamic is typically evidenced through the characteristic evolutions and 
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involutions of the author’s style between short fiction collections – his 
treatment of particular themes through narrative, the differing strategies of 
fragmentation and remediation negotiated by short fictions like ‘Octet’ (1999). 
On this note, it is pertinent to highlight the sheer difference in one’s reading 
experience of a text like Girl with Curious Hair and a text like Brief Interviews. 
One is an exhaustively fun exercise in postmodern pastiche, the other an 
exhaustingly confronting piece of work, fragmented by the emergence of the 
author’s singularly self-referential voice and his repeated references to sexual 
violence and brutality. Similar dichotomies repeat: empathy and suspicion, 
epistemological and ontological identification, sincerity and authenticity, etc. 
But what changes between collections, I think, is the extent to which Wallace 
effectively re-imagines the literary encounter (See Chapter 2) – rather than 
attempting to reclaim the literal reader ‘of’ the text, the emergence of 
Wallace’s “mature” voice signals an intensified focus on the kinds of readers 
made possible ‘within’, or perhaps even constructed by, his texts. This 
movement from literality to imagination presents new interpretive difficulties 
for the contemporary Wallace reader, for whom the epistemological and 
ontological grounds appear to have shifted once again – rather than dealing 
with empirical readers beyond the text, we are now supposed to discover 
hypothetical readers within the text as well.  
This study begins tracing these kinds of interpretive stakes by 
highlighting the persistent and insistent repetition of the term ‘reader’ in 
Wallace’s work and reception, if only because the movement towards 
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imagination poses new kinds of epistemological aporia and ontological 
impasse. By reviewing this escalation of stakes with Holland and Hayes-Brady, 
the present study thus lays the ground for new imaginative reconstructions of 
Wallace’s texts, premised on the almost self-reflexive  suspicious nature of 
those texts. This kind of methodology ultimately informs my own approach, 
both in its reliance on philosophers such as Paul Ricoeur (See Chapter 2) and 
its attention to Wallace’s rhetorics on reading and interpretation. In this 
sense, I hope to do justice to the kinds of “logicking work” suggested by 
Holland (2013: 110), particularly when it comes to subjects like literary love and 
the strange erotics of the literary encounter in Wallace (See Chapter 4).  
In the present study, this logicking work (suspicious reading) comes 
down to the complex bracketing of the term ‘reader’ for discussion – the 
evolution of Wallace’s disposition towards such ‘readers’ prompts this study’s 
subsequent discussions of (literalistic) readers who identify and (imaginative) 
readers who critique, whilst considering the consequences of that turn itself 
(See Chapters 3-4). After all, if Wallace’s texts identify, either erotically or 
diagnostically, isn’t there plenty to be said about what gets identified? This 
sort of question is exemplified in the works of Mary K Holland, particularly 
the essays ‘“the art’s heart’s purpose”: Braving the Narcissistic Loop of Infinite 
Jest’ (2006) and ‘Mediated Immediacy in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men’ 
(2013). These essays are important in that they highlight the epistemological 
ambit of Wallace’s literary project, specifically exploring the extent to which 
Wallace’s texts define and hypothetically judge their own “audience” whilst, 
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of course, soliciting that audience’s complicity with graphically anti-
sympathetic voicings of intention and interpretation. “Comprising 23 separate 
pieces and 37 or so different voices,” she writes in ‘Mediated Immediacy’: 
[Brief Interviews] aggressively explores the warped workings of 
relationships – largely male-female and primarily their linguistic 
workings – by creating personae that shock and disgust us with 
admissions of bad behaviour, then add offense by demanding our 
identification and understanding (2013: 107) 
As with Adam Kelly, Holland’s analysis begins with a kind of theatrical 
framework, describing an intersection of voices and personae which helps 
indicate our movement towards imagination – it is already clear that there is 
room to consider the kinds of ‘readers’ voiced within Wallace’s texts, as well 
as the “demanding” dynamics of his middle-period fiction in particular (See 
Chapter 4). But whereas Kelly’s approach identifies Wallace in terms of an 
“unconditional secret beyond representation”, specifically a paradoxical 
juxtaposition of the conditional and the unconditional (143), Holland’s work 
helps show us just how often Wallace conditions the literal intentionality of 
his texts, or at least those intentions voiced by his imagined ‘Hideous Men’.  
The “brazen solicitation of empathy for all kinds of mental, physical and 
emotional disfigurements” in Brief Interviews is, for Holland, the basis for 
Wallace’s “likewise discomfiting generic disfigurements” (107), particularly his 
suspicious reworkings of gender and power in texts like ‘Octet’ and the titular 
‘Brief Interviews’. Given this brazen and often discomfiting approach on the 
part of Wallace, it is especially pertinent to define the role of suspicious 
critique within contemporary Wallace Studies, particularly for scholars 
influenced by Holland’s work.  
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When contrasted with the works of Boswell and Kelly, for example, 
Holland’s work provides us with an alternative modelling of literary 
intentionality, which takes into account the persistence of suspicious 
hermeneutics within Wallace’s project more broadly. Such a model, recall, 
would be tasked with the recovery of hidden meanings within a given text, 
often relying on the theorisation of textual “depth” or the intervention of 
emancipatory social discourses (Kelly 2010: 138). Holland’s essay ‘Braving the 
Narcissistic Loop’ fulfils and arguably exceeds this basic definition of 
suspicious critique, drawing on the social criticism of Christopher Lasch and 
Sigmund Freud’s theorisation of primary and secondary narcissism to unpack 
Wallace’s text’s relationship to irony, and to prosecute the counter-intentional 
claim that “Infinite Jest fails to deliver on the agenda that Wallace set for it”, 
specifically through its failure to “recognize and address the cultural drive 
towards narcissism that fuels and is fuelled by irony” (2006: 218). In Holland’s 
post-Freudian reading, narcissism presents a kind of infantile and infantilising 
“repetition compulsion” (236), which thematically over-conditions the 
majority of Wallace’s texts, whether the author is writing in a narcissistic way 
or merely diagnosing the narcissistic traits of others. Again, this kind of claim 
involves both a context and a trajectory. The context, while differing in its 
emphases, remains largely the same: postmodern uncertainty, specifically 
leveraged through televisual notions of entertainment and enjoyment. This 
much is clear when Holland writes about postmodern “recursivity”, 
responding to the N Katherine Hayles’s theorisation of anti-interiority and 
“the illusion of autonomy” (C.f. Hayles 1999) in Wallace’s works: 
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Thus far, critics of Infinite Jest overwhelmingly read the novel 
optimistically, finding in it strong evidence that Wallace 
succeeded in fulfilling the artistic agenda he set out in his 1993 
interview and essay. […] Rather than view recursivity as the 
novel’s noble end goal, I point out that this illusion of autonomy 
[…] still persists through narcissistic desire as an irrational, largely 
unconscious longing that relentlessly afflicts characters despite 
their attempts to deny or escape it (225) 
However, this trajectory of suspicion – subtly indicated by a distancing from 
optimism and the positing of “noble end goal[s]” – necessarily involves the 
identification of depth, in this case the kinds of “irrational” or “largely 
unconscious longing” at stake in Wallace’s texts. In other words, rather than 
prioritising contexts and possibilities beyond those texts, Holland’s work 
prompts us to focus on those possibilities already articulated within them - 
note also the location of narcissistic desire at the level of imagination, as 
something which primarily and “relentlessly afflicts characters”. This 
suspicious modelling of Wallace has had a profound impact on the present 
study, informing the positive move towards psychoanalytic literary theory 
(See Chapter 2) and helping to frame discussions of suspicion and readers who 
critique (See Chapter 4) in particular. To my mind, Holland is among the first 
major scholars to have effectively engaged with the limits (and indeed the 
potential failures) of Wallace’s rhetoric on interpretation, and indeed to have 
challenged that rhetoric on strong theoretical grounds. Following Holland, 
my study seeks to demonstrate those points at which “recursivity, through the 
society of consumption and mediation, becomes pathological” within 
Wallace’s texts (225, emphasis mine).  
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 Nevertheless, this suspicious turn presents new interpretive difficulties 
for the Wallace reader, particularly one already well-versed in ideas like 
literary love, empathy, gooey sentiment, new sincerity, and the like. Here 
again, I think the problem is one of intentional definition – the critical and 
diagnostic approach suggested by Holland brings with it a renewed 
epistemological imperative, premised on the rediscovery of surface/depth 
tensions, both in the author’s texts and in his diverse reception contexts. But 
how do we do this without compromising the plain-language or common-
sense pleasures afforded by Wallace’s rhetoric of fiction? Holland’s essay 
‘Mediated Immediacy’ offers one answer, effectively reprising the fraught 
interplay of epistemological and ontological intent canvassed by Boswell and 
Kelly above, whilst continuing to advocate a more depth-oriented approach: 
Most essentially, [Brief Interviews] continues [Wallace’s] rejection 
of postmodernism’s unproductive irony in favor of a return to 
sincerity through fiction. But to this concern about irony, Brief 
Interviews adds an unflinching critique of narcissism as an 
impediment to empathy and sincerity, most often as wielded by 
men in solipsistic ‘relationship’ with women […] Brief Interviews, 
then, explores the degree to which men’s sexual desire for women 
taints and often prevents any attempts by men to extend 
empathy, or anything like their ‘true’ selves, to women because of 
the fraught interplay between language, desire, and power (2013: 
107, 108) 
This approach clearly offers an alternative view on the kinds of erotic and 
hermeneutic possibilities at stake in Wallace’s fiction. The author’s 
“unflinching” critique of narcissism here serves as the basis for a depth analysis 
of gendered and sexualised language in Wallace, which is both exposure-
oriented (highlighting the “collection’s ability to compel its reader to do this 
logicking work”) and resolutely intentional (suggesting that this compulsion 
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provides the collection’s “ultimate integrity”) (110). The productive 
juxtaposition of this approach with the “sincerity through metafiction” thesis 
is, I think, important. Despite differences in emphasis, the ideas that ‘Wallace 
identifies with the reader’ and ‘Wallace critiques with the reader’ are not, in 
and of themselves, incompatible. And yet, they are decisively presented as 
such within Wallace’s fiction – whether treating their “reader/lover” (Boswell), 
or appealing to their “text’s true other” both conditionally and unconditionally 
(Kelly), Wallace’s texts exploit the antagonistic dynamics of metafictional 
irony in profound and often diabolical ways. This is, finally, the kind of 
antagonism that Holland’s work helps indicate – the imagination of 
ambivalent human beings, interpreters usually, whose imagined activities are 
at once suspicious and suspect. This is an idea I explore further in ‘Chapter 4: 
specifically highlighting the theme of metafictional performance and 
transferential “acting-out” in Brief Interviews.  
  With this kind of suspicious perspective in mind, we may thus 
reconsider the value of something like Paul Ricoeur’s suspicious hermeneutics 
(See Chapter 2), particularly when dealing with issues like literary empathy 
and identification. When Wallace talks about the reader, there is always an 
element of critique at stake – so what is being critiqued? Or rather, who is 
being critiqued with in Wallace’s texts? Clare Hayes-Brady takes up this 
question in two essential essays, ‘The Book, The Broom and The Ladder: 
Philosophical Groundings in the Work of David Foster Wallace’ (2010) and 
“…”: ‘Language, Gender and Modes of Power in the Work of David Foster 
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Wallace’ (2013). Both essays provide vital insight into the role of suspicious 
hermeneutics in Wallace’s works, with a particular focus on language 
philosophy and contemporary surface/depth theories of reading and 
representation. In ‘The Book, The Broom and the Ladder’, Hayes-Brady 
highlights to the author’s “absolute mimesis of flawed voices”, in part 
evidenced by his tendency “to avoid omniscient narration in favour of 
dialogue, first-person narration, or internal-monologue-style third-person 
narration” (30): 
This narrative structure – what I call Wallace’s ‘skeletal narrative’, 
which involves the undermining and eventual collapse of a surface 
narrative to reveal the ‘true’ or ‘real’ story, by means of jarring 
elements planted within the narrative voice itself – was something 
that Wallace would develop and refine over the whole course of 
his career, and was one of the great innovations of his writing (30-
31). 
For Hayes-Brady, this strategy of “absolute” mimesis thus provides the basis 
for a kind of depth reading of Wallace, specifically highlighting the “jarring” 
elements and effects of his discourse as a means of collapsing or undermining 
a particular “surface” narrative. Moreover, this interpretive approach is in part 
derived out of Paul Ricoeur’s theorisation of “dual identity” – that is, of a 
conflict between the “inherited and imposed” aspects of the self (idem) and 
the “creative and self-determining” aspects of that same self (ipse) (in Hayes-
Brady: 29). The conflict between idem and ipse in Wallace’s works is reflective 
of the tensions canvassed above – between sophisticated irony and 
spontaneous empathy, between conditional and unconditional intentionality, 
between mediation and immediacy and so forth. Nevertheless, the suspicious 
re-imagination of these tensions as conflict arguably distinguishes Hayes-
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Brady’s work to date, again facilitating our own focus towards the essentially 
paradoxical (or perhaps simply contradictory) presentation of such tensions 
within Wallace’s texts. In this regard, her recently-released monograph The 
Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace (2016) is to be considered 
essential reading as well.  
Again, this approach is exposure-centric, attuned to the 
epistemological puzzles posed by Wallace’s fiction. Yet for Hayes-Brady, this 
kind of exposure has a particular ontological grounding as well. As Holland 
has suggested, the critical “logicking work” demanded by Wallace’s texts 
(most often through their use of suspicious or suspect discourse) is an 
essential component of those text’s attempts at soliciting empathy. Yet in 
‘Mediated Immediacy’ at least, this exegetical impulse is ultimately directed 
towards the recovery of literality (in the form of the sincerity thesis) through 
the imaginative contexts of Wallace’s fiction – the core strength of this 
argument, I have suggested, is its ability to conjoin the themes of suspicion 
and identification without subtly privileging the latter. In ‘Language, Gender 
and Modes of Power’, Hayes-Brady arguably extends this approach by 
bracketing the question of literality altogether, reincorporating themes such 
as other-directed empathy and therapeutic communication within a decidedly 
hypothetical analytic framework. Most notably, this allows for an effective 
suspicious critique of gender in Wallace’s literary project as a whole, outlined 
thus: 
Masculine linguistic power is characterized in Wallace largely by 
direct speech, linguistic play, and univocality, with oppositional 
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characteristics such as excessive quotation or tonal slippage 
indicating a lack of coherent identity. By way of contrast, Wallace 
signifies the corresponding security and coherence of identity in 
female characters via vocal plurality, dialogue, verbal 
manipulation, and, most interestingly, the infiltration of the vocal 
patterns of the men who seek to subjugate them (2013: 131-132) 
By exposing the fault-lines of Wallace’s re-imagination of gender, over and 
above his literalistic discourse on love and empathy, Hayes-Brady provides us 
with an effective hypothetical model for suspicious exegesis in relation 
Wallace. This model is explicitly premised on the empirical construction of 
character in Wallace’s work, and provides a series of representational and 
characterological binaries in this regard – “direct speech, linguistic play, and 
univocality” form one side of this semantic divide, while “vocal plurality, 
dialogue and verbal manipulation” form the other.  
Moreover, the suspicious claim linking these elements – the claim that 
Wallace’s texts represent gender difference in the form of unresolved or 
unresolvable conflict – provides a new angle to our discussions of empathy in 
Wallace. This angle is unique because it takes the representational strategies 
of the text (as revealed by semantic critique) as an a priori origin-point for 
discussing Wallace’s literary project as a whole. In other words, Hayes-Brady 
locates the ontological significance of Wallace’s project substantially within 
the text, rather than beyond it. Subsequently, the representational conflicts 
posed by the Wallace text are not preceded or resolved by the admission of 
ontology; rather, they form the precise conditions through which that prior – 
and very often hidden – ontology becomes visible and expressible. This 
reversal of emphasis – proceeding from imagination to literality, rather than 
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the other way round – makes Hayes-Brady’s work an essential addition to the 
Wallace Studies corpus, not least for its command of suspicion as a theoretical 
strategy. Whilst sharing this suspicious focus, I have elected to explore some 
of its antecedents in the field of  psychoanalytic literary theory as well, 
motivated by the proximities between Wallace-ian suspicion and the 
theoretically-specific idea of transference-neurosis in fiction (See Chapter 2). 
While the theoretical contexts of this idea have not been fully established, I 
think it fair to say that Holland and Hayes-Brady’s work provide clear accounts 
of what such a transference-neurosis might look like in Wallace. In Chapter 5, 
I will highlight some of Wallace’s more expressive or expressionistic ideas 
about “borderlinish” reading in relation to filmmaker David Lynch as well. For 
now, suffice it to say that suspicion remains an effective and wholly authorised 
response to a text like Brief Interviews, even while noting the persistence of 
literalistic and empathetic rhetoric within such texts.  
 In this second corner of Wallace Studies, then, we are dealing with the 
idea that Wallace critiques (with) the reader, both in the sense that his texts 
effectively anticipate their own interpretive conditions and – I subsequently 
argue – that they remain concerned with the imaginative activities of readers 
who critique. Following our prior discussions of intentionality, definition and 
literary empathy, we can observe that the idea of theoretical suspicion retains 
a peculiar significance in Wallace’s texts – those texts do possess depth, their 
obsessive attempts to deny such depth to the reader. In Kelly, this impossible 
dynamic occasions the critical turn outwards, to empirical readers beyond the 
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text; in Holland and Hayes-Brady, this dynamic necessitates a turn inwards, 
to the kinds of narrative, thematic and characterological strategies 
hypothesised within Wallace’s texts. Of course, the reality of Wallace’s 
criticism is far more complex than that – for example, each of the scholars 
considered thus far has taken great pains to consider the strange relationship 
of interiority and exteriority suggested by Wallace’s works, particularly 
Boswell, for whom the dialectic of inside/outside informs a kind of erotic and 
exegetical imperative. But for the sake of contrast, it is interesting to note how 
subsequent scholars have refigured this dialectic based on their approach to 
the ‘reader’. Holland, for example, arguably recapitulates a form of Boswellian 
erotics in this reading of Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, particularly 
highlighting the ironic treatment of lovers and readers therein: 
The man who ironically argues that being a ‘Great Lover’ [BI 28] 
requires allowing his partner the supreme pleasure of pleasing him 
strikes us as quite earnest only a page earlier when he is extolling 
the virtues of mutual sexual generosity, a definition of ‘great’ 
loving that sounds quite reasonable. Is it merely agreeing with him 
that makes him earnest for us? What constitutes earnestness in 
conversation, and how does one construct it in language? (2013: 
119) 
Again, what is an “act of communication” in the contexts of Wallace’s work 
and reception? The juxtaposition of these questions in Holland’s work, 
particularly in response to earlier theorisations of identification in Wallace, 
helps indicate the often-fraught relationship between literalistic and imagined 
‘readers’ in contemporary rhetorics of Wallace, whilst locating this 
relationship squarely in the realms of language and representation:  
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These interviews remind us that recognizing earnestness and 
generating empathy depend on perspective and values, negotiated 
between speakers; and that both require complex narrative 
construction and context to be present in language. (119, original 
emphasis) 
In a similar vein, Hayes-Brady’s work playfully reverses some of Wallace’s 
more overt rhetorics on readership by pointing out that “Wallace’s references 
to his imagined readers always – to the point of affectation – envisaged his 
readers as female” (2013: 133 [emphasis mine]). At the level of imagination, or 
of suspiciously affected or “imagined” readers, the present study is thus able 
to provide new insights into the ambivalent nature of Wallace’s rhetorics on 
reading, particularly where such rhetorics are transposed into narrative, 
thematic and characterological contexts. Whether writing women, rewriting 
men or re-imagining suspicious interpreters, Wallace’s texts partake in a very 
peculiar conception of literary love, arguably distinguishable from the kinds 
of plain-language empathy discovered in his earliest works. This is something 
I explore further in Chapter 4, concerning the re-imagination of suspicious 
readers in Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999). 
 
“Wallace narrates (with) the reader”  
Abstraction, Criticism and Authorship 
 How, then, does the Wallace text actually go about suggesting or 
constructing its reader? We are definitely led to consider this question in 
Wallace Studies today, given the highly-abstract and playfully theoretical 
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nature of the Wallace ‘reader’ in contemporary scholarship more broadly. 
Having effectively reopened the question of intentionality in Wallace already, 
it is pertinent to reconsider the author’s treatment of such in the essay ‘Greatly 
Exaggerated’ (1997), particularly given this text’s focus on contemporary 
capital-T Theory and the so-called ‘Death of the author’ thesis. The text is in 
fact a review, of a book by H.L. Hix called Morte d’Author: An Autopsy. 
Wallace’s theoretical framing of the book is of particular interest here, as he 
places the “metaphysical viability of the author” into question across 
numerous interpretive or meta-interpretive contexts (139). “For Romantic and 
early-twentieth-century critics, textual interpretation was author-based”, 
writes Wallace, “For Wordsworth, the critic regards a text as the creative 
instantiation of a writer’s very self” (139). On this basis, it goes without saying 
that the writer’s intentions, as an expression or instantiation of their “very self” 
in the form of text, would effectively matter in the final adjudication of that 
text. But the effective advent of the ‘Death of the Author’ thesis, as in Roland 
Barthes and what Wallace calls “the shift from New Criticism and 
structuralism to deconstruction” (138), places this common-sense idea of 
literary intention well beyond reach, in ways we have seen dramatised and 
theorised in Wallace’s texts already. In this sense, the “writer’s very self” – or 
the “relevant mental condition” of an author or text – are attempts to describe 
Hobbesian ‘authors’, defined by Wallace as “Persons who, first, accept 
responsibility for a text and, second, ‘own’ that text, i.e. retain the right to 
determine its meaning” (139).  
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With Barthes, however, Wallace takes up two main points against such 
an ‘author’. First, “a writer cannot determine his text’s consequences enough 
to be really responsible” for that text’s reception (139). We have certainly seen 
this intentional dilemma time and time again in Wallace’s work and reception 
– in their overbearing and unwieldy attempts at determining the 
consequences of their texts, Wallace’s various authorial proxies self-reflexively 
dramatise the reader’s absence, their status as the “text’s true other” (Kelly 
2010: 145). The net effect of this strategy is a kind of hypothetical surplus-
meaning in Wallace’s literary project as a whole, which becomes visible in the 
reference to and reimagining of ‘readers’ throughout his fictions, essays and 
interviews. This meaning is hinted at in Wallace’s second rejoinder to the idea 
of the ‘author’, when he writes that “the writer’s not the text’s owner in the 
Hobbesian sense because it is really critical readers who decide and thus 
determine what a piece of writing really means” (139, original emphasis). 
Again, the gesture outwards, secured by a rhetoric of undecidability and 
uncertainty – in Wallace’s take, the author is neither responsible nor 
particularly authoritative, and instead it is “critical readers” who must decide 
what the text means, and even indeed how it means.  
This kind of reader-oriented rhetoric – which of course culminates in 
Wallace’s suggestion that writing is an “act of communication” between an 
‘author’ (literal or imagined) and another “human being”, the critical reader 
(144) – allows us to consider the movement towards critical abstraction in 
Wallace’s literary project, especially in light of the literalistic or imaginative 
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discourses considered thus far. Like the qualifiers ‘literal’ or ‘imagined’, the 
term ‘abstract’ can mean a whole lot of things, but begins to take on specific 
meanings when read in conjunction with the author’s rhetoric on reading and 
interpretation. The most useful deployment of the term, I think, revolves 
around the activities of the literary critic in the wake of postmodernity, and 
the various formal, ideological or hermeneutic practices available to such a 
critic. This has certainly been a preoccupation of the scholars considered thus 
far, who have each taken up the questions of epistemological truth and 
ontological being in relation to the Wallace text, and devised particular 
abstract models – which usually involve the identity or agency of a ‘reader’ – 
for identifying and critiquing these questions. Similar theorisations of the 
‘reader’ have been shown to occur in Boswell and Holland, particularly around 
the themes of empathetic identification and critical suspicion – in each case, 
we have had cause to encounter an abstract reflection on the conditions of 
literary exegesis ‘as such’, often specifically reflecting upon the author’s own 
rhetorics on reading and interpretation at the turn of the 21st century. This 
new dynamic represents an effective escalation on the literalistic and 
imaginative rhetorics otherwise deployed by the author, and provides us with 
a third position from which to read and “read with” Wallace: a position of 
abstraction, premised on the idea that Wallace narrates (with) the reader. The 
theorisation of the critical reader in Wallace – for example, in the work of 
scholars such as Toon Staes – arguably provides us with new and distinct 
angles for discussing the identity and agency of the Wallace ‘reader’. Through 
their pre-eminent focus on the question of critical abstraction, these studies 
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provide a substantive basis for the claim that “Wallace narrates (with) the 
reader” – again in the doubled sense that they narrate their own reception-
contexts, and that they effect or compel the ‘reader’s own abstract concerns 
with such contexts.  
Toon Staes examines this dynamic from the vantage-points of narrative 
theory and contemporary reader-response theory, in his thorough analysis of 
the implied author in Wallace’s fiction, titled ‘Wallace and Empathy: A 
Narrative Approach’ (2014). Staes’ work is notable for its rethinking of 
empathy and suspicion in Wallace’s novels, and for consistently questioning 
the abstract conditions for empathy provided in contemporary scholarship. 
This approach proceeds on a largely narratological basis, which distinguishes 
itself at the outset from more literalistic or imaginative approaches: 
Although the notion of the implied author may well be drawing 
heavy criticism in recent narrative theory, empirical research 
indicates that readers infer a representation of the writer while 
reading, merging the information that they gather from the text 
with the knowledge they have about its author […] Given his 
widely quoted views on literature, the average reader may already 
have a keen image of Wallace before touching the first page of his 
books. No matter how often a writer brandishes his opinions, 
however, it would be unwise to take these at face value: especially 
for novels as challenging as Wallace’s, the possibility exists that we 
start reading things into them that are simply not there. (24) 
The key turn here, once again, is the critical bracketing of the Wallace text’s 
literality – the specific avoidance of “face value” claims in favour of a more 
abstract formulation of the problem: “The following pages address this 
problem by raising questions about the relationship between author, narrator, 
and text,” writes Staes, asking “how does Wallace present himself as a writer, 
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how does that translate into his novels […] and which narrative strategies does 
he use to that end?” (24). The foregrounding of narrative imagination – the 
representation and re-imagination of concepts through narrative discourse – 
is also unmistakable here, as are Staes’ suspicions about the literalistic 
excesses of contemporary Wallace Studies. Despite his focus on empathy, 
Staes remains wary of Wallace’s mysterious or paradoxical rhetorics of 
interpretation, pointing out that “the zeal with which critics have latched onto 
[E Unibus Pluram] and the accompanying interview with Larry McCaffery has 
given Wallace’s work an uncomfortable air of the holier-than-thou” (25).  
Building on this suspicious hermeneutics, Staes provides an abstracted 
theoretical basis for reading the implied author in Wallace, based on what he 
calls the “empathy-altruism hypothesis” (25), which foregrounds the 
substitution of “experiences of narrative empathy” for “shared feelings with 
real others” (Keen, in Staes: 25). This theorisation of the ‘author’ – which, I will 
subsequently note, is heavily framed by statements about ‘readers’ – has had 
a major impact on the present study, because it effectively traces many of the 
movements between literality, imagination and abstraction in Wallace’s 
rhetorics of authorship and interpretation. My research explores similar 
questions, whilst reversing their emphasis, asking instead how readers are 
presented by Wallace and implied by’] his texts, and investigating the 
consequences of such an implication on our own critical rhetorics of Wallace. 
But our intentions are, I think, largely the same – to remind you that Wallace’s 
complex rhetoric on fiction, whilst compelling, does not necessarily tell the 
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whole story, and does not in and of itself provide an abstract basis for reading 
Wallace’s fictions.  
 Staes’ theorisation of the ‘implied author’ is in fact comprised by a 
deluge of theoretical or definitional statements about contemporary readers, 
which confirm and reinforce many of the concepts explored above, 
particularly identification, imagination, suspicion and, of course, empathy. 
These sorts of statements are significant for the present study, insofar as an 
abstract focus on the implied author of Wallace’s texts would appear to 
authorise a renewed focus on the implied audience of those texts as well (See 
Chapter 5). Moreover, retracing Staes’ theorising of the ‘reader’ can help us 
locate his works alongside the thinkers canvassed thus far, whilst highlighting 
the recurrence of particular epistemological, ontological and rhetorical issues 
at this more abstract level of theorising. “Narrative empathy,” writes Staes, 
“hinges primarily on the reader’s willingness to engage intellectually and 
emotionally with the text” (28) – that is, it is a function of identification, as 
suggested by Boswell and Kelly above. In Wallace’s texts, however, this 
function is characteristically obscured: “The many underspecified actions and 
textual gaps in Infinite Jest indicate that it is up to the reader to reorganise the 
seemingly unrelated narrative strands into a meaningful whole” (28). The 
effect of under-specification, or narrative indeterminacy in Staes’ formulation, 
is of particular interest here, as it highlights Wallace’s unique command of 
“unnatural narration” – “consciousnesses bleeding into one another, multiply 
embedded narratives, and other examples that obscure the idea that narration 
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is a form of communication involving a sender and a receiver” (28).. However, 
as Staes goes on to note, “Every reader who fills in the gaps in a text does so 
on the basis of her or his own knowledge, preferences and experiences” (29); 
consequently, the Wallace text establishes the condition that “In order to 
achieve a complete and satisfying interpretation of [Infinite Jest], readers 
actually have to produce information” (29, original emphasis). This kind of 
observation, I think, begins to distinguish Staes’ approach from the theorists 
canvassed above – it is the explicit movement towards the production of 
information, to a more explicit rhetoric of abstraction which takes into 
account both literal and imaginative discourses of ‘reading’ and authorship.  
Staes’ approach appeals, moreover, to those inclined to suspect 
Wallace’s own rhetorics of interpretation, particularly because it is grounded 
outside of or apart from that rhetoric – for example, citing empirical 
(neurological) studies of readers, and the critical re-imagination of readers by 
narrative theorists such as Gerard Genette, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Brian 
Richardson. From this abstracted position, Staes’ work effectively reframes the 
paradoxical characteristics of Wallace’s texts in terms of their literary and 
critical effects, specifically the twin effects of over- and under-determination 
of meaning. Stated in the abstract: “Underdetermined texts send no clear 
message as to how they are to be read. Overdetermined texts send diverse or 
mutually exclusive messages” (38). By retracing these kinds of theoretical 
statements, and simply highlighting their status as statements about readers, 
the present study takes things a step further: I am specifically concerned with 
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the complex use of the term ‘reader’ in contemporary critical rhetoric, and the 
strange rhetorical authority that such use confers. Arguably, this study 
represents the reverse of an implied author approach – by centralising our 
focus through the ‘reader’, we have already been led to contend with 
numerous difficult-to-qualify statements about authorial intentionality. The 
benefit of such an approach, I think, is that it helps distinguish between 
different kinds of rhetorical overdetermination suggested by scholars like 
Staes, whilst specifically exploring the potential overdetermination of the 
term ‘reader’ in Wallace’s work and reception. The complementarity of our 
works can thus be argued on the basis of the indeterminacy/ 
overdetermination thesis. At this abstract level, and having noted our 
theoretical precedents in Wallace Studies to date, I believe there is much yet 
to discover about the implied reader of the Wallace text, particularly when 
such ‘readers’ remain potentially overdetermined by criticism.  
With this functionally-abstracted sense of the ‘‘reader’ in mind, we 
have thus arrived at a sophisticated-enough vantage-point from which to 
consider the sheer breadth of contemporary Wallace Studies. Whilst Wallace 
has already been seen to refer outwards to the age of theory (Kelly) and to 
peer inwards on questions of the narcissistic imagination (Holland), the 
positioning of these strategies in contemporary critical discourse remains an 
open question, as evidenced by the theoretical heterogeneity of Wallace 
Studies as a discipline. In the eight or so years since the author’s literal death, 
there have been at least five major critical collections released on the subject 
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of David Foster Wallace, under the titles Consider David Foster Wallace 
(Hering [Ed], 2010), The Legacy of David Foster Wallace (Cohen & 
Konstantinou [Eds], 2012), A Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies 
(Boswell & Burn [Eds], 2013), David Foster Wallace and “the Long Thing”: 
Essays on the Novels (Boswell [Ed], 2014) and Gesturing Toward Reality: David 
Foster Wallace and the Long Thing (Bolger & Korb [Eds], 2014). Add at least 
three phenomenal pieces of literary journalism – D.T. Max’s biography Every 
Love Story is a Ghost Story: A Life of David Foster Wallace (2012), the interview 
collection Conversations with David Foster Wallace (Burn [Ed], 2012) and 
David Lipsky’s Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself: A Road Trip 
with David Foster Wallace (2010) – have also arrived in that time, with the 
latter adapted for the screen as The End of the Tour (Ponsoldt, 2015). Add also 
standalone works from Boswell (2003), Greg Carlisle (2007) and Stephen J 
Burn (2012), as well as new or incoming studies, and you can certainly make a 
case for the rapid realisation and codification of knowledge in relation to the 
author and his works. This rapid emergence has been noted by Adam Kelly in 
the essay ‘David Foster Wallace: The Death of the Author and the Birth of a 
Discipline’ (2010b), which highlights the “democratic” proliferation of 
knowledge around Wallace, and the canny coexistence of scholarly 
publications and international conventions with the activities of “skilful and 
committed non-professional readers, who publish their findings in the public 
domain of the web” (Para 4).  
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But with the steadily escalating influx of critical materials about 
Wallace in mind, it is nevertheless clear that the field is moving into particular 
areas of specialisation, as evidenced by recurrent themes such as empathy, 
suspicion and authorial identity, and the recurrent and concurrent 
theorisation of concepts such as literality, imagination and abstraction. What 
do all of these approaches have in common, aside from their concern with 
Wallace? Their concern with the reader of Wallace, whether that concern is 
literal, imagined or abstract – or, as is obviously most often the case, with 
some unique admixture of these three levels.  
Having traversed this circuit already, with help from Boswell, Kelly, 
Holland, Hayes-Brady and Staes, we can conclude by considering some of the 
more effective representations of the ‘reader’ in Wallace Studies, moreover 
highlighting the work of emerging and established Wallace scholars. In the 
work of Allard den Dulk, we find Wallace’s literalistic rhetorics transposed 
through existentialist philosophy – in the conclusion to ‘Boredom, Irony, and 
Anxiety: Wallace and the Kierkegaardian View of Self’ (2014), he writes that 
Wallace’s fiction “points out the real world and urges us to pay attention to it, 
to commit to it, and thereby, to become ourselves” (58). Meanwhile, Lee 
Konstantinou’s excellent post-ideological analysis of Wallace, ‘No Bull: David 
Foster Wallace and Postironic Belief’ (2012) contains the following suspicious 
critique of the author’s “strictly literal” rhetorics: like Wallace, “Postironists 
are more concerned with overthrowing a particular type of person, the ironist, 
and have far less to say about changing the institutional relations that give rise 
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to this type” (106). Andrew Warren has sought to model the kinds of 
“community” imagined or abstracted in Wallace, through the provision of four 
discursive types, “Contracted Realism, Jargony Argot, [Spontaneous Data 
Intrusions] and Free Indirect Wraith” (80) – I recommend this piece quite a 
bit, particularly for its acknowledgment that characters in Infinite Jest 
“struggle not merely against one another but, more generally, against its 
narrative structure even as that structure struggles to encompass them” (80). 
And in the brilliant ‘How We Ought to Do Things With Words’, Alexis Burgess 
provides the definitive reading of Wallace’s linguistic prescriptivism, through 
a close reading of ‘Authority and American Usage’ (2005) which highlights the 
author’s “establishing that our linguistic choices can often have nonlinguistic 
consequences of pretty obvious practical and ethical significance”, and that 
“given what we already care about, we should also care about how we express 
ourselves (2014: 16). And finally, David Hering has written eloquently about 
fractal narrative structure in Infinite Jest in his essay ‘Triangles, Cycles, 
Choices & Chases’ (2010), and in the book David Foster Wallace: Fiction and 
Form (2016). “The reader gradually becomes aware of an increase in the size 
and focus of the chapters as they read,” writes Hering, as the initial shorter 
chapters of IJ become re-abstracted or “retrospectively understood to form 
part of the overarching structure so we are ultimately aware of the gargantuan 
system of relationships that operates across the entire novel” (90).  
Across this heterogeneous discourse about literature, I believe we can 
make a case for the persistence of the ‘reader’ as a point of interpretive 
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reference, even in the face of Wallace’s complex rhetoric of reading and 
interpretation, and the evident challenges which this rhetoric poses for us 
today. This chapter has traversed issues around epistemology and ontology, 
naivete and cynicism, sincerity and authenticity, sincerity and narcissism, 
empathy and suspicion, identification and critique and finally, abstraction in 
the form of the implied reader.  And yet throughout this process, we have had 
cause to observe the sheer ubiquity of the term ‘reader’ in Wallace’s work and 
reception, and to reconsider this term in the contexts of contemporary critical 
rhetoric.  
This approach has been guided by a definitive and plausible logic – 
again, I reason that Wallace tends to speak about his reader in four ways, each 
representing an escalation or self-conscious turn upon the terms of the 
preceding rhetoric. But if this is the case, then our fourth level – the level of 
enclosure, of metafiction or meta-rhetoric – still eludes us, even despite the 
wealth of commentary available on literal, imagined and abstract ‘readers’ of 
Wallace. In other words, our study has a context – the ‘implied reader’ of post-
postmodern metafiction, as indirectly revealed in Staes and in Wallace Studies 
more broadly – but no trajectory, that is, no particular premise on which to 
judge this context outside of its own discursive or theoretical parameters. And 
yet, we have seen that these critical parameters repeat – with the ongoing 
emergence of books about Wallace, conventions and conferences about 
Wallace, movies starring Jason Segel as Wallace and yes, even PhD 
dissertations about Wallace, we are bound to see the further repetition of 
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themes such as empathetic identification, suspicious critique and literary 
intentionality, Each of these repetitions will bear out in some way the idea 
that “Wallace narrates (with) the reader” – that his texts offer unique insights 
as to how they are meant to be read, and indeed as to what reading means for 
Wallace and his contemporary audience. I consider this idea further in 
Chapter 5: readers who narrate, by reading Wallace alongside two unlikely 
contemporaries – the director David Lynch, whose cinematics Wallace 
described in ‘David Lynch Keeps his Head’ (1999), and the tennis prodigy 
Tracey Austin, whose ghost-written memoir Beyond Centre Court: My Story is 
the subject of Wallace’s ‘How Tracey Austin Broke My Heart’ (2005). The aim 
of this detour is to consider new contexts within Wallace Studies by 
reconsidering what Wallace calls “Expressionism” – the activity or strategy of 
an author “getting inside the head” of their audience (1999) – whilst also 
reconsidering Wallace’s abstract presentation of “David Foster Wallace” in his 
para-literary works. With Staes, and with scholars such as Staes and Mike 
Miley (2016), this chapter indicates a more exposure-oriented approach to the 
question of the ‘author’, by juxtaposing the appearance of that author with the 
consistent reappearance of ‘readers’ in Wallace’s early cultural-journalistic 
works.  
  
Conclusion: Performing the ‘Fiction-Writer’s Reader’ (I) 
 Beyond this given theoretical context, there remains something kind 
of troubling about Wallace’s rhetorics on reading, which I am often at a loss 
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to describe myself. I know full well that when I read a text written by David 
Foster Wallace, I am somehow engaged in an “act of communication between 
one human being and another”, and that I am seeing that “act” presented on 
the page, and that my peers see either variant of this “act” as representative of 
the quality and versatility of “David Foster Wallace the author”. But what 
interests me, and what governs the entirety of this study, is the sheer and 
simple fact of repetition – that is, the fact of the actual concept of reading being 
placed into question, time and time again, in Wallace’s fiction. A simple 
enough reason for the escalation of reader-rhetorics in Wallace is that he 
simply couldn’t let go of his reader – as scholars of Wallace knows, his work is 
a masterful tribute to literary self-obsession, typically appearing to have 
hypothesised and exhausted every known interpretive possibility before the 
critic has even raised their pen. But this self-reflexive obsession leaves traces, 
which can be routinely observed at that most crucial of narrative junctures – 
the constructive repetition of readers who identify, critique and narrate the 
Wallace text.  
This is where our typology of performance comes in handy once again; 
by distinguishing between the literal, the imagined, the abstract and the 
performative senses that we have of the term ‘reader’, we can begin to offer 
new commentary on the use of the term in Wallace’s project more broadly, as 
well as in exciting emerging research on the implied author and authorial 
“performance” (Miley, 2016; Staes, 2014). The completion of our circuit is thus 
provided on the basis of repetition, of the specific repeating of themes like 
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literality, imagination and abstraction in Wallace’s work and reception. The 
movement towards enclosure in Wallace is thus signalled by the interposition 
of three major questions. Who are we in relation to David Foster Wallace and 
his texts? Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace? And, finally, how are 
we to ascertain the identity and agency of such ‘readers’, particularly in light 
of the author’s complex and assuasive rhetorics about reading? This typology 
suggests that there are four major types of claim at stake in contemporary 
Wallace Studies, each providing us a new vantage point for assessing the 
author’s complex rhetoric on reading and the literary encounter. As we shall 
see, this typology authorises a particular kind of rhetoric, or rather a diverse 
set of rhetorical positions, predicated on the escalating repetition of the term 
‘reader’ in fiction and criticism alike.   
In the first corner of this typology, Wallace identifies (with) the reader. 
This kind of claim is evidenced whenever someone, more often than not 
Wallace, makes a claim for a reader ‘beyond’ the text, whether in his 
discussions of literary “conversation” in McCaffery (1993) or his complex 
treatment of literary “love” in Girl with Curious Hair (1989). As a kind of 
referential definition, Wallace’s identifications of his reader are many and 
complex; as a form of literary empathy, Wallace’s literary identification with 
his reader have been taken as a sign of the author’s entire predisposition 
towards fiction-writing in the information age.  
Yet in the second corner, Wallace critiques (with) the reader. This kind 
of claim arguably inheres in the suspicious quality of Wallace’s writings, 
136 
 
particularly middle-period works such as Brief Interviews with Hideous Men 
(1999) and even Infinite Jest (1997). As a kind of rhetorical imagination, 
Wallace’s texts critique their own postmodern preconditions; nevertheless, 
this critique is itself subject to self-reflexive scrutiny in those same texts. In 
this ambivalent or bifurcated sense, Wallace’s texts identify, identify with, 
critique and critique with their reader all at once – the adaptive complexity of 
Wallace’s texts, their complex presentation of readers, writers and texts alike, 
presents the basis for the third corner: Wallace narrates (with) the reader.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this narration comes from two places. First, it 
comes from Wallace “himself”, or more specifically in the abstract notion of 
“David Foster Wallace” the author (Staes, 2013), or in the various self-
presentations of same in Wallace’s essays and interviews (Miley, 2016). 
Second, it comes from Wallace’s texts, in their abstract re-imagining of this 
same process, more often than not in the form of a cultural, journalistic or 
political essay.  
As I argue subsequently, this re-imagining or re-abstraction of a 
particular subject term – the ‘reader’ – can be read as a kind transferential-
neurotic discourse, that is, an “acting-out” of certain unconscious exegetical 
anxieties on the part of the Wallace text. This claim is pursued and elaborated 
in the following chapter, which presents a novel reading of the Freudian 
transference-neurosis in Wallace. This will allow us to better understand the 
kind of claim canvassed at the beginning of this chapter – that is, Wallace’s 
positing of a “familiar love-hate syndrome of seduction”, a “desperate desire 
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to please coupled with a kind of hostility towards the reader”. This kind of 
definitional diagnosis is not uncommon in Wallace’s far-reaching statements 
about his ‘reader’, and I have elected to preface chapters of this thesis with an 
overtly “Freudian” statement about the ‘reader’ in Wallace, to highlight those 
moments at which the author and his literary project can appear most 
estranging to contemporary audiences. The proximity of Wallace’s “act of 
communication” thesis to psychoanalytic ideas about transference and 
performance is, I think, quite illuminating.  
By reconstructing the theme of “acting-out”, and the kinds of critical 
estrangement afforded by 20th century psychoanalytic literary criticism, 
Chapter 2 offers substantial methodological grounds for negotiating Wallace’s 
rhetoric of the ‘reader’, alongside some of the more prominent paradoxes in 
contemporary scholarship on the author. In the claim-making and 
classificatory style deployed above, I will argue that Wallace negates (with) 
the reader, an effect evident in late phase fictions such as Oblivion (2004) and 
The Pale King (2010). These fictions (Oblivion in particular) take us full circle, 
repurposing the ‘reader’ in a game of transferential-neurotic uncertainty, 
which takes into account the diversity and heterogeneity of meaning behind 
concepts like literality, imagination and abstraction (See Chapter 6). Wallace’s 
final short story collection is both self-reflexive (reflecting in particular on the 
author’s empathetic technique) and estranging (in its blatant repurposing of 
Freudian tropes and anxieties). This negative technique is something I will 
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compare to the transference-neurosis in Freud, which is typified by the 
production of self-reflexive discourse by the analysand under treatment.  
Thus, there is perhaps no escaping our enclosed sense of Wallace and 
his fictional project as a whole – the feeling of pre-determination or 
manipulation in Wallace’s texts, and the consequences of this feeling for the 
engaged interpreter of those texts. Nevertheless, by unpacking this 
interpretive predicament, this approach fulfils the heuristic promise of the 
study as a whole, allowing the new reader of Wallace access into some of the 
more overt ‘Close Encounters’ suggested by Wallace’s literary project and its 
diverse reception contexts. Having suggested four complex rhetorical 
positions in the introductory chapter – a literalistic position, an imaginative 
position, an abstract position and a performative position – it remains for us 
to establish whether these positions are unique to or especially beneficial for 
existing studies of Wallace. My novel reading of performance, predicated on a 
post-Freudian reading of the term “acting-out” in Wallace, offers an 
enthusiastic yes to both of these concerns. Through the positing of such 
games, Wallace’s texts anticipate or foreclose upon their own effect on 
readers; yet as an imagined disclosure, an acting-out of the author-reader 
relationship in discourse, these texts provide an performative meta-
commentary on their own operations as texts. The escalation from the literal 
to the imagined to the abstract to the performative sense of the ‘reader’ is 
essential to Wallace’s rhetorics of same. Moreover, we experience this 
rhetoric; it is at once conveyed as the substance of Wallace’s metafictions, and 
by the repetition of that substance in contemporary scholarship.   
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Chapter 2  
Acting-Out 
 
 
As time passes I get less and less nuts about anything I’ve 
published, and it gets harder to know for sure when its 
antagonistic elements are in there because they serve a useful 
purpose and when they’re just covert manifestations of this 
‘look-at-me-please-love-me-I-hate-you’ syndrome I still 
sometimes catch myself falling into.  
(Wallace, in McCaffery 2012: 32) 
 
 
Introduction: “look-at-me-please-love-me-I-hate-you” 
 This chapter provides an alternative reading of self-reflexivity and 
repetition in Wallace’s works, which takes into account the persistence of 
Freudian and post-Freudian models of reading in contemporary Wallace 
scholarship (Boswell, 2003; Holland 2006, 2013). This reading emerges out of 
my engagements with the field in Chapter 1, which have placed the ‘implied 
reader’ of Wallace’s fiction into decisive question. By observing the particular 
significance of themes such as empathetic identification, suspicious critique 
and critical abstraction in discussions of Wallace, we have also begun to 
establish productive parallels between those discussions and the various self-
reflexive rhetorics pursued in Wallace’s fictions and essays. In one sense, then, 
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we can say that Wallace’s fictions are self-reflexive because they repeat certain 
persuasive ideas about reading. The uncertain (yet surely multivalent) nature 
of the author’s “act of communication” thesis has provided clear evidence of 
this already, as has the estranging repetition of such uncertainty in texts such 
as the Gilbert interview (2012; see Introduction). But what is it to say that a 
text repeats? Moreover, why do such repetitions lead to such estranging 
effects?  Chapter 1 has provided us with part of the answer – estrangement 
(through eroticised discourse, say, or through utilisation of theoretically 
‘suspicious’ discourses) is simply a necessary component of Wallace’s 
empathetic agenda, the formal and thematic ‘negative’ of the “really human” 
communication that the author sought within his fiction. But the 
destabilisation of this relationship – between the “act[s] of communication” 
avowed by Wallace and the repetition of inhuman or even anti-human 
discourses in his fiction – has also been a long-standing concern for scholars 
of Wallace, who all recognise (to differing extents) that statements about 
‘reading Wallace’ require negotiating certain estranging instances of ‘Wallace 
reading’. Because when Wallace reads – or more accurately, when his writings 
start making claims, offering critiques or rendering abstractions – these 
readings self-reflexively return to and repeat certain ideas about the ‘reader’.  
These ideas are the focus of my reconstructive efforts in this study, and 
have been grouped by the tropes of (literalistic) readers who identify, 
(imaginative) readers who critique, and (abstract) readers who narrate (See 
Chapter 3-5). Having considered the particular significance of such ‘readers’ 
in contemporary Wallace scholarship, it remains for us to consider whether 
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the repetition of these ideas (even in the form of self-reflexive exposition, 
explanation, or exegesis) can itself account for the estranging nature of 
repetition in Wallace’s fiction. In investigating this idea, I have elected to 
highlight a particularly estranging vector in Wallace’s short fictions – 
specifically, the persistence of Freudian and post-Freudian tropes in the 
author’s discussions of the ‘reader’. Through close attention to four seminal 
psychoanalytic works – Freud’s metapsychological essay ‘Remembering, 
Repeating and Working-Through’ (1914), Paul Ricoeur’s Freud and Philosophy: 
An Essay on Interpretation (1978), Peter Brook’s ‘The Idea of a Psychoanalytic 
Literary Criticism’ (1986) and Shoshanna Felman’s Writing and Madness (2012) 
– this chapter provides novel insight into the estranging dynamics of acting-
out in fiction. As this chapter suggests, the weird world of 20th century 
psychoanalytic literary criticism can provide an effective alternative basis for 
reading Wallace’s fiction, particularly when that fiction remains concerned 
with certain performative and transferential ideas about reading, repeating, 
working-through and acting-out . By engaging with these ideas, we may thus 
set the stage for the claim that Wallace’s texts perform their ‘readers’, through 
the estranging mechanisms of repetition, re-imagination and re-abstraction.  
While Freudo-Lacanian thought is an acknowledged vector in 
contemporary Wallace Studies, there is much to be said about the 
epistemological and ontological bases for ‘reading Freud in Wallace’ (and 
indeed of reading Freud with Wallace, as this study seeks to do). As this 
chapter’s readings of Freud, Ricoeur, Brooks and Felman indicate, some of the 
more effective arguments for “the status of the ‘and’ linking psychoanalysis 
142 
 
and literary criticism” (Brooks, 1986: 3; Felman 2012: 149-159) have already 
been made by prominent Freudian and post-Freudian critics of the 20th 
century, and it is thus appropriate to consider whether these arguments 
remain in play in psychoanalytically-aware, dialogically-disposed metafictions 
like Wallace’s. There is at least one point on which Wallace appears almost 
perfectly in sync with these ideas – that is, his insistence on the estranging yet 
therapeutic nature of the literary text, as evidenced by the idea that Wallace’s 
fiction functions as both diagnosis and cure (Boswell, 2003), or rather that its 
diagnostic functions engender or effect empathetic outcomes (Holland, 2013) 
(See Chapter 1).  
What follows, then, is a reading of psychoanalytic theory that is 
particularly inflected by Wallace’s own ideas about literary transference and 
performance, which have already been obliquely signalled by his complex 
rhetoric of the ‘reader’ – most importantly, through this rhetoric’s emphasis 
on performative and engaged modes of reading, which this study likens to the 
activities of a transference-neurosis in the classical Freudian sense (1914). In 
this reading, the “act(s) of communication” repeated, re-imagined and re-
abstracted by Wallace’s fictions are viewed here as akin to the discourse of a 
Freudian analysand, due to their shared self-consciousness towards 
psychoanalytic interpretive method as such. This self-consciousness enables 
the production of new (estranged, yet discursive and observable) meanings 
within the dialogue between analyst and analysand, specifically within the 
discourse which both participants construct and negotiate. But this second-
order psychoanalytic dialogue remains, in virtually every sense, performative 
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– it is a game of masks, of identities quite literally ‘assumed by’ speakers, 
particularly as the clinical transference results in new forms of self-
presentation, imaginative construction and critical representation on the part 
of analyst and analysand alike.  
Nevertheless, I maintain that this transferential-neurotic game matters 
in Wallace’s fiction – as this study suggests, the most estranging thing about 
Wallace’s rhetoric of the ‘reader’ is its proximity to Freudian ideas about 
acting-out, and close attention to this term yields valuable insights when 
discussing “act(s) of communication” in Wallace’s fiction. Through this novel 
reading of the term ‘acting-out’, specifically in the contexts of Wallace’s short-
fictional project, I suggest a simple point of departure: the ‘reader’, as it has 
been formulated thus far in this study, is an index for those points at which 
Wallace repeats particular transference-neuroses, that is, particular second-
order responses to the question: Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace? 
If we take this question as a basis for performative critique, a challenge to 
Wallace’s rhetoric (since it questions that rhetoric’s uncritical repetition of the 
term ‘reader’), then we can begin to articulate the more suspicious or 
exposure-oriented vectors of the claim that ‘readers’ repeat in Wallace.  
The psychoanalytic perspective arguably authorises this study’s use of 
the verbs repeat, re-imagine and re-abstract. Under the conditions of the 
transference-neurosis, the analysand is no longer dealing with a ‘real’ 
phenomenon, but with a self-conscious disposition towards ‘unreal’ 
hypothetical phenomena, necessitating one’s self-conscious formation of new 
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discourse, new explanations, new abstract connections (Lear, 2006). I believe 
that something similar occurs in Wallace’s self-reflexive fictions, particularly 
when those fictions begin to insist that they are quite specifically not 
transferential (in a manner which produces, inevitably, a string of excessive 
claims which indicate that those texts do, in fact, inhere to some transferential 
dynamics). To quietly insist that they are, then, is to engage with a 
proliferation of second-order meanings, which remain specifically and 
explicitly indexed by concerns around the ‘reader’ – specifically, with the idea 
of readers who negate. This negation – of the claim that fiction is “an act of 
communication between one human being and another” (Wallace 1997: 144) 
– is not the same as a suspicious critique of that claim. It involves, rather, a 
certain wholesale deconstruction of Wallace’s empathetic project, or at the 
very least of its rhetorical underpinnings. It would be conveyed, most likely, 
from one of the older psychoanalytic schools, for which empathy, 
intentionality and even love might be seen as a semiotic conspiracy, a 
transference-neurosis or “acting-out” that is (the imagined ‘reader’ would 
suggest) nothing more than a substitute for any real “act of communication”. 
I say ‘would be’ because this is precisely the kind of ‘reader’ that Wallace 
imagines in his final short story collection – as this study will ultimately reveal, 
Freudian psychodrama is at least one basis upon which Wallace himself will 
ask the question Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace?, estranging scare 
quotes and all (See Chapter 6).  
We have defined the transference – and the related concepts of 
obsessional neurosis, transference-neurosis and acting-out – in our 
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introductory  chapter. But for the purposes of our discussions here, we will 
define the transferential-neurotic ‘reader’ – the subject of classical 
psychoanalytic reading – in the following ways. The transferential subject 
repeats: the most famous instances of the transference are in fact declarations 
of love for the analyst, which Freud takes to be repetitions or defensive 
projections of prior relationships onto the analytic ‘present’. Moreover, the 
transferential subject re-imagines: when made aware of particular repetitions 
in their speech, the analysand provides numerous possible accounts for this 
repetition (which are, of course, further iterations of the same phenomena). 
These second-order responses form the basis for the analyst’s intervention, 
which is primarily discursive – the analyst performs their work on the 
transference-neurosis by re-abstracting  particular connections within a 
predefined discursive space. At the same time however, the specific loci and 
trajectories of the transference-neurosis – as will be demonstrated in Ricoeur’s 
work on psychoanalytic hermeneutics, Brooks’ formal erotics and Shoshanna 
Felman’s critical hermeneutics – retain a certain illuminating and estranging 
proximity to the idea of ‘reader’-construction in Wallace’s fiction.   
Without pre-empting this analysis, I’d like you to consider this 
definition of literary dialogue from Peter Brooks’ 1986 essay 'The Idea of a 
Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism’:  
A transferential model thus allows us to take as the object of 
analysis, not author or reader, but reading, including of course 
the transferential-imperative operations that belong to reading.  
Meaning in this view is not simply ‘in the text’, nor wholly the 
fabrication of a reader (or a community of readers), but in the 
dialogic struggle and collaboration of the two, in the activation 
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of textual possibilities in the process of reading. Such a view 
ultimately destabilizes the authority of the reader/critic in 
relation to the text since, caught up in the transference, he 
becomes analysand as well as analyst (1986: 14) 
Crucially, Brooks will proceed to connect this interpretive psychodrama to the 
more traditional idea of a framed tale, whose theoretical coherence appears 
dictated through the deliberate construction of the ‘reader’ (a “surrogate 
addressee” for the transferential desires of a given text):  
The narratee, the addressee, the ‘you’ of the text is always in some 
measure a surrogate for the reader, who must define his own 
interpretation and responses in response to the implied 
judgement, and the discursive implication, of the explicit or 
implicit textual ‘you’ (11) 
The advantage of a Brooksian model, in this instance at least, is its near-total 
congruity with Wallace’s statements about ‘readers’. Even whilst admitting 
the specific interposition of the transference, and the necessary refusal of 
authority that this interposition confers, the above statements seem to me to 
be an effective counter-response to the more overtly transferential (or 
transferential-neurotic) aspects of Wallace’s own ‘declarations of love’ for the 
‘reader’ (See Chapter 3). Moreover, as we shall see, the interposition of 
psychoanalytic literary theory and Wallace Studies allows for a more thorough 
discussion of estrangement in the Wallace text. Wallace’s anxious take on the 
(transferentially-)framed tale is enough to alert us to this concern, particularly 
as we situate this performative reading in broader psychoanalytic contexts. 
This estrangement, like Wallace’s fiction and Freud’s transference-neurosis, is 
to be considered a self-reflexive effect, primarily achieved through repetition 
– that is, more simply, through “acting-out”.  
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As we shall see, this theoretical groundwork forms the necessary basis 
for the psychoanalytic reader-response readings of Wallace which follow. At 
the outset, however, we can make a few basic observations about Wallace’s 
texts which may arguably warrant a more judicious awareness of Brooksian 
methodology in relation to those texts. These are simple observations, but 
they are underwritten by the ‘four readers’ hypothesis which I have brought 
to bear on Wallace’s works thus far. First, these texts have a surprising 
tendency to evoke the reader’s sympathies through overt declarations of love 
for that reader. Second, they also provide elaborate examples of such 
declarations, though grotesque and hideous parodies of “lovers” and ‘readers’ 
alike. Third, they present rhetorically-complex ideas as to how they (the texts) 
should be interpreted. And fourth, they  repeat certain essential relationships 
between ‘reader’ and ‘author’ at the level of text, a strategy which seems 
inevitably conditioned by certain authorial or metafictional anxieties on the 
part of “Wallace the author”.  
The specific strangeness of these gestures reminds me, quite vividly, of 
the strange rhetoric of the classical Freudian analysand, even – or especially – 
when Wallace frames such gestures with a canny self-awareness of 
transferential idioms and tropes. Again, this self-awareness has been well-
documented, but I am rather concerned with the estranging proximities 
between this strategy and Wallace’s insistent return to Freudian ideas within 
his fiction. For example, we might reconsider some of the more well-known 
claims in the Wallace corpus from a more informed post-Freudian 
perspective, for example the author’s claim that good art has “something to 
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do with love”, that is, with “having the discipline to talk out of the part of 
yourself that can love instead of the part that just wants to be loved” 
(McCaffery 2012: 50, emphasis mine). Here and elsewhere, Wallace refers back 
to psychoanalytic ideas about fiction, which are not exactly resolved by the 
author’s definition of love as “having the discipline” to “talk out” certain parts 
of “yourself”. In fact, I believe it is sometimes fair to say that Wallace’s fictions 
refer back transferential and performative ideas about talking-out (acting-out) 
as a matter of necessity – while there is no doubt that Wallace’s texts practice 
a kind of self-reflexive love for the reader (See Chapter 3), it remains to be seen 
whether this love is not simply exhausted by a close reading of the 
transference in Wallace.  
 
Reading the Literal with Freud 
In the 1914 essay ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’, 
Sigmund Freud reconsiders the evolution of psychoanalytic theory following 
the theorisation of the transference, distinguishing the activities of the 
informed Freudian analyst with pre-transferential approaches such as Breur’s 
cathartic method (hypnotic regression), as well as the kind of interventionist 
approaches that had characterised earlier forms of the psychoanalytic work 
(146). In these different hypothetical phases of the psychoanalytic treatment, 
the role of the analyst differs according to the empirical location of 
psychoanalytic knowledge, particularly in relation to the pre-history (or more 
simply the ‘past’) of the analysand in treatment. Whether through a kind of 
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repetitive return to that past (as per hypnotic suggestion), or an re-
imagination of that past (as per analytic exegesis), Freud indicates that the 
work of the analyst had been concerned with “The situations which had given 
rise to the formation of the symptom and the other situations which lay 
behind the moment at which the illness broke out” (146).  
However, with the theoretical advent of transference, we see a marked 
redefinition of what we might call the classical Freudian analyst: 
Finally, there was evolved the consistent technique used today, 
in which the analyst gives up the attempt to bring a particular 
moment or problem into focus. He contents himself with 
studying whatever is present for the time being on the surface 
of the patient’s mind, and he employs the art of interpretation 
mainly for the purpose of recognizing the resistances which 
appear there, and making them conscious to the patient. […] 
The aim of these different techniques has, of course, remained 
the same. Descriptively speaking, it is to fill gaps in memory; 
dynamically speaking, it is to overcome resistances due to 
repression (146-147).  
In this almost-benign theorising of psychoanalytic practice, Freud is actually 
setting up one of the most enduring theoretical contributions to the 
psychoanalytic corpus in its fraught century or so of existence. ‘Remembering, 
Repeating and Working-Through’ asks after the descriptive and dynamic 
bases of the classical psychoanalytic dialogue, and grounds its answers 
through the complex epistemological and ontological dilemmas posed by the 
transference, a phenomenon which is thought to account for both descriptive 
“gaps in memory” and dynamic “resistances due to repression”. On this basis, 
the transference is a cornerstone mechanism of resistance to the work of 
psychoanalytic interpretation – through it, Freud writes, “The patient brings 
out of the armoury of the past the weapons with which he defends himself 
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against the progress of the treatment – weapons which we must wrest from 
him one by one” (150). Yet despite this formulation, the transference is also 
thought to be the principal dynamic of the Freudian cure, that is, the basis on 
which the analyst succeeds in “curbing the patient’s compulsion to repeat and 
[…] turning it into a motive to remember” during the course of the 
psychoanalytic treatment (153).  
In other words, the transference suggests a prescriptive diagnosis – the 
analysand repeats the past in distorted forms –  and a descriptive cure – by 
repeating, the analysand is led to remember and work-through aspects of their 
own self-expression. My study highlights a key aspect of this dynamic – the 
development, in the clinical dialogue, of a transference-neurosis – in order to 
relate Freud’s strange phenomenology of the clinic to more productive 
accounts of acting-out in psychoanalytic criticism.  
However, when defining the transference, it is pertinent to note the 
particular framing of the concept in Freud, particularly in texts like 
‘Remembering’. For example, Freud often imagined the transference as a kind 
of estranging interpersonal drama – a sudden declaration of love for the 
doctor, a hysterical pregnancy, the sudden interruption or cessation of 
treatment – in which the analysand’s forgotten (repressed or unconscious) 
past is literally repeated acted-out through the contexts of the analytic 
encounter (1914: 149). Whilst its symptoms can often be more mundane, Freud 
argues that under the yoke of transference, “the patient does not remember 
anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out”. Freud 
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immediately clarifies that this acting-out is a kind of repetition: the analysand 
reproduces his past “not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, 
of course, knowing that he is repeating it” (149, original emphasis). This sense 
of performance is, I have suggested above, the key point of connection 
between Freudian hermeneutics and the “act[s] of communication” suggested 
by the Wallace text. In both instances, we are dealing with a particularly 
fraught kind of intentional claim – a claim about the analysand’s ‘real’ 
intentions – conveyed primarily through discourse. We are moreover 
concerned with the expression of that intention as discourse, and the extent 
to which that expression is conditioned or impacted by non-intentional 
factors.  
In Freud, meanwhile, we can here observe that the analysand is first 
and foremost performing their own “compulsion to repeat” (150). On the idea 
that “the patient repeats instead of remembering”, Freud writes: 
We may now ask what it is that he in fact repeats or acts out. 
The answer is that he repeats everything that has already made 
its way from the sources of the repressed into his manifest 
personality – his inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his 
pathological character traits. He also repeats all of his symptoms 
in the course of the treatment. And now we can see that in 
drawing attention to the compulsion to repeat […] we have only 
made it clear to ourselves that the patient’s state of being ill 
cannot cease with the beginning of his analysis, and that we 
must treat his illness, not as an event of the past, but as a 
present-day force (150) 
When acted-out, the analysand’s illness becomes literal, a “present-day force” 
– under this insight, the Freudian analyst no longer goes looking for past 
situations because those situations have literally found them, under the 
auspices of a motivated “compulsion to repeat” (150). However, for the 
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analysand, this compulsion is experienced as a genuine, motivated reality. 
Prior to the analytic work, the analysand experiences their feelings towards 
their doctor or treatment as “something real and contemporary” (151). For 
example, Freud notes that when “the transference becomes hostile or unduly 
intense and therefore in need of repression, remembering at once gives way 
to acting out” (150). Again, this return to the strange literality of transferential 
discourse, to conditioned declarations of love or hate in the place of authentic 
reflection and remembering, is characterised by Freud as a form of resistance 
to interpretation.  
Nevertheless, the extent to which this resistance takes the form of 
verbal repetition – that is, the extent to which the Freudian analysand “does 
not listen to the precise wording of his obsessional ideas” or “grasp the actual 
purpose of his obsessional impulse” (151) – helps provide the preliminary bases 
for our readings of the transference-neurosis in Wallace. For now, we might 
simply observe that some of Wallace’s most enduring attempts at defining his 
‘reader’ – the McCaffery interview (2012), essays like ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (1997), 
early fictions like those in Girl with Curious Hair – are characteristically 
described as expressions of love for that reader (See Chapter 3). Before going 
further, of course, it remains to be seen how this phenomenon of acting-out 
actually impacts Freud’s ontology of the clinic – what is it about the 
transference that necessitates a change in disposition on the part of the 
analyst, the movement from direct intervention to a more dynamic and 
descriptive approach? Freud’s major innovation in this regard involves the 
subsequent theorising of the transference-neurosis, a move which will allow 
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us to connect the transference with broader discursive and dialogic trends in 
psychoanalytic theory.  
Recalling our introductory chapter, we can say that the transference-
neurosis is premised on the analysand’s self-conscious relationship to their 
own treatment, that is, a “change in the patient’s conscious attitude to his 
illness” (151) and, the production of a self-reflexive account for that 
relationship. Recall also the form that the  latter account is voiced by Freud., 
The patient’s transference-neurosis asks the analyst “See what happens when 
I really give way to such things. Was I not right to consign them to 
repression?” (151). This question, or cluster of questions (See what happens? 
Was I not right?) challenge the descriptive and dynamic bases of the new 
psychoanalytic treatment explicitly, albeit dramatically.  
In response to what we might call the analysand’s therapeutic self-
awareness, Freud proceeds to outline the successful conditions of the new 
psychoanalytic treatment. “The main instrument,” he writes, “For curbing the 
patient’s compulsion to repeat and for turning it into a motive for 
remembering lies in the handling of the transference” (155, emphasis mine). 
How does the analyst handle the transference? How does repetition become 
transformed into a “motive for remembering”? Freud answers: 
We render the compulsion harmless, and indeed useful, by 
giving it the right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it 
into the transference as a playground in which it is allowed to 
expand in almost complete freedom and in which it is expected 
to display to us everything in the way of pathogenic instincts 
that is hidden in the patient’s mind. Provided only that the 
patient shows compliance enough to respect the necessary 
conditions of the analysis, we regularly succeed in giving all the 
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symptoms of the neurosis a new transference-meaning and in 
replacing his ordinary neurosis by a ‘transference-neurosis’ of 
which he can be cured by the therapeutic work (153, emphasis 
mine) 
For a preliminary example, let’s say the analysand one day blurts out “That’s 
not true, dad!” to his analyst. Whereas the second-wave psychoanalyst would 
cut to the chase, pointing out the analysand’s obvious and pertinent fixation 
on his fathers, authorities et al, etc, the new Freudian observes this repetition 
and asks something like “That’s the fifth time you’ve called me dad in as many 
minutes, why is that?” By simply calling attention to the strangeness of the 
analysand’s discourse – particularly when that discourse frames the analyst in 
a particular idiosyncratic way, and expresses certain patterns of attachment 
and ideation – the analyst counters the analysand’s self-awareness and 
prompts a second, more positive or constructive awareness, a transference-
meaning.  
Now, instead of noticing nothing (and calling everyone Dad), the 
analysand is able to productively ask himself “Why do I keep doing that? Is it 
impacting my treatment? Actually, why can’t I keep doing that? Doesn’t my 
analyst tell lies anyway? Don’t all my dads tell lies?” and so forth. Freud’s 
‘playground’, I think, is comprised of these second-order questions, following 
from the first counter-transferential question: Why does your discourse repeat 
in this way? Or, expressed another way: Who, exactly, are you talking to? 
Whilst these questions have an obvious epistemological basis, the 
transference-meanings they create, the analysand’s subsequent attempts to 
talk their way out of parapraxis, to justify, to reconsider, and ultimately to 
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repeat again, form a substantial descriptive background for the present study. 
The observation of such second-order responses, and of the stories that such 
responses tell, helps distinguish my research from earlier uses of Freud in 
Wallace scholarship, whilst providing new grounds to consider the 
ontological basis of psychoanalytic reading in Wallace’s fiction. 
The significance of the Freudian transference, for this study at least, is 
to provide a productive basis for reading the transference-neurosis within 
Wallace’s texts, particularly to the extent that those texts repeat, re-imagine 
or re-abstract certain transferential themes and effects. There is, I think, a 
peculiar exegetical imperative attached to this approach – the observation of 
repetition requires a particular ability to identify, critique, narrate and/or 
negate the materials repeated, especially when those materials concern the 
potential interpretation of texts (this of course connects with the present 
study’s choice of the terms readers who identify et al). On this basis, it is 
helpful to consider how Freud goes on to define the transference-neurosis as 
a descriptive and dynamic phenomenon: 
The transference thus creates an intermediate region between 
illness and real life through which the transition from one to the 
other is made. The new condition has taken over all the features 
of the illness; but it represents an artificial illness which is at every 
point accessible to our intervention. It is a piece of real 
experience, but one which has been made possible by especially 
favorable conditions, and it is of a provisional nature. From the 
repetitive reactions which are exhibited in the transference we are 
led along the familiar paths to the awakening of the memories, 
which appear without difficulty, as it were, after the resistance 
has been overcome (153-154) 
The transferential literary theories collected in this chapter (Brooks in 
particular) all refer back to Freud’s theorisation of an intermediate region, an 
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“artificial illness” which takes on real significance for both analyst and 
analysand. This artificial illness remains made up of second-order questions, 
“repetitive reactions exhibited in the transference”, which are themselves 
accessible and susceptible to the interventions of the classical Freudian 
analyst, who here aims at discovering “familiar paths” across the analysand’s 
emotionally-fraught discourse. Moreover, this turn towards second-order 
discourse allows us to consider the more imaginative and abstract extensions 
of the transference, particularly in relation to concepts like literary intention 
and critical rhetoric (See Chapter 1). What is the difference, then, between the 
actual response of an analysand in the Freudian clinic and the kind of 
responses suggested by the literary (or metafictional) text? Meanwhile, how 
do Wallace’s texts get beyond their own concerns with repetition, particularly 
when it comes to the proliferation of second-order ‘readers’ evidenced already 
in this study? Does Wallace relate to the transference on a more-than-literal 
level?  
By turning our attention to the work of Paul Ricoeur, we can begin to 
consider the hermeneutic relevance of psychoanalytic literary criticism more 
broadly, and continue to consider Wallace’s complex relationship to 
suspicious (theoretical and post-theoretical) re-imagination.  Again, this move 
is secured by the strange pertinence of the term “acting-out” – having observed 
the strange literality of the transference-neurosis in Freud, it remains to be 
seen how this estranging effect translates into the more specified fields of 
literary criticism and critical rhetoric.  
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Suspicious Re-Imagination in Paul Ricoeur’s Freud and Philosophy 
 Paul Ricoeur’s Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation is a 
paradigm-setting analysis of classical psychoanalysis from the vantage point 
of hermeneutic philosophy, which places the idea of psychoanalytic thought 
as a ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ into decisive question. This is obviously quite 
significant for the present study, particularly given the typical location of 
thinkers like Freud and Lacan in Wallace’s critical reception, for example in 
Kelly and Hayes-Brady’s respective imaginings of suspicious hermeneutics in 
Wallace (See Chapter 1). The Freudian transference has already appeared to 
authorise some strain of interpretive intervention, premised on the 
“awakening of memories” through the identification of repetition in the 
analytic encounter. But this approach still seems a step removed from the 
kinds of aggressive surface/depth models presupposed by Wallace. Whilst the 
approach recognises the necessity of depth (simply because it remains aware 
of repetition and resistance), its descriptive dynamics have been located in the 
second-order responses of the analysand, the latter’s reactions to and re- 
imagination of the analytic situation, particularly when their first response – 
which might as well be parapractic speech – comes under scrutiny. In other 
words, we are as concerned with transference-neurosis in Wallace’s works as 
we are with actual literary transference – in fact we must be more concerned 
with the former, given the author’s own self-conscious relationship to 
psychoanalysis, talk-therapy and themes such as traumatic recollection 
(Tracey, 2010). Nevertheless, on our reading, Wallace’s texts can be said to 
read like a transference-neurosis, given both their “thematic obsession with 
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connection” (Boswell, 2013) and the second-order acting-out of such 
obsessions in relation to the ‘reader’. This kind of distinction helps us 
reconsider Wallace’s treatment of the transference on a more imaginative 
level. while the strange literality of the author’s dialogue with his ‘reader’ 
certainly carries weight in the subsequent discussion, I am once again inclined 
to consider such declaration of love in terms of their neurotic (because re-
imagined) extensions.  
This is where Ricoeur’s hermeneutic resituation of Freud becomes 
most pertinent. Freud and Philosophy provides a range of answers to the twin 
imaginative questions of “what interpretation is” and “how psychoanalysis 
enters into the conflict between interpretations” (1978: 19). Ricoeur’s conflict 
of interpretations designates a kind of hermeneutic schism, that is, a conflict 
between different philosophical modes of reading and understanding texts. 
For Ricoeur, this conflict exposes two approaches to critical exegesis, the 
second of which – the school of ‘suspicion’ – we have already had cause to 
examine (See Chapter 1). The first approach, framed by Aristotelian semantics 
and religious phenomenology in Ricoeur, is predicated on the “recollection” 
or “restoration” of meaning (1978: 28). His remarks on this approach are, I 
think, pertinent to our discussions of Wallace:  
The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly, is faith. What faith? 
No longer, to be sure, the first faith of the simple soul, but rather 
the second faith of one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith 
that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith. Let us look for it 
in the series of philosophic decisions that secretly animate a 
phenomenology of religion and lie hidden even within its 
apparent neutrality. It is a rational faith, for it interprets; but it 
is a faith because it seeks, through interpretation, a second 
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naiveté. Phenomenology is its instrument of hearing, of 
recollection, of restoration of meaning. ‘Believe in order to 
understand, understand in order to believe’ – such is its maxim; 
and its maxim is the ‘hermeneutic circle’ itself of belief and 
understanding (28) 
What interests me here is Ricoeur’s juxtaposition of recovery-based 
hermeneutics with the more exposure-centric (that is, suspicious) capacities 
of psychoanalytic discourse. For good reason, Ricoeur’s location of the 
Freudian theory of mind alongside Nietzschean genealogy and Marxist 
critique are considered benchmark theories in the critical tradition of 
suspicion. Ricoeur defines these approaches in terms of “the general 
hypothesis concerning both the process of false consciousness and the 
method of its deciphering” (34). The phenomenon of transference is a handy 
reference here. As Freud has suggested, the transference is a kind of 
unconsciously ciphered discourse, which also points the way to its own 
deciphering through the analytic work.  
Yet the transference presents its own kind of second naiveté as well – 
the resolution of the transference-neurosis and the return to self-aware or 
conscious speech is, as we have seen, the nominal aim of the psychoanalytic 
dialogue in essays like ‘Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through’ 
(1914). This trajectory points the way for Ricoeur’s situation of Freud within 
the ‘conflict of interpretations’: as he subsequently puts it, “The question now 
is not simply why an interpretation, but why these opposed interpretations?” 
(42). How, then, does the transference-neurosis become involved in the 
conflict of interpretations? In Ricoeur, this sort of neurotic antagonism 
becomes a source of imaginative significance, because of its hypothetical 
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realisation within the psychoanalytic theory of interpretation, for example 
Freud’s well-known The Interpretation of Dreams (1901). On this basis, Ricoeur 
provides a simple analogical model which spells out the interpretive 
movements at stake in his reading of Freud:  
The analogy that may exist between the second meaning and 
the first meaning is not a relation I can place before me and 
inspect from the outside. It is not an argument; far from lending 
itself to formalization, it is a relation adhering to its terms. I am 
carried by the first meaning, directed by it, toward the second 
meaning; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and through 
the literal meaning which achieves the analogy by giving the 
analogue. In contrast to a likeness that we could look at from 
the outside, a symbol is the very movement of the primary 
meaning intentionally assimilating us to the symbolized, 
without our being able to intellectually dominate the likeness 
(17) 
In classical dream-analysis, this contrast between first-order and second-
order meaning is typically understood as the movement between surface and 
depth meaning, i.e., the suspicious recovery of latent structures from the 
analysand’s manifest repetitions. But prior to this kind of symbolisation, 
Ricoeur identifies a movement towards abstract imagination – that is, towards 
the interiority of the text, the event of a text “intentionally assimilating us to 
the symbolized”. There is a pronounced element of Lacanian linguistics to 
Ricoeur’s theorisation of symbol and double meaning in Freud and Philosophy, 
conveyed in the movement between literal meaning and intentional depth. As 
with Brooks and Felman’s theorisation of the psychoanalytic author-reader 
relationship, we see a situation cannot be “inspected from the outside”, 
because of the interpreter’s fraught co-implication with language, their 
essential distance from (yet concern with) literal meaning. This Lacanian 
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situation has been effectively described in Wallace Studies, particularly in 
studies which compel the reader’s attentions ‘beyond’ the text – Boswell’s 
readings of the inside/outside dialectic in Wallace are essential reading in this 
regard, as we have seen.   
Nevertheless, the suspension of literal meaning – as suggested in the 
counter-transferential refusal of the truth of the analysand’s discourse – 
remains a clear point of reference for the present study, because it authorises 
the move towards second-order ‘truth(s)’ in Wallace, which are themselves 
striking for their “assimilating” capabilities. On Ricoeur’s reading, then, we 
might say that first-order or ‘literal’ meaning has been effectively put into 
question by the psychoanalytic approach. Building on this approach, the 
present study observes the repetition and proliferation of truths about the 
‘reader’ in contemporary critical rhetoric, as well as in Wallace. The key 
benefit of Ricoeur’s psychoanalytic approach, I think, is that it highlights the 
necessary detours through the critical and philosophical imagination which 
must take place before we arrive at literal statements about things, especially 
texts.  
 On this basis, the theme of transference can help shed light on 
Ricoeur’s subsequent treatment of critique and identification in Freud, in a 
manner which highlights the persistence of suspicious imagination across 
these respective discourses. In the transference, the analysand’s spoken 
discourse is distorted by repetition, and this distortion sheds characteristic 
light on the issues under consideration in the analytic dialogue, particularly 
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within texts like ‘Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through’ (1914). The 
patient does not remember; the patient acts-out their past for the analyst, by 
effectively situating the latter within hypothetical scenarios of investment and 
exchange. In light of this, Ricoeur provides a phenomenological account of 
what occurs in the transference: 
That which makes the analytic relationship possible as an 
intersubjective relation is indeed, as we have said, the fact that 
the analytic dialogue, within a special context of disengagement, 
of isolation, of derealization, brings to light the demand in which 
desire ultimately consists; but only the technique of the 
transference, as a technique of frustration, could reveal the fact 
that desire is at bottom an unanswered demand… (417, emphasis 
mine) 
The problem with this phenomenology of dialogue is that it is incomplete. 
Ricoeur subsequently distinguishes psychoanalysis from phenomenology, by 
way of a haunting quote from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, which suggests that 
phenomenological enquiry does not say “in a clear way what psychoanalysis 
said in a confused way; it is rather by what it only hints at or reveals at its limit 
– by its latent content or its unconscious – that phenomenology is in harmony 
with psychoanalysis” (in Ricoeur: 417). These marginal hints and hypothetical 
limits provide us with a context and a trajectory for reconsidering a field like 
Wallace Studies, which is no stranger to concepts like phenomenology, 
existentialism and, of course, dialogue. On the one hand, then, we can say 
with Ricoeur that the transference provides a “special context of 
disengagement, of isolation, of derealization” (1978: 417) because it allows a 
certain suspension of belief with regards to certain supposedly empirical 
aspects of the analysand’s discourse – for example, in the latter’s apparently-
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sincere belief that they are in love with their analyst, and that the analyst may 
in fact be able to reciprocate that love somehow.  
On the other hand, however, in the transference-neurosis this 
suspicion becomes realised as a trajectory or technique of frustration, which 
effectively results in the formation of a treatable transference-meaning. My 
study figures this frustration through the observing of repetition in Wallace, 
as predominantly conveyed through the critical reconstruction and re-
imagination of the ‘reader’ in his texts. Through this kind of imaginative 
approach, we may thus have cause to observe Wallace’s empathetic 
(dis)engagements with the reader, his suspicious re-imagination of ‘readers’ 
within his texts. Since Freud’s theory of the transference incorporates this 
kind of self-reflexive account of the psychoanalytic dialogue, we may 
subsequently consider the extent to which transferential acting-out 
determines our abstract vocabularies for thinking and speaking about the 
Wallace ‘reader’. In this sense, the study provides a reader-response model for 
discussing Wallace’s fiction and reception; however, this approach is meta-
rhetorical for its inductive adherence to persuasive statements about the 
‘reader’ by Wallace and Wallace scholars. But without getting ahead of 
ourselves, we may consider again how the ‘reader’ is abstracted in texts, 
particularly within the transferential terms which we have set for Wallace’s 
fictions already. This is where the aforementioned work of Peter Brooks comes 
into play.  
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Re-Abstracting the ‘Reader’ with Peter Brooks 
 Peter Brooks’ 1986 essay ‘The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary 
Criticism’ observes the operation of the transference in 20th century narrative 
theory, highlighting the abstract notion of the ‘implied reader’ in structuralist 
and psychoanalytic narratology. “Psychoanalytic literary criticism has always 
been something of an embarrassment,” Brooks declares, highlighting his 
general concern with “the legitimacy and force that psychoanalysis may claim 
when imported into the study of literary texts” (1).Brooks begins the essay with 
a clever recapitulation of Freudian theoretical criticism, which, like Freud and 
Ricoeur, sets out a series of theoretical positions in relation to psychoanalytic 
knowledge. The major issue, for Brooks, is that “psychoanalysis in literary 
study has over and over again mistaken the object of analysis” (1).  
On this basis, Brooks writes that “Traditional psychoanalytic criticism 
tends to fall into three general categories, depending on the object of analysis: 
the author, the reader or the fictive persons of the text” (1-2). To summarise, 
author-based criticism locates meaning in the mind of a text’s creator; 
character-based criticism observes meaning through the actions or 
interiorities of “fictive persons”; and reader-based criticism “willingly brackets 
the notion of author in favour of the acceptable and also verifiable notion of 
reader” (2). This broad-based reading typology informs some of our theorising 
of the ‘reader’ – that of readers who identify (with the fraught and literal 
intentionality of an ‘author’), readers who critique (often on the basis of 
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imagined ‘readers’) and readers who narrate (their own empirical and 
hypothetical accounts of the reading process). ).  
However, as Brooks points out, each of these approaches bears 
uncanny traces of largely-outdated psychoanalytic themes – by mistaking or 
misrepresenting the object of analysis, classical Freudian criticism often 
“displaces the object of analysis from the text to some person, some other 
psychodynamic structure” (2). For Brooks, the improper use of psychoanalysis 
helps reveal the interpretive risks at stake in the classical Freudian method. 
Again, these risks refer back to the suspicious hermeneutics suggested in 
Ricoeur, the deciphering of false speech in the Freudian interventionist model. 
“Psychoanalysis is imperialistic”, Brooks writes, “almost of necessity” (3). In 
Freud’s work at least, the work of analysis often remains wedded to the idea 
of epistemological intervention, conveyed in Brooks’ imagining of Freud as a 
“conquistador”, “extend[ing] remarkably the empire of signs and their 
significant decipherment, encompassing all of human behaviour and symbolic 
action” and so forth (3). Speaking to this idea, Brooks speaks to his own 
theoretical dilemmas with Freud, which are based once more on the curious 
(and at times interventionist) conjunction of ‘psychoanalytic theory’ and 
‘literary studies’: 
We continue to dream of a convergence between psychoanalysis 
and literary criticism because we sense that their ought to be, 
that there must be, some correspondence between literary and 
psychic process, that aesthetic structure and form, including 
literary tropes, must somehow coincide with the psychic 
structures and operations they evoke and appeal to […] Part of 
the attraction of psychoanalytic criticism has always been its 
promise of a movement beyond formalism, to that desired place 
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where literature and life converge […] I very much subscribe to 
that urge, but I think that it is fair to say that in the case of 
psychoanalysis, paradoxically, we can go beyond formalism only 
by becoming more formalistic (4, original emphasis) 
Brooks is subtly concerned with the abstract notions of convergence and 
coincidence suggested by psychoanalytic literary criticism. To describe these 
notions is to consider the difference between a text which identifies with a 
reader and a text which identifies a ‘reader’ – the first text appears to converge 
upon the identifications of the literal reader, while the second text actually 
appears to try and coincide with their ‘reader’. But the movement towards 
imagination – towards characters, narrators and narratives – is not enough to 
resolve this dilemma, because it cannot yet account for the charge of 
interventionism. While a characterological account can prove quite useful, 
particularly in the sorts of “situational-thematic” analyses provided by, for 
example, feminist criticism (2), Brooks suggests that such an approach is 
“methodologically disquieting in its use of Freudian analytic tools in a wholly 
thematic way, as if the identification and labelling of human relations in a 
psychoanalytic vocabulary were the task of criticism” (2).  
As we have already seen, the field of Wallace Studies has thus far 
considered and largely avoid this sort of risk. Mary K Holland’s situational-
thematic analyses of narcissism in Infinite Jest and Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men suggest a more productive and self-aware kind of feminist 
criticism than the kind imagined by Brooks (See Chapters 1, 3), whilst Marshall 
Boswell’s theorising of erotic sentimentality actually bears productive 
similarities with the textual “erotics” claimed in ‘Psychoanalytic Literary 
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Criticism’, and in Brooks’ extended work Reading for the Plot: Design and 
Intention in Narrative (1992). Nevertheless, the question of ‘psychoanalytic 
literary criticism’, of theoretical convergence and coincidence, remains an 
open one in these subsequent studies. Whilst each of these approaches has 
merit, the psychoanalytic approach can sometimes appear short-sighted, at 
least according to Brooks. In borrowing from Freud to imagine authors, 
characters, situations, themes and even readers, we potentially divert our own 
attentions away from the “textual and rhetorical” dynamics of criticism (p2), 
and the curious manner in which texts reimagine the author-reader 
relationship.  
But in revisiting these limits, Brooks discovers the basis for a new kind 
of textual erotics, “attuned to form as our situation, our siting, within the 
symbolic order, the order within which we constitute meaning and ourselves 
as endowed with meaning” (8). In Brooks’ analysis, this narrative situation is 
inevitably framed by the spectacle and mystery of the transference-neurosis, 
and the dynamics of acting-out. For Brooks, The transference is inherently 
textual, comprising “a semiotic and fictional medium wherein the 
compulsions of unconscious desire, and its scenarios of infantile fulfilment, 
become symbolically present in the communicative situation of analysis” 
(1986:10). Whence Brooks’ semiotic accounting of the Freudian clinic: 
The analyst (I paraphrase Freud here) must treat the analysand’s 
words and symbolic acts as an actual force, active in the present, 
while attempting to translate them back into the terms of the 
past […] to restore the links between ideas and events that have 
fallen away, to reconnect isolated memories and to draw 
conclusions from interconnections and patterns. The analyst 
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must help the analysand construct a narrative discourse whose 
syntax and rhetoric are more plausible, more convincing, more 
adequate to the give account of the story of the past than those 
originally presented, in symptomatic form, by the analysand (10) 
In this abstracted sense, the transference serves to highlight the ambivalent 
nature of our engagement with the literary text – routinely described in terms 
of struggle, conflict, agitation or antagonism, we enter this kind of dialogue 
through “our very act of reading, in our (counter-)transferential desire to 
master the text, as also in the desire to be mastered by it” (11-12). In this 
context, the various limits placed on psychoanalytic hermeneutics – such as 
the absence of a psychologically-viable ‘author’, the displacement of attention 
onto characterologies, theme, situation, et al – effectively intersect, suggesting 
a more psychoanalytically-attuned rhetoric for discussing those same 
displacements in precedent analyses of Wallace. By exploring this reader-
response rhetoric, and its manifestations within Wallace’s work and criticism, 
we will have laid the groundwork to connect our reading of Freud and the 
transference to the kinds of metafictional “conversation” imagined by Wallace 
and his texts.  
This is where the notion of the implied reader proves most useful to 
the present study. For Brooks, literary criticism is best characterised by “a 
willingness, a desire, to enter into the delusional systems of texts, to espouse 
their hallucinated vision” (16). Yet Brooks makes it clear that this espousal is 
in fact a complex negotiation of meaning between reader and text, in which 
the potential response of the former is placed into question by the latter. This 
sense of dialogue informs Brooks’ definition of a framed tale – that is, a 
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narrative explicitly framed by its relationship to an imagined ‘reader’ or 
interlocutor. Framed tales “stage the presence of a listener or narratee, whose 
reactions to what is told are often what is most important in the narrative” 
(11), thus espousing elements of their own reception within the text. Brooks 
writes: 
Texts are always implicitly or even explicitly addressed to 
someone. The ‘I’ that speaks in lyric ever postulates a ‘Thou’ […] 
Even in texts which have no explicit narrator or narratee, there 
is necessarily a discourse which solicits a response, be it only in 
the play of personal pronouns and the conjugation of verbs (11). 
This seems dangerously close to what Wallace had in mind when he referred 
to fiction as an “act of communication between one human being and 
another” – a solicitation of response, a dialogised mode of expression, an 
espousal of a worldview which encloses on the worldviews of its various 
supposed ‘others’. But first, it is important to locate the significance of the 
transference in this newly-abstracted definition of literary dialogue – how 
does the text implicitly or explicitly address itself to the reader? Is this 
incompleteness itself a kind of acting-out?  
In Brooks, the transference emerges as a key point of distinction for 
psychoanalytic criticism, particularly for the kinds of textual and rhetorical 
criticism available to contemporary audiences. It is easy to imagine this 
criticism as formalistic and lifeless, having already been stripped of “authorial 
mutants”, “Oedipal triangles in fiction”, other “person[s]”, “other 
psychodynamic structure[s]” and such (2). But one of the best things about 
reading Brooks, I think, is that he doesn’t quite dispense with these kinds of 
wild psychoanalytic intentionality – rather, he provides abstract models for 
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thinking and speaking about them, particularly as they appear in self-aware 
narrative texts and self-aware literary theory. A case in point is his artful 
framing of the transference in relation to literary interpretation: 
Within the transference, recall of the past most often takes place 
as its unconscious repetition, acting it out as if it were present: 
repetition is a way of remembering, brought into play when 
recollection in the intellectual sense if blocked by repression 
and resistance. Repetition is both an obstacle to analysis – since 
the analysand must eventually be led to renunciation of the 
attempt to reproduce the past – and the principal dynamic of 
the cure, since it is only by way of its symbolic enactment in the 
present can the history of past desire, its objects and scenarios 
of fulfilment, be made known, become manifest in the present 
discourse (10) 
In a more abstract account of the Freudian talking-cure, the transference 
refers to the literal through unconscious repetition, that is, in “symbolic 
enactments” of “past desire, its objects and scenarios of fulfilment” It is on this 
basis that the analyst, or the literary critic, may attempt to “help the analysand 
construct a narrative discourse whose syntax and rhetoric are more plausible, 
more convincing, more adequate to give an account of the story of the past” 
than the “symptomatic” rhetorics of the analysand (10). In this sense, Brooks 
suggests that the hermeneutic work of the critic – specifically, their 
reconstruction and retransmission of the text through the act of criticism – is 
something literally akin to the work of the analyst, helping substantiate a 
more dynamic sense of the relationship between scholarship and the analytic 
work. “The advantage of such a transferential model,” he writes, “is that it 
illuminates the difficult and productive encounter of the speaker and the 
listener, the text and the reader” (12). But to this literalistic concern, Brooks 
also highlights the hypothetical extremes to which literary dialogue “takes 
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place in an ‘artificial’ space – a symbolic and semiotic medium – that is none 
the less the place of real investments of desire” (12-13). This is part of what this 
study highlights in relation to Wallace: the dynamic activity of transference in 
Wallace’s rhetorics of the ‘reader’, which certainly appear to partake of 
Brooks-ian ideas about the relative reality/unreality of the literary dialogue. A 
further advantage of this approach is its capacities to consider various forms 
of uncritical psychoanalytic reading in Wallace’s texts and reception. 
 Whilst recognising the semiotic and rhetorical depths of 
psychoanalytic criticism, Brooks’ transferential model is most notable for its 
treatment of critical abstraction, of a kind suggested in the relationship 
between literary criticism “and” psychoanalytic method. We can note again 
that Brooks is concerned with convergence or literal coincidence of “literary 
and psychic process”, of the psychoanalytic theory of mind with “aesthetic 
structure and form, including literary tropes”. If this convergence is to 
succeed, however, it must first traverse the literalistic and imaginative 
dimensions of discourse, a necessity reflected in Brooks’ extended critique of 
criticism in the 80’s: 
One can in general indict Anglo-American ‘New Criticism’ for 
being too quick to leap from the level of formal explication to 
that of moral and psychological interpretation, neglecting the 
trajectory through linguistics and poetics that needs to stand 
between. […] The more recent – rhetorical and deconstructive – 
kind understands the formalist imperative, but I fear that it may 
too often remain content with formal operations, simply 
bracketing the human realm from which psychoanalysis derives 
[…] It is not willing to make the crossover between rhetoric and 
reference that interests me – and ought to be the raison d’etre 
for the recourse to psychoanalysis in the first place” (4-5, 
emphasis mine) 
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Brooks’ Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative is largely based 
on this abstract “crossover” between rhetoric and reference, particularly in 
light of structuralist narratology – for example distinguishing between a 
narrated fact and narrative fact (that is, between fabula and sjuzet in formalist 
terms), and considering the curious “double logic” at stake in this distinction 
(1992: 28). This second logic, the turn inwards to the “results that we know” 
rather than “givens” of a pre-textual reality, is borne out by our readings of 
Wallace scholarship and suspicious hermeneutics (See Chapter 1). By 
observing this conflict between rhetoric and reference, between the narrated 
worlds of the text and the narrated realities ‘beyond’ it, my study bears out 
Brooks’ suggestion that both logics might apply: “the contradiction may be in 
the very nature of narrative, which not only uses but is a double logic” (29).  
Brooks’ model, which attentively observes this kind of fraught reader-
presentation and provides a vocabulary for discussing it, thus points the way 
to a more abstract appreciation of the ‘reader’ in Wallace. Conversely, the 
psychoanalytically-aware and maximally self-reflexive nature of Wallace’s 
texts arguably provide us new extensions to this approach, which can help us 
identify the more forward-thinking or prescient aspects of Brooks’ discussions 
of the psychoanalytic interpretive dialogue. In Reading for the Plot, for 
example, these discussions tend to centre on the movement between re-
imagination and re-abstraction, which cannily takes into account the self-
conscious treatment of this movement in the avant-garde fiction of the 1980s. 
Moreover, Brooks provides some canonical and accessible examples of this 
movement from earlier modernist narratives: 
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The translations of narrative, its slidings-across in the 
transformatory process of its plot, its movements forward that 
recover markings from past in the play of anticipation and 
retrospection, lead to a final situation where the claim to 
understanding is incorporate with the claim to transmissibility. 
One could find some of the most telling illustrations of this 
claim in the 19th century’s frequent use of the framed tale which, 
dramatizing the relations of tellers and listeners, narrators and 
narratees, regularly enacts the problematic of transmission, 
looking for the sign of recognition and the promise to carry on, 
revealing, too, a deep anxiety about the possibility of 
transmission, as in Marlow’s words to his auditors in Heart of 
Darkness: ‘Do you see the story? Do you see anything?’ (28) 
Brooks’ affinity for the framed tale, and for the strange detective-works of the 
reader in relation thereto, help indicate the pertinent fact that some of the 
literary anxieties in Wallace’s texts are not new. In fact, from this abstract 
hermeneutic standpoint, virtually all authors are concerned with the claim, 
problematics and possibility of their text’s transmission, a transmissibility 
which is ultimately coincident (or “incorporate”) with the kinds of 
understanding made possible by literary criticism.  
The difference here, I think, is that this concern has been made explicit 
and is in fact routinely exposed by the Wallace text, particularly through its 
treatment of themes such as literary abstraction. I view this exposure as a kind 
of re-abstraction, related to the repetition readers who narrate in Wallace’s 
essayistic and autobiographical works (See Chapter 5).  
Nevertheless, like Brooks’ Conrad’s Marlow, the anxiety in Wallace’s 
texts seems explicable on the basis of a familiar set of questions: “Do you see 
the story? Do you see anything?” This self-reflexive anxiety about transmission 
is, of course, a characteristic feature of Wallace’s work (See Chapter 1). In 
response, this study provides a new take on this anxiety by considering themes 
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such as “anticipation of retrospection”, rhetoric and reference in Freudian 
narratology, particularly as these themes relate to literal and imaginative 
forms of repetition (See Chapter 6). In this respect at least, Brooks’ works 
remain an invaluable resource for the present study, and for readers looking 
to understand the complexities of psychoanalytic criticism in the 20th (and 
arguably the 21st) century.  
 
Repetition and Negation with Shoshanna Felman 
In the works of Shoshanna Felman (2012), the theme of “acting-out” 
takes on a particularly relevance to the present study, as it is specifically 
applied to the paradigm-building activities of literary critics, what we have 
termed critical rhetoric. In Felman’s reading, the psychoanalytic author-
reader relationship is thrown into complete disarray by certain texts’ grasp of 
the transference as reading-effect. The text in question is Henry James’ The 
Turn of the Screw, which tells a vivid tale of a haunted Victorian estate, mostly 
narrated from the perspective of a young, unnamed governess. Notably, 
Felman’s review does not begin with the text itself, but with that text’s 
complex critical reception, charting the “impact” of James’ work on writings 
of reviewers and critics alike, that is, the “exegetic passions and energetic 
controversies” stirred up by the text’s scandalous narrative of haunting, desire, 
possession and death (143-144). Surprisingly enough, Felman also discovers 
this narrative repeated in scholarship:: 
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what is perceived as the most scandalous thing about this 
scandalous story is that we are forced to participate in the 
scandal, that the reader’s innocence cannot remain intact: there 
is no such thing as an innocent reader of this text. In other 
words, the scandal is not simply in the text, it resides in our 
relation to the text, in the text’s effect on us, its readers: what is 
outrageous in the text is not simply that of which the text is 
speaking, but that which makes it speak to us (2012: 144, original 
emphasis).  
For Felman, this sense of critical scandal is amplified by the entry of 
psychoanalysis into the debate, most notably in the works of critic Edmund 
Wilson, whose work re-imagines James’ ghosts as “figments of the governess’ 
sick imagination, mere hallucinations and projections symptomatic of the 
frustration of her repressed sexual desires” (Felman: 144). Wilson is, in this 
sense, one of Brooks’ interventionist psychoanalytic critics concerned with the 
intentional workings of the, text as revealed by the psychology of its 
characters. On the other side of the debate, however, non- or anti-
psychoanalytic critics such as Robert Heilman are seen to partake in a rhetoric 
of moral redemption, in which the text is literally rescued or “saved” from the 
clutches of Freudian literalism, in a manner eerily reminiscent of the 
governess’ own attempts to protect the virtue of her young Victorian charges 
(147-148).  
The empirical existence of this literary-psychoanalytic debate helps 
Felman to locate the significance of The Turn of the Screw in terms of an 
“uncanny” and “inescapable” reading-effect (2012: 149). “The scene of the 
critical debate is thus a repetition of scene dramatised in the text,” she writes 
of this effect, “The critical interpretation, in other words, not only elucidates 
the text but also reproduces it dramatically” (147, emphasis mine). In this 
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sense, texts such as James’ enable us to effectively perform the transference 
through the act of reading: “Through its very reading, the text, so to speak, 
acts itself out […] whichever way readers turn, they can be turned by the text, 
they can but perform it by repeating it” (p148, original emphasis). Once again, 
we find the significance of the literary text described as an acting-out, both in 
the text’s various espousals of delusion and intention, and the critic’s various 
repetitions of these discourses in the act of interpretation.  
These textual and critical performances enable something like Brooks’ 
“transferential” narrative rhetoric, when we consider the extent to which 
literary inquiry repeats its own object, espousing and working-through the 
various delusional systems at stake in the text itself. In a similar vein, Felman 
distinguishes her approach from that of Wilson, whose diagnoses of sexual 
frustration are said to contribute to a kind of “vulgar” Freudianism, a reductive 
and literalistic idea of psychoanalysis as a direct “answer” to the questions 
posed by the literary text (p149-153). In response, Felman’s model exploits the 
kinds of disengagement, isolation and derealization imagined by Ricoeur 
(1978: 417), in order to imagine a self-reflexive psychoanalytic criticism which 
can accomplish both “a reading of the text which will at the same time be 
articulated with a reading of its readings” (Felman: 149). By engaging with this 
interpretive space, we remain concerned with the idea of literary transference, 
whose performative significance has at this point become clear: 
Freud’s discovery of the unconscious is the outcome of his 
reading of the hysterical discourse of his patients, i.e., of his 
being capable of reading in this hysterical discourse his own 
unconscious. The discovery of the unconscious is therefore 
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Freud’s discovery, within the discourse of the other, of what was 
actively reading in himself: his discovery, in other words, of 
what was reading – in what was being read (164) 
Through the literary transference, reading is a kind of self-consciously 
negative performance, in which the exegetical and hypothetical tensions of 
the text are repeated, re-imagined, re-abstracted and ultimately worked-
through by the reader. But like its antecedents in the Freudian clinic, this 
literary transference is rhetorically unstable – it depends on a complex parsing 
of both the intentions of the text (which are always in some way hidden) as 
well as in the various re-workings and re-voicing of these intentions within 
the paradigmatic field of Wallace Studies. Conversely, the transference-
neurosis may thus represent a rhetoric of instability, highlighting the 
disruptive and controversial stakes of the psychoanalytic literary encounter by 
implicating the reader’s own intentions with those of the text.  
Throughout this chapter, we have found that the Freudian 
transference-neurosis provides a versatile theoretical model for 
understanding the ways in which a text repeats, re-imagines and re-abstracts 
its own reception. Like the complex term ‘reader’, the concept of transference-
neurosis can thus potentially help us parse the unique difficulties of the 
metafictional dialogue, whilst alerting us to the unique kinds of reader-
performance at stake in Wallace’s works. In Freud’s metapsychology, we 
discovered the idea of acting-out as literal repetition – often, in Wallace, the 
suggestion of particular interpersonal or dialogic scenarios, or the imagining 
of literal ‘readers’ in the text (See Chapter 3). In Brooks, we discovered the 
bases of a textual and rhetorical psychoanalytic criticism, which helps us 
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elaborate the essentially self-conscious tenor of Wallace’s approach, through 
the idea of the “framed tale” and its various elaborations of identity and agency 
(1986). Finally, in Felman, we can also begin to observe the estranging impact 
of such tales on contemporary paradigms of interpretation, best evidenced in 
the bizarre theatricality of Henry James scholarship, and the kinds of 
interpretive acting-out revealed through close attention to the transference in 
criticism.  
This sense of estrangement, again indexed by the term acting-out, can 
help us understand Felman’s post-structural re-imagination of the 
transference, as in this discussion of the self-conscious (because 
transferential) narrative ‘frame’: 
A narrative frame that thus incarnates the very principle of 
repetition of the story it contains, and, through that repetition, 
situates both the loss of the story’s origin and the story’s origin 
as its own loss […] constitutes rather a complication, a 
problematization of the relationship itself between the inside 
and outside of the textual space […] the frame indeed leaves no 
one out: it pulls the outside of the story into its inside by 
enclosing in it what is usually outside it: its own readers. But the 
frame at the same time does the very opposite, pulling the inside 
outside: for in passing through the echoing chain of the 
multiple, repetitive narrative voices, it is the very content, the 
interior of the story that becomes somehow exterior to itself, 
reported as it is by a voice inherently alien to it […] a voice whose 
otherness violates the story’s presence to itself (168-169) 
Through this kind of reasoning, the present study has already indicated 
certain essential movement from the literal (gesturing ‘beyond’ the text to real 
readers), to the imagined (highlighting the various ‘readers’ repeated in 
Wallace’s fiction) to the abstract or implied ‘readers’ of Wallace’s fiction.  
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From a literalistic concern with literary love (See Chapter 3) to an 
ironized sense of metafictional “performance” (See Chapter 4), Wallace’s texts 
present an array of unclear consequences for contemporary scholarship, 
particularly in a field is still coming to terms with the dramatic, dramaturgical 
and theatrical impact of Wallace’s literary project as a whole. These 
consequences, I think, are explicable in terms of a psychoanalytic 
hermeneutics, which affirms and embodies the simple enough principle: 
observe repetition. Beyond literal repetition, we are thus led to considered 
more utile concepts like re-imagination and re-abstraction, which are often 
conveyed at the most self-conscious or overdetermined junctures of a David 
Foster Wallace text. In Wallace’s fictions about fiction, this intrusion of 
“inherently alien” voices and violating or violated “otherness” is nothing if not 
repeated (See Chapter 1; Chapter 6), yet Felman’s reference to “the echoing 
chain of multiple, repetitive narrative voices” helps alert us to new, more 
estranging ways of understanding this repetition in Wallace.  
Throughout Wallace’s work, we encounter diverse and creative forms 
of apparent conflict between interpretations – often presented as a kind of 
rhetorical uncertainty, a mystery of intentions or a bizarre interpersonal 
drama. By parsing these kinds of conflict, our model extends understandings 
of repetition in Wallace, because it begins to account for the ways in which 
Wallace’s discourse of the ‘reader’ becomes visible and problematized in 
contemporary Wallace scholarship. This visibility can only be a good thing – 
for one, it allows us to consider the sheer rhetorical potency of the term 
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‘reader’ in Wallace’s works, and the sorts of unanswerable questions that the 
term appears to pose for contemporary Wallace critics. 
 
Conclusion: Performing the ‘Fiction-Writer’s Reader’ (II) 
In Chapter 1, the self-reflexive question of the Wallace ‘reader’ provided 
us with a plausible basis for observing repetition – whether taken literally, 
viewed imaginatively or considered abstractly, we saw that Wallace’s ‘reader’ 
repeats, suggesting something like a rhetorical or exegetical imperative at the 
margins; an insistence, a claim, perhaps even a demand. On one level, we were 
compelled to read the Wallace ‘reader’ literally, to fix our gaze firmly and 
squarely beyond the text and towards ourselves as readers. After all, how hard 
is it to take Wallace at face value when he describes the literary encounter as 
“an act of communication between one human being and another” (Wallace 
1997: 144), really? Isn’t this exactly the point of Wallace’s fiction, especially 
when considered against the alleged improprieties or excesses of his literary 
peers (Bret Easton Ellis, Jonathan Franzen et al)? Yet despite this weight of 
common-sense, we were also taken to reading Wallace’s ‘reader’ 
imaginatively, particularly when considering the value of suspicious 
hermeneutics in the author’s life and work. Through this, we were led to ask: 
how do we distinguish ourselves from the suspicious ‘reader(s)’ imagined 
within Wallace’s fictions, and avoid falling into the narcissistic interpretive 
traps which those fictions inarguably devise? 
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On this basis, I think that the theme of transference-neurosis – 
particularly in the literal, imaginative and abstract senses we have outlined 
thus far – can help us arrive at a new perspective on repetition in Wallace. 
This perspective exposes the sense of performance or “acting-out” represented 
in the metafictional text, the fiction about fiction, whilst drawing upon such 
performances to understand why metafiction continues to confound us, 
continues to provide new and often quite explicit accounts of who readers are 
and how readers read. But the ‘fourth reader’ position also asks: Does literary 
criticism do the same? And if so, why? The outward/inward dialectic 
suggested by Wallace’s text’s self-reflexivity – those texts’ specific games with 
the literalistic and the imaginative – has formed a major basis for 
contemporary studies of Wallace and his works, as suggested by the theorising 
of naiveté/cynicism (Boswell), sincerity/authenticity/New Sincerity (Kelly), 
empathy/narcissism (Holland), identification/suspicion (Hayes-Brady) and, 
finally, of author and reader (Staes). Yet even here, we find the estranging 
stamp of a self-concerned author, as evidenced by the complex play of 
intentions and abstract self-presentation in Wallace’s essays and interviews 
(See Chapter 5). We have already caught a glimpse of this in Wallace’s 
interview with Matthew Gilbert, where he asserted that he had “at least fifty-
three” different responses to a single question, and in fact gave four.  
Who is our fourth ‘reader’, then? The ‘reader who negates’ is, quite 
simply, a reader who observes textual repetition, in the form of acting-out, 
before locating their own response to the dynamics being repeated. This is 
what this study is trying to do – observe the effective repetition of the term 
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‘reader’ across multiple semantic and rhetorical registers, and provide a 
psychoanalytically-informed account of that repetition. But to my mind, this 
fourth ‘reader’ does bear many of the hallmark characteristics of an archetypal 
Freudian analyst, not least in their tendency to view repetition as a force for 
both dialogue and cure. In this sense, we might begin to imagine the Wallace 
text as sort of analysable discourse, explicable in terms of its most estranging 
repetitions of particular psychoanalytic reading-tropes. The key to this 
reading is the recognition that Wallace’s self-aware relationship to classical 
psychoanalysis does not preclude a more thorough application of 
psychoanalytic methodology to his fictions. As my reading of the transference-
neurosis suggests, self-awareness about psychoanalysis is in fact a necessary 
condition of both the Freudian talking-cure and its counterparts in literary 
theory, and worth considering further in Wallace’s fictions.  
Finally, our reading of psychoanalytic reading needs to take into 
account the methodological juxtaposition of psychoanalysis and critical 
rhetoric, particularly given the rich history of such juxtapositions in 
contemporary Wallace Studies. A noted example of psychoanalytic exegesis is 
Mary Holland’s theorisation of cultural narcissism in Infinite Jest (2006) – this 
study proceeded to consider the imagination of irony and narcissism in 
Wallace’s major works, particularly as re-imagined within  those works (See 
Chapter 1). Elsewhere, Boswell has provided paradigm readings of Freud and 
Jacques Lacan in Infinite Jest, which are notable for strong critique of Lacanian 
ethics in fiction (on what I would call literalistic grounds): 
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Lacanian thinking […] is not a truth reported but a truth 
constructed, and what these sophisticated, poststructuralist 
depressives have really ‘constructed’ are their own cages, cages 
in which they hide the ‘hideous interior self’ where un-hip truth 
and sentiment reside (2003: 156). 
As these readings have highlighted, Wallace’s metafictional treatment of 
psychoanalytic thought are primarily self-reflexive – in stories such as ‘Here 
and There’ (1989), ‘The Depressed Person’ (1999) and ‘Good Old Neon’ (2004), 
the role of psychoanalysis is both teased and thwarted by the self-conscious 
activities of Wallace’s characters, who see themselves as both adjacent and 
anterior to their respective treatments. Nevertheless, I think this particular 
antagonism can be effectively investigated in terms of the author’s respective 
treatments of readers who identify (that is, his literalistic repetition of 
‘readers’), readers who critique (his re-imagination of suspicious reading), and 
readers who narrate (his re-abstracting of ideas like authorial intentionality 
and literary self-presentation). In these kinds of texts, and especially in 
collections such as Oblivion (2004), we can see the oblique (yet inarguably 
characteristic) emergence of primal psychoanalytic themes in Wallace, 
something I consider further in Chapter 6. 
 For now, suffice it to say that the value of psychoanalytic hermeneutics 
in Wallace’s work is bound up in the macro-claim that “Wallace negates the 
reader” – following the schema set up in Chapter 1, I argue that Wallace’s 
works are negatively concerned with the reader, they effect a kind of critical or 
rhetorical negation ‘of’ that reader. When we take up this idea, we are stepping 
beyond the parameters laid out by Wallace in his “act of communication” 
thesis, that is, we are no longer inclined to view literary dialogue as 
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communication between “human being[s]”, because this definition of the 
‘reader’ is itself part of the schema, due to its second-order placement 
alongside literal, imagined and abstract ‘reader(s) of Wallace’. Put simply, 
Wallace recalls the idea of the ‘reader’ so often that this idea becomes 
unconsciously over-determined in his fictions, more often than not resulting 
in interpretive paradox. 
By exposing these questions, and traversing their impact on 
contemporary readings of Wallace, the present study highlights the extent to 
which Wallace’s fictions effect and undermine their own conception of the 
‘reader’, an effect arguably exemplified in Wallace’s late short fictions, as per 
Oblivion and its treatments of Freudian psychodrama. To confront these 
estranging limits and proximities in Wallace’s self-reflexive rhetoric of the 
‘reader’, the present study has provided a novel account of repetition (in the 
form of acting-out), which can help us understand significant Freudian and 
post-Freudian anxieties in Wallace’s broader literary project. Let us begin, 
then, by considering the most overt of these anxieties: the fact that Wallace’s 
fiction, for all of its antagonistic complexity, remains empathetically and 
erotically concerned with the activities of readers who identify. From here, and 
in subsequent chapters, the idea of the ‘implied reader’ as transferential-
neurotic discourse is in play. Having outlined the relationships between self-
reflexivity and repetition at stake in the term ‘acting-out’, we may now press 
the case that Wallace’s fictions perform their ‘reader’, through the negative 
(because transferential-neurotic) mechanisms of repetition, re-imagination 
and re-abstraction.   
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CHAPTER 3  
Readers who Identify 
 
 
 
For whom?  
You are loved. 
(Wallace 1989: 373) 
 
 
Introduction: “the part of yourself that can love” 
When considering the kinds of dialogue and communication made 
possible by David Foster Wallace’s literary project, we cannot overlook the 
centrality of identification – particularly empathetic identification – to that 
project, and to the author’s expansive statements on fictional and 
metafictional practice at the turn of the 21st century. From the outset of his 
literary career, with the early publications of The Broom of the System and 
short story collection Girl with Curious Hair, Wallace set forth articulating a 
literary program founded on empathetic communication, dialogue between 
living “human beings”, a dialogue set in vital contrast to the kinds of ironic 
disavowal and self-reference at stake in the author’s own diagnoses of 
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postmodernity and avant-garde fiction. In one of many celebrated statements 
from the author’s interview with Larry McCaffery in 1993, Wallace reacts to 
the idea of “conventionally political or social-action-type solutions” in 
contemporary fiction: 
That’s not what fiction’s about. Fiction’s about what it is to be a 
fucking human being. […] What’s engaging and artistically real is, 
taking it as axiomatic that the present is grotesquely materialistic, 
how is it that we as human beings still have the capacity for joy, 
charity, genuine connections, for stuff that doesn’t have a price? 
And can these capacities be made to thrive? And if so, how, and if 
not, why not? (2012: 26-27). 
As a proxy for the kinds of “joy, charity [and] genuine connections” at stake in 
Wallace’s own texts, the theme of empathetic identification remains crucial 
to our understandings of the author and his legacy. From the idea of Wallace’s 
works as an “intimate zone of communication, of subjective interaction” 
(Boswell 2003: 19), to the oblique glimpses of “the truly valuable in human life 
– traits such as love, trust, faith and responsibility” effected therein (Kelly 2012: 
139), Wallace’s legacy remains predicated on the idea of fiction as a significant 
“act of communication between one human being and another” (Wallace 1997: 
144) – most overtly, an act of identification.  
As we are well aware, these complex gestures towards empathetic 
dialogue are both unique and crucial to Wallace’s literary legacy as a whole. 
But having theorised these kinds of gestures in terms of literality (See 
Chapters 1-2), it remains for us to observe the repetitive nature of this literality 
in Wallace’s fiction – when and why do Wallace’s texts repeat the literal? 
When do they make a claim about the literalistic nature of reading? Having 
situated our own approach a step removed from literality, I think we can 
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observe the extent to which Wallace’s texts not only repeat, but re-imagine 
and re-abstract this idea of literal reading as a matter of high significance. The 
most telling indicator of this significance is Wallace’s idiosyncratic definition 
of literary love, which provides an erotic (albeit ambivalent or antagonistic) 
capacity to “talk out the part of yourself that can love” – as opposed to, of 
course, “the part of yourself that just wants to be loved”. Whilst scholars have 
certainly modelled this literal sense of love in Wallace’s fiction (C.f. Hayes-
Brady, 2016), I want to explore the strange term “talk out” as well. How does 
this talking-out manifest itself in Wallace’s short fictions, and how does it 
impact on the kinds of claims we make about those fictions, for example in 
the idea that Wallace identifies (with) the reader?   
This claim is the subject of the present chapter, examining the 
centrality of empathetic identification to paradigmatic accounts of Wallace 
and his literary legacy. By reviewing the avowedly empathetic parameters of 
Wallace’s literary project, this chapter examines the ways in which the 
author’s early fiction – in this case the short fictions collected in Girl with 
Curious Hair – repeat and re-imagine the theme of literary identification 
through sophisticated narratives of readers, writers, critics and texts. These 
narratives are decidedly self-reflexive, both in their overt pastiches of modern 
and postmodern style, and in their insistent fascination with the assumptions 
and expectations of readers who identify. In texts such as ‘Westward the 
Course of Empire Takes its Way’, Wallace’s narrator routinely interrupts the 
story to recant such expectations directly to the reader, at one point detailing 
the follies of so-called “Realist” writers as expressions of 
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The ‘illusion’ of a windowed access to a ‘reality’ isomorphic with 
ours but possessed of and yielding up higher truths to which all 
authentically human persons stand in the relation of applicand 
(1989: 265) 
Considering the rhetoric surrounding empathy and identification in Wallace’s 
works – and the kinds of “higher truths” and “authentically human persons” 
professed by the author – we begin to grasp the uniquely self-referential 
significance of the term identification within those works, and its bearing on 
our contemporary conversation with the author and his legacy. At the same 
time, however, Wallace’s preoccupation with the reader, and their status as 
“applicand” to the complex claims of the “Realist” (read: pre-metafictional) 
author, reminds us that this conversation is a kind of self-reflexive 
performance, explicitly pitched towards the whims and attitudes of Wallace’s 
own postmodern audience. Nevertheless, the surfeit of claims about ‘readers’ 
is already apparent in texts like ‘Westward’, which will go on to claim its own 
love for the reader in a literalistic way (See Chapter 1).  
But if we are to claim that Wallace’s texts successfully identify and 
identify with this audience, then we must also negotiate with the kinds of self-
referential readers who identify performed within these texts. In the case of 
Girl with Curious Hair, this sense of performance is surprisingly literalistic, as 
texts such as ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, ‘Here and There’, ‘Say Never’ and 
‘Everything is Green’ identify a range of empathetic and non-empathetic 
readers, whilst openly questioning these readers’ capacities for empathy, 
dialogue, trust and – especially – for love. Whilst many of the characters in 
Girl are writers – such as Bruce in ‘Here and There’, whose “honors thesis is an 
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epic poem about variable systems of information- and energy-transfer” (155) – 
virtually everyone in Girl is a ‘reader’, whose reactions to respective unfolding 
narratives self-reflexively shape our own understandings and appreciations of 
those narratives. In this sense, they begin to sound like Peter Brooks’ “framed 
tales”, which figured their own significance via the repetition of respondents, 
interlocutors and narratees (See Chapter 2).  
However, Wallace arguably extends this framing of the ‘reader’ to 
newer, more estranging places. From the conflicting array of perspectives 
canvassed in ‘Say Never’, to the anhedonic and anti-empathetic dialogues 
canvassed in ‘My Appearance’, ‘Westward’ and the titular ‘Girl with Curious 
Hair’, Wallace’s debut collection offers a substantially complex account of the 
reader as a kind of performer, literally “acting-out” the stakes of the narratives 
in which they appear. For example, in the hyper-minimal story ‘Everything is 
Green’, Wallace imagines his narrator gazing at a girl named Mayfly, herself 
transfixed on the morning light outside her window:  
Everything is green, she is saying. She is whispering it and the 
whisper is not to me no more I know […] She is looking outside, 
from where she is sitting, and I look at her, and there is something 
in me that can not close up, in that looking. Mayfly has a body. 
And she is my morning. Say her name. (230) 
At the concluding limit of the text, openly entreating the reader to ‘speak with’ 
its speaker and say the name “Mayfly”, the narrator of ‘Everything is Green’ 
works to evoke a sense of expansive empathy, in a kind of literalised 
compression of the apparent gesture ‘behind’ the text (which is, of course, to 
provide the reader with a means of getting ‘beyond’ the text). Thus the reader 
is invited to empathise with, indeed to see through Mayfly’s unique 
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perspective, a perspective which can only be revealed through the externalised 
discourse of the narrator. This multi-focal and highly self-referential form of 
literary empathy – which plays on the literal body and gaze of Mayfly herself, 
and her own insistence that ‘Everything is green’ – helps us to understand the 
sentimental complexity of Wallace’s earliest works, and their overriding 
(albeit self-conscious and self-reflexive) concern for the reader’s empathetic 
sensibilities.  
Meanwhile, the elaboration of this strategy in Girl provides some of the 
clearest evidence as to the performative ambit of Wallace’s fiction more 
broadly. In his attempts to speak with and see through his own postmodern 
“audience”, Wallace effectively recreates that audience within the text, 
leveraging the presence of readers who identify against his own explorations 
of modernist and postmodern form. However, this performance of the reader 
inevitably complicates our contemporary conversations with texts such as Girl 
with Curious Hair, to the extent that we potentially fail to distinguish between 
the kinds of catharsis anticipated within those texts and our own 
appreciations thereof. Whilst contemporary readings assume authority on the 
part of Wallace’s reader-protagonists, citing the latter’s complex predilection 
for moral virtue and “really human” forms of communication, these readings 
arguably repeat the same tensions canvassed in and by Wallace’s texts (See 
Chapter 1). By speaking with or through these readers, and uncannily evoking 
Wallace’s own rhetoric around readership and dialogue, contemporary 
scholars remain caught up in the broader transferential schemes acted-out or 
performed within Wallace’s own texts. The most telling expression of this 
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game comes from Wallace, who makes the following distinction between two 
kinds of literary identification: 
But that’s just the first level, because the idea of a mental or 
emotional intimacy with a character is a delusion or a contrivance 
set up through art by the writer. There’s another level that a piece 
of fiction is a conversation. There’s a relationship set up between 
the reader and the text that’s very strange and complicated and 
hard to talk about (62, emphasis mine) 
As an open claim for a “very strange and complicated” conversation with the 
reader, Wallace’s texts inevitably repeat and act-outact-out their own stakes 
as texts – yet at times, I think, we struggle to identify the level of “delusion or 
contrivance” involved in this performance. This strategy forms much of the 
basis for Wallace’s claim that the distinction between “great art and so-so art” 
has something to do with “the art’s heart’s purpose, the agenda of the 
consciousness behind the text – it’s got something to do with love, with having 
the discipline to talk out the part of yourself that can love, instead of the part 
that just wants to be loved” (1993).  
By reviewing the persistence of readers who identify in Girl with Curious 
Hair, we can thus place Wallace’s own performative strategies back into 
question, highlighting for example the elaborative discourses of literary love 
and empathetic identification in Wallace’s earliest fictions, and their bearing 
on our conversations with the author’s works today. To wit, we may ask: what 
is it to “talk out of the part of yourself that can love” in texts such as Girl with 
Curious Hair? Is this talking-out in fact a kind of acting-out? To what extent 
do the ideas of literary love and empathetic identification shape our 
contemporary conversations with Wallace and his texts? 
192 
 
Performing Postmodernity: Girl with Curious Hair 
 Originally published in 1989, Girl with Curious Hair is a virtuosic 
literary performance, bringing together the diverse stylistic and rhetorical 
strains of Wallace’s own literary inheritance, and deftly parroting the styles of 
20th century authors such as John Barth, Bret Easton Ellis, Robert Coover and 
Phillip Roth (Boswell 2003: 65-70). Through these overt parodies and stylistic 
re-imaginings of postmodernity, Girl lays the foundations for many of the 
author’s signature concerns, including the role of irony in modern “televisual 
culture” (See Chapter 1), and the capacities of the contemporary reader to 
empathise and identify therein. In this latter sense, we encounter once more 
the moralistic imperatives of Wallace’s broader fictional project, recollected 
in a 1993 interview with Hugh Kennedy and Geoffrey Polk: 
But anyway, one of the things I was doing in Girl with Curious 
Hair was to write a very traditionally moral book. This is a 
generation that has an inheritance of absolutely nothing as far as 
meaningful moral values, and it’s our job to make them up, and 
we’re not doing it. And we’re being told, by the systems that the 
Sixties were so right to fear, that we needn’t worry about making 
up moral systems: you know, that there isn’t more to being alive 
than being pretty, having intercourse a lot, and having a lot of 
possessions. But the darkly delicious thing is that these systems 
that are telling us this are using the techniques that the Sixties 
guys had used – by that I mean postmodern techniques like black 
irony, metafictional involutions, the whole literature of self-
consciousness. We are heirs to it. (2012: 18) 
Situated in direct conversation with “the Sixties guys” of high postmodernism, 
and the “whole literature of self-consciousness” bequeathed thereby, Girl with 
Curious Hair offers several defining performances of the author’s relationship 
to contemporary culture, and to his contemporary postmodern audience. 
Wallace is quick to note that this moral and cultural inheritance is shared, not 
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only by fiction writers, but by readers and television watchers across America 
and the Western world: “I mean, TV is so good now”, he declares, “So you’ve 
got us kids, aged twenty to thirty-five, right on the edge, and all the kids 
coming after us really getting sucked into that stuff” (17). Wallace’s famously 
meta-generational anxieties – here expressed in the form of TV Guide-esque 
exclamations (“TV is so good now”) and demographics (“kids, aged twenty to 
thirty-five”) – help inform the self-reflexive stakes of Girl, in which simple 
stories of love and loss are mediated through complex narratives of readers, 
writers and texts. In his seminal review of Wallace’s early fiction, titled ‘The 
Panic of Influence’, A.O. Scott makes these stakes clear when he writes that: 
“It’s hard to think of another writer of any generation […] who has lampooned 
the self-dramatizing frustrations of the creative process with such 
inexhaustible, maniacal conviction” (2000).  
In texts such as Girl with Curious Hair, these frustrations become an 
engine for narrative meaning, an “inexhaustible” and “maniacal” source of 
inspiration for both the author and his audience. Meanwhile, as Scott  
correctly observes, the text remains a “virtuoso compendium of tried and true 
avant-garde techniques” (2000), through which the author effectively repeats 
and reworks the stakes of his own literary and metafictional inheritance. 
Underpinned by these performative tensions, Girl with Curious Hair thus 
provides a prodigious account of the author’s relationship to contemporary 
postmodern culture, which is reflected in the author’s references to 
hypothetical postmodern ‘readers’.  
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This account is perhaps most overt in the celebrated novella which 
concludes the collection, titled ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes its 
Way’. As Boswell notes, this story sets itself in a kind of generational 
juxtaposition with the postmodern style of John Barth, whose ‘Lost in the 
Funhouse’ has proved a formative influence on Wallace’s early works more 
broadly (2003: 103). Moreover, Boswell declares ‘Westward’ to be “one of the 
most important texts in Wallace’s oeuvre,” which, taken as a prelude to 
Wallace’s later works such as Infinite Jest, stands as “an astonishingly 
confident preface to a masterpiece he hadn’t written yet” (103). The prefatory 
significance of the text comes down to the voice of Wallace’s narrator, which 
routinely interrupts the text’s narrative to address the reader directly, as in 
one section subtitled “A REALLY BLATANT AND INTRUSIVE 
INTERRUPTION” (Wallace 1989: 264). In this particular interruption, the 
narrator declares that  
If this were a piece of metafiction, which it’s NOT, the exact 
number of typeset lines between this reference and the 
prenominal referent would very probably be mentioned […] in 
metafiction it would, nay needs be mentioned, a required 
postmodern convention drawing the reader’s attention to the 
fact that the narrative bought and paid for and now under 
time-consuming scrutiny is not in fact a barely-there window 
onto a different and truly diverting world, but rather in fact an 
‘artifact’, an object (264-265). 
In this sense, ‘Westward’ attempts to distinguish itself from a “piece of 
metafiction”, whilst nevertheless alerting the reader to the artificiality and 
provisionality of its own textual operations, and reflecting on the 
metafictional text as a kind of “opaque forgery of a transfiguring window” 
(265). As a modality of “time-consuming scrutiny”, Wallace’s account of 
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metafiction is also an account of the reader’s expectations of metafiction, 
specifically the expectation of “this self-conscious explicitness and 
deconstructed disclosure supposedly making said metafiction ‘realer’ than a 
piece of pre-postmodern ‘Realism’” (265, emphasis mine).  
To these self-reflexive assumptions, Wallace’s narrator imagines the 
formation of a “New Realism”, which would ultimately demonstrate “that 
metafiction […] opens a fetid closetful of gratuitous cleverness, jazzing 
around, no-hands-ism”, and that such techniques are “the ultimate odium for 
any would-be passionate virtuoso” (265). Caught between the de-realising 
realism of metafiction, and the “certain antiqued techniques” of earlier Realist 
forms, ‘Westward’ imagines a fiction which “diverges, in its slowness, from the 
really real only in its extreme economy […] its grim proximity to its own 
horizon” (267). As Boswell’s work has indicated (See Chapter 1), this highly 
self-referential account of fictional practice, which hints at possibilities 
beyond even the Newest of Realisms, remains highly significant in our own 
accounts of Wallace’s legacy.  
Meanwhile, as we negotiate the opaque forgeries, extreme economies 
and grim proximities at stake in Girl with Curious Hair, we are also invited to 
negotiate our own role as ‘readers’, and to consider the possibilities for 
identification through the literary text. Fittingly, ‘Westward’ elects to 
conclude on a literal declaration of love to the reader, performed by the 
narrator in one final interruption to the preceding narrative. Reflecting on the 
silence of a stalled car, the narrator addresses the reader directly: 
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See this thing. See inside what spins without purchase. Close your 
eye. Absolutely no salesmen will call. Relax. Lie back. I want 
nothing from you. Lie back. Relax. Quality soil washes right out. 
Lie back. Open. Face directions. Look. Listen. Use ears I’d be proud 
to call our own. Listen to the silence behind the engine’s noise. 
Jesus, Sweets, listen. Hear it? It’s a love song.  
For whom? 
You are loved. (373) 
As Boswell writes, ‘Westward’ fulfils Wallace’s apparent desire to “build a text 
that treats its reader like a lover” (2003:  113), and to become, in his own words, 
an “architect who could hate enough to feel enough to love enough to 
perpetrate the kind of special cruelty only real lovers can inflict” (in Boswell: 
114). Indeed, the silent limit “behind the engine’s noise” of the text appears to 
be an actual “love song” for the reader; meanwhile, this limit is also expressed 
in the rhythmic, indeed hypnotic, repetition of phrases such as “Lie back” and 
“Relax”. Yet this song, as put by Wallace and Boswell, is downright creepy, as 
the narrator commands the reader to “Lie back”, “Open”, and “Face 
Directions”, to “Look” and to “Listen” – the anaesthetic tone effected by this 
narrator alerts us a peculiar kind of risk, that of the “reader/lover” (Boswell: 
114) in relation to the metafictional author. Negotiating the apparent “cruelty” 
of Wallace’s “love song” for the reader, Boswell finds relief in the outside of 
the text, imagining this lover “still inside the text with the Exit finally in view” 
(114) – the text’s silence is thus “an indicator of the novella’s respect for the 
real world to which all worthwhile literature must finally return us” (115).  
However, this rhetorical appeal beyond the text elides the complex 
relationships principally established within the text, particularly between its 
narrator and reader. Boswell’s immediate metaleptic move towards the “real 
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world” in this instance perhaps undermines the hypothetical significance of 
Wallace’s literal declarations of love and identification in ‘Westward’, and in 
Girl with Curious Hair more broadly. Our conversations with Wallace hinge 
on a shared sense of a world beyond the text, and yet this world appears largely 
predicated on sexual metaphor – for Boswell at least, the implied reality of 
reading a text like ‘Westward’ is akin to sex, or at the very least involves an 
encounter between the text and its imagined “reader/lover”. So much, then, 
for the idea of Wallace’s works as an “intimate zone of communication, of 
subjective interaction” (Boswell: 17). But how do we arrive at such claims? By 
following the scripts laid out by Wallace, retracing the assumptions and 
expectations writ large in Wallace’s texts, and their estranging statements of 
intent with regards to the reader. This sense of rhetorical intentionality is 
made literal in the final passage of ‘Westward’, as the narrator lays claim to 
the reader’s very senses, instructing them to “Use ears I’d be proud to call our 
own” (373). Co-opting the eyes, ears and head movements of the reader, 
Wallace presents a striking portrait of the narrator ‘seeing through’ that 
reader’s perspective, into a supposed real world of literary expectations and 
judgments.  
Yet these responses are themselves written into Wallace’s texts – the 
repetition of the reader’s identifications with the text forms the basis for 
Wallace’s constant “interruptions” in ‘Westward’, and for the text’s hyper-
intimate accounts of the literary dialogue as a kind of uncanny “love song”. By 
echoing these judgments – joining the choir, so to speak – we are entering into 
a decidedly personal kind of dialogue with the author and his texts, a dialogue 
198 
 
which is nevertheless beset by its own sense of forgery, economy and 
proximity. Against these hypothetical limits, we can restate the essential claim 
that Wallace identifies (with) the reader, that his texts succeed in both 
identifying and identifying with an empirical reader. This claim, as we have 
seen, rests on a concomitant identification of the “audience” within Wallace’s 
texts, an imagining of that audience’s capacities for empathy, identification 
and communication (See Chapter 1). Yet as we have also seen, this claim to 
identification also remains bound up in the diverse discourses of reading and 
readership already performed by texts such as Girl with Curious Hair; by 
retracing the figures of readers who identify in Girl, we may thus further 
understand the cathartic (and with Boswell, erotic) dimensions of Wallace’s 
hypothetical conversation with the ‘reader’.  
 
“a line of distraction without origin or end”  
Wallace’s debut short story collection thus concludes with a love song, 
or at the very least a declaration of love towards the reader of ‘Westward’. 
What does this mean for the theme of identification in Wallace’s work more 
broadly? Returning to the texts which precede ‘Westward’, we find this theme 
reshaped by Wallace’s overdetermined sense of the reader, and his paradoxical 
attempts to situate the reader both within and without the space of the text. 
This gesture is primarily accomplished through the imagining of various 
hypothetical ‘readers’ within the text, and the creative juxtaposition of these 
readers and their actions against the operations of the text itself. In this sense, 
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Wallace’s readers are themselves performers – from Jeopardy! contestant Julie 
Smith in ‘Little Expressionless Animals’, to actress and David Letterman guest 
Edilyn in ‘My Appearance’, Wallace juxtaposes the discerning act of reading 
with the kinds of ironic and televisual performance he would later diagnose 
in ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (1997). Julie Smith is a troubled young woman with an 
encyclopaedic memory, gleaned from time spent with actual encyclopedias in 
her youth; on the Jeopardy! set, however, Julie becomes (according to one TV 
executive) a “lens, a filter for the great unorganized force that some in the 
[television] industry have spent their whole lives trying to locate and focus” 
(24), that is, “the capacity of facts to transcend their internal factual 
limitations and become, in and of themselves, meaning, feeling” (24-25). 
Edilyn, meanwhile, is an actress “whose face and attitudes are known to over 
half of the measurable population of the United States”; yet according to her 
own account, she is also a woman “whose heart’s heart is invisible, and 
unapproachably hidden” (175). In these kinds of stories, Wallace presents two 
sides of the conundrum that is identification, against a self-reflexively 
postmodern backdrop of fake SNL commercials, Triscuit advertisements and 
serialised television tapings.  
Julie’s arc as reigning champion of Jeopardy! in the mid-eighties is 
shaped by the interventions of the show’s executives, whose attempts to 
“locate and focus” her performance culminate in Julie’s defeat at the hands of 
her estranged and autistic brother. As a treatise on “Total Data”, and the re-
emergence of traumatic memories over time, ‘Little Expressionless Animals’ 
highlights the idea of identification as reference (See Chapter 1), ultimately 
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hinging on its protagonist’s inability to correctly answer certain types of 
question. Meanwhile, Edilyn’s ironic dilemma – as to how to seem to appear 
on Late Night with David Letterman – highlights the complex idea of 
identifying with, that is, of identification as empathetic “act” on the part of the 
hypothetical Wallace reader. Following copious review and discussion of 
David Letterman and his show, Edilyn embarks on a risky performance of 
ironic transparency – revealing to the host and his audience that she is 
mundane and self-effacing, Edilyn becomes a kind of “anti-Guest”, to the 
raucous approval of virtually everyone except her husband. Both of these 
stories hinge on a conflation of identification and performance, mediated 
through diverse spheres of televisual production and reception.  
Our recognition of such performances thus shapes our own 
identifications with and within the text. However, both of these stories end 
badly for those concerned – both women face the loss of their respective loves 
as a result of their performances in front of the camera. As figures of 
identification and empathy, Wallace’s readers who identify present special 
problems for our contemporary conversations with the author and his works. 
To examine this effect in more detail, it pays to recall that we are dealing with 
‘meta-fictions’ here – from generic pastiche to postmodern self-reference, 
each story in Girl with Curious Hair comments on its own operations as text, 
ever focalising these strategies through the figure of the reader, and the latter’s 
supposed response to the text.  
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We see these tensions writ large in the story ‘Here and There’, within 
which Wallace pursues a pseudo-autobiographical form of “fiction therapy” 
(Boswell, 2003, 89), and in which the Wallace-esque “Bruce” recounts a failed 
relationship to an unnamed therapist-figure. This text highlights the decided 
intimacy of Wallace’s early fiction, with its detailed account of a relationship 
gone wrong, and the puzzled remnants of that relationship in the voices of its 
three principal characters. Bruce, a mechanical engineer, is preoccupied with 
a specific kind of love, a kind of contrived longing for his ex-girlfriend’s 
photograph: “I kiss her bitter photo. It’s cloudy from kisses. I know the outline 
of my mouth from the image. She continues to teach me without knowing” 
(152). Notably, the therapist-figure offers explicit advice to Bruce in response, 
voicing the formal stakes of the therapeutic relationship: 
“Bruce here I feel compelled to remind you that fiction therapy in 
order to be at all effective must locate itself and operate within a 
strenuously yes some might say harshly limited defined structured 
space. It must be confronted as a text which is to say fiction which 
is to say project. Sense one’s unease as you establish a line of 
distraction without either origin or end […] Yes but remember we 
decided to construct an instance in which for once your interests 
are subordinate to those of another.” 
 “So she’s to be reader, as well as object?” 
“See above for evidence that here she is so constructed as to be for 
once subject as well.” (153, emphasis mine) 
The therapist’s advice already serves as a sort of self-reflexive statement on the 
text’s fantasies of objectivity, circumscribing the analytic relationship as a 
kind of “harshly limited defined structured space” and inviting Bruce to 
“construct an instance in which for once your interests are subordinate to 
those of another”. However, it is telling that the text connects this therapeutic 
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imperative to the idea of a ‘reader’, constructed as both the “object” of Bruce’s 
narrative and a “subject” within Wallace’s narrative. To wit, the story is 
punctuated throughout by the voice of Bruce’s former lover (also unnamed), 
who provides a sort of quotidian critique of Bruce’s idealism: “He just works 
all the time on well-formed formulas and poems and their rules. They’re the 
things that are important to him. He’d tell me he missed me and then stay 
away” (152). The interposition of these various “subjects” – with Bruce, his ex-
partner and therapist all implicated within the same fiction-therapy space – 
helps us highlight the complex tensions at stake in Girl with Curious Hair, 
particularly when it comes to the idea of identification. The object of Bruce’s 
affections is “so constructed to be for once subject as well”, an expansive 
strategy which also enables the point-counterpoint nature of the text’s 
subsequent recollections. Yet at the outset, it is clear that we are contending 
with multiple perspectives, diverse and divergent readers of the same 
relationship – with the additional interventions of the analyst figure, we may 
thus ready ourselves to encounter a highly contested retelling of key narrative 
events.  
This multifocal strategy thus enables and problematises the idea of 
literary empathy as identification, presenting multiple distinct perspectives to 
identify and identify with; moreover, each of these narrative personae go on 
to inhabit different roles within the text, in turn refuting, expanding and 
collapsing the claims preceding their own. This strategy is most visible in the 
text’s accounts of Bruce’s own aesthetic program, which, recalling ‘Westward’, 
is a model of both “extreme economy” and “grim proximity”.  Bruce sees 
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himself at the vanguard of a “crystalline renaissance”, in which creative 
expression takes on a certain mathematical form and precision – “No more 
qualities. No more metaphors. Gödel numbers, context-free grammars, finite 
automata, correlation functions and spectra” (1989: 155). Privileging pure 
form, Bruce sees the future of art as a kind of “impending upheaval”, a 
cathartic “great cleaning” (155), and yet this sense of catharsis is undercut by 
the quotidian account of Bruce’s ‘reader’, who highlights the more obvious 
narcissistic motivations behind his formal idealism. “His honors thesis is an 
epic poem about variable systems of information- and energy-transfer” she 
recounts, “He wants to be the first really great poet of technology” (155). The 
text weaves these accounts together, framing Bruce’s discourse of literary 
beauty in terms of self-conscious conflict with the ‘reader’: 
“Words as fulfillers of the function of signification in artistic 
communication will wither like the rules of form between them. No, 
she says? Assuming she cares enough to even try to understand? 
Then say that art necessarily exists in a state of tension with its own 
standards. That the clumsy and superfluous logos of all yesterdays 
gives way to the crisp and proper and satisfactory of any age. That 
poetry, like everything organized and understood under the rubric 
of Life, is dynamic. The superfluous always exists to have its ass 
kicked.” (155, emphasis mine) 
Through self-conscious anticipation of his own ‘reader/lover’ (“No, she says?”) 
coupled with antagonism (“Assuming she cares enough to even try to 
understand?”) Bruce puts forth his manifesto for the “crisp and proper and 
satisfactory”, which he describes as a necessary effect of progress. But 
alongside this parodically teleological model of meaning, ‘Here and There’ 
continues to weave its multifocal fiction-therapy game, leveraging Bruce’s 
own stated ambivalence towards his ex and to the therapeutic situation itself. 
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Time and time again, the voice of the therapist interjects to remind Bruce of 
the matter at hand, having already declared such talk as “a line of distraction 
without either origin or end” (153). Despite these reminders, ‘Here and There’ 
recounts itself in a digressive and dissimilatory way, playing off of the 
conflicting perspectives of its narrators, and the various repetitions of loss 
effected therein. In this sense, Bruce’s “crystalline renaissance” soon begins to 
sound more like Shoshanna Felman’s take on the literary transference, itself a 
repetition which “situates both the loss of the story’s origin and the story’s 
origin as its own loss” (2003: 169; See Chapter 2).  
In this play of origins, ‘Here and There’ offers up a more self-reflexive 
take on the idea of literary identification as such, whilst continually framing 
this idea through obliquely psychoanalytic stagings of the text and its 
narrative. The apogee of this strategy occurs in the text’s final pages, in which 
Bruce, recovering with family after the breakup, is tasked with repairing an 
old stove in his Aunt’s kitchen. We are given an explicit portrait of this task, 
by way of the stovetop mechanism itself, described thus: 
The burner controls determine temperature level at the selected 
point through straightforward contact and conduction of AC to 
the relevant burner’s heating unit, each of which units is simply a 
crudely grounded high-resistance transformer circuit that 
conducts heat, again through simple contact, into the black iron 
spiral of the burner (Wallace 1989: 168-169).  
However, Bruce’s schematism is undermined by the decrepit status of the 
stove itself, with wires “so old and worn and be-gooed that I can’t possibly tell 
which bundle of wires corresponds to which outflow jack on the circuit” (169). 
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Schematic certainty is quickly subsumed by mystery, as Bruce’s crude 
attempts at rewiring the stove irrevocably complicate the stove-fixing process: 
I am unsure what to do. I could attach the main oven’s own 
conduction bundle to a burner’s outflow jack on the distributor 
circuit, but I have no idea how hot the resultant surge would 
render the burner. There is no way to know without data on the 
resistance ratios in the metal composition of the burners. The 
current used to heat a large oven even to WARM could melt a 
burner down. It’s not impossible. I begin almost to cry (170-171, 
original emphasis). 
This thermodynamic dilemma bleeds out into the text, as the final pages of 
‘Here and There’ effectively overheat in tandem with the Bruce’s meltdown. 
As the text reintroduces the competing voices of the therapist and the ex-
‘reader’, Bruce becomes convinced that his efforts have “broken the stove”, 
and becomes “so scared behind the dirty stove that I can’t breathe” (171). The 
mysteries of the stove top are compounded by the shifting tone of the 
therapist. “Is it that you love this pretty old woman and fear you’ve harmed 
the stove she’s had since before Kennedy?” he interjects, later issuing the 
oblique challenges “Whom else have you harmed.”, “What are you afraid of.” 
(171) and so forth. In this dramatically receding narrative frame, the story’s 
subject becomes unclear – it appears to no longer be the “reader” imagined by 
Bruce and his therapist, nor the relationship between Bruce and the so-called 
“subject” of his recollections. The meaning of the scene appears to come from 
the sheer absurdity of the scene itself, the overdetermined sense of risk and 
exposure at stake in Bruce’s talk of “resistance ratios” and “high-resistance 
transformer circuit[s]” (169, 170).  
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The sense of compounding mystery – and indeed of literal (albeit 
electrical) “resistance” – informs Bruce’s obsessive performance behind the 
stove top, undermining the text’s pretensions to epistemic closure through an 
increasingly transferential-neurotic narrative set-piece. As Bruce opines, there 
is “no way to know” how he has harmed or will harm the stove, nor how he has 
harmed those around him. At the apex of this scene, Bruce is reduced to a 
figure of confused impotence, trapped inside a womblike mechanical space: “I 
point at the filthy distributor with my screwdriver and do not say anything,” 
he says, “I prod it with the tool.” (171). The image of a “filthy distributor”, poked 
and prodded inside the “tidied black hollow of the stove” (171), presents the 
reader with a perverse kind of ‘primal scene’, a scene which echoes throughout 
Bruce’s recollections of his lover and his art. This psychological undercurrent 
helps us make sense of Bruce’s initial fixation with his ex-girlfriend’s image, 
which is built on an almost phobic apprehension towards kissing her: “kissing 
someone is actually sucking on a long tube the other end of which is full of 
excrement” (151). Bruce’s fear of abjection, of a “long tube” leading to 
“excrement”, motivates his desire to create “a line of distraction without either 
origin or end” within the therapeutic dialogue. Yet the insistent demands of 
the therapeutic narrative drive Bruce to an abject state, boxed up inside the 
“black hollow” of his own neuroses. Early in the text, Bruce proudly recalls his 
love life: “I could unlock her like a differential, work her like an engine. Only 
when I was forced to be away at school did things mysteriously ‘change’” (152).  
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However, as the narrative progresses, the power dynamic between 
Bruce and his ‘reader’ begins to shift and change, becoming more ambivalent 
the further Bruce gets from his ex-love: 
“I have one slow dream in which she is bagging leaves in my 
family’s yard in Indiana and I am pleading with her to magically 
present with amnesia, to be for me again, and she tells me to ask 
my mother, and I go into the house, and when I come out again, 
with permission, she is gone; the yard knee-deep in leaves. In this 
dream I am afraid of the sky: she has pointed at it with her rake 
handle and it is full of clouds which, seen from the ground, form 
themselves into variegated symbols of the calculus and begin to 
undergo manipulations I neither cause nor understand. In all my 
dreams the world is windy, disordered, gray” (165) 
Following the dream, Bruce begins to vividly imagine the presence of an 
“outside voice”, explicitly distinguishing this voice from that of his ex-
girlfriend. “I begin to realize that she might never have existed,” he declaims, 
“That I might feel this way now for a different – maybe even no – reason”. 
Bruce’s subsequent disavowals of the ‘reader/lover’ cast his interpretations in 
a more paranoid, narcissistic light: “I begin to feel as though my thoughts and 
voice here are in some way the creative products of something outside me, not 
in my control, and yet this shaping, determining influence outside is still me.” 
(165, emphasis mine). Under the pressures of the therapeutic situation, Bruce 
begins to hallucinate his own voice, externalised as a ‘shaping, determining 
influence outside’ that is nevertheless him, a part of his own discourse and 
recollection.  
In this decidedly neurotic narrative turn, Wallace’s story thus repeats 
and replays its narrative of loss as a kind of Freudian farce, in tune with the 
author’s engagements with psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic thought more 
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broadly. But while the “mock-Freudian” elements of Wallace’s work have been 
appreciated by Boswell (2003: 127) and others, there is no ignoring the 
productive fact of the transference in texts such as ‘Here and There’. The 
therapeutic framing of the text is particularly significant, as Bruce is instructed 
to imagine the object of his loss as a “subject”, a gesture which inaugurates the 
fragmentary recollections and interpretive voicings performed within the 
text’s final scene.  
In fact, there is no real way to know whether the voices canvassed in 
‘Here and There’ speak from distinct vantage-points, or whether they are 
simply voicings of Bruce’s own obsessive neuroses. We cannot forget that this 
subject is initially misapprehended by Bruce as a kind of ‘reader’, whilst 
remaining a definitive “object” in his own recollections – indeed, it is only 
through the interposition of the therapist (yet another kind of reader) that we 
can even begin to distinguish between the supposed vantage-points canvassed 
within the text. And yet, ‘Here and There’ remains, according to Boswell, “a 
love story, of sorts” (89), to the extent that it destabilises these precise 
boundaries within the text: 
The lover whose memory [Bruce] is trying to exorcize, moreover, 
becomes in this ‘defined structural space’ at once reader (of 
Bruce’s justifications), object (of Bruce’s narrative) and subject (of 
her own narrative). The story therefore creates a ‘space’ that 
contains and ultimately collapses such dichotomies as reader 
versus text, self versus other, and here versus there – the very 
dichotomies that the text is in fact exploring (91).  
Again, we locate the destabilising nature of Wallace’s texts alongside the 
imagination (or re-imagination) of the reader, the subject of “her own 
narrative” in Boswell’s words. Yet no matter where we locate this reader – in 
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Bruce’s fantasies, in Wallace’s therapeutic frame, or in Boswell’s anodyne 
readings of both – we remain attentive to the fact that this reader must be 
hypothesised for the story to take place. Boswell concludes that the story 
reflects the author’s awareness of desire “as an insistent urge that must be 
reconciled with the fact that we cannot contain or finally possess the things 
that we desire” (93). Yet on this basis, we might also observe that Wallace’s 
text appears to desires its own reader, distinct from Bruce’s own lover. The 
thwarted re-imagination of this reader as yet another ex-lover effectively 
complicates our own attempts to identify with and through the text.  
 
Repeating Readers: ‘Say Never’, ‘Girl with Curious Hair’ and 
‘Everything is Green’ 
 Under our transferential-neurotic model, identification (in the forms 
of either love or empathy) involves the incorporation of another’s expectations 
into one’s own identity (See Introduction). The extent to which texts such as 
‘Here and There’ repeat, re-imagine and re-abstract their own empathetic 
stakes indicates this hypothetical sense of reader-construction in Wallace’s 
texts more broadly. While it is one thing to acknowledge that the role of the 
reader is unstable in Wallace’s work, it is another to ignore the effects of this 
instability on our contemporary conversations with Wallace, or to judge this 
instability as a function of pseudo-empirical, psycho-sexual dynamics. This is 
particularly true when it comes to the theme of empathetic identification – 
are we so lacking in analogues for empathy that we must read Girl with Curious 
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Hair as a kind of literal love affair, a love song, a love story between ourselves 
as readers and the text itself? It appears increasingly apt to speak of Wallace’s 
fictions through the lens of the transference-neurosis, as a metafictional 
acting out of certain  empathetic author-reader relationships. In the 
transference, meanwhile, we also encounter the kinds of opaque forgeries, 
extreme economies and grim proximities predicted by Wallace in ‘Westward 
the Course of Empire Takes its Way’, alongside overt performances of these 
and other limits in texts such as ‘Here and There’, ‘My Appearance’ and ‘Little 
Expressionless Animals’. As always, the key mechanism of this effect is the 
performance of the ‘reader’, the repetition and overt literalisation of that 
‘reader’ within the text. The sheer proliferation of readers who identify in Girl 
with Curious Hair is enough to indicate the complexity of our contemporary 
conversations with Wallace, and the sorts of assumptions and expectations we 
are to deal with therein. As a series of “framed tales” (Brooks, 1986), expanded 
with methamphetamine zeal, Girl with Curious Hair embodies the maximalist 
aspirations of the early Wallace, as well as his complex relationship to the idea 
of identification as such.  
The resultant effects are once again reminiscent of Henry James’ 
transferential games in The Turn of the Screw, as read by Shoshanna Felman 
(See Chapter 2). It is pertinent to recall the idea of the narrative frame itself, 
and its bearing on the dynamic significance of the literary dialogue. Through 
his mis-placings of narrative authority and voice, James is remembered by 
Felman as the curator of a peculiarly transferential sense of narrative, 
expressed in the text’s creative framing of its core contents. As Felman has 
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suggested in Chapter 2, these kinds of texts enact a drama in which “the very 
content, the interior of the story that becomes somehow exterior to itself, 
reported as it is by a voice inherently alien to it […] a voice whose otherness 
violates the story’s presence to itself (Felman 2012: 169). We have already had 
cause to observe this effect in ‘Westward’ and ‘Here and There’ – more than 
anything else, Wallace’s performances of readership and identification in Girl 
with Curious Hair highlight the essential exteriority or “otherness” of their 
reader, an idea very often grasped in the proliferations of sexual metaphors 
and moralistic substitutions within contemporary Wallace Studies.  
Yet for a reader like Boswell, this game is most notable for its moments 
of synthesis, its beats of “gooey sentiment” – the idea of Wallace’s works as a 
vehicle for sentimental identification with and of the reader is, for Boswell, 
Wallace’s “work’s ultimate mode, and what the work ‘really means’, a mode 
that Wallace equates with the ‘really human’” (2003: 17). Nevertheless, in 
Wallace’s defiant and multifaceted performances of literary love, do we not 
also encounter the “echoing chain of […] multiple, repetitive narrative voices”, 
each contending with the hypothetical and empirical “otherness” of their 
subject? Through their proliferation and sheer manic difference, these 
subjects are made into proxies for the diverse kinds of identification and 
empathetic engagement sought by Wallace’s own texts. Like The Turn of the 
Screw, Wallace’s texts are also notable for the tenor of their reception, and the 
strange ways in which critics “repeat unwittingly – with a spectacular 
regularity – all the main lexical motifs of the text” (Felman 2012: 145).  
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If we can consider the idea of the ‘reader’ to be one such “lexical motif”, 
then the repetition of readers who identify within Wallace scholarship – 
already demonstrated through Boswell’s imaginings of the reader in relation 
to Wallace’s texts – has its own spectacular regularity. However, as I’ve 
suggested in this chapter, these kinds of repetitions remain crucial to our 
contemporary understandings of Wallace’s works, laying the essential 
foundations for our understanding of what makes these works unique – 
namely, their overt concern with the theme of identification. The apparent 
exhaustions and resuscitations of ironic culture come and go; what has 
become essential in the wake of David Foster Wallace’s works is the anterior 
question of empathy, of empathetic identification “between one human being 
and another” (1997: 144). Thus it’s no surprise for us to imagine ourselves in 
the shoes of Wallace’s ‘readers’, to recognise their actions as part of the text’s 
broader overtures towards us, the supposed actual reader of that text. 
Through these exhaustively self-reflexive games with the reader’s own 
identifications, elaborated within and with regard to the texts in which they 
appear, Wallace’s texts irrevocably complexify and over-determine the 
response of their own reader. And yet, as repetition, Wallace’s performances 
of readers who identify would thus alert us to the properly transferential 
dimensions of the literary exchange, adapted for the whims of an assumed 
postmodern audience. By placing this audience within and without the 
narrative frame, Wallace effectively squares the circle of postmodern self-
reference, allowing for a more overtly self-conscious identification with the 
theme of identification as such. We see this hyperbolic imperative at work in 
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texts such as ‘Everything is Green’ and ‘Say Never’, two texts which once again 
place the idea of the reader who identifies centre-stage. 
 All of the texts in Girl with Curious Hair privilege the theme of love, 
with each of Wallace’s narratives drawing on specific kinds of love to motivate 
the thoughts, judgments and performances of their characters. The shortest 
story in the collection, ‘Everything is Green’, runs for two pages, and presents 
a characteristically condensed portrait of the transferential relationships at 
stake in Wallace’s broader literary project (see above). The relationship 
between “Mayfly” and the story’s narrator is predicated on an intimate (albeit 
shifting) sense of trust, and a complex transfer of investments between 
interlocutors: 
She says I do not care if you believe me or not, it is the truth, so 
go on and believe what you want to. So it is for sure that she is 
lying. When it is the truth she will go crazy trying to get you to 
believe her. So I feel like I know. (229) 
I say Mayfly I can not feel what to do or say or believe you any 
more. But there is things I know. I know I am older and you are 
not. And I give to you all that I got to give you, with my hands and 
my heart both. Every thing that is inside me I have gave you […] I 
have made you the reason I got for what I always do. (229) 
Meanwhile, Mayfly also presents a characteristically postmodern sensibility, 
telling the narrator to “believe what you want to”; the narrator, meanwhile, 
declares that he has exhausted himself for Mayfly’s benefit, elevating her to a 
kind of symbol, “the reason I got for what I always do”. This strangely co-
dependent relationship between the narrator and Mayfly arguably mirrors the 
broader author-reader relationships at stake in Girl, as Wallace’s authorial 
personae justify themselves against the expectations of individual and 
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collective ‘readers’. And yet, the narrator opines that this relationship is falling 
apart, on the grounds that “I am feeling like there is all of me going into you 
and nothing of you is coming back anymore” (230). This odd ambivalence, a 
sense of transaction or transference, shapes the relationships reproduced in 
Girl, as Wallace’s narrators self-consciously grapple with the expectations of 
the ‘reader’, and the kinds of “full human relationship” achievable through the 
literary dialogue (McCaffery). Nevertheless, Mayfly is a site of cathartic 
fascination for the narrator – “Her hair is up with a barret and pins and her 
chin is in her hand,” Wallace writes, “she looks like she is dreaming out at the 
clean light through the wet window over my sofa lounger” (230).  
In Wallace’s idiom, literary identification involves a positive assertion 
of the relationship between reader and author, an assertion which is 
complicated by the self-referential and inward-looking structures through 
which this assertion takes place. ‘Everything is Green’ stages this assertion as 
a kind of transference, in which the narrator ambivalently justifies his love for 
Mayfly, metaphorising her as “my morning” (1989: 230). And yet, this 
“morning” is in the eye of beholder Mayfly, and it is only by beholding her that 
the narrator can properly see the dawn. Notably, the image of morning, 
particularly a grey and cloudy “dawn”, is repeated and reproduced throughout 
Girl, typically serving as the stage for traumatic and oneiric encounters 
between narrative actors and their pasts (See Chapter 6). In the final 
paragraph of ‘Green’, Wallace frames love as a kind of ‘looking-out’, with the 
narrator transfixed by Mayfly staring out the window: “and there is something 
in me that can not close up, in that looking. Mayfly has a body. And she is my 
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morning. Say her name” (230). Finally, the imperative to “say her name” is 
directed towards the reader, imploring the latter to identify and name Mayfly 
as the narrator’s love-subject, a self-avowed “reason I got for what I always 
do”.  
Wallace’s literary project, meanwhile, is made up of attempts to talk 
out the perspective of named figures like Mayfly, to detail their assumptions 
and expectations. By self-consciously sketching the horizons of the ‘reader’, 
and framing themselves through staged encounters with such hypothetical 
readers, texts such as ‘Everything is Green’ effectively act-outact-out their own 
reception; through this performance, these texts invite the reader to expose 
their own assumptions to the self-conscious judgments canvassed in the text 
itself. We see this process at work in the various performer figures canvassed 
in Girl with Curious Hair, and in the relationship between Wallace’s narratives 
and the textual ‘performances’ staged therein. In texts such as ‘My 
Appearance’ and ‘Westward the Course of Empire Takes its Way’, key 
characters are framed by their role as a cipher for audience expectations. 
Edilyn in ‘My Appearance’ is referenced by David Letterman as “a woman who 
acts in television” (194). Drew-Lynn Eberhart in ‘Westward’ is someone “who 
actually went around calling herself a postmodernist” and who “honestly, it 
seemed to us, couldn’t see far enough past her infatuation with her own 
crafted cleverness to separate posture from pose, desire from supplication” 
(234).  
216 
 
Each of these performer-figures is explicitly connected to the 
expectations of a broader audience, whilst their in-text performances repeat 
and reinforce the self-reflexive themes of their respective texts. For example, 
Edilyn’s self-effacing performance on ‘Letterman’ upends the ironic 
expectations of the television audience, whilst stoking the insecurities of her 
husband, Rudy. ‘My Appearance’ concludes on a note of loss, as Edilyn asks 
her husband “just what way he thought he and I really were, then, did he 
think”, before declaring that question “the mistake” that presumably cost her 
marriage (201). Nevertheless, Edilyn pulls through by virtue of her 
performance –  “I’d come through something by being in its center,” she 
narrates, “survived in the stillness created by the disturbance from which I, as 
cause, perfectly circled, was exempt” (200-201).  
Wallace’s performers serve as a focalising thematic centre in Girl with 
Curious Hair, a position somehow exempted, yet implicated as “cause”, for the 
narratives which unfold around them. In this sense, Wallace’s performers 
function as thematic proxies for the ‘reader’, to the extent that Wallace’s texts 
routinely frame the reader as an explosion engulfing the performer, a 
hyperbolised “cause” for the text’s efforts at centring the ‘reader’.. Yet this self-
conscious valorisation of performance remains caught up in Wallace’s 
concern the ‘reader’ as a kind of empathetic ideal, itself offset by the 
ambivalent discourse of “love” through which both figures are constructed in 
Wallace’s work. For better or worse, Wallace’s narratives retain an over-
determined fascination within feminine performance, casting his performer-
figures as mysterious ciphers for both the expectations of the audience and 
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operations of his own texts. Clare Hayes Brady writes that “Wallace’s 
treatment of gender evokes Slavoj Zizek’s account of contemporary 
incarnations of courtly love themes, in which the female is disembodied and 
idealized out of potency” (2013: 132).  
Brady argues that Wallace’s texts work to accommodate, rather than 
resolve, the conflicts posed by this disembodied and idealised feminine image, 
creating a fictional space in which “the competing vocabularies employed by 
masculine and feminine voices enact a powerful dynamic struggle between 
Self and Other” (132). These tensions undoubtedly frame Wallace’s discourse 
of the reader, specifically when it comes to love and identification. Wallace’s 
account of the literary dialogue as a denial and affirmation of distinct 
“agendas” on the part of author and reader is a case in point (McCaffery), as 
are the gendered performances of texts such as ‘Everything is Green’, ‘Here 
and There’, ‘My Appearance’ and ‘Little Expressionless Animals’.  
Each of these texts are structured around the interplay of distinct 
voices and perspectives, with feminine performers serving as a focalising point 
for the conflicting desires and expectations of both the text and its presumed 
audience. In a less endearing sense, however, Wallace’s most hyper-aware 
early fictions attempt to make a virtue of the author’s estranging issues with 
women, and thus offer excruciating insights into the fetishistic impulses 
underpinning many of the collection’s best performances. The 
overdetermination of feminine ‘mystery’ is taken to parodic extremes in ‘Say 
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Never’, wherein Romantic scholar Lenny Targus unleashes an almost 
salivating appraisal of his muse, Carlina: 
Carlina Rentaria-Cruz, secretarial aide at North Side offices of 
Chicago Park District. Twenty, lovely, light and dark, hair sticky 
with gin, our lady of wet rings on album covers, Spanish lilt, 
pointed boots, a dairy sheen to redly white skin, lips that gleam, 
shine a light – shine without aid of tongue – they manufacture 
their own moisture. (213) 
Meanwhile, the titular story ‘Girl with Curious Hair’, Wallace presents the 
“curious hair” in question as a kind of fetish object par excellence: 
Gimlet stated that the girl’s curious hair represented radioactive 
chemical waste product anti-immolation mojo and that if Gimlet 
could cut it off and place it in her vagina beneath the porch of her 
stepfather’s house in Deming, New Mexico, she could be burned 
and burned and never feel pain or discomfort (63-64) 
The weirdly abject image of the curious hair, in the context of Gimlet’s 
sadomasochistic relationship to narrator “Sick Puppy”, presents an explicit 
desire to idealise and disembody the fetish image, a desire set in tension with 
the anhedonic and nihilistic contexts of Sick Puppy and his punkrocker 
friends. In both ‘Say Never’ and ‘Girl with Curious Hair’, performance is 
fetishised to an absurd degree, providing the reader with a certain informed 
scepticism regarding the text’s broader discourse of “love” and identification. 
In their over-identifications with (and absurd objectifications of) their 
respective love-objects, Wallace’s male protagonists both solicit and ironically 
foreclose the reader’s own engagement with the text. These texts serve as 
timely reminders that over-identification with Wallace’s texts is indeed 
possible, and that we ought to continue to distinguish between the kinds of 
love and identification pursued within Wallace’s texts.  
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Conclusion: Performing the Reader who Identifies 
 What does it mean to say that Wallace identifies (with) the reader? As 
this chapter has suggested, the empathetic tenor of Wallace’s early fiction 
suggests a kind of rhetorical and hypothetical integrity to his project as a 
whole. Whether taken as a plain-language argument for literary love, or 
considered through the erotic and literalistic discourses at stake in Girl with 
Curious Hair, the question of empathy remains a decisive point of reference 
for Wallace’s work and reception. Nevertheless, actual references to empathy 
and love in Wallace’s early fiction have provided a more estranging take on 
these dynamics, which appears to conflate self-reflexive statements about the 
‘reader’ with particular transferential-neurotic relationships. When parsing 
the various love songs, love stories and declarations of love at stake in these 
fictions, we are led to assume particular dispositions towards the Wallace text 
– that these texts are speaking directly to us, that they solicit our 
identifications and question the capacity of ‘readers’ to respond to such 
solicitations. But despite the evident self-reflexivity of this strategy, Wallace’s 
return to transferential-neurotic ideas about reading – particularly in ‘Here 
and There’ and its aforementioned experiments with fiction therapy – present 
distinct challenges for readers who identify, and complicate the interpretive 
positions that such ‘readers’ may assume. These challenges reflect the 
concerns with literality and repetition outlined in previous chapters  – in this 
sense, to posit ourselves as an empirical reader beyond the text is to repeat 
aspects of the author’s own literalistic rhetoric about love and identification, 
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even as this rhetoric retains an estranging proximity to Freudian ideas about 
performance and transference.  
However, these challenges do not emerge from the simple fact that 
Wallace incorporates psychoanalytic discourse into his works - rather, it is the 
fact that these works appear conditioned by the production of second-order 
responses to such discourse, that they repeat their own transferential 
overtures by locating their significance in the identities and agencies of 
‘readers’. Wallace’s repeated insistence on empathetic identification, as both 
a moral imperative and a literary principle, continues to resonate throughout 
the field. Nevertheless, to insist on the idea that Wallace identifies (with) the 
reader is to insist on the significance of readers who identify within Wallace’s 
texts. Even accepting the notion of a non-figural, literalistic or actual ‘reader’ 
(as Wallace’s rhetoric arguably does), the sheer extent to which this early 
rhetoric figures the literal cannot be overlooked, even in the parodic and 
experimental contexts of Wallace’s early fictions. When Wallace’s Bruce asks 
“So she’s to be reader, as well as object?”, his therapist replies “See above for 
evidence that she is here constructed as to be for once subject as well” (1989: 
153). But the erotic objectification and indeed subject-ification of ‘readers’ – as 
lovers, as performers, as analysts or analysands – is a curious effect of 
Wallace’s early writings, even (or especially) when those writings return to the 
question of empathetic dialogue “between one human being and another” 
(Wallace 1997: 144). In other words, texts like Girl with Curious Hair indicate 
a particular and powerful rhetorical vector for Wallace’s literary project as a 
whole – the idea of erotic reading, or what Boswell calls “subjective 
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interaction” with the metafictional text (2003: 17) – whilst alerting us to the 
strangely performative and transferential-neurotic dynamics of this rhetoric.  
As we shall see, Wallace’s subsequent short fictions take up the 
question of identification, and of literalistic and eroticised reading, in 
particularly estranging ways. But this study’s focus on ‘acting-out’ has already 
allowed us to observe the impact of repetition, re-imagination and re-
abstraction within Wallace’s early rhetoric of readers who identify, whilst 
alerting us to the interpretive challenges which surround themes like love, 
reading and performance in our readings of Wallace. Having investigated 
these dynamics here, and provided a theoretical account of their escalation in 
Wallace’s work and reception, it is now pertinent to consider the kinds of 
transference-neurosis at stake in a text like Brief Interviews with Hideous Men. 
Through this approach, we may thus consider the difference between 
(literalistic) readers who identify and (imaginative) readers who critique across 
Wallace’s short fiction collections, and in contemporary discussions of 
suspicious reading in relation to Wallace. By distinguishing the effect of re-
imagination in Wallace’s middle-period fictions, and considering the kinds of 
transferential naiveté or repetition hypothesised within those fictions (as 
opposed to ‘beyond’ them), we may thus gain a better understanding of self-
reflexivity and repetition in Wallace’s fictional project more broadly.  
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CHAPTER 4 
Readers who Critique 
 
 
Can we talk about it before you react? Can you promise? 
(Wallace 1999: 83) 
 
 
Introduction: Repetition and Re-Imagination 
Wallace’s early metafictional works have been characterised by their self-
reflexive (albeit estranging) repetitions of readers who identify, as evidenced 
by the author’s return to literalistic ideas about the relationship between 
empathetic identification and the author-reader relationship. In my reading 
of Girl with Curious Hair, I highlighted particular parallels between this 
strategy (which saw ‘readers’ repeated across a range of narrative and 
characterological contexts) and Wallace’s transferential-neurotic take on love 
– in his words, on “talking out of the part of yourself that can love, instead of 
the part that just wants to be loved” (in McCaffery 2012: 50). The key to this 
reading was recognising the extent to which acting-out, performance, dictated 
the terms of Wallace’s response to the empathetic and erotic dilemmas of late 
postmodernity. Through their essentially self-reflexive disposition towards 
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the ‘reader’, texts such as ‘Here and There’ and ‘Westward’ were shown to 
repeat Freudian ideas about transference and transference-neurosis, 
signalling the psychoanalytically-aware nature of the author’s literary project 
more broadly.  
However, it remains to be seen whether these early insights into ‘literal 
literary love’ persist in the more sophisticated rhetorical contexts suggested 
by later Wallace texts, such as Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999). This 
short fiction collection boasts some of the author’s most challenging 
statements about erotic reading, particularly when considered against the 
kinds of reading-positions suggested in Girl. With the text’s obsessive shift 
towards the theme of male anxiety, and towards the fraught discourse of 
“hideous men”, it becomes particularly difficult to square the idea of love 
(erotic, empathetic or otherwise) with the more antagonistic rhetorical 
dimensions of these statements. In fact, Brief Interviews appears to have 
radically overhauled some of the author’s plain-language ideas on love, and by 
extension empathy and identification. The text openly and exhaustively 
details the psychological stakes for ‘fiction writers’ and ‘readers’ who engage 
with texts erotically.  
The chapter highlights a particular aspect of this strategy – the insistent 
return to suspicious reading-tropes in Brief Interviews – to consider whether 
Wallace’s texts anticipate the work of a psychoanalytically-engaged 
interpreter, following the exposure-centric questions established in Chapters 
2 and 3. As we have seen in the introduction, the transference-neurosis, as a 
224 
 
discursive performance or acting-out, re-imagines the stakes of analytic 
encounter.  But isn’t this exactly what Wallace’s texts do as well? Beyond 
superficial similarities to the clinical Freudian dialogue, isn’t there something 
familiar about the way that Wallace’s texts respond to the charge that they are 
operating under transference, despite their repeated insistence that they are 
motivated by love? When I read Wallace’s rhetorically-fraught narratives of 
rapists, misogynists and fiction-writers, I am almost forced to recall the sorts 
of questions asked by Freud in the transference-neurosis, particularly “See 
what happens when I give way to such things. Was I not right to consign them 
to repression?” (See Chapter 2). And indeed, through his radically over-
exposed portraits of male anxiety, Wallace appears to invite us to “see what 
happens” when readers read erotically. Nevertheless, this increasingly critical 
treatment of erotic ‘readers’ is worth exploring further, to the extent that it 
reprises and responds to the transferential-neurotic dynamics canvassed in 
Wallace’s earlier works. We have already seen that these works manifest a 
kind of second-order response to their own erotic exigencies, by invoking 
specific transferential and neurotic tropes which complicate the ideas of 
‘reading’ and  indeed loving.  
These tropes are certainly on display in Brief Interviews – the collection is 
widely recognised for its self-reflexive treatment of ‘hideous’ male voices, 
whose extreme and often rhetorically-bizarre views on gender politics invite 
the reader’s more suspicious critical faculties. But while contemporary 
scholars may differ on the merits or significance of this strategy, the extent to 
which Wallace re-imagines particular suspicious tropes – specifically, the 
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extent to which his texts figure suspicious reading through narratives about 
suspicious ‘readers’ – remains a point of concern for this scholarship, 
particularly when situating Wallace’s work within theoretically-inclined or 
exposure-oriented interpretive frameworks (See Chapter 2). Our modelling of 
the transference-neurosis is one such framework – while recognising the kinds 
of erotic common-sense at stake in Wallace’s fiction, the study aims at 
clarifying and distinguishing between different ‘types’ of ‘reader’ that this 
common sense discloses. But Wallace’s sophisticated treatment of 
psychoanalytic reading would appear to pre-empt such a model, and in fact 
does so, to such an extent that we might begin to discern a new reading-
position within Wallace’s texts – one which recognises and accounts for its 
own exposure-oriented and suspicious tendencies, particularly when faced 
with themes such as ‘literal literary love’ and empathetic identification.  
And yet, this escalation of stakes – the movement to increasingly complex 
reading-positions in relation to Wallace – is precisely what the transferential-
neurotic model identifies. As the narratological and characterological 
dilemmas of Wallace’s fiction begin to multiply exponentially, and the 
question of erotic reading becomes increasingly antagonised, the sense of 
estrangement remains – after all, the most vivid indicator of this escalation is 
more ‘readers’, more narratives about ‘reading’ and ‘loving’ and ‘narrating’ and 
‘fucking’ and so forth… While Wallace’s views on literary love may have 
evolved over time, the estranging extent to which that evolution plays out in 
the negative – that is, through almost anti-empathetic rhetorical strategies – 
remains a point of concern for contemporary scholarship, a point which I 
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engage with further in this chapter with Kelly (2010), Holland (2013) and 
Hayes-Brady (2013). By distinguishing a second type of ‘reader’ in Brief 
Interviews, a ‘reader who critiques’ – and highlighting the text’s own fraught 
mechanisms of distinction and re-imagination in the process – this chapter 
considers the impact of transference-neurosis and suspicious critique in 
Wallace’s middle-period fictions.  
The first time we investigated this dynamic, we found that texts such as 
Girl with Curious Hair inhabit and exploit the tensions between two kinds of 
identification, that is, between the avowed need for empathetic dialogue 
“between one human being and another” (1997, p144), and the imperative to 
literally refer to these very same dialogues as a matter of narrative, thematic 
and characterological substance. But if Wallace’s subject matter appears to 
have changed, it is because the stakes of his transferential-neurotic game have 
escalated. With a shift in focus towards readers who critique, and towards 
exposure-centric or suspicious modes of reading, this chapter seeks to situate 
Wallace’s middle period fiction within the more substantive critical 
dimensions of the question: Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace?  
Whilst the question of literary love is certainly on display in texts such as 
Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (1999), this question has been refracted 
through critical satires of male performance. As a result, Brief Interviews is a 
claustral and claustrophobic text, which once again highlights the author’s 
ability to craft psychologically-vivid, formally complex and linguistically dense 
portraits of (male) ‘reader/lovers’. However, the text also evokes what Clare 
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Hayes-Brady has called “an almost-pathological consciousness of gender 
politics” on the part of Wallace (2013: 132), through which the author’s 
concerns for empathy and identification become entangled in much broader 
questions regarding sex, gender and language in contemporary life and 
culture. These sorts of questions animate the work of Mary K Holland (2004; 
2013), who leverages the insights of classical psychoanalysis and contemporary 
feminist theory to address Wallace’s “unflinching critique of narcissism as an 
impediment to empathy and sincerity” in Brief Interviews, “most often as 
wielded by men in ‘solipsistic’ relationship to women” (2013: 107). In such 
readings, which remain productively sceptical of the author’s own discourses 
on literary love and identification, we are engaged with the more diagnostic 
and prescriptive dimensions of Wallace’s fiction, which are also reflected in 
the author’s vocal engagements with postmodernity and avant-garde fiction 
in essays such as ‘Pluram’ and ‘Joseph Frank’s Dostoyevsky’ (See Chapter 1).  
This chapter leverages the metafictional dynamics of Wallace’s texts – 
their performative repetitions, re-imaginations and re-abstractions of the 
‘reader’ – to explore the various ways in which Wallace performs the critical 
or suspicious ‘reader’ in Brief Interviews. Having reviewed Wallace’s 
relationship to postmodernity and critical theory in Chapter 1, we saw that his 
texts manifest a somewhat tortured view of the contemporary suspicious 
reader, often diagnosing such perspectives alongside those of the 
“postmodern rhetorician” in ‘Octet’ or the self-conscious “lurkers and starers” 
in ‘E Unibus Pluram’ (1997). The significance of readers who critique in our 
readings of Wallace enables Boswell, for example, to speak to the “impact on 
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our collective consciousness of therapeutic discourse writ large” in Brief 
Interviews (2003: 182). Yet more importantly, this chapter finds these 
diagnostic stakes re-imagined in Wallace’s own fictions, as the author extends 
his various critiques of love, reading and performance into the realms of 
extreme self-consciousness and metafictional complexity. In the sophisticated 
rhetoric of Brief Interviews’ various narrators, interviewees, fictionalised 
authors and audiences, we have cause to encounter the imaginative 
dimensions of Wallace’s metafictional project.  
Given the alarming insistence on suspicion in Brief Interviews – 
conveyed through hideous voices which demand our attention to sex and 
gendered language in particular (Holland, 2013) – I think there is room to 
consider the way in which Wallace-ian empathy gets translated in the more 
“anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, Oedipally arrested, borderlinish parts” of his 
writing as well (Wallace 1997: 166). These audaciously Freudian elements are 
borrowed from Wallace’s own take on director David Lynch, whose films 
would appear to be a major influence on the kinds of hideous or monstrous 
male psyches depicted in Brief Interviews – as I explore much further in 
Chapter 5, the Lynchian psycho-dramatics averred by Wallace can helps us 
make sense of the interpretive ambivalence at stake in Wallace’s own fictions. 
For now, suffice it to say that Wallace’s treatment of suspicion – that is, his 
effective repetition, re-imagination and re-abstraction of suspicious reading 
in texts like Brief Interviews – can help us understand the escalation of 
hermeneutic stakes in Wallace’s middle-phase fiction, particularly when 
measured against the empathetic or literalistic parameters laid out in earlier 
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works. On this basis, it is unsurprising to find that the question of suspicion 
remains caught up in the question of performance – the metafictional 
centrepiece of Brief Interviews is, I think, the text ‘Octet’, which continues to 
inspire the present study with its exhaustions of possibility with regards to the 
Wallace ‘reader’ (See Introduction). Here again we discover the significance 
of repetition in Wallace’s works – to the extent that readers who critique repeat 
in Wallace’s works, we may continue to observe the fraught dynamics of 
suspicious re-imagination at stake in those works as well.  
 
Performing Suspicion: Brief Interviews with Hideous Men 
Throughout Brief Interviews, Wallace reframes the idea of empathetic 
dialogue through the verbal performances of “Hideous Men”, a rogue’s gallery 
of narcissists, perverts, psychotics, solipsists and rapists, whose various 
performances exemplify the text’s critical engagements with themes such as 
toxic masculinity and sexual violence. This strategy is most overt in the titular 
‘Brief Interviews with Hideous Men’, a series of formally-inventive dialogues 
between such men and a female interviewer whose questions are deliberately 
effaced from the text itself, replaced with various iterations of the letter “Q”. 
Rather, we find these questions indirectly presented within the one-sided 
discourse of Wallace’s ‘hideous’ male speakers, who are often highly 
suspicious of the interviewer’s own motivations. For example, the speaker of 
the celebrated ‘Interview 20’ recounts his response to a lover’s traumatic 
anecdote, in which she (the former lover) survived a brutal rape at the hands 
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of a psychotic killer; in Holland’s synopsis, the woman survives due to her 
empathic ability to “create and sustain […] a powerful connection with the 
attacker that will not allow him to dehumanize and kill her” (119-120).  
Whilst this narrative is indeed well-canvassed within the field, it is 
worth noting again the text’s subtle escalation of hostility towards the text’s 
‘interviewer’, and indeed towards the kinds of critical readers the interviewer 
is taken to represent. As the interviewee considers the broader psychological 
and rhetorical significance of his lover’s story, he becomes increasingly 
agitated about the questions being posed, as in this exchange: 
Q. 
‘And please be aware that I’m quite familiar with the typology 
behind these bland little expressions of yours, the affectless little 
questions. I know what an excursus is and I know what a dry wit 
is. Do not think you are getting out of me admissions I’m unaware 
of. Just consider the possibility that I understand more than you 
think.’ (260, emphasis mine) 
The speaker’s injunction, specifically against very the notion that his 
discourse merits suspicion – that it contains “admissions I’m unaware of”, 
hidden depths or anxieties – is here juxtaposed with a passive-aggressive 
dismissal of the interviewers’ “bland little expressions” and “affectless little 
questions”. In these less-than-subtle jibes on the kinds of theoretical jargon 
deployed by contemporary critical readers, texts such as ‘Interview 20’ define 
themselves against the kinds of suspicious readership they presuppose, 
particularly critical feminist thought – best evidenced in the speaker’s fear 
that the interviewer will “turn this into a Narcissistic Male Wants Woman’s 
Gaze On Him At Climax” (269), and, again, his anxious insistence that “I 
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understand more than you think” (260). From their expansive discourses on 
love and sexual violence, to their conflicted accounting of the respondent’s 
own (supposed) suspicions, texts such as ‘Interview 20’ self-consciously 
highlight their own suspicious stakes as texts.  
Meanwhile, the dialogic and therapeutic staging of these discourses as 
literal ‘interviews’ recalls Wallace’s earlier experiments with ‘fiction-therapy’ 
– elaborating on techniques developed in texts such as ‘Here and There’, Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men often reads like an open transcription of its 
characters’ transferential obsessions, their verbal compulsions to repeat and 
control the dialogues in which they find themselves. In the tortured discourse 
of Wallace’s hideous men, we are thus led to reconsider the kinds of 
empathetic identification and “love” imagined in texts such as Girl with 
Curious Hair. If there are indeed love songs in Wallace’s second short story 
collection, they are of a decidedly different key and genre – virtually every 
text in Brief Interviews grapples with the idea of love as a kind of conflict, 
elaborating on this notion through the increasingly self-conscious and 
deluded performances of its male protagonists. In this vein, Holland defines 
the collection through its “brazen solicitations of empathy for all kinds of 
mental, physical, and emotional disfigurements through likewise 
discomforting generic disfigurements” (2013: 107).  
In her critique of the author’s concern for empathetic dialogue in 
fiction, Holland’s research details “the degree to which men’s sexual desire 
for women taints and often prevents any attempts by men to extend empathy 
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[…] to women” in Wallace’s work, and the extent to which this dynamic is 
shaped by “the fraught interplay of language, desire and power” (Holland: 
108).  We see such games in a text like ‘Interview 76’, which presents an eerily 
upbeat account of its narrator’s “love” for women, extending this account ad 
nauseam until its insincerities and suspicious nature become clear: 
I love women. I really do. I love them. Everything about them. I 
can’t even describe it. Short ones, tall ones, fat ones, thin. From 
drop-dead to plain. To me, hey; all women are beautiful. Can’t 
get enough of them. Some of my best friends are women. I love 
to watch them move. I love how different they all are. I love how 
you can never understand them. I love love love them. (Wallace 
1999: 191-192) 
This monotonic recycling of clichéd sexist tropes – through a speaker who 
just “love love love(s)” himself some women, no matter “how different they 
all are” or how little he can “understand them” – helps set the stage for Brief 
Interview’s broader re-imaginings of sexuality and suspicion, particularly as 
the interviewee keeps going, keeps on voicing his love in iterative, almost 
microscopic, detail. The speaker describes “the different little sounds” that 
women make, “that little look” they sometimes give you, their “dainty little 
unmentionables” and “special little womanly products at the store” (192), 
sounding more and more like a Brett Easton Ellis character, collapsed into 
neat repetitions of the word “little” beneath a micro-thin veneer of civility. In 
this claustrophobic discursive space, the idea of identification becomes 
fraught with ironic significance; the speaker’s discourse of “love” appears 
calibrated to please precisely no one, defined instead by its rote repetitions 
of chauvinist rhetoric, and a literally micro-aggressive pandering to “little” 
women everywhere.  
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In this antipathetic and anti-empathetic rhetoric on gender, Brief 
Interviews presents considerable challenges for the contemporary empathetic 
reader of Wallace. Whereas Girl with Curious Hair imagined a reader capable 
of empathetic identification, particularly with the kinds of “love” appealed to 
and evoked by the text, Brief Interviews is pre-eminently concerned with the 
rejection of such overtures, and with the suspicious strategies of readership 
through which these rejections are performed. In the respective conclusions 
of ‘Interviews’ 20 and 76, we find our attentions displaced onto the figure of 
the interviewer, whose response to the discourse at hand is presented as a 
primary motivator for the speakers’ anxious recollections. ‘Interview 76’ 
presents this dynamic ironically, as both the speaker and the interview itself 
are interrupted by the sudden appearance of some monstrous presence: 
“What would the world be without women? It’d – oh no not again behind you 
look out!” (192, original emphasis). This jarring displacement of attention 
away from the speaker – literally telling the interviewer “Look out behind 
you!” – serves as a kind of punchline to the speaker’s maximally insincere 
rhetoric, alerting us to the kinds of toxic assumptions lurking beneath such 
rhetorics in a strangely overt way. This pantomime display of suspicion is 
subtly pre-empted by the speaker when he says “When it comes to women 
I’m helpless” (192, emphasis mine); read literally, is seems like the speaker is 
trying to warn us about the return of something monstrous, a return which 
is finally played out when the speaker exclaims “oh no not again behind you 
look out!”.  
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Interview 20 ends on a similarly explosive note, as its speaker, 
frustrated by the interviewer’s suspicions, attempts to declare his love for the 
woman identified in the preceding narrative. “I know how this sounds,” he 
announces, 
trust me. I know your type and I know what you’re bound to ask. 
Ask it now. This is your chance. I felt she could save me I said. 
Ask me now. Say it. I stand here naked before you. Judge me, you 
chilly cunt. You dyke, you bitch, cooze, cunt, slut, gash. Happy 
now? All borne out? Be happy. I don’t care. I knew she could. I 
knew I loved. End of story (271) 
In this passage, we see an apotheosis of Wallace’s suspicious strategy more 
broadly – recapitulating a series of ironic commands to the interviewer (“Ask 
it now”, “Ask me now”, “Say it”, “Judge me”) alongside a vitriolic display of 
gendered insults and dismissals, the speaker’s discourse is at once maximally 
suspect and maximally suspicious. Meanwhile, this performance is uncannily 
reminiscent of the rhetoric in a text like ‘Westward’, which represented its 
reader through staged directions (“Relax”, “Lie back”, “Look”, “Listen” et al) 
and cathartic declarations of intent (“It’s a love song”, “For whom?” “You are 
loved”).  
And yet in performing the repetition of such strategies, Brief 
Interviews appears to situate itself against a new kind of reader, one 
predisposed to critique the text’s explicit declarations of love. To wit, the 
speaker overtly distinguishes the suspicious interviewer, a “chilly cunt” borne 
out by judgement, from his re-imagined anecdote-teller, a woman with 
extreme capacities for empathy, sincerity and love. This kind of failure is at 
stake in Clare Hayes-Brady’s The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster 
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Wallace (2016), which recapitulates key arguments for critical theory and 
suspicious hermeneutics from her essays ‘Philosophical Groundings in The 
Broom of the System’ (2010) and ‘Language, Gender and Modes of Power’ 
(2013, See Chapter 1)). Again, I’d like to opt for complementarity between 
these studies and my own, because of the sheer significance of suspicion and 
suspicious hermeneutics in Wallace, and the complex representation of 
exposure-oriented and suspicious hermeneutics effected thereby. Building 
on this renewed critical approach, my study is also concerned with the impact 
of such representations upon critical rhetorics about Wallace today, 
particularly in light of the literalistic concerns canvassed already. Specifically, 
our reading leads us to wonder: If Wallace’s rhetorics about women and sex 
fail so dramatically in Brief Interviews, where are we to find the kinds of plain-
language author-reader relationship promised and presaged in Girl with 
Curious Hair? 
This ambivalent tension operates throughout Brief Interviews, as the 
conflicts between empathy and suspicion produce a litany of failed 
relationships, suspicious judgements and uncomfortable confrontations 
between Wallace’s narrators and readers who critique. We also find such 
readers at stake within contemporary Wallace scholarship, as critics grapple 
with the suspicious dynamics of Wallace’s avowed relationship to the reader 
in Brief Interviews and beyond (See Chapter 1). For Boswell, the overtly one-
sided nature of the ‘Brief Interviews’ suggests an interpretive dialogue in 
which “the questions actually being posed must be deduced by the reader 
based on the nature of answer” (2003: 188). In at least one sense, then, this 
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reader is invited to become a dynamic “participant in the narrative’s 
construction” (188), to critically deduce the text’s missing ‘questions’ from 
the self-conscious and suspicious nature of the interviewee’s ‘answers’. Yet in 
order to do so, the reader must directly confront the “sexist, self-protective, 
self-absorbed, objectifying, and […] cruel” dynamics of such answers (189).  
Meanwhile, in a slightly different critical vein, Hayes-Brady questions 
whether Wallace’s “hyperawareness of gender difference […] paralyses his 
authorial capacity for empathy” (132). This suspicious tension enables Hayes-
Brady to characterise Brief Interviews as a text in which 
the competing vocabularies employed by masculine and 
feminine voices enact a powerful dynamic struggle between Self 
and Other whose conflict cannot be resolved but must instead 
be accommodated (2013: p132).  
Hayes-Brady proceeds to outline the ambivalent taxonomy of gender in texts 
such as Brief Interviews, noting in particular Wallace’s constructions of 
“successful feminine identity” as a play of “absent centrality, disembodiment 
or disguise, linguistic fluidity, and manipulation” (142). Meanwhile, we find 
such rhetoric extended beyond Brief Interviews, most notably in the 
“undertones of conflict” present in the author’s own discussions of feminist 
discourse – pertinently, Hayes-Brady also highlights the curious fact that 
“Wallace’s references to his imagined readers always – to the point of 
affectation – envisaged the reader as female” (133).  
It is here that we re-encounter Wallace’s more performative 
discourses on reading, his various re-imaginings of the literary dialogue as a 
place for empathy and identification “between one human being and 
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another” (1997: 144) – except we must now also contend with the suspiciously 
gendered and often affectatious dimensions of this discourse. For while a 
great deal of authors may refer to their reader in the feminine, very few have 
articulated such an overt desire to “get inside” that reader’s “head” as Wallace 
(See Chapter 5). We might recall here Boswell’s readings of intimacy and 
“subjective interaction” in Wallace (2003: 17), imagined by Boswell as pseudo-
literal erotic encounters between Wallace and his so-called “reader/lover” 
(144). Boswell’s sense of Wallace as erotic “architect”, who in the author’s own 
words could “hate enough to feel enough to love enough to perpetrate the 
special kind of cruelty that only lovers can inflict” (in Boswell: 114), feels now 
suspicious, particularly in its ambivalent conflations of love, hate and feeling, 
and its erotic imagination of “cruelty” inflicted upon the reader (See Chapter 
3). In these critical conversations, we thus encounter two parallel modes of 
conversing with Wallace’s texts, the erotic and the diagnostic, each revealing 
new sides to our contemporary conversation with Wallace and his legacy.  
On the one hand, Wallace’s games with the respective insides and 
outsides of the text represent an extension of his earlier erotic strategies, 
aimed at complex identification with and of the reader; on the other hand, 
we find this identification displaced through the suspicious rhetorics of texts 
such as Brief Interviews, alongside manifold critical discourses on love, sex 
and gender. The relationship between these modes of reading, the kinds of 
readers imagined or implied therein, has long been a site of concern for critics 
such as Holland. In her essay ‘Mediated Immediacy’ (2013), we see these 
relationships expressed in a kind of ‘yes/and’ conjunction, with a dual claim 
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for the significance of identification and critique in Wallace’s works. Holland 
also notes the one-sided nature of Brief Interviews, whilst reviving the 
Wallace-ian notion that “the idea of the interview […] needs to be, or is, part 
of a larger conversation” (109, emphasis mine): 
The consistent structural monovocality [in Brief Interviews] 
enacts exactly the interior solipsism and resulting 
communicative barriers that Wallace’s fiction aims to diagnose 
and overcome. At the same time, the interrogatory format [of the 
text] creates a mechanism for eliciting and examining characters’ 
and readers’ understanding of their beliefs, values, and selves, 
thus structurally insisting that the linguistically experimental 
stories be, as Wallace proposed in his 1993 interview, ‘for the 
sake for something’ (109, original emphasis). 
At once “a return to earnestness via ironized irony” and an attempt, through 
various forms of intentional and empirical critique of language, to “remind 
the reader that […] that she and the fiction are constructing empathy together 
through language” (108), Wallace’s interrogations of the reader, and of 
“characters’ and readers’ understanding of their beliefs, values and selves”, 
thus becomes an interpretive hinge for both empathy and critique in texts 
such as Brief Interviews. Holland insists that this interrogation is a kind of 
“conversation”, a sophisticated act of communication on the part of Wallace, 
whilst reframing this conversation through the critical reconstruction of 
“beliefs, values and selves” in Wallace’s texts.  
We see a similar movement in the thought of Adam Kelly, for whom 
Wallace’s texts are indicative of an “ethical undecidability”, “which opens up 
a space for the reader to inhabit and challenges the investment in writerly 
mastery that characterises most modern and postmodern literature” (2010). 
For Kelly, undecidable rhetorics of a text like Brief Interviews are an attempt 
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at a “New Sincerity”, deployed ‘for the sake of’ the reader, and “thus 
structured and informed” by a sophisticated rhetorical “appeal to the reader’s 
attestation and judgment” (2012: 145). Nevertheless, this appeal remains 
predicated on the maximally suspicious parameters of such texts, described 
as a “weak appeal to the reader to look beyond the text’s self-conscious pre-
empting of its own reception” (144). In this dynamic play of beliefs, values 
and selves, the tensions between empathetic identification and suspicious 
critique become an engine for new kinds of dialogue with the author and his 
works.  
 
Suspicious Re-Imagination in ‘Think’ and ‘Octet’ (I) 
At once suspicious and sincere, critically interrogative and 
empathetically insistent, Wallace’s texts are thus set in complex relation to 
readers who critique – particularly Brief Interviews, which as we have seen is 
treated as a kind of threshold test (or negative example) for the author’s 
claims for empathy and identification in fiction. Yet it remains for us to see 
the transferential-neurotic extent to which this critical dynamic – the claim 
that Wallace critiques the reader, that his fictions are a vehicle for the 
“beliefs, values and selves” at stake in the literary dialogue – is itself 
performed within Wallace’s texts. To wit, we may reconsider the essentially 
therapeutic staging of the reader’s conversation with Brief Interviews, their 
repeated encounters with discursive ambivalence, exemplified in the coded 
and conflicted confessions of Wallace’s ‘Hideous Men’. To the extent that 
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these performances predicate themselves on the ‘silent’ (though heavily 
anticipated) response of the interviewer, they are decidedly transferential. 
Throughout the interviews, Wallace leverages his insights into the 
psychologies of masculinity to craft uniquely suspicious dialogic scenarios. 
These scenarios enable Holland’s observation that “the collection’s ability to 
compel the reader to do this logicking work, and to manufacture the 
compulsion from its faint logical promise […] provides its ultimate integrity” 
(110).  
This self-reflexive logicking work recalls Peter Brooks’ modelling of 
the literary dialogue in terms of transference, noting the critical reader’s 
entry into “agonistic dialogue” with the text (1986: 12), and elaborating on this 
dialogue as a kind of therapeutic endeavour – a translating “back into the 
terms of the past” of the text’s “words and symbolic acts”, effectively working 
with the text to “construct a narrative discourse whose syntax and rhetoric 
are more plausible, more convincing, more adequate to give an account of 
the story of the past that those that are originally presented, in symptomatic 
form, by the analysand” (10).The suspicious performances of Wallace’s 
‘Hideous Men’ openly invite this kind of reconstruction, compelling the 
reader to recognise the shallow depths of their discourses on love, sex and 
gender. Yet to the extent that these performances are suspicious of their 
respondent, they reconstruct themselves, scrambling to provide “plausible”, 
“convincing” and “adequate” accounts of their own performative nature. In 
this proliferation of symptoms, texts such as Brief Interviews work to diagnose 
and cure their own discourses, inevitably repeating, re-imagining and re-
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abstracting their own suspicious stakes as texts. Nevertheless, this self-
referential and metafictional performance remains predicated on the 
imagined judgments of readers who critique in Wallace’s texts. By 
interrogating ‘these readers’ and their construction, we may further 
understand the tensions between identification and critique in Wallace’s 
works. We see these tensions writ large in texts such as ‘Think’ and ‘Octet’, 
which stage elaborate and hyper-specific dialogues between “human beings”. 
In the first of these texts, an intimate sexual encounter is interrupted by a 
strange compulsion, while in the second a “fiction-writer” grapples with their 
own evident failures to communicate with the reader.  
In the two-page story ‘Think’, Wallace again stages the relationship 
between reader and text as an intimate encounter between two lovers, 
recalling the overtly stage-like direction of perspectives in texts such as 
‘Everything is Green’ (See Chapter 3). But in ‘Think’, this process is disrupted 
by the man’s unexpected compulsion to “kneel” in before his lover – “It’s not 
even that he decides to kneel,” reports the narrator, “he simply feels the 
weight against his knees” (61). In ‘Think’, Wallace’s pornographic romance 
devolves into a scenic or even filmic staging of the speaker’s choice to kneel 
– the man’s compulsion interrupts the narrative’s pornographic reporting of 
the scene, which recalls the “smoky”, “Page 18 of the Victoria’s Secret 
dialogue” muses in ‘Say Never’: 
The sister with the breasts by the bed has a level gaze and a slight 
smile, slight and smoky, media-taught. […] We see these things 
a dozen times a day in entertainment but imagine we ourselves, 
our own imaginations, are mad. […] The languid half-turn and 
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push of the door are tumid with some sort of significance; he 
realizes she’s replaying a scene from some movie she loves. (61). 
Wallace’s oblique shift to the third-person inclusive implicates the reader’s 
response to the scene in an artfully self-conscious way: “We […] imagine we 
ourselves, our own imaginations, are mad”. Wallace specifically implicates 
the reader’s sense of cliché, the idea that “We see these things a dozen times 
a day in entertainment” – an idea which is ironically embodied in the man’s 
realisation that his lover is “replaying a scene from some movie she loves”. 
Kneeling in prayer, however, the man turns away from the “level gaze” or 
“media-taught” smile of his lover – an expression critically described as “a 
combination of seductive and aroused, with an overlay of slight amusement 
meant to convey sophistication, the loss of all illusions long ago” (62). 
Overwhelmed, the man has fixed his “gaze” away from his lover, in a 
“supplicatory” kind of prayer: “His eyes never leave the distance between the 
ceiling and themselves” (62). She, in response, has turned her attention 
inward: “She’s now aware of just how she’s standing, how silly it might look 
through a window” (p62). The repetition of the window, as a focaliser for the 
text’s narrative perspectives and impressions, is at least as theatrical as 
‘Everything is Green’, but whereas the latter saw ‘through’ the eyes of the 
mysterious character “Mayfly”, here we are compelled to note divergence, 
conflict, anticipation. The narrative effectively positions the reader between 
a male gaze turned upward and a female gaze turned inward, and explicitly 
invites the ‘reader’ to inhabit the spaces between.  
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Yet Wallace has also staged this choice within another highly-charged 
field of assumptions and expectations, evidenced in the text’s self-reflexive 
obsession with perspective, imagination and literal lines of sight. The text 
opens with the man convinced of “what she might think if he kneels” – this 
unstated expectation compounds the narrative tension of the piece, 
culminating in the man exclaiming “It’s not what you think,”, to his 
increasingly alienated lover (1999: 61-62). These tensions are compressed into 
the latter half of the story, as the narrator pulls the ‘reader’ into the action of 
the text itself, enjoining the reader to imagine an ending where the two lovers 
unite in prayer: 
She could try, just for a moment, to imagine what is happening 
in his head […] Even for an instant, to try to put herself in his 
place. 
The question she asks makes his forehead pucker as he winces. 
She has crossed her arms. It’s a three-word question.  
[…] 
He says “It’s not what you think I’m afraid of”. 
And what if she joined him on the floor, just like this, clasped in 
supplication: just this way. (62) 
But troublingly enough, this ending is mediated by the narrator’s casual shift 
in tense – “just like this”, “just this way” (62) – which maintains an uneasy 
authority around what is represented and when it happens. By disarraying 
the perspectives of its two principal characters, ‘Think’ stages their encounter 
as a field of conflict, overdetermined by the narrator’s anxieties towards the 
encounter itself. These anxieties are unsurprisingly expressed in the form of 
gendered hostility, towards the female lover for failing to empathise with 
their self-conscious male counterpart. Tellingly, the narrator shifts tone to 
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declare that “She could try, for just a moment, to imagine what is happening 
in his head […] Even for an instant, trying to put herself in his place” (62). In 
the final lines of the text, Wallace effectively invites the reader to stage the 
two lovers themselves, whilst implicating both author and reader within the 
same ambiguous space: “And what if she joined him on the floor, just like 
this, clasped in supplication: just this way.” (62).  
Yet we are left wondering whether the inwardly-focused woman will 
join the supplicant man on the floor; we are also left wondering precisely why 
the man has knelt in the first place. In this undecidability, we find that 
looking through the other’s perspective becomes impossible, as both reader 
and character are left with an empty kind of ‘looking-at’, which registers no 
intentions, and can summon no enduring extensions. A kind of disruptive 
impotence permeates texts such as ‘Think’, as the narrator routinely deflects 
his desires onto anxious observations and denials; yet this impotence appears 
partly displaced towards the supposed insincerity of his companion, her 
apparent detachment from the scene at hand. While the man’s eyes stare out 
into the “middle distance between the ceiling and themselves”, the woman 
sees herself from outside of the window, ironically considering how “silly” she 
must look (62). In this fraught (non-)intersection of perspectives, Wallace 
presents yet another narrative of failed identification, through which the 
abstract suspicions of the “human beings” involved are subject to scrutiny, 
alongside those of the suspicious reader. Wallace’s narrator dares to suggest 
a moment of complicity between the two figures, with the two kneeling and 
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staring at the same fixed distance, yet it is clear that such a moment is 
precluded by the self-conscious conflicts which have preceded it.  
Regardless of this gesture’s abstract metafictional significance, this is 
a strangely and overtly gendered narrative, which bears out the kinds of 
pathological hyperawareness diagnosed by Hayes-Brady and Holland (see 
above). Nevertheless, for the reader of texts like ‘Think’, the relationships 
between empathetic identification (with the text and its imagined moments 
of empathy and love) and suspicious critique (of the prolific and conflicting 
perspectives which that moment implies) turns out to retain its significance, 
even when refracted through Wallace’s parapractic and overdetermined 
sense of his female ‘reader’. Accordingly, we can begin to see the ways in 
which Wallace repeated and re-imagined his own approach to the ‘reader’, 
subjecting the literalistic approach of a text like Girl with Curious Hair to 
abject scrutiny in his subsequent major collection. Again, this movement 
towards literality has sought to define itself as a move beyond or away from 
the text; the benefits of a more imaginative approach, it would seem, is that 
it highlights those elements of the David Foster Wallace text that one might 
be, in fact, more than willing to look beyond or get away from.  
We see this this significance written into metafictional works such as 
‘Octet’, which engage openly with the idea of the literary dialogue as a kind 
of transferential relationship between text and reader. Here, of course, we 
have come full circle – ‘Octet’ forms the basis for many of the observations 
collected here, in its complex parsing of the literary dialogue as such and its 
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concomitant imaginations of the ‘fiction writer’s reader’ (See Introduction). 
But in this context, it is also helpful to view ‘Octet’ as an evolution of the 
author’s signature style, as the text recapitulates key strategies from his 
earlier works towards an increasingly self-aware and critical narrative frame. 
Read in light of texts such as ‘Here and There’, ‘Octet’ places the idea of the 
narrative contract into question, as a proxy for the kinds of dialogue and 
communication at stake in Wallace’s project more broadly. Whereas ‘Here 
and There’ explored the idea of the text as a “harshly limited defined 
structured space” (1989: 153) – in which the text’s implied other was “to be 
both reader and object”, “constructed so as to be for once subject as well” 
(153) – ‘Octet’ creates spaces of maximal undecidability, in which the ideas of 
reader, object and subject are placed into dramatic question.  
We see an early indication of this strategy in the section titled ‘Pop 
Quiz 9’, when Wallace distinguishes the activities of the narrative’s “fiction 
writer” from the performances of so-called “postmodern rhetoricians”, 
through an extended footnote on the nature of literary performance as such: 
With the now-tired S.O.P. ‘meta’ stuff it’s more like the 
dramatist coming onstage from  the wings and reminding you 
that what’s going on is artificial and that the artificier is him (the 
dramatist) and but that he’s at least respectful enough of you as 
reader/audience to be honest about the fact that he’s back there 
pulling the strings, an “honesty” which personally you’ve always 
had the feeling was actually a highly-rhetorical sham-honesty 
that’s designed to get you to like him and approve of him (i.e. of 
the ‘meta’-type writer)[…] (Wallace 1999: 125, FN)  
This description of “sham-honesty”, a strategy designed to “get you to like” 
and “approve” of Wallace’s fictionalised “‘meta’-type writer’, is appended by 
a more open foray into the assumptions and expectations underpinning 
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“honest” and “highly-rhetorical” dialogue as such. As the passage concludes, 
or rather collapses under its own recursive weight, Wallace’s narrator effuses 
wildly about the needs and aptitude of the ‘reader who critiques’, veering into 
another suspicious recollection of same: 
and feel flattered that he apparently thinks you’re enough of a 
grownup to handle being reminded that what you’re in the 
middle of is artificial (like you didn’t know that already, like you 
needed to be reminded of it like a myopic child who couldn’t see 
what was right in front of you) […] viz not interrogating you or 
[having] any sort of interchange or even really talking to you but 
rather just performing* in some highly-self-conscious and 
manipulative way (125, FN, emphasis original) 
Wallace’s suspicious model of dialogue as “highly self-conscious and 
manipulative” performance, is distinguished within the text for “interchange” 
or “really talking to you” (the reader) – in yet another footnote, this suspect 
performance is imagined as a kind of “dancing”, “formally unimpeachable and 
wholly self-serving” (125). In this sense, ‘Octet’ addresses itself to the idea of 
performance in metafiction, whilst alerting us once more to the possibilities 
for dialogue and empathetic communication in fiction more broadly. In 
making these tensions explicit, and moreover leveraging these tensions as a 
vehicle for dramatic action and narrative, ‘Octet’ exemplifies the complex 
metafictional stakes of Wallace’s literary project as a whole –  with the idea 
of performance made into kind of discursive limit, ‘Octet’ struggles to assert 
its own claims for love, “urgent sameness”, to its own re-imagined ‘reader’.  
At the same time, however, this meta-fictional dialogue is itself 
suspect, repeating many of the suspicious dynamics canvassed in companion 
texts. Through their suspicious account of the contemporary metafictionalist, 
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Wallace’s narrator also posits a “myopic” and childlike reader, for whom the 
text’s revelations of artificiality are both a baseline expectation (“Like you 
didn’t know that already”) and a kind of unassailable need (“like you needed 
to be reminded of it”). Yet on the surface at least, ‘Octet’ readily caters to such 
needs, delivering an extraordinarily self-conscious account of its own 
artificialities and dialogic strategies – a key example of this is the text’s 
staging of the reader in the second person, speaking to the latter as the 
“fiction writer” responsible for a text named “Octet”. “You are, unfortunately, 
a fiction writer” writes Wallace at the beginning of ‘Pop Quiz 9’, “[…] 
attempting a cycle of very short belletristic pieces”, all of which are “supposed 
to compose a sort of ‘interrogation’ of the person reading them, somehow” 
(123). These interrogative pieces (including the formally diverse ‘Pop Quizzes’ 
preceding number ‘9’) thus become the subject for the fiction writer’s own 
anxieties – as it turns out, their text is a “total fiasco” (124), in which “Five of 
the eight pieces don’t work at all – meaning they don’t interrogate or palpate 
what you want them to” (124). In a way, the ensuing narrative presents itself 
as a substitute for the incomplete and problematic text “Octet”, which is itself 
presented as a fictionalised version of Wallace’s own text.  
This narrative anxiously repeats and literalises the idea of the text as 
a performance, as Wallace’s fiction writer attempts to solve their 
interrogative fiasco by addressing the reader directly, for example in the 
rewritten 6th Quiz, which “start[s] out with some terse unapologetic 
announcement that that it’s another ‘try’ at whatever you were trying to 
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palpate into interrogability in the first place” (1999: 124); to wit, ‘Pop Quiz 
6(A)’ opens on the terse command to “Try it again” (114). This strategy of 
“intranarrative acknowledgment” is, the fiction writer knows, decidedly close 
to the idea of metafictional performance – a fact that the text will ultimately 
disavow, in its articulations of the fiction writer’s broader strategy: 
You were betting the queer emergent urgency of the organically 
unified whole of the octet’s two-times-two-times-two pieces 
(which you’d envisioned as a Manichean duality raised to the 
triune power of a sort of Hegelian synthesis w/r/t issues which 
both characters and readers were required to ‘decide’) would 
attenuate the initial appearance of postclever metaformal hooey 
and end up (you hoped) actually interrogating the reader’s initial 
inclination to dismiss the pieces as ‘shallow formal exercises’ […] 
forcing the reader to see that such a dismissal would be based 
precisely on the same sorts of shallow formalistic concerns she 
was (at least at first) inclined to accuse the octet of (127-129) 
In this compressed and extraordinarily self-referential sentence, ‘Octet’ 
speaks to its supposed reader twice – first, in relation to “issues which both 
characters and readers were required to ‘decide’” (an effective description of 
the ‘Pop Quiz’ format), and second, in relation to that reader’s “inclination to 
dismiss the pieces as ‘shallow formal exercises’”. This idealised and completed 
version of ‘Octet’ would expose the reader’s own “shallow formalistic 
concerns”, thus enabling the reader to engage with the “queer emergent 
urgency” attested to in the text, and to identify themselves in the “revelations 
of urgent sameness” contained therein. In a final inversion, Wallace imagines 
the fiction writer at their wit’s end, paralysed by their fear of the suspicious 
reader, becoming “more like a reader, in other words, down here quivering in 
the mud of the trench with the rest of us” (136).  
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Same-ness, Like-ness and ‘Blind Faith’: Octet (II) 
Yet as we can already see, this account is itself a kind of self-reflexive 
repetition writ large, which openly engages with the idea that ‘Octet’ the text, 
and its fictionalised and idealised proxies, are to be read in terms of literal 
same-ness, a form of identification between the text and its reader. In the 
obliquely self-referential account that follows, ‘Octet’s fiction writer grapples 
with the decision to compose a “ninth” quiz – i.e. ‘Pop Quiz 9’ itself – and to 
include that quiz within their finished text. “In other words”, writes Wallace, 
What you could do is now you could construct an additional Pop 
Quiz […] less a Quiz than (ulp) a kind of metaQuiz – in which 
you try your naked best to describe the conundrum and 
potential fiasco of the semiworkable pieces all seem to be trying 
to demonstrate* some sort of weird ambient sameness in 
different kinds of human relationships*, some nameless but 
inescapable ‘price’ that all humans are faced with having to pay 
at some point if they ever want truly ‘to be with’* another person 
instead of just using that person somehow (1999: 131-132, original 
emphasis) 
The proliferation of footnotes from this passage, each of which a play on 
terms such as ‘demonstrate’, ‘palpate’, ‘relationship’, ‘parent, ‘share’, ‘be’, ‘be 
with’ and ‘be there’, add uncanny echoes to the “weird ambient sameness” 
attested by the fiction writer, as they imagine this sameness to be a kind of 
“nameless but inescapable ‘price’”. This ‘price’, the text suggests, “can actually 
sometimes equal death itself”, or rather involves 
your giving up something (either a thing or a person or a 
precious long-held ‘feeling’* some certain idea of yourself and 
your own virtue/worth/identity) whose loss will feel, in a true 
and urgent way, like a kind of death (132-133). 
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This anxiety around “giving up something” speaks to the metafiction writer’s 
desire to abdicate authority, to become “more like a reader, in other words”; 
yet this anxiety reads like a kind of castration, conflating the loss of “some 
certain idea of yourself” with the loss of a “precious long-held ‘feeling’”. In 
this ambivalent sense, the fiction writer is caught between their urgent and 
honest ambitions towards the reader, and their anxious fears about same, as 
the reader is warned that “there are right and fruitful ways to try to 
‘empathize’ with the reader, but having to imagine yourself as the reader is 
not one of them” (129). But this is exactly what the fiction writer does, 
attempting not only to analogise and realise their own expectations of the 
reader, but to imagine that reader’s own response to the text. In this 
sophisticated performance, Wallace refracts the idea of identification 
through a range of empathetic and formalistic lenses, which are in turn 
mediated through the fiction writer’s ambivalent concern for their reader – 
to wit, this concern is described as “perilously close to the dreaded trap of 
trying to anticipate whether the reader will ‘like’ something you’re working 
on” (p129, original emphasis). 
As empathy, as anxiety, as abstract analogy and erotic anticipation, 
‘Octet’ presents its key idea of same-ness in manifold ways. But as we have 
seen, all of these approaches presuppose the agency of the suspicious reader, 
and in fact define their own rhetorical overtures as a critique of that reader’s 
“shallow formalistic concerns”. Moreover, the fiction writer’s anxieties of 
authority, embodied in their decision to “address the reader directly and ask 
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her straight out whether she’s feeling anything like what you feel” (1999: 131), 
help us to locate the relationship between ‘Octet’ and its reader in the realm 
of suspicion. Whilst lacking the more vivid descriptors of their ‘Hideous’ 
counterparts, the fiction writer can be defined by the kinds of narcissistic 
self-consciousness they appeal to and evoke – terrified of loss and repelled by 
‘like’-ness, the fiction writer imagines themselves: 
(like for example using that person as just an audience, or an 
instrument of their own selfish ends, or as some piece of like 
moral gymnastic equipment on which they can demonstrate 
their virtuous character […] or as a narcissistically-cathected 
projection of themselves, etc.) (132) 
Suspicious of its own rhetorical overtures, and their proximity to various 
forms of “interhuman manipulation and bullshit gamesmanship” (131), ‘Octet’ 
ruminates furiously on the phrase “Do you like me? Please like me” (131), 
imagining the fiction writer appearing “like the sort of person who not only 
goes to a party obsessed about whether he’ll be liked or not, but actually goes 
around the party […] and asks them whether they like him or not” (134).  
On another level, then, ‘Octet’ repeats the sort of extensional 
criticisms performed in the ‘Brief Interviews’, re-imagining the author-reader 
relationship through a range of sexually-fraught encounters between “human 
beings” and “Hideous Men”. Except in this case, Wallace’s hideous man is a 
rote metafictionalist, caught up in a decidedly self-referential dialogue with 
their imagined reader – whence the fiction writer’s anxiety that they’ll simply 
“look like a self-consciously inbent schmuck, or like just another 
manipulative pseudopomo Bullshit Artist, trying to salvage a fiasco” (135). 
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Meanwhile, this salvage operation is, in fact, functionally identical to the 
performance of the metafictional dramatist, to the extent that it relies on 
“dropping back to a metadimension and commenting on the fiasco itself” 
(135). “Even under the most charitable interpretation” Wallace writes 
(without necessarily presuming such an interpretation), “it’s going to look 
desperate. Possibly pathetic” (135). 
In anticipating such dismissals, the text both invites and forecloses 
upon its own suspicious reading, particularly to the extent that the text 
continues to produce new reading-narratives, which hinge on the re-
imagination of particular suspicious reading tropes. In turn anticipating the 
reader as an “audience”, a “piece of like moral gymnastic equipment”, and a 
“narcissistically-cathected projection of themselves”, the fiction writer’s 
discourse reveals them to be a true inbent schmuck, every bit as shallow as 
their supposed suspicious reader.  
Yet even this ambivalence is itself projected back onto the reader, as 
the fiction writer reconsiders whether to “come onstage naked […] and say all 
this stuff right to a person who doesn’t know you or particularly give a shit 
about you one way or another” (1999: 133). Tellingly, the fiction writer’s 
frustrations are also displaced onto the idea of “cultural politics” (133, FN14), 
as the fiction writer imagines a reader “who probably wanted to […] unwind 
in one of the very few safe and innocuous ways of unwinding left anymore*” 
(133). In response, and in yet another intranarrative acknowledgment, 
Wallace’s narrator tenders the following observation: 
254 
 
Yes things have come to such a pass that belletristic fiction is 
now considered safe and innocuous (the former predicate 
probably entailed or comprised by the latter predicate, if you 
think about it), but I’d opt to keep cultural politics out of it if I 
were you (133, FN14, original emphasis) 
In this striking interjection, the distance between the text’s narrator and its 
fiction writer is made suspiciously visible, staging a kind of meta-intrusion in 
the latter’s dilemmas of same-ness, like-ness and such; this gesture is also 
punctuated by the ironic repetition of phrases like “if you think about it” and 
“if I were you”. Meanwhile, this passage appears to reprise the text’s 
suspicions towards metafictional performance, the idea of the fiction writer 
as a “dramatist,” dispensing trite postmodern observations to a mollified 
“reader/audience” (125, FN2). Despite its overt repetitions of this rhetorical 
strategy, the text’s anxieties towards critical thought ultimately foreclose 
upon the reader’s suspicious judgment, implicating such judgments within 
the “safe” and “innocuous” confines of orthodox metafiction. In this sense, 
the message is clear: to deny the text’s sense of “urgent sameness” is to opt 
for “cultural politics” writ large, and to deny oneself the possibilities for 
genuine dialogue afforded by the text. Yet to identify with ‘Octet’s idea of 
sameness, and thus to recognise oneself amongst the readers “down here 
quivering in the mud of the trench” with the fiction writer, is to risk co-
implication in the text’s ambivalent ideas about dialogue, performance and, 
in particular, suspicious critique.  
By repeating these tensions across numerous levels – in the staging of 
the reader as fiction writer, the imagining of fiction writer as “like a reader”, 
the fraught re-imaginings of same-ness and like-ness, and the occasional 
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very-odd gesture towards cultural politics and critique – ‘Octet’ reads like a 
savage critique of an erotic text like Girl with Curious Hair. In this dialogue, 
the ideas of identification and critique form an impossible and inexhaustible 
point of tension, as characters such as the fiction writer (and Wallace’s 
narrator) attempt to distinguish between competing attitudes and 
expectations on the part of the contemporary reader. On this basis, the text’s 
collapsing of roles and responsibilities into literal “sameness” raises specific 
questions for the text itself – as a narrative of a text named “Octet”, does 
‘Octet’ purport to be self-reflexive, that is, to repeat and yet perform its own 
activities as text? Despite the text’s anxieties around metafictional 
performance, and the kinds of ‘readers’ inevitably purported thereby, the 
answer would appear to be yes. In multiple instances, the ironic return of 
Wallace’s narrative voice signals an attempt at avoiding erasure, of 
negotiating the text’s meaning with and from the reader. In a final, vigorous 
summation of his approach, footnoting the loss of a “precious long-held  
‘feeling’” in the passage quoted above, Wallace’s narrator engages the reader 
thus: 
*Ibid footnotes 8 and 9 on feeling/feelings too – look, nobody 
said this was going to be painless, or free. It’s a desperate last-
ditch salvage operation. It’s not unrisky. Having to use words 
like feeling or relationship might simply make things worse. 
There are no guarantees. All I can do is be honest and lay out 
some of the more ghastly prices and risks for you and urge you 
to consider them very carefully before you decide. I honestly 
don’t see what else I can do (1999: 133, FN11) 
As such, despite painful and overwrought arguments to the contrary, ‘Octet’ 
reveals its own “100% honest” appeal to the reader’s judgment, predicated on 
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the “not unrisky” acceptance of sincere terms such as “feeling or 
relationship”. The exhaustive exclamation of the narrator – “I honestly don’t 
see what else I can do” – signals a kind of alternate ending to the text, whilst 
‘Octet’ continues to prepare its fiction writer to decide on the fate of ‘Pop 
Quiz 9’ itself. Of course, in our version of ‘Octet’, this question has already 
been decided – the section is included within the text – and yet the fiction 
writer is called upon to once more “construct an additional Pop Quiz”, and 
thus to re-imagine their reader and their reception. This perpetual 
reinscription of the “fiction writer’s reader” thus represents a threshold point 
in ‘Octet’ as text – as a tale of perpetual and recursive origins, the idea of the 
“fiction writer’s reader” opens up a near-infinite array of possibilities as to the 
text and its eventual reception.  
Nevertheless, as the narrator makes clear, this dialogue is indefinitely 
constrained by its own “ghastly prices and risks”, that is, by the avowedly 
suspicious dynamics of the literary exchange at hand. These risks inform the 
work of critic Adam Kelly, whose essay ‘David Foster Wallace and the New 
Sincerity in American Fiction’ explores the inherently insincere potentials of 
Wallace’s fiction. For Kelly, Wallace’s work responds to postmodern anomie 
by “returning to literary narrative a concern with sincerity, not seen since 
modernism shifted the ground so fundamentally almost a century before” 
(133). However, the transferential-neurotic nature of Wallace’s texts 
complicate this approach. These concerns amplify and clarify the stakes of 
contemporary literary sincerity, whilst highlighting the historical 
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connections between this concept and “its theatrical connections to a notion 
of performance” (135). This latter notion is particularly significant in Kelly’s 
own reading of ‘Octet’, in which Wallace ostensibly breaks with metafictional 
orthodoxy to perform a “weak appeal to the reader to look beyond the text’s 
self-conscious pre-empting of its own reception” (144).  
But in attempting to look beyond this effect, Kelly’s work raises key 
questions about the “good intentions of the artist as a communicator of truth” 
(135), here leveraging the author’s own rhetoric on fiction as “an act of 
communication between one human being and another” (Wallace, 1997). 
Kelly has indeed anticipated many contemporary readings of Wallace in his 
attempt to move beyond suspicious hermeneutics, that is, beyond reading 
“that emphasizes what it sees as the blindnesses caused by ideological 
investment, historical ignorance, and psychological repression” (p138). 
Elsewhere, Kelly himself has noted “the implicit agreement among so many 
critics with Wallace’s professed premise that fiction should act as both 
‘diagnosis and cure,’” and – building once more on the idea of conversation – 
“that [fiction] should be viewed not primarily in terms of aesthetic 
representation, but of ethical intervention” (2010). Again, the paradoxical 
hermeneutics underpinning this “implicit agreement” – that however they 
work, Wallace’s texts work the way they’re supposed to – is of interest as a 
response to the suspicious dynamics canvassed in this chapter.  
For Kelly, the ultimate “guarantee of the writer’s sincere intentions” is 
impossible, predicated as it is upon the futurity of the reader’s response. This 
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is because of the New Sincerity’s implication in a dialectic between 
conditionality (overdetermination, say, or narcissism) and “the 
unconditional” - “sincerity is rather the kind of secret that must always break 
with representation” (143), that is, it must be conveyed somewhere anterior 
to the representational work, possibly in the hearts and minds of readers who 
identify. As a surface-oriented “secrecy hiding no knowledge that can be 
exposed” (143), Kelly’s idea of sincerity is a testament to the author’s own 
ideologically-invested approach to the literary conversation. And yet, even 
Kelly notes that this sincerity comprises power, given its “structural similarity 
to Fascism” (143) and what the author calls “an almost classic sort of Blind 
Faith in the older guys” (in Kelly: 144).  
Nevertheless, the suspicious stakes of Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men complicate this view quite a great deal, as we have already seen. 
Wallace’s self-reflexive literary cure seems to involve the repetition of 
particular diagnoses, and it is these diagnoses which self-reflexively define 
the more erotic and therapeutic dimensions of such a cure in Wallace’s texts 
(See Chapter 3). But in Wallace’s second-order response to this kind of 
reading-position, there appear to be several estranging versions of the ‘reader’ 
at stake as well. Wallace’s hideous ‘speakers’ imply suspicious ‘readers’ – they 
solicit more than empathy, they self-reflexively solicit judgment, ironic 
appreciation, even contestation. In Kelly’s reading, the response of the reader 
is conceived as a kind of anterior threshold act, providing both “uncertainty” 
and an effective sense of “futurity” to Wallace’s texts (145). Of course, Kelly’s 
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articulation of Wallace’s work in terms of “the reader’s choice” does imply a 
reader who might reject the text’s claims upon their attention and 
investment, thus suggesting the persistence of readers who critique within 
Wallace’s texts. Nevertheless, following the sincerity thesis (See Chapter 1), 
Kelly views this dialogue as a kind of paradoxical Derridean “transaction”, in 
which an impossible “element of genius” slips in, “a secret beyond 
representation, beyond theoretical definition, tied as it is to the very excess 
of writing itself” (2010: 146). In a similar vein, Boswell presents Wallace’s 
conversations with the reader thus: “ultimately, truly, deeply expressive of 
what is unknowable and unsayable” (2003: 209). The stakes of Wallace’s 
literary legacy are thus conceived in dialogic terms, as expressions of an 
intimate, transactional and highly-uncertain conversation between the text 
and its reader – one again, a literal “act of communication”.  
By arbitrating Wallace’s legacy in favour of readers who identify, critics 
such as Kelly and Boswell thus help us to recover the mystified (and erotic) 
dimensions of texts such as Brief Interviews, their thresholds of “love” and 
empathetic identification which inhere despite (or perhaps because of) their 
suspicious re-imaginings by Wallace. In Boswell and Kelly, we see the idea of 
readers who identify aligned with Wallace’s own diagnostic relationship to 
postmodernity, with the paradoxical Wallace text posited as “diagnosis and 
cure” for society’s ills (Boswell: 17), and chiefly accomplished through 
mysterious mediations of themes such as “love, trust, faith and responsibility” 
(Kelly: 139). As we have also seen, though, these mysteries are often 
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confrontingly straightforward at times – their potential decipherment is 
conveyed in repetitive and estranging ways, and they appear to remain 
caught up in particular, ‘hideous’ notions about performance, love and erotic 
‘reading’.  
Conclusion: Performing the Reader who Critiques 
What is it to say that Wallace critiques (with) the reader? Given the 
author’s myriad theoretical, philosophical and cultural engagements, it is no 
surprise to encounter divergent views on the topic of suspicious critique in 
Wallace. For some readers, Brief Interviews is a fraught critique of male 
narcissism and violence, for others, it is loophole-ridden treatise on the 
vagaries of postmodernity. But the author’s insistent return to transferential-
neurotic ideas about reading, and about psychoanalytically-informed readers 
who critique, has allowed us to consider the term re-imagination in a more 
demonstrative context. Wallace’s suspicious treatment of erotic reading has 
provided a kind of second-order response to the claim that his texts are, in 
effect, transferential and neurotic objects. This response is at once self-
reflexive (as in the myriad layerings of narrative self-conscious at stake in 
‘Octet’) and transferential-neurotic (to the extent that it pathologizes erotic 
reading), but it remains dependent on the re-imagination of ‘readers’. 
Discussions about gendered language and metafictional paradox have both 
highlighted, to differing extents, the role that readers who critique play in the 
construction or co-construction of literary meaning, However, in an 
extension of the transferential model explored in Chapter 2, we have seen 
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texts such as Brief Interviews act-out such ‘readers’, most notably in their 
antagonizing accounts of suspicious reading tropes. A great deal of these 
tropes turned out to be psychoanalytic in nature – the dissembling awareness 
of “admissions I’m unaware of” in the ‘Brief Interviews’, the self-reflexive 
declarations of “urgent sameness” in ‘Octet’ – while others reflected a 
tendency to present feminist thought antagonistically, that is, through its co-
optation and conditioning by hideous interviewees. But the transferential-
neurotic impact of this strategy can be measured in relation to the erotic 
reading strategies canvassed in Wallace’s earlier fictions, that is, through the 
extent to which literalistic ideas about love, reading and performance are re-
imagined by suspicious ‘readers’ in Brief Interviews. . In this sense, we can 
begin to understand Boswell’s claim that Wallace’s works “to embody and to 
explode” (2003, 17) the “queerly persistent U.S. myth that cynicism and 
naivete are mutually exclusive” (Wallace, in Boswell: 16). 
This approach to reader-construction presents a substantial evolution 
on the strategies explored in Wallace’s earlier works, as we witness a decided 
shift in the author’s empathetic rhetoric, towards confrontation and conflict 
with readers who critique, and the repetition of this conflict through 
characteristically hyperaware discourse on sex, gender and identity politics. 
Strangely enough, the kinds of love imagined in Girl with Curious Hair are 
distorted through estranging discourses of violence and sexual metaphor, 
alerting us to the more suspicious dynamics of our broader conversation with 
Wallace and his legacy. Stranger still, we are led to imagine, with Boswell and 
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Kelly, that these suspicious textual dialogues are themselves a clever reversal, 
in fact enabling new kinds of intentional understanding and identification 
with the text. In this collision of the erotic and the diagnostic, we see readers 
who identify set into self-conscious conflict with suspicious readers who 
critique, a conflict repeated throughout the author’s empathetic and erotic 
accounts of readership at the turn of the century. How is this conversation 
possible, given the suspicious proliferation of “hideous” voices and rhetorics 
within the text? And, moreover, how can suspicious critique provide answers 
to a text which suspects itself, yet insists on its own sincerity?  
By repeating these questions, texts such as Brief Interviews function as 
a self-conscious corrective to the kinds of empathetic strategies explored in 
Girl, offering a more sophisticated and ironic account of those strategies and 
their psychologically-vivid significance. On the one hand, exemplary texts 
such as ‘Octet’ promise an empathetic encounter, a “queer nameless ambient 
urgent interhuman sameness”, a terrifying “price” paid by reader and fiction 
writer alike. On the other hand, the terms of this price are ultimately dictated 
by whims of the suspicious ‘reader’, or, as Wallace characteristically puts it in 
‘Octet’, “any of the things readers usually want to pretend they believe the 
literary artist who wrote what they’re reading is”. In other words, Wallace 
proceeds from or arrives at a claustral and compact accounting of the reader’s 
own assumptions and expectations, specifically what they “want to pretend 
they believe” about the literary artist.  
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Now we are caught between two equally compelling performances of 
that ‘reader’, and the ambivalent juxtaposition of such performances 
throughout Wallace’s work. In its fraught admissions of cultural politics, 
critical discourse and suspicion, Brief Interviews critiques the contemporary 
suspicious reader, against their more idealised capacities for empathy and 
communication. Yet this critique remains, by design, susceptible to critical 
reconstruction, particularly as the author goes on to provide some 
compelling accounts of toxic male narcissism. In the rhetorical performances 
of “Hideous Men” and “fiction writer(s)” alike, we are left to negotiate the 
spaces between empathetic identification and suspicious critique, and to 
encounter ourselves within those spaces. Hence the uncertainty surrounding 
“the reader’s choice whether or not to place trust and Blind Faith” in the 
literary text (Kelly 2010) – in order to perform such a judgment, we must first 
negotiate with the kinds of judgments presupposed by the text, and the 
significance of this very gesture of presupposition. Again, it is the notion of 
the ‘implied reader’ that carries us through, enabling a unique admixture of 
empathetic and anti-empathetic rhetoric in relation to Wallace’s texts. In 
engaging with Wallace’s performances of readership, we are thus led to 
consider the essentially ambivalent stakes of the author’s relationship to the 
reader, and to the postmodern “audience” to whom so much of his work is 
overtly addressed.  
But in our model, the game has changed – in fact, it has often been 
pertinent to speak of Wallace’s ‘reader’ not simply as diagnoses, or even 
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cures, but as a kind of sickness. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we can see two 
possible articulations of this sickness in Wallace’s own writings on erotic and 
transferential-neurotic ‘reading’, which inform the contents of the following 
two chapters. By exploring two marginal discourses on performance and 
readership, in the essays ‘David Lynch Keeps his Head’ and ‘How Tracy 
Austin Broke My Heart’, we can observe the extent to which Wallace 
imagines himself (or his narrative persona) in the role of reader, offering 
theatrical and autobiographical accounts of “David Foster Wallace” the 
“author”, in conversation with both anterior text and ‘reader’ (See Chapter 5).  
Meanwhile, by turning our attention to Wallace’s later works, 
specifically the short stories collected in Oblivion, we see the idea of the 
‘reader’ repeated beyond repair, in the author’s dynamic imaginings of the 
literary dialogue and, crucially, of the transference-neurosis (See Chapter 6). 
In both of these readings, the idea of acting-out is demonstrated as both a 
characteristic theme and an estranging literary effect in Wallace’s texts. By 
distinguishing between Wallace’s self-reflexive and repetitive responses to 
the transference in fiction, through the elaboration of (abstract) readers who 
narrate and (performative) readers who negate, we will be better situated to 
relate the estranging effects discussed here with the more specific technical 
question of this study: Who is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace?  
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CHAPTER 5 
Readers who Narrate 
 
 
“As, to be honest, is a part of us, the audience. Excited, I mean. 
And Lynch clearly sets the rape scene up to be both horrifying 
and exciting. This is why the colors are so lush and the mise en 
scene so detailed and sensual, why the camera lingers on the 
rape, fetishizes it: not because Lynch is sickly or naively excited 
by the scene but because he – like us – is humanly, complexly 
excited by the scene. The camera’s ogling is designed to 
implicate Frank and Jeffrey and the director and the audience all 
at the same time” 
(Wallace 1997: 206, FN56) 
 
 
Introduction: Re-Abstraction and Reading-Positions 
 Chapters 3 and 4 have helped us distinguish between two different 
types of Wallace ‘reader’, a literalistic reader who identifies and an imaginative 
reader who critiques. The basis for this distinction was a particular sense of 
escalation between Wallace’s first and second short fiction collections – an 
escalation of interpretive stakes,  evidenced by the author’s increasingly self-
reflexive deployment of suspicious reading-tropes in his middle-period 
fictions. This comparative reading allowed us to situate the more exposure-
oriented dynamics of the present study, whilst continuing to investigate the 
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impact of transference-neurosis and ‘psychoanalytic reading’ within Wallace’s 
work and reception. Through this framework, we read Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men as a second attempt at reconciling the tensions between self-
reflexivity and repetition that Wallace had identified in his earlier works – 
most notably, through the themes of love, talking-out and performance (See 
Chapter 3). But whereas these works repeated literalistic ideas about ‘reading’, 
Brief Interviews also provided an imaginative (that is, narratological and 
characterological) account of the psychologies underpinning such ideas, 
engaging directly with the kinds of suspicious psychoanalytic tropes 
canvassed in Chapter 2 – distorted speech, intervention, resistance, acting-out 
and the like. By tracing this escalation, we saw how certain generalist erotic 
concerns in Wallace are translated into self-reflexive interpretive models in 
Wallace scholarship, whilst noting the extent to which particular suspicious 
tensions repeat themselves in fictions such as ‘Octet’, ‘Think’ and the ‘Brief 
Interviews’.  
However, the end result of this investigation was a familiar kind of 
estrangement – the assertion of two apparently contradictory vantage-points 
on a particular trope in Wallace’s work, and the suggestion that both 
viewpoints (in this case, the perspectives of readers who identify and readers 
who critique) made sense of that work. However, though we have built on our 
preliminary investigation of empathetic love in Girl with Curious Hair, and 
extended these insights into the psychoanalytically-aware narrative contexts 
of Brief Interviews, we have yet to fully distinguish the more abstract 
permutations of this reader-rhetoric in Wallace. In other words, we have yet 
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to see how Wallace’s broader writings take up the subject of psychoanalytic 
reading as such, and whether such writings give us an indication of the 
author’s own response to the transferential-neurotic dilemmas identified in 
his fictions thus far. This chapter takes up two Wallace essays in which the 
idea of transference-neurosis is certainly in play – the 1995 essay ‘David Lynch 
Keeps his Head’ (collected in A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again 
[1997]) and ‘How Tracy Austin Broke My Heart’ (in Consider the Lobster 
[2005]). These journalistic essays are linked through their concerns with 
“audience”, alongside the repetition of particular reading-scenarios and tropes 
(such as the cognate concepts of literary inspiration and ironic diagnosis). As 
my reading in this chapter demonstrates, the most pertinent audience-
member in these scenarios is none other than “David Foster Wallace”.  
Following the works of scholars such as Toon Staes, we have had cause 
to consider the literalistic and imaginative connotations of a figure like the 
‘implied author’ in Wallace’s works (See Chapter 1). However, we have yet to 
consider the extent to which authorial dispositions imply particular 
interpretive positions in Wallace’s writings, or conversely, the extent to which 
self-reflexive statements about ‘readers’ connect with repetitive and re-
imaginative portrayals of ‘authors’ in Wallace’s body of work. When Wallace 
asks “himself” about this dynamic, we find that the theme of transference-
neurosis returns almost instantly – the two essays considered appear to be 
concerned with specific transferential motifs, the strangest of which is a desire 
to literally “get inside the head” of other human beings. When Wallace reads 
Lynch, he speaks to the overtly Freudian stakes of interpreting Lynch’s films, 
268 
 
the strange fact of “expressions presented with very little inhibition or 
semiotic layering” in Lynch, “presented with something like a child’s 
ingenious (and sociopathic) lack of self-consciousness” (1997: 166). 
Meanwhile, when Wallace reads Austin, he describes the memoirs of 
sportspeople as “written invitations inside their lives and their skulls”, and 
outlines a definitive reading-position which takes into account the reader’s 
desire for “the (we want, expect, only one, the master narrative, the key) Story” 
(2005: 144). This positioning is the subject of the present chapter, which 
distinguish a third Wallace ‘reader’ by considering particular instances of 
Wallace reading. This approach builds on existing studies of the ‘implied 
author' (See Chapter 1) by considering the extent to which that author is 
under- and over-determined by their status as critical reader in Wallace’s 
para-literary writings.  
Given our interest in transference-neurosis and performance, it is no 
surprise to find “David Foster Wallace” returning to particular erotic and 
psychodynamic tropes in his readings of Lynch and Austin, particularly when 
these readings place such onerous stakes on the psycho-biographical stakes of 
‘reading’ and criticism. Of course, close attention to psychoanalytic literary 
theory has led us to question such stakes – Brooks in particular has warned 
against the conflation of erotic reading and psychobiography, the 
displacement of interpretive attentions onto the inaccessible intentionality of 
authors, characters and empirical readers (See Chapter 2). Nevertheless, we 
see a version of this displacement in Wallace’s own writings on the subject – 
whilst invoking the more abstract idea of psychoanalytic reading, Wallace is 
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quick to posit new ‘readers’, new audiences, new narratives of reading to 
account for his own peculiar relationship to the texts in question. At this third, 
abstract level, we thus encounter an ‘author’ obsessed with the activities of 
readers who narrate – interpreters, including Wallace himself, who engage 
with and repeat particular critical narratives about the relationship between 
readers and texts. When these narratives occur outside of a fictional context, 
when they appear to define the very identity of the ‘author’ who presents 
them, we can begin to explore the claim that Wallace narrates (with) the 
reader in its properly abstract dimensions. In the following chapter, however, 
the question of psychoanalytic intentionality – the question of whether 
authors, characters or readers represent the true ‘subject’ of a post-Freudian 
aesthetic – will be taken up much further. 
Wallace’s essayistic narratives are distinct from those canvassed in 
texts like Girl and Brief Interviews, because they represent another escalation 
of stakes on the part of Wallace’s writing, a third-order response to the kinds 
of transference-neurosis uncovered in previous chapters. This response has 
been anticipated by our own model – it involves a complex re-imagination of 
the critical work, an effective re-abstraction of specific critical stakes, 
including the formulation or construction of ‘readers’ in contemporary 
discourses about reading and interpretation. Again, it appears as if Wallace 
has anticipated this move, through the self-reflexive positioning of “himself” 
as a Freudian reader. This formulation would of course allow us to reconsider 
the erotic and diagnostic stakes of essays like ‘David Lynch’ and ‘Tracy Austin’, 
and perhaps to reconcile the tensions between empathetic identification and 
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suspicious critique investigated thus far. However, this study maintains that 
Wallace’s psychoanalytically-aware authorial persona is simply not enough to 
resolve the issue of transference-neurosis in his works, particularly later works 
such as Oblivion (See Chapter 6). This chapter’s expanded study of readers 
who narrate justifies this reticence – whilst presenting himself as an 
authoritative critical reader, particularly around concepts like the 
transference-neurosis in fiction, Wallace’s essayistic writings remain caught 
up in the symptomatic project of repeating, re-imagining and re-abstracting 
‘readers’, and thus remain susceptible to the exposure-oriented dynamics of 
the present study.  
 
“you might want to keep all of this in mind”: Narrative Persona and 
Ambivalence in ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’ (1999) 
Wallace’s essay ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’ presents an 
“Expressionistic” account of the relationship between the narrative text and 
its audience, that is, the kinds of hypothetical contract made possible by the 
narrative exchange. It also presents an exemplary performance on the part of 
“David Foster Wallace”, in his lauded role as journalistic interlocutor and 
cultural essayist. This latter performance inflects and informs Wallace’s self-
referential take on the narrative “contract”, as the author situates “himself” as 
a dynamic participant in just such a contract with the films of David Lynch. In 
so doing, Wallace’s essay highlights the psychological stakes of Lynch’s works, 
inviting vital comparisons between these works and Wallace’s own. Tellingly, 
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as Wallace exposes the “agenda” of Lynch, he inevitably provides evidence of 
such an agenda at work within his own essay, through a series of sophisticated 
rhetorical appeals to the reader’s own sensibilities and sensitivities. By 
reconstructing these appeals, and exploring the distance between Lynch’s 
diagnosis of “evil” and Wallace’s diagnosis of Lynch, we arrive at a better 
picture of Wallace’s meta-literary agenda in ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’, 
especially in relation to themes such as narrative identity, inspiration and 
critical diagnosis.  
Wallace makes no secret of his admiration for the work of David Lynch, 
the latter of whom has spent nearly four decades intriguing and offending 
audiences with films including Blue Velvet (1986), Mulholland Drive (2001) and 
the hyper-experimental INLAND EMPIRE (2006). In the middle of ‘David 
Lynch Keeps His Head’, collected in 1997’s A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never 
Do Again, Wallace relates the “epiphanic” experience of seeing Blue Velvet in 
cinemas, writing that “the movie helped us realize that first-rate 
experimentalism was a way not to ‘transcend’ or ‘rebel against’ the truth but 
actually to honor it.” (201, original emphasis). In one of the more evocative 
passages of this relatively marginal text, Wallace writes enthusiastically about 
David Lynch’s commitment to “getting inside” his audience, which the author 
defines as a kind of Expressionistic approach to art: 
I felt like [David Lynch] showed me something genuine and 
important on 3/30/86. And he couldn’t have done it if he hadn’t 
been thoroughly, nakedly, unpretentiously, unsophisticatedly 
himself, a self that primarily communicates itself – an 
Expressionist. Whether he is an Expressionist naively or ultra-
pomo-sophisticatedly is of little importance to me. What is 
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important is that Blue Velvet rang cherries, and it remains for me 
an example of contemporary artistic heroism (201).  
On the set of Lynch’s Lost Highway in 1997, in his role as pop-culture journalist 
for PREMIERE magazine, Wallace explores the full extent of the director’s so-
called Expressionist agenda, whilst wondering aloud at the effect of Lynch 
“himself” on the American cinema-going public. While reporting on the 
complex machinations of filming, and canvassing an array of entertaining 
opinions on Lynch, Wallace struggles with the idea that “Most of Lynch’s 
film’s don’t really have much of a point […] Nor are they seductive, though, at 
least in the commercial senses of being comfortable or linear or High-Concept 
or ‘feel good’” (171).  
In this interlude, Wallace concludes that the transformative 
importance of David Lynch has a whole lot to do with ambivalence, which is 
on display as the author refuses judgment on the director’s works. “This may, 
in fact, be Lynch’s true and only agenda”, writes Wallace, “just to get inside 
your head. He sure seems to care more about penetrating your head than 
about what he does once he’s in there. Is this ‘good’ art? It’s hard to say. It 
seems – once again – it’s either ingenious or sociopathic.” (171). This ambivalent 
take on the ultimate ‘meaning’ of Lynch’s works nevertheless stresses the 
importance of the artist “himself”, or rather “a self that primarily 
communicates itself – an Expressionist”.  In revisiting Wallace’s essay on 
Lynch, we are forced to think on the connections between this kind of filmic 
Expressionism and the author’s own literary agenda. Given that we search for 
the “genuine and important” in Wallace’s works, and place our bets on a 
273 
 
literary figure who is supposed to be “thoroughly, nakedly, unpretentiously, 
unsophisticatedly himself”, hasn’t David Foster Wallace already gotten inside 
our heads? Before answering that question, it pays to review the author’s own 
assessment of this strategy, which oscillates between inspired (as per the 
enthusiastic passages above) and diagnostic, that is, sceptical of the director’s 
filmic project as a whole.  
In examining this movement, we can better understand the 
ambivalence around our own discourse on Wallace, particularly around the 
question of narrative personae, the artist “himself”. Throughout the essay, 
Wallace positions “himself” as a vocal authority on the attitudes and 
expectations of American cinema-goers. This is particularly evident as the 
author assesses Lynch’s relationship to contemporary postmodern audiences, 
and seeks to justify his observations in a series of illustrative ways. Recalling 
the thrilling scene in Blue Velvet in which villain Frank (Dennis Hopper) 
appears to address the audience – saying, quite literally, “You’re like me” to 
that audience – Wallace writes of feeling “exceedingly uncomfortable indeed” 
(209). “In the film’s audience,” writes Wallace, “I, to whom Frank has also just 
claimed kinship, have no such luxury of violent release; I pretty much have to 
sit there and be uncomfortable.” In the passage that follows, Wallace begins 
to outline the ambivalent sense of “bothness” conveyed in and by Lynch’s films 
(211, original emphasis), whilst also appearing to violently reject this 
ambivalence in his role as American cinema-goer: 
And I emphatically do not like to be made uncomfortable when I 
go to see a movie. I like my heroes virtuous and my victims 
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pathetic and my villains’ villainy clearly established and primly 
disapproved by both plot and camera. I like to have my own 
fundamental difference from sadists and fascists and voyeurs and 
psychos and Bad People unambiguously confirmed and assured 
by those movies. I like to judge. I like to be allowed to root for 
Justice to Be Done without the slight squirmy suspicion (so 
prevalent and depressing in real moral life) that Justice probably 
wouldn’t be all that keen on certain parts of my character, either. 
(207-208) 
The clincher to this passage is the following paragraph, in which Wallace 
loudly states his credentials in terms of “the characterizations and moral 
structures in the U.S. movies that do well at the box office”, from which 
Wallace deduces “that there must be rather a lot of Americans who are exactly 
like me” (p208). In this move to position “himself” as reader of, and authority 
on, the films of David Lynch, Wallace reproduces his own highly-ambivalent 
account of the cinema-going experience, here figured through the impossible 
moral demands of a hypothetical American audience. For this supposed 
audience, movies are meant to confer a sense of “epistemological privilege”, 
as blockbusters apparently unearth and compartmentalise the moral 
complexity of contemporary life: “knowledge is power, and we (I, anyway) like 
to feel powerful” (p208). But we are also left with the haunting extent to which 
Wallace attempts to imagine himself as this kind of cinema-goer, and the 
fraught identifications and likenesses which appear as a result of these 
attempts.  
The absence of this knowledge in Lynch’s films – indeed, the “absence 
of point or recognizable agenda” in Lynch’s work as a whole (171) – is presented 
by Wallace as a kind of “Betrayal” (211), a betrayal of the fact that “We as an 
audience have certain core certainties about sowing and reaping, and these 
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certainties need to be affirmed and massaged.*” (209). In the accompanying 
footnote, Wallace doubles down, stating “This is inarguable, axiomatic.” (209, 
FN60). Moreover, Lynch’s failure to affirm and massage the certainties of 
Wallace’s audience is presented by the latter as an actual violation of these 
“moral certainties”. “When a filmmaker fails to wrap his product up in the 
appropriate verity-confirming fashion,” Wallace writes, “we feel not 
disinterest nor even anger but a sense of betrayal – we feel that an unspoken 
but very important covenant has been violated” (FN60, emphasis mine). This 
apparent outright rejection of Lynch’s moral agenda (or indeed of the absence 
thereof) positions the author in a much more ambivalent relationship to the 
director, an effect which is no doubt amplified by the author in his maximalist 
appeal to the cinema-going public.  
Nevertheless, I think there is room to wonder to what extent Wallace 
saw his own refusals of epistemological and ontological certainty as a kind of 
effective betrayal, the violation of an “important covenant”. Whether through 
a return to literality (in breach of postmodernity’s ironic contract) or a 
concomitant turn towards suspicious imagination (in apparent breach of his 
own empathetic agenda), Wallace’s fiction tends to define itself in terms of 
the rules it breaks, and the “certain core certainties” which get repeated and 
upended in the process. Nevertheless, this rule-breaking bears striking 
affinities to the capital-E Expressionist of David Lynch, especially given the 
extent to which Wallace connects the breaking of abstract rules with the 
emergence of scandalous, traumatic or hyper-sexualised events within his 
narratives (See Chapter 6).  
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Wallace’s reflections on this ambivalence, and on the relative of merit 
of Lynch’s films in general, comes back to the question of performance, and 
to concomitant questions about the abstract stakes of artistic contracts and 
exchanges. To the issue of Lynch’s “sickness”, that is, the extent to which his 
films portray a “sick” mind at work, Wallace suggests that  
Lynch’s movies are inarguably creepy, and part of their creepiness 
is that they seem so personal. A kind way to put it is that Lynch 
seems to be one of those people with unusual access to their own 
unconscious. A less kind way to put it would be that Lynch’s 
movies seem to be expressions of certain anxious, obsessive, 
fetishistic, Oedipally-arrested, borderlinish parts of the director’s 
psyche, expressions presented with very little inhibition or 
semiotic layering i.e. presented with something like a child’s 
ingenuous (and sociopathic) lack of self-consciousness.  
Or, the text continues: 
It’s the psychic intimacy of the work that makes it hard to sort out 
what you are feeling about one of David Lynch’s movies and what 
you are feeling about David Lynch. (p166) 
This sense of “psychic intimacy” – redolent of Boswell’s claims to “a special, 
surprisingly intimate zone of communication, of subjective interaction” in 
Wallace’s works (2003: 19) – brings Wallace’s ambivalence about Lynch back 
to the question of authorial performance, and the fraught relationships 
between “what you are feeling” about author and text respectively. 
Meanwhile, Wallace’s evocative renderings of the “unconscious”, and the 
“anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, Oedipally-arrested, borderlinish” dynamics at 
stake in Lynch’s films, continues to underline the author’s transferential 
conception of the director’s work (168). “His best films tend to be his sickest,” 
writes Wallace, “And they tend to derive a lot of their emotional power from 
their ability to make us feel complicit in their sickness” (168). At this point, 
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Wallace makes the David Lynch film sound an awful lot like transferential 
discourse. For the time being, we may observe the extent to which sickness 
and pathology figure into Wallace’s own “Expressionistic” works – from the 
therapeutic dialogue of ‘Here and There’ to the hideous discourse of the ‘Brief 
Interviews’, there is nothing definitively separating the author from his 
narrative self-presentations, but for the sense that these various authorial 
personae serve some anterior purpose, some attempt at talking through a cure 
for the more literal and imaginative sicknesses that we have seen inhabiting 
Wallace’s fiction.  
Are these approaches convergent with one another? I would simply 
point out that paying attention to Wallace’s writings on Lynch has already 
yielded some startling and weird insights – allowing us to reconsider, for 
example, the prevalence of Expressionistic metaphor in a text like Brief 
Interviews or the symptomatic accounts of literary love in Girl with Curious 
Hair. Wallace seizes on the director’s literalistic commitment to character, 
writing of his films that “Most of them (the best) have devoted quite a lot of 
energy to character I.e. they’ve had human beings in them” (168). Beyond Blue 
Velvet’s Frank and Jeffrey (Kyle McLachlan), Wallace offers up two 
characterological examples to support his claim. In an extended sideline 
discussion, Wallace stakes out the ambivalent, yet electrifying nature of the 
Lynchian villain: 
Lynch is not interested in the devolution of responsibility, and 
he’s not interested in moral judgments of characters. Rather, he’s 
interested in the psychic spaces in which people are capable of 
evil. He is interested in Darkness. And Darkness, in Lynch’s 
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movies, always wears more than one face. Recall, for example, how 
Blue Velvet’s Frank Booth is both Frank Booth and the ‘well-
dressed man’ […] How in both TV’s Twin Peaks and cinema’s Fire 
Walk With Me, ‘Bob’ is also Leland Palmer, how they are, 
‘spiritually’, both two and one […] Characters are not themselves 
evil in Lynch’s films; evil wears them. (203-204, original 
emphasis). 
In the grip of “Darkness”, Wallace writes, Lynch’s villains are “literally 
inspired” – that is (Wallace footnotes), they are “‘in-spired’ = ‘affected, guided, 
aroused by divine influence’, from the Latin inspirare, ‘breathed into’” (204). 
These inspired villains, in their most cinematic moments, have “yielded 
themselves to a darkness way bigger than any one person”, and Lynch, 
according to Wallace, is “diagnosing” the stakes of this transformation, which 
involves acknowledging the “fact” that “evil [is] hideously vital and robust and 
usually impossible to look away from” (204).  
Given what we know of Wallace’s own Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men, this identified tension between inspiration and the ‘hideous’ diagnoses 
of evil no doubt rings true for most. Nevertheless, the ambivalent tenor of 
Wallace’s account – right down to the essential doubling and ‘double-ness’ of 
Lynch’s villains – again highlights the transferential stakes of the author’s 
relationship with Lynch’s works, and the complex discourse of psychoanalytic 
interpretation at play therein. In the following chapter, I explore more fully 
what a Lynchian reading of Wallace might entail – given the author’s almost 
counter-obsessive obsession with popular culture, and his affinities for 
authors such as Franz Kafka (Staes 2009) and Fyodor Dostoevsky (Miley 2016), 
it should come as no surprise that the hideous, ironic and yet strangely 
redemptive films of David Lynch serve as reference-point Wallace’s texts. In 
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either case, this sense of sickness serves as Wallace’s final critical-interpretive 
hinge, allowing the author to highlight the performative merits of Lynch’s 
work as a whole. 
Wallace’s second example again attempts to manage the author’s 
ambivalence towards Lynch’s filmic approach, through the figure of Twin 
Peaks’ Laura Palmer (played by Sheryl Lee). Eulogising Lee’s performance in 
both the TV Series and film prequel, Fire Walk with Me, Wallace describes 
Laura Palmer as a figure of maximal “bothness”, confounding viewers with a 
multi-faceted portrayal of American culture’s more fractured desires: 
In [FWWM], Laura was no longer “an enigma” or “the password 
to an inner sanctum of horror.” She now embodied, in full view, 
all the Dark Secrets that on the series had been the stuff of 
significant glances and delicious whispers. 
This transformation of Laura from object/occasion to 
subject/person was actually the most morally ambitious thing a 
Lynch movie has ever tried to do […] and it required complex and 
contradictory and probably impossible things from Ms. Lee, who 
in my opinion deserves an Oscar nomination for just showing up 
and trying. (210) 
Despite his accolades for “Ms. Lee”, Wallace’s Laura Palmer remains a target 
for the vicissitudes of his audience. To reviewer Steve Erickson, who notes that 
Palmer’s behaviour in FWWM might signal “an act of innocence or damnation 
[…] or both” (201), Wallace fires back in characteristic fashion: 
Or both? Of course both! This is what Lynch is about in this 
movie: both innocence and damnation, both sinned-against and 
sinning. Laura Palmer in Fire Walk with Me is both ‘good’ and 
‘bad’, and yet also neither: she’s complex, contradictory, real. And 
we hate this possibility in our movies; we hate this ‘both’ shit. (211, 
original emphasis) 
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In his challenge to Erickson, Wallace makes a rousing call for such “bothness”, 
figured through the “complex, contradictory, real” figure of Cheryl Lee’s Laura 
Palmer. And yet, this performance remains the site of Wallace’s most palpable 
literary anxieties, as Laura’s “bothness” flirts with the discomfort of the 
author’s self-constructed audience – indeed, Wallace casts this performance 
as “a bothness we go to the movies to get a couple hours’ fucking relief from”, 
quoting the words “overwrought”, “incoherent” and “too much” from 
contemporary reviews (211, FN61). With the equivocal energies of a 
semiotician, Wallace’s diagnosis of Laura Palmer as “both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and 
also neither” simply reinforces the central dilemma of the author “himself”, 
who appears both transfixed and repulsed by the performances cultivated in 
Lynch’s work. Nevertheless, we might also highlight how this effect repeats 
and replays some of the less-appealing dynamics canvassed in a text like Brief 
Interviews (See Chapter 3).  
 
Between “Darkness” and “Bothness”:  
An Expressionistic Reading-Position 
Given Wallace’s complex affinities for Lynch, way may return to our 
question: is David Foster Wallace looking to “get inside our heads” in his own 
work? In ‘David Lynch Keeps His Head’, the answer definitely appears to be 
yes – from his self-referential attempts to construct an audience for Lynch, to 
the text’s final passage, which literally exhorts the reader to “try to keep all of 
this in mind” (p212), Wallace is certainly making some kind of game out of the 
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connection between Lynch’s approach and his own. The author’s thorough 
critique of Lynch stakes out the conditions of a radically Expressionistic style, 
built on “making real” the ambivalent, indeed hideous and contradictory, 
contents of one’s own psyche for public consumption. From comparisons with 
Lynch’s “hideously vital” portrayals of darkness and evil, to both artists’ 
attraction to the idea of performance (particularly the feminine performer-
figure), the influence of Lynch upon Wallace cannot be understated. When 
discussing Lynch’s ‘contract’ with the viewer, however, Wallace offers up one 
more significant distinction between the director’s work and his own: 
It may be that Jeffery, [Elephant Man’s] Merrick, Laura et al. 
function for Lynch as they do for audiences, as nodes of 
identification and engines of emotional pain. The extent (large) 
to which Lynch seems to identify with his movies’ main 
characters is one more thing that makes the films so disturbingly 
‘personal’. The fact that he doesn’t seem to identify much with his 
audience is what makes the movies ‘cold’, though the detachment 
has some advantages as well. (168) 
In the final diagnosis, Wallace conflates Lynch’s lack of observable agenda 
with a “cold” disinterest in the “audience”, the very same audience that has 
shored up Wallace’s own claims for critical authority. Despite the author’s 
ambivalent conclusions about Lynch – characteristically presented as 
conclusions about the director’s own ambivalence – Wallace’s recurrent 
appeal to the audience of Lost Highway, and to the ‘reader’ of ‘David Lynch 
Keeps His Head’, continues to secure our understandings of both artists. 
Nevertheless, this essayistic performance does little to assuage the evident 
tensions at stake throughout the text – in his role as ‘reader who narrates’, the 
ambivalent “David Foster Wallace” continues to struggle with Lynch’s 
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“ingenious or sociopathic” agenda, his answers seemingly caught between 
“Darkness” and “bothness’. Meanwhile, doesn’t Wallace appear familiar with 
the “advantages” of such an approach in the preceding quote? 
To the extent that we too remain caught up in this extra-literary 
performance, I think we continue to struggle with the transferential stakes of 
Wallace’s texts, with all the “anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, Oedipally-arrested, 
borderlinish parts” of those texts alive and intact. Is this what Wallace meant 
when he referred to the “self’s heart’s special tangle” (C.f. Boswell), or perhaps 
to the Expressionist “self that primarily communicates itself”? One thing is 
clear – the tensions which animate Wallace’s reading of Lynch are themselves 
at stake in Wallace’s relationship to the reader. Whilst this supposed ‘contract’ 
between reader and author remains unclear, we have seen Wallace insist on 
the merits of an artist who remains “thoroughly, nakedly, unpretentiously, 
unsophisticatedly himself” in their dialogue with audience – not unlike the 
“fiction writer” in ‘Octet’ (1999), who attempts their own kind of “obscenely 
naked direct interrogation of someone else” (131). Yet both Wallace and his 
“fiction writer” remain fixated on that audience, that “someone else”, 
attempting to ward of the charge of ‘coldness’ or “S.O.P metafiction” through 
their fixations. As we have seen in Girl and Brief Interviews, this strategy can 
play out any number of ways, from Romantic idealisation to hyperbolic self-
critique. But Wallace’s complex focus on the ‘reader’ remains palpable every 
step of the way.  
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In Wallace’s second Expressionist essay, ‘How Tracy Austin Broke My 
Heart’ (collected in 2005’s Consider the Lobster), we can see this focus 
repeated and refracted through the lens of autobiography and, again, through 
the strange dynamics of expression propounded by “David Foster Wallace” the 
author. From his cultural journalism to essays on sports, politics and 
American life, Wallace consistently positions the reader in a kind of living 
dialogue with the text, typically figured as a sort of complex and self-
referential contract between author and reader. In cultivating this dialogue, 
one of the author’s most effective approaches is, as we have already seen, to 
position “himself” as the de facto ‘reader’ of another text, effectively inviting 
the reader to engage and identify with this latter performance of readership 
canvassed within the text. And yet, this textual performance remains haunted 
by the hypothesised presence of actual empirical readers, whose attitudes and 
expectations inevitably inform the author’s presentation of “himself” as 
reader, interpreter, and audience.  
In the essay ‘Tracy Austin’, Wallace grapples with the idea of the 
commercial sports memoir, roundly declaring that Austin’s own book has 
“finally broken my jones for the genre” (141). The piece is a somewhat marginal 
text within Wallace’s writings on sports, sportspeople and athletic 
performance, which include seminal pieces such as ‘Derivative Sports in 
Tornado Alley’ (1997), ‘Federer Both Flesh and Not’ (2012) and the (well?)-
titled essay ‘Tennis Player Michael Joyce’s Professional Artistry as a Paradigm 
of Certain Stuff about Choice, Freedom, Discipline, Joy, Grotesquerie and 
Human Completeness’ (1997). When it comes to the mathematical challenges 
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of modern sports, or the Olympian prowess of the modern sports star, Wallace 
has already exhaustively detailed his views in these more well-known texts, 
often interposing his own memoir-like recollections of playing junior-grade 
professional tennis as a young man. In ‘Tracy Austin’, however, Wallace 
appears to take a different approach, focusing less on athletic performance 
(though the piece distils many of his key observations on such), and zeroing 
in on the literary and emotional stakes of the autobiographical text itself. As 
we shall see, this focus illuminates the author’s complex take on the idea of 
narrative persona, and the extent to which autobiographical narratives can 
both inspire and diagnose the whims of their own contemporary audience. 
Moreover, the essay makes for an illuminating pair with ‘David Lynch Keeps 
His Head’, given both essays’ focus on expression, inspiration and diagnosis.  
‘Tracy Austin’ shares some remarkable similarities with ‘David Lynch 
Keeps His Head’, which alert us to the self-referential stakes explored by 
Wallace across different texts and different subject matters. It should also be 
noted that ‘Tracy Austin’ was in originally published around the same time as 
the PREMIERE essay, in 1994. At one point in ‘Tracy Austin’, Wallace decries 
the “ad-cliché sense” of the word “inspirational”, and dusts off his definition 
of “inspire” for the reader: “to animate the mind or emotions of; to 
communicate by divine influence” (2005: 150). This sense of inspiration, once 
embodied by the hideous villains of Lynch’s films, is here presented as 
“precisely what a great athlete becomes when she’s in the arena performing, 
sharing the particular divinity she’s given her life for” (p150). Wallace is 
referring to the performative spectacle of the young Tracy Austin herself, the 
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“first real child star in women’s tennis”, whose “incongruously adult genius” 
on the court inspired a 15-year-old Wallace to reflect on “the differences that 
kept this girl and me on our respective sides of the TV screen” (144). However, 
this sense of inspiration is nowhere to be found in Austin’s memoir – “the book 
is inanimate”, Wallace writes, “because it communicates no real feeling and 
so gives us no sense of a conscious person. There’s nobody at the other end of 
the line” (151). Wallace’s appeals towards athletic inspiration, coupled with his 
sharp critique of the memoir itself, reflect an ongoing concern with the nature 
of the literary contract. From the idea of the text as a “line” to another person, 
to the ambivalent questions of “genius” and “difference” evoked thereby, 
Wallace effectively returns to the critical concerns raised in ‘David Lynch 
Keeps His Head’, whilst repurposing these concerns to the more commercial 
contexts of autobiography and memoir.  
Wallace’s continuity of purpose is best demonstrated by the avowed 
“promise” of the sports memoir, which again reveals the author’s self-defined 
Expressionistic bent. Despite the “breathtakingly insipid” (2005: 142) object of 
his essay, Wallace places great stock in the potentials of the autobiographical 
text to provide a window into the profundity and grace of athletic 
achievement. “Because top athletes are profound”, he writes, 
because they make a certain type of genius as carnally discernible 
as it can ever get, these ghost-written invitations inside their lives 
and their skulls are terribly seductive for book-buyers. Explicitly 
or not, the memoirs make a promise – to let us penetrate the 
indefinable mystery of what makes some persons geniuses, 
semidivine, to share with us the secret and so both to reveal the 
difference between us and them and to erase it, a little, that 
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difference… to give us the (we want, expect, only one, the master 
narrative, the key) Story. (144, emphasis mine) 
The author’s overdetermined sense of the capital-S “Story” – notably premised 
on the desires and expectations of the audience for a singular “master 
narrative” – reflects the impossible promise of the autobiographical text, the 
desire to understand and “erase” the difference between reader and subject, 
or perhaps the capital-S Subject waiting at the other end of the text. At the 
same time, however, Wallace casts the seductive appeal of such texts within 
another familiar framework – the autobiography promises readers the chance 
to get “penetrate the indefinable mystery” of their subject, to get “inside their 
lives and their skulls”. But in this instance, it is the reader “getting inside” the 
life and skull of the autobiographical author, as opposed to something like the 
agenda of David Lynch, premised on “getting inside your head […] penetrating 
your head” (1997: 171).  
Whilst the roles appear reversed in this scheme, the central dynamic 
mechanism described by Wallace – put simply, the abstraction of the 
movement of one consciousness ‘into’ another – remains at stake in ‘Tracy 
Austin’, replete with penetrative metaphor and a fixation on similarity and 
difference. But how does this shift in focus impact the author’s presentation 
of “himself” within the text? In contrast to Lynch’s Expressionism and Austin’s 
ghost-written opacity, the figure of “David Foster Wallace” seems to adhere to 
the kind of autobiographical contract -outlined by Toon Staes: 
According to the autobiographical contract, the author 
guarantees that the name on the cover of the book matches the 
identity of the person who witnessed the events within. Readers 
feel shocked and betrayed when it doesn’t […] These feelings of 
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betrayal ostensibly stem from the belief that the reader has been 
empathizing with a narrative that is untrue, despite being told 
otherwise (2014: 37).  
This reading is consistent with Wallace’s writings on his own autobiographical 
contracts with Lynch and Austin – like Wallace, are driven to such texts for 
the thrill of relating to “genius”, that is, the sense that we are in some way 
inside the head of the author himself. This “head” is nevertheless a narrative 
persona on the part of Wallace – a character, hiding his sports memoirs from 
the cashier (2005: 141), watching David Lynch pee on a tree (1999: 147), and 
generally conforming to “a certain persona created, that’s a little stupider and 
schmuckier that I am” (in Lipsky 2010: 41). Yet this persona appears real or 
true enough to solicit our empathy, allowing us access to the consciousness of 
the text while opening our own minds to the agendas expressed therein.  
Still, given what we know of Wallace’s relationship to reader, and his 
ambivalence towards the contemporary postmodern reader in particular, it 
pays to examine the distance between this autobiographical “David Foster 
Wallace” and the more overtly textual “author himself” in more detail. 
Wallace’s ambivalence towards David Lynch was bolstered by a complex 
appeal to the average American cinema-goer; in ‘How Tracy Austin Broke My 
Heart’, Wallace routinely shifts into a more generalistic appeal to “book 
buyers” (2005: 144). In both instances, these appeals deflect attention away 
from the speaker (Wallace or “Wallace”), towards the freighted and 
ambivalent expectations of the contemporary reader themselves. And yet 
these expectations remain an intrinsic part of the speaker’s own ostensive 
“point”, particularly in terms of staking out the cultural, interpretive and 
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psychological dynamics surrounding the text(s) in question. Consider this 
justification for the banality of sport broadcasting: 
The baritones in network blazers keep coming up after games, 
demanding of physical geniuses these recombinant strings of 
dead clichés, strings that after a while start to sound like a lullaby, 
and which of course no network would solicit and broadcast again 
and again if there weren’t a large and serious audience out here who 
find the banalities right and good. As if the emptiness in these 
athletes’ descriptions of their feelings confirmed something we 
need to believe (152, emphasis mine). 
Once again it is our beliefs, as part of “a large and serious audience out here”, 
which form the basis for “David Foster Wallace’s” ambivalence towards the 
text. It is we who share the author’s “twin fascinations with competitive 
superiority and hard data” (142), whilst also sharing in “some deep compulsion 
to both experience genius in the concrete and universalize genius in the 
abstract” (153). Once again, the attitudes and expectations of the audience are 
called upon (repeated, inscribed, literalised) to inform the rhetorical authority 
of “David Foster Wallace”; our supposedly banal or moralistic narratives form 
the basis for the author’s critique of both Lynch and Austin.  
But at the end of the day, we are not presently concerned with 
comparative American cinema or the optics of American sporting spectacle – 
we are concerned with our own relationship as ‘readers’ of Wallace’s sporting 
memoirs. To the extent that Wallace ghost-writes this relationship into his 
own contracts with various texts and authors, we are again led to reconsider 
the function of the author “himself” within the text. Recall that the figure of 
“David Foster Wallace” has been served up to account for the complexities and 
contradictions of Wallace’s literary project as a whole, through a body of work 
289 
 
that seeks “both to embody and to explode” the notion that “cynicism and 
naivete are mutually exclusive” (Boswell, pp. 16-17). The core mechanism of 
this project is the complex figure of the author “himself”, a narrative and 
autobiographical proxy for the irreconcilable tensions canvassed by this 
project, and the infuriating “bothness” of his rhetoric on fiction and culture. 
The essential ambivalence of Wallace’s fiction (seen in his radically different 
constructions of the ‘reader’ in Girl and Brief Interviews) is effectively 
displaced onto ambivalent questions about “David Foster Wallace” the author, 
furthered and raised anew by Wallace’s strategies of in- and over-
determination (Staes). But in order to create this sense of the author “himself”, 
Wallace’s texts inevitably refer back to the attitudes and expectations of the 
contemporary reader, repeating and re-imagining this ‘reader’ as part of their 
sophisticated rhetorical construction of said author within the literary 
exchange. In so doing, Wallace’s texts inevitably recreate the same kinds of 
ambivalence that the figure of “David Foster Wallace” is meant to ‘stand-in’ 
and account for, albeit at a more overtly metafictional or meta-rhetorical level.  
Whether inviting himself inside our heads or inviting us into the heads 
of others, Wallace’s approach to narrative persona and autobiographical 
contract is haunted by this ambivalence, chiefly expressed as affinity/hostility 
towards the “audience” (of Lynch’s films, of Austin’s memoir) and towards the 
constructed ‘reader’ (of Wallace’s texts). The final passage of ‘How Tracy 
Austin Broke My Heart’ settles on this ambivalence, as Wallace attempts to 
reconcile both the failure of the sports memoir as such and the inspirational 
promise he can’t help but see: 
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As is so often SOP with the truth, there’s a cruel paradox involved. 
It may be that we spectators, who are not divinely gifted athletes, 
are the only ones able truly to see, articulate, and animate the 
experience of the gift we are denied. And that those who receive 
and act-out the gift of athletic genius must, perforce, be blind and 
dumb about it – and not because blindness and dumbness are the 
price of the gift, but because they are its essence. (155) 
Wallace’s “cruel paradox” – that “The real secret behind top athlete’s genius 
[…] may be as dull and profound as silence itself” (154) – raises an array of 
questions as to our own relationship with the Wallace’s own literary “genius”. 
Whilst neither Wallace nor his authorial proxies can ever be described as 
approaching silent, it may yet be that the figure of “David Foster Wallace” 
remains effectively blind to his rhetorical dependence on “spectators”, “book-
buyers”, “cinema-goers”, “audience” and so forth (even if the author himself 
was assuredly not). To effectively act-out or perform his particular blend of 
genius, then, it would appear crucial to downplay this dependence on the 
‘reader’ or ‘readers’, despite this dependence informing virtually every aspect 
of “David Foster Wallace’s” extra-literary rhetoric canvassed thus far. In other 
words, the ambivalent avowal/disavowal of the reader who narrates underpins 
Wallace’s extra-literary performance of “himself”. Whether approaching 
Lynchian fullness or Austin-esque silence, Wallace’s hypothetical authorial 
self remains overdetermined by its relationship with the attitudes and 
expectations of this textual ‘reader’. 
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“cruel paradox”: Expressionism, Abstraction and the ‘Reader’ 
The persistence of Expressionistic tropes in Wallace – that is, of 
transfers between consciousness, of arrested and borderlinish speech, of re-
imagined and re-abstracted narratives about communication between human 
beings – helps indicate a new response to the problem of interpretive 
ambivalence in Wallace scholarship. This response might even be described 
as “Lynchian”, to the extent that Wallace’s work routinely delivers on the 
author’s compelling definition of that term: like Lynch’s films, Wallace’s 
fiction “refers to a particular kind of irony where the very macabre and very 
mundane combine in such a way as to reveal the former’s perpetual 
containment within the latter” (1997: 161). Whilst this dialectic of perpetual 
“containment” recalls earlier positioning of Wallace’s literary project (See 
Chapter 1), I am more interested here in the ideas of the macabre and 
mundane, given the extent to which both ideas remain consistently 
overdetermined in Wallace’s rhetorics of the ‘reader’. Wallace’s pitch to “those 
of us civilians who know in our gut that fiction is an act of communication 
between one human being and another” (1997: 144) is striking precisely 
because it is mundane. And yet, when the writer turns his imaginative 
attentions towards the author-relationship, the result is more often than not 
macabre, ambivalent, even hideous. And whilst this “particular kind of irony” 
can be understood in terms of the author’s reference to it, perhaps even his 
awareness or command of it, it is also indelibly connected with a vast range of 
unchecked psychoanalytic and Freudian ideas. Accordingly, Wallace 
describes “Lynchianism” as a kind of unbound or un-framed transference, the 
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act of an artist getting inside the head of his ‘audience’, literally acting-out 
their own symptoms and sicknesses without the epistemological security of a 
particular narrative contract. Moreover, in ‘Austin’, Wallace imagines an 
audience that wants exactly the same thing, an audience in pursuit of a master 
“Story” which would see them located somewhere inside the skull of an 
inspiring memoir’s ‘author’. In other words, we are not simply concerned with 
the potential abstract similarities between Lynch and Wallace – pursuant to 
the aims of this study, we are concerned with how Lynch’s works allow 
Wallace to repeat, re-imagine and re-abstract the question of psychoanalytic 
reading ‘as such’. With this in mind, it is prudent at this juncture to connect 
our discussions of Lynch, Wallace and the ‘reader’ to the broader question of 
critical rhetoric, and the way we talk about fictions about fictions in particular. 
Mike Miley’s essay ‘…And Starring David Foster Wallace as Himself: 
Performance and Persona in The Pale King’ points to new ways forward on 
these kinds of questions, which explicitly take up Toon Staes’ theorising of the 
authorial contract as a point of departure (2016: 191). To this concern with 
authorship and abstraction, Miley adds a concern with the conflicted 
iconographies we develop around authors like Wallace, for example in the 
conflict between modernist and postmodernist intentionality (191):  
One would be hard-pressed to think of a contemporary writer 
more emblematic of this conflict than David Foster Wallace, 
whose image and persona have unleashed a torrent of iconic 
imagery, and whose work becomes increasingly preoccupied 
with, resistant to, and absorbed by this kind of iconography. 
Wallace feared that having that iconic status conferred on himself 
would negatively affect his fiction because, as he claims in ‘Joseph 
Frank’s Dostoevsky,’ “to make someone an icon is to make him an 
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abstraction, and abstractions are incapable of vital 
communication with living people”. (191) 
I think that Miley’s work captures, in an effective and abstract manner, the 
extent to which performative self-consciousness plays out, or is indeed acted-
out, in Wallace’s literary project. Miley writes about the “double-bind” facing 
Wallace as a writer. “He must inhabit an artistically toxic literary universe that 
is consumed by performance and the construction of personas,” writes Miley, 
“and yet he must still create work that expresses something honest and true. 
He must be an honest performer” (193).  As Miley immediately points out, 
honest performance is an oxymoron in Wallace’s work, yet it appears to have 
taken on the status of a “true cliché” for Wallace as well. I highly recommend 
Miley’s work for its forensic discussions of abstraction and annotation in 
Wallace, particularly in light of the author’s “Paradoxical” hermeneutics and 
the more abstracted accounts of scholars like Staes.  
In the essay’s conclusion, Miley compares reads Wallace with essayist 
Jonathan Lethem, through the idea of a performative trap: “Where Lethem 
makes his peace with this inevitable trap the best he can, Wallace (and 
perhaps also his readers) becomes permanently ensnared in his search for a 
way out” (204). In this subtle rewriting of the sincerity thesis – which repeats, 
of course, the uncertain postulation of “perhaps also [Wallace’s] readers” – 
Miley highlights the extent to which performance overdetermines abstraction 
in Wallace’s fiction, ironically concluding with Lethem that “there is no way 
out of performance […] so the best thing to do is to stop wringing your hands 
and start learning your lines” (204). This is the kind of claim I wish to explore 
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further in Chapter 6 – the idea that both Wallace and his reader are capable 
of learning lines, reciting and repeating, performing one another in some 
indeterminate or overdetermined way.  
I would say that my work complements Miley’s because it provides a 
basis for distinguishing between different layers of performance in Wallace’s 
fiction, particularly when it comes to the ‘implied reader’ of those fictions. 
From the overtly literal performances captured in Girl with Curious Hair, to 
the hyperbolic critique of such performances in Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men, we have seen that Wallace’s texts inevitably repeat, re-imagine and re-
abstract their own stakes as texts. And yet, the sheer differences in scope and 
approach between these two texts reveals an array of tensions, no doubt 
familiar to the contemporary reader of Wallace. These tensions go to the heart 
of the author’s literary project, and its avowed attempts to represent the 
contemporary ‘reader’ within the text, that is, to authentically capture the 
attitudes and expectations of a decidedly postmodern audience. On the one 
hand, Girl with Curious Hair allowed us to explore the author’s self-conscious 
pastiche of the contemporary postmodern audience, which contrasted the 
cathartic promise of so-called “entertainment” with a more complex, 
idiosyncratic performance of literary empathy and dialogue. Wallace’s 
rendering of the sincere performer, whose narratives repeat and inscribe the 
operation of the text itself, remains the central feature of Girl’s metafictional 
dialogue with its reader – by inviting the reader to identify with the 
performance of and within the text, Wallace stakes a unique claim on what we 
have called the reader who identifies.  
295 
 
It is in this first sense, then, that Wallace’s texts enact the author’s 
belief that “fiction is an act of communication between one human being and 
another” (1997: 144).On the other hand, however, Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men confronts the narcissistic and transferential stakes of this act, 
this metafictional appeal to any number of ‘other’ readers. The claustrophobic 
narrative experiments in Brief Interviews confront the reader with a critical 
discourse of misogyny and authorship, through warped tales of “hideous men” 
enmeshed with highly self-referential accounts of the literary dialogue itself. 
These narratives inevitably repeat and re-imagine the stakes of Wallace’s own 
literary performance for the reader, which is recast as a more ambivalent 
demand upon the latter’s attention and investment, reflected, for example, in 
the obsessively self-referential overtures of ‘Octet’ (1999). Wallace’s 
performance of the ‘author’ in Brief Interviews presents the reader with a 
second critical challenge, that is, to confront the self-referential stakes of the 
author’s “critique of critique” (Levey 2010) and to arrive at one’s own critical 
judgment of same. In this second sense, Wallace’s “act of communication” 
thesis is approached from a substantially different vantage-point, predicated 
on the self-referential figure of the reader who critiques.  
Through these distinct approaches to representing the reader, 
Wallace’s texts invite an array of now-familiar responses, which are 
themselves fraught with the author’s characteristic ambivalence. These 
responses position the author in terms of “legacy”, particularly the legacies of 
modern and postmodern form re-imagined within his texts. Marshall Boswell 
situates Wallace thus: 
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Wallace is doing much more than simply diagnosing a peculiar 
form of alienation that haunts contemporary culture. Rather […] 
this strategy stands as Wallace’s solution to the apparently 
indissoluble dilemma that sits at the center of his historical 
situation as a serious literary artist: how to follow postmodernism 
without merely rejecting it and returning to the mode of the 
prepostmodern, or even the premodern. (18) 
Boswell’s critical narrative, repeated in different ways throughout Wallace 
Studies, is here tied to the author’s characteristic moral ambivalence, 
particularly regarding “that queerly persistent U.S. myth that cynicism and 
naivete are mutually exclusive” (16-17). The contents of this myth provide, for 
Boswell, a “thorough explanation of what Wallace had in mind when he speaks 
of this ‘delusion’ […] a delusion, obviously, that his work seeks both to embody 
and to explode” (emphasis mine).  Here we can see the transferential stakes of 
Wallace’s literary project writ large, as Boswell writes of the author’s paranoid 
relationship with “hip irony” and “gooey sentiment”:  
Wallace’s work, in its attempt to prove that cynicism and naivete 
are mutually compatible, treats the culture’s hip fear of sentiment 
with the same sort of ironic self-awareness with which 
sophisticates in the culture portray ‘gooey’ sentimentality; the 
result is that hip irony is itself ironized in such a way that the 
opposite of hip irony – that is, gooey sentiment – can emerge as 
the work’s indirectly intended mode. (17) 
Boswell’s passing reference to “sophisticates in the culture” gives us a sense of 
Wallace’s paranoid, fractured relationship with the literary avant-garde, and 
his self-imposed distance from all kinds of ‘postmodern’, ‘prepostmodern’ and 
‘premodern’ approaches to fiction. Meanwhile, “gooey sentiment”, “the work’s 
indirectly intended mode”, itself emerges out of a characteristic inversion, an 
effective ‘ironising of irony’ performed within Wallace’s texts. The recursive 
and ambivalent terms in which Wallace’s legacy is sketched, by Boswell and 
297 
 
by others, reflect and repeat the freighted ambivalence of the author in 
relation to his own literary legacy.  
The full meaning of this legacy, however, remains difficult to define. In 
an almost textbook case of critical negation, Boswell ultimately defines 
Wallace’s work in terms of “an attempt to invoke indirectly the very things 
that it is not addressing” (209). “Wallace’s argumentative and self-reflexive 
work,” he writes, “is ultimately, truly, deeply expressive of what is unknowable 
and unsayable” (2003: 209). But this appeal remains haunted – and not only 
by the baleful strings of Savage Garden’s ‘Truly Madly Deeply’ – but in its 
insistence on repeating the author’s own emotive gestures beyond the literary 
dialogue, towards the negative:  
Though these heartfelt utterances present themselves as 
assuasive or argumentative, what they really are are – truly, 
deeply – expressive – expressive of a self’s heart’s special tangle, of 
a knowing and verbal self’s particular tortured relationship to 
what is unknow-and-sayable. (Wallace, in Boswell: 209). 
In other words, Wallace’s texts express “a self’s heart’s special tangle”, 
reminiscent of the author’s claims that fiction “has something to do with love” 
(See Chapter 3). This gesture beyond ambivalence – and, significantly, away 
from the very things that Wallace’s works are directly addressing – places the 
figure of Wallace “himself” centre-stage, as a necessary and literal proxy for 
the reader’s attention and investment. And yet, in the author’s own words, 
this “self’s heart” is itself a figure of ambivalence, that “of a knowing and verbal 
self’s particular tortured relationship” with a radically negative horizon. This 
latter horizon, I think, also informs Kelly’s critical appeals to “Blind Faith”, and 
an indeterminate “secret beyond representation” (2010). But given what we 
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know of the author’s fictional response to such questions, we may ask after 
the effects of this “expressive” performance, particularly upon our 
understanding of the ‘reader’ in relation to Wallace’s literary project more 
broadly. How do Wallace’s texts work to secure the reader’s empathetic and 
critical engagement? And what is the role of “David Foster Wallace”, the 
indeterminate and yet overdetermined image of the author “himself”, in 
securing these investments? How does Wallace’s performance of “himself” 
affect and effect our own retransmissions of the author’s literary legacy? 
 
Conclusion: Performing the Reader who Narrates 
What is it to say that Wallace narrates (with) the reader? This chapter 
has continued to locate the transferential and neurotic substance of Wallace’s 
writings about literary criticism, and investigated the extent to which these 
writings respond to the Freudian dimensions of Wallace’s short fictions. 
Whilst recognising the increasingly sophisticated treatment of psychoanalytic 
reading-tropes in Wallace’s essays on Lynch and Austin, and their bearing on 
concepts such as the ‘implied author’, empathetic identification and critical 
suspicion in Wallace’s works, we also saw the extent to which these essays 
over-determine particular types of audience. The insistent parallels drawn in 
these essays – between cinema-goers, book-buyers, critical readers and 
‘authors’ – provide ample evidence of this over-determination in Wallace’s 
own works, particularly when we consider the similarities between this self-
reflexive essayistic style and the more literalistic and imaginative strategies 
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pursued in Girl with Curious Hair and Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (See 
Chapters 3-4). However, the self-reflexivity of this strategy – indicated by the 
extent to which Wallace imagines “himself” as a critical reader – remains 
arguably dependent on the formulation of other critical ‘readers’, that is, the 
representation of specific and distinct reading-positions in relation to 
particular texts or authors.  
While this strategy is stylistically similar to the kinds of suspicious re-
imagination canvassed in Brief Interviews, it also represents a more 
sophisticated response to idea of psychoanalytic reading on the part of 
Wallace. A striking thing about this response is the extent to which Wallace, 
narrating the activities of readers who narrate (himself included), returns to 
specific and at times divergent ideas about erotic or psychoanalytic ‘reading’. 
The notions of inspiration (“exultant, orgasmic, most fully present […] not only 
actuated by evil but literally inspired” [1997: 204]) and of the diagnosis of 
inspiration (“creating a narrative space where this idea can be worked out in 
its fullest detail and to its most uncomfortable consequences” [205]) have 
proven particularly relevant here, for their abstract reprisal of various 
literalistic and imaginative reading-positions. In attempting to mediate these 
positionings, through the interposition a third ‘reader’ – himself – Wallace’s 
essays have thus presented us with a third-order response to the kinds of 
rhetorical ambivalence identified in previous chapters, directly addressing the 
apparent conflicts between readers who identify and readers who critique that 
we have seen in Wallace’s fiction already.  
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Yet despite this escalation of stakes, Wallace’s writings seem 
determined to return to transferential-neurotic tropes in their response. 
Whether claiming moral fidelity with Lynchian ‘readers’ in ‘David Lynch 
Keeps His Head’, or actively deploying this kind of ‘reading’ in ‘How Tracy 
Austin Broke My Heart’, Wallace’s definition of Expressionist art remains 
framed the peculiar notion of getting inside someone’s head. By investigating 
this notion, and relating it to the more extreme reader-rhetorics at stake in 
Wallace’s short fictions and essays, we have seen the extent to which Wallace 
figures the relationship between ‘reader’ and ‘text’ in psychoanalytic terms. 
The author’s apparent enthusiasm for “anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, 
Oedipally arrested, borderlinish” reading has been a case in point for this 
chapter (1997: 166), and it is perhaps worth giving Wallace the final say on his 
own Freudian reading of Lynch: 
They’ve noted this, the critics all have, and they’ve noted how, 
despite its heaviness, the Freudian stuff tends to give Lynch’s 
movies an enormous psychological power; and yet they don’t 
seem to make the obvious point that these very heavy Freudian 
riffs are powerful instead of ridiculous because they’re deployed 
Expressionistically, which among other things means they’re 
deployed in an old-fashioned, pre-postmodern way, i.e., nakedly, 
sincerely, without postmodernism’s abstraction or irony (198). 
Then again, given all that we have learned about Wallace’s fictions thus far, 
we might pause at this conflation of (Freudian) ‘reading’ with old-fashioned, 
pre-postmodern, naked and sincere modes of expression. Because even in this 
sophisticated critique of what critics already supposedly know, Wallace is 
clearly repeating himself, re-imagining himself and re-abstracting his own 
transferential-neurotic anxieties through the hypothesised positions of “the 
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critics”. In other words, his texts are still is still performing ‘readers’, even 
when speaking in the more abstract voice of the author “himself”. In this 
sense, it is difficult to read statements like these as a solution to our own 
interpretive dilemmas, because their net effect is to suggest more ‘readers’, 
more reading-positions or abstract narratives of reading. In other words, 
Wallace’s discussions of symptomatic discourse, of pathological or 
pathologised texts, are themselves symptomatic – they remain caught up in 
the confusions canvassed thus far, whose chief symptom has been the return 
to and repetition of ‘readers’.  
Having now considered the limits of such a response, it remains for us 
to consider whether this kind of author-rhetoric truly accounts for the 
psychological power of Wallace’s short fictions, that is, whether an estranging 
metaphor about head-penetration and psycho-biographical performance 
really exhausts the post-Freudian possibilities suggested in and by those 
fictions. Strangely enough, I think that it does, particularly when we consider 
the kinds of transferential-neurotic acting-out at stake in Wallace’s late-
period metafictions. By turning our attentions to texts such as Oblivion (2004), 
we will see that the questions of erotic, diagnostic and transferential-neurotic 
‘reading’ have almost completely superseded the author’s own plain-language 
ideas about empathy, suspicion and performance. Yet given what we know 
about this escalation, and its self-reflexive and repetitive dimensions, we are 
now situated to provide a decidedly post-Freudian account of the Wallace 
‘reader’, in which the full textual and rhetorical consequences of the 
transference-neurosis may yet be made explicit.   
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CHAPTER 6  
Readers who Negate 
 
 
And the mind of those stories is nearly always a mind that lives 
in and through books. This is because Borges the writer is, 
fundamentally, a reader. The dense, obscure allusiveness of his 
fiction is not a tic, or even really a style; and it is no accident that 
his best stories are often fake essays, or reviews of fictitious 
books [...] Whether for seminal artistic reasons or neurotic 
personal ones or both, Borges collapses reader and writer into a 
new kind of aesthetic agent, one who makes stories out of stories, 
one for whom reading is essentially - consciously - a creative act. 
This is not, however, because Borges is a metafictionist or 
cleverly disguised critic. It is because he knows that there's 
finally no difference - that murderer and victim, detective and 
fugitive, performer and audience are the same. 
(Wallace, 2012: 293-294, emphasis mine) 
 
 
Introduction: Post-Freudian ‘Reading’ and Oblivion 
The psychoanalytic concept of transferential-neurotic performance – 
acting-out –  has thus far allowed us to distinguish between a series of 
escalating reading-positions – ‘readers’ – in Wallace’s short fictions and essays. 
Each escalation of this scheme has been dictated by a particular self-reflexive 
innovation within those writings – the author’s early conflations of reading 
and erotic love, his narratological and characterological critiques of ‘readers’ 
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and ‘lovers’ in subsequent fictions, and his overt attempt at positioning the 
metafictional author as ‘reader’ in essays and interviews. In Wallace’s first 
response to the idea of psychoanalytic reading, we saw how ideas such as 
reading, performance and love implied a sense of repetition – a return to the 
literalistic idea of fiction as an “act of communication between one human 
being and another” (Wallace 1997: 144; See Chapter 3). However, the re-
imagination of psychoanalytic reading in subsequent Wallace texts 
complicated this scheme, alerting us to fraught distinctions between 
literalistic readers who identify and psychoanalytically-aware readers who 
critique within texts such as Brief Interviews with Hideous Men (See Chapter 
4). Moreover, the re-abstraction of particular reading-positions – best 
evidenced by the author’s treatment of “himself” as a psychoanalytic reader 
amongst ‘readers’ – has proven to be yet another abstract escalation of the 
same problem, whose chief symptom now appears to involve the rampant 
profiling and pathologising of readers who narrate (including, of course, the 
author himself) (See Chapter 5).  The strangest thing about these strategies, 
from the perspective of this study, has been their proximity to self-reflexive 
ideas about the psychoanalytic interpretation of texts, which appear to have 
coalesced around the author’s anticipatory concerns with and responses to 
such an interpretation being performed upon his own writings.  
Nevertheless, the innovation of this study has been to read these self-
reflexive responses as transferential-neurotic effects, brought on by the 
increasingly-fraught treatment of ‘reading’, ‘readers’ and reading-positions 
within Wallace’s texts. In Chapter 2, we described these effects through the 
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terminology of psychoanalytic literary theory, highlighting the extent to 
which acting-out (repeating, re-imagining, re-abstracting the ‘subject’ of one’s 
speech) dictated particular modes of Freudian and post-Freudian 
interpretation for theorists such as Paul Ricoeur, Peter Brooks and Shoshanna 
Felman. The performative dynamics of the transference, evidenced by the 
transferential-neurotic production of new identifications, new suspicions and 
new discursive abstractions in the course of the psychoanalytic treatment, 
have been shown to provide a working heuristic model for the relationship 
between literary criticism and Freudian dialogue in Wallace’s metafictional 
texts. However, this modelling has also consistently highlighted the 
estranging dimensions of Wallace’s psychoanalytically-aware approach. On 
this reading, Wallace’s text’s overt self-consciousness about and towards their 
own analysis (and indeed their respective ‘analysts’) continues to read as 
symptomatic, due the difficulties and escalation of difficulty that this self-
consciousness tends to evoke in Wallace’s texts, and due to the fact that ‘being 
aware of psychoanalysis’ is a clinical and literary-theoretical phenomenon 
unto itself. Before metafiction, and indeed before most modernist fiction for 
that matter, Freud had recognised that the role of the analyst required a 
specific engaged awareness of the analysand’s verbal and self-conscious 
relationship to their own treatment, that is, the negotiation of idealised 
and/or distorted discourse through dialogue and interpretation (See Chapter 
2). The productive adaptation of this insight in psychoanalytic literary 
criticism has been established already; the idiosyncratic or symptomatic 
presentation of this claim in Wallace’s fictions remains to be fully determined.  
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In this final demonstrative chapter, I investigate the kinds of 
transferential-neurotic reading made possible by texts such as Wallace’s final 
short story collection, Oblivion (2004). In various ways, this collection has 
been described by critics as Wallace’s most estranging text, the most difficult 
texts to ‘read’ in the Wallace corpus. Boswell, in his 2013 reading, describes 
Oblivion as Wallace’s “bleakest” work, pointing to the “ponderous intensity of 
the prose and the hermetic isolation Wallace places on his protagonists” as a 
case in point (151). Notably, Boswell’s analysis highlights the significance of 
early texts such as ‘Here and There’ (1989) for the more estranging 
performances pursued in Oblivion: 
In his conviction that something ‘outside’ of him is controlling 
his thoughts and voice, Bruce […] anticipates Oblivion’s 
paralyzed isolates, and yet Bruce holds out hope for a way out, 
namely by sharing this sense of a divided self with others via 
Wittgensteinean ‘community of signs’, a key concept in 
Wallace’s apprentice fiction. Early in his career, Wallace went so 
far as to deem Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, which posits language as a ‘game’ requiring a 
community of players, as “the single most comprehensive and 
beautiful argument against solipsism that’s ever been made”. As 
we shall see, for the Wallace of Oblivion, Wittgenstein’s solution 
might not be enough (155) 
As we have already seen, this game-like solution was already not enough to 
account for the erotic and empathetic stakes of a text like Girl with Curious 
Hair – the solution itself depended on eroticised assumptions about ‘readers’, 
and a curious proximity to the kinds of language-game suggested by the 
transference-neurosis. Nevertheless, Boswell is correct to describe Oblivion 
through the phrase “nightmare of consciousness” – in an apposite comparison 
with Nabokov, Boswell writes that: 
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The characters in these late-period fever dreams rattle 
desperately at that Nabokovian window only to discover, upon 
successfully springing the lock, not a sunlit landscape but rather 
another enclosure. In that sense, Nabokov’s ‘night of non-being’ 
is just a lovely alliterative way to describe Oblivion. (168) 
With this bleakness duly noted, and the estranging discovery of “rather 
another enclosure” in mind, I wish to provide an alternative take on the 
Wallace-ian author-reader relationship, which dives headlong into the 
possibilities afforded by psychoanalytic literary theory. With the Freudian 
vectors of Wallace’s reader-rhetoric well-established, we are thus poised to 
consider what a truly post-Freudian reading of Wallace would look like, and 
to properly take into account Wallace’s matured writings on psychoanalytic 
interpretive method.  
As this chapter’s positive post-Freudian readings of Oblivion indicate, 
there is a lot more to this play of dynamic reading-tropes and reader-positions 
than a cursory reading of character (or worse, a superficial reading of psycho-
biographical intentionality) might suggest. As Peter Brooks argued as early as 
1986, the psychoanalytic ‘intentionality’ of a text does not necessarily reside 
with the figuration of psycho-biographical ‘authors’, fictional characters or 
empirical ‘readers’ – more often than not, it involves the complex inter-
positioning of these figures within a given text, relative to that text’s unfolding 
or activation through the transferential-neurotic act of ‘reading’ (See Chapter 
2). The strength of this approach has been to dispense with or displace certain 
pre-theoretical (even pre-Freudian) ideas about such a ‘reading’, in favour of 
more textual and rhetorical reader-response model. In the previous chapter, 
we have also highlighted Wallace’s strange predilection for “prepostmodern” 
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(because Freudian) expression in David Lynch, and the transferential-neurotic 
stakes of what Wallace calls Expressionist art.  
At the same time, however, we noted the persistence of what we might 
call a category error in Wallace’s account of Expressionistic and Freudian 
reading – Brooks diagnoses this error as a “methodologically disquieting […] 
use of Freudian analytic tools in a wholly thematic way”, especially when 
dealing with particular characters or relationships in particular texts, “as if the 
identification and labelling of human relations in a psychoanalytic vocabulary 
were the task of criticism” (1986: 2). As I have sought to make clear throughout 
this study, this is not the task of a contemporary psychoanalytic criticism, 
despite claims to the contrary in Wallace’s erotic fiction about readers who 
identify, readers who critique and readers who narrate. Rather, it is the 
escalation of stakes, the various stylistic and rhetorical strategies by which 
that escalation occurs and repeats within Wallace’s texts, that interests us 
here. We have elected to embrace the game-like nature of these texts before – 
the love songs in Girl with Curious Hair, the fraught victimology of Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men, and the truly estranging idea of getting inside 
someone’s head, have all helped us locate the rhetorical limits of Wallace’s 
early-middle writings, and to distinguish our perspective from those of the 
Wallace text (and its various characters, authors or readers) when necessary.  
The epigraph to this chapter, from the 2004 essay ‘Borges on the Couch’ 
(2012), also provides several positive indicators for such an approach, whilst 
decisively calling into question the merits of a psycho-biographical (that is, 
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author-centric and intentional) approach to criticism. The occasion for 
Wallace’s critique is a literary biography of the South American author by 
Edwin Williamson, titled Borges: A Life. In Wallace’s view, Williamson is an 
“atrocious” reader of Borges, whose psychologically-determined approach to 
interpretation “is a pronounced case of the syndrome that seems common to 
literary biographies, so common that it might point to a design flaw in the 
whole enterprise” (287). Wallace’s diagnosis of this interpretive “syndrome” is 
of particular interest here, not least for its reprisal of familiar critical themes: 
The idea is that we can’t correctly interpret a piece of verbal art 
unless we know the personal and/or psychological circumstances 
surrounding its creation. That this is simply assumed as an axiom 
by many biographers is one problem; another is that the approach 
works a lot better on some writers than on others. It works well 
on Kafka […] because Kafka’s fictions are expressionist, projective, 
and personal; they make sense only as manifestations of Kafka’s 
psyche. But Borges’ stories are very different. They are designed 
primarily as metaphysical arguments; they are dense, self-
enclosed, with their own deviant logics. (287-288, emphasis mine) 
In characteristic fashion, Wallace’s respective engagements with Borges and 
Kafka depend on the formulation of distinct reading-positions – in our terms, 
they suggest a (literalistic) ‘reader’ for whom texts are “expressionist, 
projective, and personal” on the one hand, and an (imaginative) ‘reader’ for 
whom texts are “dense, self-enclosed, with their own deviant logics” on the 
other. Wallace’s alternative model, that of a “mind that lives in and through 
books”, involves somehow “[collapsing] reader and writer into a new kind of 
aesthetic agent, one who makes stories out of stories”. Of course, Wallace 
justifies this reading through the characteristic third-order claim that “Borges 
the writer is, fundamentally, a reader” (293). But given what we already know 
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about the “deviant logics” at stake in Wallace’s own work, and the abstract 
Expressionist manner in which the author tends to account for the 
relationship between ‘authors’ and ‘readers’ (See Chapter 5), this description 
of the ‘reader’ as a “new kind of aesthetic agent” arguably alerts us to a new 
kind of self-reflexivity in Wallace’s late works.  
This fourth-order response continues to respond to the idea of 
“[making] stories out of stories” – in this sense, Wallace’s fourth-order 
aesthetic agent is a kind of transferential-neurotic ‘reader’, whose agency 
hinges on their capacities to repeat, re-imagine and re-abstract particular 
elements of the discourses they encounter. In the transferential-neurotic 
“nightmare” that is Oblivion, we can observe the extent to which Wallace’s 
late-period fiction displaces pre-theoretical ideas like empathy/“literal literary 
love”, suspicion/“performance” and reader/“audience” into new, hyper-
Freudian dimensions. Put simply, Oblivion appears to dispense of particular 
anxieties around “labelling […] human relations in psychoanalytic terms” (as 
per Brooks), and/or being a “cleverly disguised critic” (as per Wallace’s 
Borges). Rather, Oblivion sees Wallace embracing the transferential-neurotic 
potentials of his own fiction, perhaps even working-through the idea of a 
metafiction estranged from its ‘reader’. Having dealt with this kind of rhetoric 
before – and investigated its literalistic, imaginative and abstract tropes to 
their limits – we can square Wallace’s idea of a “new kind of aesthetic agent” 
quite effectively at this point.  
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But Wallace’s subsequent claims about such agents, once more 
displaced onto what we now know to be Freudian reading tropes, might give 
us pause: “[Borges] knows that there's finally no difference - that murderer and 
victim, detective and fugitive, performer and audience are the same” (294, 
emphasis mine). This sort of conflation has signified a lot of things for 
Wallace’s short fictions – more often than not, it has signalled the discursive 
interplay of ‘reader/lovers’, ‘performers’, ‘audiences’, ‘detectives’ and, 
strangely enough at times, ‘victims’, ‘fugitives’ and ‘murderers’. On this basis, 
it is no surprise to find that particular modes of estrangement are reprised in 
Wallace’s final collection – Oblivion boasts bizarre love stories, traumatic re-
imaginations and thoroughgoing intertextual abstractions, all of which we 
have had cause to discover in the author’s early-middle fictions and essays.  
Yet through this precise form of acting-out strategies from across his 
literary career, Wallace arguably succeeds in correcting the category errors 
which have attended his treatment of ‘readers’ in prior works. In this reading, 
Oblivion’s self-reflexive account of repetition, re-imagination and re-
abstraction (and of the estranging significance of these themes in his early 
metafictional works) finally avoids the trap of “[displacing] the object of 
analysis from the text to some person, some other psychodynamic structure” 
(Brooks 1986: 2), a displacement whose repetition we have observed, in 
various forms and intensities, throughout this study. These readings justify 
the interposition of a fourth reading-position – that of a performative ‘reader 
who negates’ – and the concomitant claim that Wallace, in his mature (though 
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no less escalatory) treatment of the transference-neurosis, succeeds in 
negating the ‘psychoanalytic reader’ as a utile rhetorical concept.  
In this fourth-order response to the psychoanalytically-engaged 
interpreter, Wallace effectively cedes the point – or rather, he throws the entire 
game into question, through psychologically-powerful and inherently self-
reflexive reprisals of erotic, diagnostic and transferential-neurotic ‘readers’ 
from his earlier works. In ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, the question 
of erotic love is refracted through parallels with the films of Hitchcock and, I 
subsequently argue, one David Lynch. In this text, the literalistic assumptions 
of readers who identify are subject to an extreme and estranging case study, 
which sees a spider-keeping man (who is also an ‘accidental’ child-murderer) 
and his cosmetically-disfigured mother riding the bus together. This sort of 
empathetic estrangement escalates in ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’, whose 
narrator speaks at estranging lengths of his capacities to re-imagine particular 
ways of ‘reading’ (whilst re-imagining a host of bizarre and erotically-
overdetermined memories in the process). Finally, in the titular short story 
‘Oblivion’, we discover nothing less than an abstract Freudian psychodrama. 
In the maximally-estranging tale of Randall and his wife Hope, and their 
somnambulistic (indeed nightmarish) marital troubles, we arguably discover 
Wallace’s most successful re-abstractions of anxious, obsessive, fetishistic, 
Oedipally-arrested, borderlinish forms of authorship, leading me to read the 
text as a kind of Lynchian sitcom. This reading marks the culmination of my 
close readings of Wallace’s fictions, as it appears to represent the point at 
which acting-out, performance, definitively supersedes the idea of the text as 
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a literalistic, imaginative or abstract “act of communication” between text and 
reader. Through these readings, we can effectively respond to Boswell’s claim 
that Oblivion represents “dense description without redemption” (168) – 
through their own sustained negotiations of the transference-neurosis, and 
their challenge to the sorts of “redemption” that readers may expect from 
metafiction (including Wallace’s own), texts such as Oblivion do in fact 
perform their ‘reader’ to the fullest possible extent.  
The whole point of this performance, in Oblivion at least, is to alert the 
reader to the Expressionistic risks involved in becoming a ‘reader’ of Wallace’s 
fiction – regardless of which reading-position one may choose to assume. In 
the transferential, neurotic and borderline-oneiric games which follow, we are 
thus poised to discover an alternative way of presenting these risks, which 
continues to recognise the diverse ‘readers’ at stake in contemporary Wallace 
scholarship. At the limits and margins of such a model, we will have resolved 
our estrangement from Wallace’s texts by transforming that estrangement 
into a motive for a post-Freudian reading of those texts, through which the 
idea of a Wallace ‘reader’ – though no doubt a repetition – also represents a 
kind of remembering, an effective working-through of the author’s own 
psychoanalytically-determined rhetoric about love, performance, reading 
and, perhaps most importantly, readers who negate.  
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‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’:  
David Lynch, Pastiche and Performance 
In ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, Oblivion appears to return to 
the kinds of performative pastiche first explored in Girl with Curious Hair, 
inviting the reader to empathise with a David Lynch-ian narrative of 
interpersonal woe. Wallace’s narrator outlines the bizarre plight of his 
mother, awarded a modest product liability settlement, whose “botched” 
cosmetic surgeries have transformed her face into an “insanely frightened” 
caricature of a real human face: 
No doubt you know the way an individual’s face can look in the split 
second before it screams. That was now Mother. It turns out that it 
only takes a miniscule slip of the knife one way or the other in this 
procedure and you now look like someone in the shower scene of 
Hitchcock. (2004: 182) 
These framing utterances reveal the text’s indebtedness to American film, 
particularly referring to Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho and “the 1935 classic of the 
studio system Bride of Frankenstein” as points of reference for the reader. 
She asked for my candid reaction and I felt our relation demanded 
nothing less. Her crow’s feet indeed were things of the past but now 
her face was a chronic mask of insane terror. Now she looked more 
like Elsa Lanchester when Elsa Lanchester first lays eyes on her 
prospective mate in the 1935 classic of the studio system Bride of 
Frankenstein. (182, original emphasis) 
Moreover, the text’s uncanny deployments of italics, here evidenced in the 
narrator’s “candid reaction” to his mother’s face, is at once claustrophobic and 
estranging, an effect which informs his increasingly fraught descriptions of 
said face: 
314 
 
even dark glasses were no longer of much help as there was still the 
matter of the gaping mouth and mandibular distention and 
protrudent tendons and so forth. (182) 
In a weird discursive synthesis, Wallace evokes the American film industry 
and Franz Kafka in the disfigured face of the narrator’s mother, and in the 
increasingly hyperbolic narrative ensured thereby. Wallace’s italicisations also 
evoke the short fictional style of William S Burroughs, to the extent that key 
words and phrases are estranged from the body of the text – in his more 
elaborate use of the strategy, Wallace appears to play on his affinities for the 
‘Lynchian’ effect. Meanwhile, the text’s more formal estrangements create an 
atmosphere of heightened tension, inviting a kind of claustrophobic suspicion 
around the actions, motivations and overall reliability of the narrator.  
As the narrator goes on to implicate himself in the sudden death of a 
local child, this suspicion takes on an almost diagnostic fervour. How are we 
to parse the exculpatory and fantastic elements of the narrator’s discourse, 
and his Lynchian fascination with “the phylum anthropodae” – spiders – as 
well as with deaths caused by “widow bites” and “neurotoxins”? In full italics, 
the narrator cites a physician from 1935 as to the excruciating nature of death 
by spider bite:  
I do not recall having seen more abject pain manifested in any other 
medical or surgical condition whereas the painless loxoceles or 
recluse toxin only causes necrosis and a severe sloughing of the area. 
Recluses however exhibiting a native aggression which widow 
species never share unless actively disturbed. Which he did. (185, 
emphasis original) 
This ambivalence towards an unnamed disturber of widow spiders is crucial 
and overt – a moment ago, we have seen that the narrator is somehow culpable 
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for the death of a nine-year old boy, “he was only nine which was repeatedly 
stressed as if his age in any way strengthened any charge of negligence on my 
part” (p184). It is clear from these utterances that this child has died in “abject 
pain” from a widow bite, from the narrator’s own widow spider, and the 
narrator overtly blames the child for disturbing the spider. Meanwhile, the 
Kafka-esque description of his mother’s “mandibular distention” and 
“protrudent tendons” reflects a kind guilty ambivalence, as the narrator 
attempts to care for his (presumably widowed) mother in the wake of both 
her surgery and his “charge of negligence”. As we shall see, this paranoid, even 
arachnoid, disposition towards judgement – and the kinds of suspicion 
presented in and amplified by the text – frame the entirety of Wallace’s 
narrative, at least when it comes to the literalistic concern with empathy that 
we might have come to expect from Wallace’s earlier fictions.  
Wallace’s hyperbolic presentation of the ‘reader’ in ‘Philosophy’ helps 
us understand the paranoid stakes of the narrator’s discourse with and to the 
reader. Unlike the “loxoceles or recluse” spider, whose “native aggression” 
makes them culpable, the narrator and his “widow” mother are positioned as 
unlikely victims of circumstance, such that the external world – from plastic 
surgeons and dead children to unfortunate on-lookers on the bus – become 
perpetrators of such aggression. Whence the narrator’s maximally passive-
aggressive denunciation of the now-dead child, for effectively disturbing his 
web and paying the price: 
To say nothing of him trespassing and having no business up there 
anyhow. In the deposition. To say nothing of claiming that not 
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foreseeing a trespasser falling through a portion of a garage roof and 
wholesale wrecking a complex and expensive tempered-glass 
container complex and crushing or otherwise disturbing a great 
many specimens and inevitably, due to the mishap, leading to some 
partial decontainment and penetration of the surrounding 
neighborhood amounts to my failing due exercise and caution. (186) 
Pointedly, the Lynchian narrator embeds this arachnoid narrative within 
references to classic American cinema, particularly “primitive special effects” 
and “the classics of older film terror” (186). The narrator blames his lawyers 
for lack of due diligence, their inability to “translate this reasoning into 
effective legal language in legal briefs and arguments in camera” (186). This 
ambivalence certifies the narrator’s paranoid disposition: 
But the reality is counsel proves to be abundant if you are the 
aggressor but not if you are merely prey, they’re parasites, daytime 
TV is infested with these commercials urging the viewer to wait 
patiently for the opportunity to attack, handled on a percentage 
basis, no fee of any kind of you are the aggressor! (186) 
This oblique reference to the “viewer” of daytime TV, and the spider-like 
patience demanded of that viewer, again recapitulates the paranoid and 
arachnoid stakes of Wallace’s narrative. The author’s open letter to Lynch, 
Kafka and Hitchcock is thus struck through by this “infestation” of the 
“audience” – despite the culpability of our spider-keeping narrator, we are 
challenged to accept his claims to be “merely prey”, and to turn our aggression 
towards the parasitic percentage bases of the narrator’s “counsel”. Yet the 
web-like interlacing of film criticism, legal/moral argumentation and 
ambivalent self-presentation in the text both invites and disrupts our 
investment as empathetic readers – to what extent can we possibly judge the 
narrator’s discourse as true, whole or deserving of sympathies?  
317 
 
Yet this narrative is itself a site of arachnoid Lynchian ambivalence. In 
the pastiche present of ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, our paranoid 
narrator busies himself by hiding his mother’s face from the “gasps” of fellow 
bus travellers, paying close attention to the sight-lines and vectors of the bus 
itself. Like a film director, the narrator actively frames the visibility of his 
mother’s twisted visage, optimally seating her behind the driver’s seat so that: 
The sole exposure to liability of Mother’s placement here is that any 
individual in the opposing seat hence will have the vantage of gazing 
frontally at us throughout the ride. And on select occasions such a 
specimen will, if predisposed by environment conditioning or 
instinctive temperament, appear to assume that the stimulus 
causing her expression is me. (188) 
In a pseudo-corporate way, the narrator justifies this placement against its 
“sole exposure to liability” – as this “liability” is cashed out further, the narrator 
identifies their fear of the potential on-looker’s judgment, predicated on the 
idea that the narrator is to blame for his mother’s expression. This covert fear 
is the locus of the narrator’s arachnoid obsession – as the latter reveals towards 
the text’s end, his mother’s face was initially scarred by “backward”-facing 
nozzle on a “common household spray”, namely pesticide, containing “a great 
deal of trans-d allethrin” (188-189). The narrator blames a worker at the 
manufacturing plant for the mishap: “I submit a clear-cut case of failing to 
exercise due care” (188). However, the narrator declines to identify the 
company named in his mother’s liability suit – her case effectively censures 
the narrator, invoking a silence “which I am resolved to honor on her behalf, 
the law is the law” (189).  
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The unstated implication, however, is that the narrator’s spider-
keeping habits are to blame for the pesticide being kept in the house, which 
has triggered the chain of events leading to his mother’s progressive 
disfigurement. Nevertheless, our narrator remains compelled to keep an 
actual briefcase full of spiders with him on the bus – he notes that his mother’s 
expression now would not change, “Even if I opened up the entire case right 
here on my lap and tipped it out into the central aisle allowing rapid spread 
out and penetration of the contained environs” (189). In the closing sentence 
of the text, Wallace loosely resolves the fractious nature of this relationship 
between narrator son and mother, presenting the full and strange physicality 
of the narrator himself: “It is for such a case that I am her sematic accessory or 
escort, with my imposing size and goggles one can tell beneath the gaping 
rictus she believe I can protect her which is good” (189, emphasis mine). But 
for which case – his mother’s liability suit against the cosmetic surgeons, or 
the unopened case of spiders in his lap? The text juxtaposes an image of a 
spider leg, poking out from the briefcase, with the “imposing” and phallic 
image of the narrator – a leg moving “Unseen against the more inorganic black 
of the briefcase’s side” (189). This ambivalent juxtaposition of the imposing 
and the inorganic fuels our own ambivalence towards the final scenes of the 
text. We are not even sure that the relationship between the son and his 
mother is sound, given the former’s harsh assessments of the latter’s initial 
product liability case in relation to his own. The narrator is moreover bound 
to “carry a briefcase with me at all times since my own case” – a case 
comprising both the death of a child and the destruction of his spider-keeping 
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equipment – deepening the scope of the narrator’s compulsions, and 
forestalling our ultimate identification with his discourse. As one final twist 
in the web, we are drawn to the narrator’s penultimate revelations that two 
red widow spiders “have not been reacquired” following the incident. “Once 
conditioned to know what to look for,” he reassures, “They are often 
observable everywhere hiding in plain sight. Patience being another hallmark” 
(187).  
The narrator’s arachnoid fantasies thus appear to inform and infest the 
text, with a hyperbolic and paranoid confession, hiding within plain sight of 
an empathetic author-reader relationship. By openly appealing to the reader’s 
capacity to empathise with such fantasies, Wallace’s narrative re-imagine and 
re-abstract the stakes of his earlier literary pastiches, while suspending any 
final judgments on the “viewer” themselves. From its Hitchcock-ian overtures 
and obsessive lines of sight, ‘Philosophy’ presents a more estranging generic 
pastiche of an American avant-garde film, with decidedly Lynchian overtones 
when it comes to theme, imagery and plot. With Lynch as a vehicle, Wallace’s 
text installs a series of strange tensions between the imposing and the 
inorganic, the empathetic and the ambivalent, deepening our complex 
entanglement with the narrator and his macabre and mundane presentation 
of events. But by situating this pastiche within a decidedly obsessive, indeed 
arachnoid narrative, these experiments with empathetic performance 
effectively belie and forestall such a ‘reader’s capacities to empathise with and 
through the text.  
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Faced with a narrator who is a caricature of a cryptic Lynchian villain, 
whose mother is transformed into a Kafka-esque insect, we can remark that 
Wallace in ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’ effects a truly borderlinish 
presentation of literary empathy as such. What is at stake in the narrator’s 
“case” to the reader, and their performance of that case through and 
throughout the text? Are we meant to recognise ourselves in this twisted 
delusional web, to the extent that we remain at once “viewers” and 
“aggressors”? Or do Wallace’s games with performance and catharsis invite a 
new kind of reading, which translates the text’s ambivalent constructions of 
its audience into a more relativised critical space? In tracing the reader who 
negates, we are largely pursuing the latter question, exploring the extent to 
which Wallace’s ambivalence towards “audience” gets translated into rhetoric, 
particularly in relation to the strategies pursued in his earlier works. By 
turning to another Oblivion story, ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’, we can explore 
the extent to which this suspicion is itself re-imagined by Wallace’s fiction.  
 
‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’: A Game of Possession 
As with Wallace’s Lynchian pastiche in ‘Philosophy’, ‘The Soul is Not a 
Smithy’ at first reads like a treatise on the Lynchian ideas of inspiration (taken 
in Wallace’s sense of ‘possession or exultation’) and of suspicious diagnosis. 
However, Wallace situates these themes within a bizarre coming of age story, 
built on conflicted recollections of childhood trauma and adulthood angst, as 
our protagonist/narrator attempts to relate: 
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The story of how Frank Caldwell, Chris DeMatteis, Mandy Blemm, 
and I became, in the city newspaper’s words, the 4 Unwitting 
Hostages, and of how our strange and special alliance and the 
trauma surrounding its origin bore on our subsequent lives and 
careers as adults later on (67, original emphasis). 
In the inciting trauma of the story, the narrator witnesses the psychotic 
breakdown of his substitute teacher, Mr Richard Allen Johnson, who for 
unknown reasons begins writing “KILL THEM KILL THEM ALL over and over 
again on the chalkboard” during a 4th grade Civics class (91). The main focus 
of the story, however, is the delayed recognition of and reaction to these 
events by the narrator and his “Unwitting” student cohort. The cited 
paragraph continues: 
The repeated thrust of the Dispatch articles was that it was we four, 
all classified as slow or problem pupils, who had not had the 
presence of mind to flee the civics classroom, thereby creating the 
hostage circumstance that justified the taking of life (67, original 
emphasis). 
As ‘Smithy’ unfolds into myriad and overlapping lines of narrative enquiry – 
as to the origins of Johnson’s psychotic ‘possession’, the narrator’s “Unwitting” 
implication in his death, and the impact of this trauma on the present-day 
narrator and his family – Wallace places the reader in a position of critical and 
moral judgment, inviting the latter to critically assess the protagonist’s plight. 
However, the self-conscious re-presentation of such judgments within 
‘Smithy’, and the text’s ambivalent presentation of reading and attention as 
such, invite the reader into a kind of diagnostic game with the text. It is never 
entirely clear what we are diagnosing in ‘Smithy’, except for that text’s 
repetition of response, and its marked attempts to cultivate its own response 
to that response. With Wallace’s predilection for self-conscious digression and 
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paratactic juxtaposition, the text reads like a perverse transference-neurosis, 
primarily conveyed through second-order anticipations and re-imagining of 
readers who critique.  
From spectacular and fragmented displays of narration and 
recollection, to the embedding of crucial narrative details at the periphery of 
the reader’s awareness, Wallace reprises the diagnostic style first developed in 
Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, with a more overt focus the game-like 
nature of the literary transference. Crucially, this narrative is also presented 
by the text as a kind of entry into language, as the narrator describes his own 
peculiar brand of inattention thus: 
At the time of the inciting trauma, I was still nine years old; my 
tenth birthday would be April 8th. Ages seven to nearly ten were 
also the troubling and upsetting period where I could not, in any 
strictly accepted sense, read. […] Much to everyone’s relief, this 
reading problem reversed itself, almost as mysteriously as it had 
first appeared, somewhere around my tenth birthday (73). 
The narrator’s inability to read – or specifically to “internalize or communicate 
in any very satisfactory way what the words and their various combinations 
were meant to mean” (72) – is reversed suddenly and “mysteriously” around 
the young protagonist’s tenth birthday in April. The text makes it clear (albeit 
indirectly) that the text’s inciting trauma has occurred in March that year: 
It was during the cold and seemingly endless period in March 
when our regular Civics teacher was absent that we had our 
Constitution unit and perused the American Constitution and its 
various drafts and amendments under the supervision of Mr. 
Richard A. Johnson, a long-term sub (68).  
The possession and death of his substitute teacher, and the narrator’s sudden 
capacities to read, internalise and communicate, are part of the same narrative 
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game – ‘Smithy’ makes it clear that the protagonist’s entry into language, the 
mysterious reversal of his reading problem, are intimately bound up with the 
events of the Civics classroom. By returning to and reconstructing this 
scenario, and its transferential impacts on the ‘present-day’ situation of our 
narrator, Wallace thus presents a game-like ‘origin story’ (a birthday story) for 
the literary transference itself. This game even evokes a (pseudo-)Lacanian 
dimension, stressing the protagonist’s movement into the Symbolic register 
of reading, internalisation and communication; however, this game must 
negotiate with the Imaginary and overdetermined figure of “Mr Johnson”, and 
the traumatic recollections performed within and by the text (See Chapter 2). 
In recollecting the events of the Civics classroom, ‘Smithy’ repeats and 
inscribes the transferential stakes of the narrator’s traumatic experience. The 
transferential theme of possession – embodied by Mr Johnson, “frozen and 
transported” at the chalkboard (p112) – is explored by Thomas Tracey in the 
essay ‘Representations of Trauma in David Foster Wallace’s Oblivion’ (2010). 
In particular, the narrator’s oblique reference to classic horror film The 
Exorcist, and to its “significance for the story” of the “4 Unwitting Hostages” 
(Wallace, p97, emphasis original), is read as an  
appositely ironic cultural reference, since it humorously invites us 
to wonder whether the substitute teacher may be in some ways 
demonically possessed – when in fact it is more likely to be a 
psychotic episode, all the more terrifying because conventionally 
truer to life. More generally, though, the narrator’s celebration of 
imagination over scholastic drudgery or administrative tedium 
asks us to consider what it might mean to be ordinarily ‘possessed’ 
of anything: that is, why one thing rather than another should 
‘possess’ our individual attention. (Tracey 2010: 179) 
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Following from this, I would say that ‘Smithy’ repeats and re-imagines myriad 
narratives of attention and peripheral awareness to an estranging degree, from 
the narrator’s present-day fixations on the face of Mr Johnson to the 
peripheral narratives constructed around the events of the Civics classroom. 
Capitalising on the ironic and psychic imagination of the narrator, these 
peripheral narratives confound and complicate the text’s recollections of 
trauma with layered discourses of spectacle, fixation and possession. ‘Smithy’ 
provides a metafictional smorgasbord of view- and vantage-points in relation 
to the traumatic spectacle – those of the invested present-day narrator, his 
inattentive childhood counterpart, the city newspaper, the police, the school 
and the children, as well as their respective families.  
This interplay of narrative perspective, through the narrator’s own 
fraught manner of recollection, helps drive the traumatic impact of ‘Smithy’ 
as a text. As Tracey notes more broadly, “the active (if subconscious) censoring 
of seemingly peripheral though emotionally seminal aspects of their lives 
comes to haunt most of the principal actors [in Oblivion]” (2012: 180). And yet, 
the net effect of these viewpoints is to over-determine the narrator’s own 
response to his traumatic situation – in many ways possessed by the events of 
his childhood, and in turn fixated on the mechanism of ‘possession’ as such, 
the narrator of ‘Smithy’ nevertheless flees into “whole, linear, discretely 
organized narrative fantasies, many of which unfolded in considerable detail” 
(71).  
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So if the text is indeed about possession – by trauma, by transference, 
by narrative – then we must also consider the fantastic and fantasmatic 
dimensions of the text itself, and the extent to which it performs this 
possession as a kind of literary game. This metafictional strategy is best 
embodied in the peripheral narratives imagined within ‘Smithy’ – as Tracey 
puts it, the narrator of ‘Smithy’ is “quite absorbed in his imaginings of various 
narrative tableaux, in layout similar to cartoon strips, in the squares of the 
classroom’s meshed windows” (2012: 177). These cartoonish and eventually 
nightmarish narratives – concerning the fates of a blind girl named Ruth 
Simmons, her family and several anthropomorphic dogs – are ironically 
juxtaposed with the scene of the Civics classroom, including the image of two 
actual dogs copulating outside the window (77). In this particular 
juxtaposition, the theme of possession is made graphic and borderline 
perverse – the narrator describes the view beyond the window thus: 
The conjoined dogs were too distant to ascertain whether they 
had collars or tags, yet close enough that I could make out the 
expression on the face of the dominant dog above. It was blank 
and at the same time fervid – the same type of expression as on a 
human being’s face when he is doing something that he feels 
compulsively driven to do and yet does not understand just why 
he wants to do it […] The unhappy but stoic expression on the face 
of the brindle-colored dog beneath was harder to characterize. 
Perhaps it was less distinct, or obscured by the window’s 
protective mesh (Wallace 2004: 74).  
As to the latter dog, the narrator eventually settles on “long suffering” as a 
description (p74, original emphasis). In the narrative fantasy that follows from 
this image, the text re-imagines the story of Cuffie the dog, who is led astray 
by two larger, feral dogs. Cuffie is left at the mercy of the blank and fervid 
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older dog; as this embedded narrative concludes, Wallace describes “the 
actual field through the classroom window”, and the two dogs “miming the 
position and expressions of mating”, the possessed dog “exhorting the 
defenseless, long suffering whelp to sit still and endure it or else something 
really terrible would happen” (99).  
In this fantasy narrative, then, the theme of possession comes to take  
on a vivid and subterranean significance. Consider further the narrator’s 
otherwise anodyne reference to his own father’s “lifeless and dead” expression 
and routine upon coming home from work, and its gripping impression upon 
the young protagonist: “There was something about this routine that cast 
shadows deep down in parts of me I couldn’t access on my own” (105). This 
routine involves the divestment of hats and briefcases, and the consumption 
of alcohol – the narrator describes in detail: 
His arrival was always between 5:42 and 5:45, and it was usually I 
who was the first to see him come through the front door. What 
occurred was almost choreographic in its routine. He came in 
already turning to press the door closed behind him. He removed 
his hat and topcoat and hung the coat in the foyer closet; he 
clawed his necktie loose with two fingers, took the green rubber 
band off the Dispatch, entered the living room, greeted my 
brother, and sat down with the newspaper to wait for my mother 
to bring him a highball (103, emphasis mine). 
In the young protagonist’s narrative fantasy, the image of the “highball” is 
repeated, albeit obliquely, in relation to one of the anthropomorphic feral 
dogs. Operating at the extreme periphery of ‘Smithy’s narrative, this repetition 
triggers a lengthy divestment of violent, densely-coded images, and evokes a 
much darker take on the ‘homecoming routine’ of that dog’s owner: 
327 
 
I did not, though, initially recall the window’s narrative including 
any explanation of what fate befell the smaller, subordinate feral 
dog, whose name was Scraps, with the sores, and had run away 
from home because of the way its owner had mistreated it when 
the tedium and despair of his lower-level administrative job made 
him come home empty-eyed and angry and drink several highballs 
without any ice or even a lime, and later always found some excuse 
to be cruel to Scraps (90). 
The passage continues at length, citing the violence inflicted on the innocent 
Scraps by his white-collar, highball-consuming owner, to the point where 
even the narrator’s maximalist imagination suddenly gives way – “the 
backstory cut off abruptly,” he reports, “after the second time the man kicked 
Scraps in the stomach so hard that Scraps couldn’t stop coughing” (90). This 
candid, and seemingly tangential account of abuse is directly linked to the 
narrator’s own father, re-imagined as a violent and abusive alcoholic. 
Meanwhile, this narrative makes for a particularly dark juxtaposition with the 
fate of Cuffie the dog, as well as the ultimate possession and death of Mr 
Johnson – in each narrative, the text advances an abject image of possession 
and dominance, the remnants or ‘scraps’ of a largely forgotten trauma within 
the text.  
These ambivalent accounts, their complex positioning within the text’s 
multiple narrative layers, and their curious relationship with the figure of the 
narrator’s own highball-drinking father, inform a range of mis-recollections, 
substitutions and reversals within the text. As to the actual fate of Scraps – 
devoured by giant insects inside a sewage pipe – Wallace paints a grisly 
tableau, replete with Kafka-esque imagery and a cinematic, indeed Lynchian, 
sense of the grotesque: 
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The tableaux, complete with the unfortunate piebald dog’s mouth 
open in agony, a rat or mutated roach abdomen protruding from 
his eyesocket as the predator’s anterior half consumed his eye and 
inner brain, was so traumatic that this narrative line was 
immediately stopped and replaced with a neutral view of the 
pipe’s exterior (94).  
From the curiously negative manner of the narrator – “I did not though, 
initially, recall” – to the numerous vague references to his own older brother, 
(who has suffered an array of mental problems in early adolescence) Wallace’s 
narrative dances obsessively around the implications revealed in the narrator’s 
fantasies. Meanwhile the strangely self-censorious reporting of the tableaux 
itself, “immediately stopped and replaced” in the narrator’s account, indicates 
a broader focus beyond trauma, towards a kind of literalised narrative 
repression. Yet by excluding or eliding this narrative of familial abuse, the text 
generates an array of suspicious and indeed unconscious associations within 
the text, bringing together such narrative strands as the protagonist’s 
extensive eulogising of his father; his fixations on “the Father’s transfigured 
face” in The Exorcist and its bearings on his early courtship (94-95); an early 
narrative of a dog and piano stand; and finally, the “nightmares about the 
reality of adult life” recollected alongside these narratives.  
All of these narratives imply possession, at least in the sense of 
ownership (of memory, of meaning, of one’s own white-collar fate). And yet 
each is subordinated to the estrangingly passive and static narrative of Mr 
Richard Allen Johnson, described thus: “his head was now cocked curiously 
over to the side, not unlike a dog’s when it hears a certain type of high sound” 
(86, emphasis mine). Wallace’s command of narrative ‘dog-whistling’, that is, 
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the embedding of crucial narrative detail inside actual textual aporia, here 
reaches its peak – the intrusive narrative of Mr Johnson interrupts the 
recollection of vital narrative details, leading to the creation of disparate, 
ambivalent narrative substitutions. These substitutions again have a Lynchian 
tenor – the literal penetration of Scraps’ “eye and inner brain” by a giant 
cockroach, the “predator’s anterior half”, presents the reader with a properly 
Expressionistic vision of the literary dialogue as such (see Chapter 5).  
 ‘Smithy’, then, presents the reader with a game of transferential-
neurotic substitution, with each strand of the narrator’s recollections 
borrowing and embedding materials from the other. The text’s decisive ironic 
gestures towards repression (that is, the self-conscious abandonment of 
certain plots or images by the narrator), reveals crucial details about the 
narrator’s fantasies, including the violent and abusive scenarios unearthed 
thereby. These scenarios are made palpable and vivid within the “narrative 
tableaux” reproduced within the text, through the interplay of signifiers such 
as “highball”, “ballpark”, “dog”, “Blind” and “possessed” – at the extreme 
periphery of the text, Wallace weaves a strange kind of verbal fantasy, which 
both informs and undermines the text’s tabloid and celluloid takes on the 
horrific, the marginal, the ambivalent. All of this bears upon the text’s 
negotiations with its own central thesis, cashed out across multiple interposed 
narrative streams. This ambivalent and ambiguated claim upon the reader is 
made visible in another of the text’s reality-show confessions of significance: 
Only much later would I understand that the incident at the 
chalkboard in Civics was likely to be the most dramatic and 
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exciting event I would ever be involved in in my life. As with the 
case of my father, I think that I am ultimately grateful not to 
have been aware of this at the time. (69) 
Finally, we should once again take note that this ambivalent tale – both a 
hyperbolic recollection of childhood trauma and a coded confession of 
familial abuse – represents a literal learning to read for the protagonist, with 
the reversal of his “reading problem” a key side-effect of the traumatic events 
in ‘Smithy’. And yet, the protagonist’s entry into effective and meaningful 
communication remains predicated on their own fragmented recollection of 
these events. In fact, the conflicted presentation of key materials in ‘Smithy’ 
invites our suspicious consideration that the narrator has not overcome his 
childhood demons, and that the overdetermined narrative of the Civics 
Classroom is but a prelude to a more cathartic and authentic engagement with 
the materials presented.    
Meanwhile, the literal “substitute” Mr Richard Allen Johnson continues 
to write “KILL THEM KILL THEM ALL” across the Civics chalkboard, effacing 
Amendments XIII and X of the U.S. constitution. Wallace’s effusive and 
overdetermined ‘main narrative’ presents a strikingly literal yet monstrous 
portrait of literary production, and the possessive compulsions effected 
thereby – Wallace writes: 
(as my own eyes would register just moments later) in capital 
letters that got bigger and bigger with every letter, and the 
handwriting less and less like the sub’s customary fluid script and 
more and more frightening and ultimately not even human 
looking, not seeming to realize what he was doing or stopping to 
give any kind of explanation but only cocking his already oddly 
cocked head and further over to the side, like somebody struggling 
might and main against some terrible type of evil or alien force 
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that was ahold of him at the chalkboard and compelling him to 
write things against his will (91, emphasis mine) 
In literalising the transferential stakes of the (critical) literary dialogue, 
through the scenario of the writer and text “struggling might and main against 
some terrible type of evil or alien force”, Wallace grants the reader a crucial 
and honest insight into their own activities as readers of ‘Smithy’. By inviting 
our suspicious re-viewing, the text arguably makes a language game out of 
“frightening and ultimately not even human looking script”, without 
explanation but for the “evil or alien force” possessing the writer “against his 
will”. The text’s rampant dog-whistling of trauma, and its command of 
indirect recollection and narrative aporia, results in a narrative discourse 
which is ambiguous, ambivalent and perversely confessional, and marked by 
self-referential demands that the reader look ‘beyond’ the stated confines of 
the text.  
While this approach does reflect the traumatic imperatives explored by 
Tracey (2010), it also invites a more transferential consideration of the themes 
of reading, narration and possession within the text, as our readings above 
have demonstrated. We may say that the text itself is possessed by 
ambivalence – towards the suspicious reader, and towards the literary 
dialogue as such. To wit, the text’s overarching appeal to the tabloid media – 
particularly the city Dispatch newspaper – makes a frightening and scandalous 
game of the text’s multiple central traumas: 
Mr Johnson’s face’s character and expression were indescribable. 
I will never forget it. This was the part I fully saw of the incident 
the Dispatch first called Deranged Substitute’s Classroom Terror 
– Mentally Unbalanced Instructor Stricken at Blackboard, 
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Appears ‘Possessed’, Threatens Mass Murder, Several Pupils 
Hospitalized, Unit 4 Board Calls Emergency Session, Bainbridge 
Under Gun (at that time, Dr. Bainbridge was Superintendent of 
Schools for Unit 4) (100)  
The theme of possession, and the indescribable (though often described) face 
of Mr Johnson, are both explicitly gifted to us by the Dispatch’s tale of the 
“Deranged Substitute”, with its over-the-top implications of mass murder, 
violence, emergency and “Classroom Terror”. The interposition of these 
reports effectively overdetermines the narrative at stake in ‘Smithy’, clouding 
the narrator’s recollections with sensationalistic jargon and an overriding 
sense of guilt – recall that the narrator’s implication in the death of Mr 
Johnson is the “repeated thrust” of Dispatch reporting on the “Unwitting 4” 
(p67). This guilt haunts virtually every level of the narrator’s recollections, yet 
it emerges from outside of the trauma itself. Possessed by these mediated 
vision of his own trauma, our protagonist is caught in a transferential game of 
recollection and substitution with this outside, “alien” force. Between 
Wallace’s transferential vision of literary production (that of a writer 
possessed by an unknown and unconscious force) and his game-like 
presentation of the traumatic dialogue as such, a game of possession, ‘The Soul 
is Not a Smithy’ elaborates upon the strategies pursued in Brief Interviews with 
Hideous Men, with a renewed focus on the transferential-neurotic mechanics 
of the literary exchange.  
‘Oblivion’: Love and the Lynchian Sitcom 
 Oblivion’s self-referential take on the theme of transference – as seen 
in ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’s Lynchian repetitions of empathy, 
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and ‘The Soul is Not a Smithy’s games with critical and traumatic re-
imagination – places considerable and estranging emphasis on the roles of 
‘readers’ in the literary dialogue. In both texts, Wallace posed open questions 
around the ontological status of his narrators, the reliability and authenticity 
of their discourse, and the almost-impossible nature of the events represented 
thereby. These questions are often obscured by Wallace’s pretensions towards 
the bizarre, the overt – from the literal Spider-man to the meta-phallic figure 
of Mr Richard Allen Johnson, Wallace’s texts present the reader with a 
cinematic array of villains and neuroses, each conveying their own Lynchian 
sense of un- or dis-ease. The titular short story ‘Oblivion’ develops these 
questions even further, repeating, re-imaging and re-abstracting the role of 
the idea of an author-reader relationship to the point of  metafictional 
exhaustion, at least from the vantage-point of the present study. Like ‘Octet’, 
‘Oblivion’ conceals its readers through overdetermination, but having 
escalated this overdetermined sense of the ‘reader’ as far as it might honestly 
go, Wallace arrives once more at perverse Lynchian strangeness.  
This textual performance hinges on an ambivalent conflict between a 
husband and a wife, and the text’s reprisals and reversals of the TV situation 
comedy (sitcom) form. Through bold and literal distortions of this form, 
Wallace creates an atmosphere of impossible doubt and uncertainty around 
the conflict between effusive narrator “Randall” and his beleaguered wife 
“Hope”. The dream-like presentation of this conflict, replete with literal 
hallucinations and Lynchian subtexts, invites the reader to inspect and 
suspect everything, including the reliability of the text and its narrator. This 
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dream-like game is ultimately punctured by ‘Oblivion’s brazen reversals of 
form in its closing pages – the text effectively ‘wakes up’ onto an indistinct, 
minimalist dialogue, in which one person has woken up from a terrible dream 
(and into what appears to be an unhappily literalised reality; trigger warnings 
should accompany the reading that follows).  
This sudden reversal, and its decidedly estranging impact upon the 
reader, helps to highlight the transferential stakes of Wallace’s work more 
broadly, as the actual reader is left to piece together the disparate possibilities 
of the text, without full knowledge of the interlocutors involved. Wallace’s 
hyperbolic parody of the American sitcom thus explodes the possibilities of 
the format, responding to the possibilities offered by Lynch and others. In its 
oneiric game with the reader, though, ‘Oblivion’ also creates a 
characteristically Wallace-ian space, positing an abstract waking nightmare of 
textual possibilities.  
 To recount, ‘Oblivion’ centers on a peculiar and specific marital 
conflict, as nominally recounted by husband Randall Napier. Randy has not 
slept in several months, following a protracted conflict with his wife Hope – 
she is being kept awake at night by his supposed snoring, while he maintains 
that he cannot fall asleep in the first place, as he is routinely roused to 
consciousness by his wife’s sudden, shocked complaints. This ambivalent 
scenario is repeated and returned to throughout the text: 
After some further time had passed, however, and all attempts to 
discuss the conflict rationally or induce Hope to consider even 
the mere possibility that it was she, not myself, who was in reality 
asleep when the alleged ‘snoring’ problem manifested itself led 
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only to a further entrenchment or ‘hardening’ in her own 
position – the essence of her position being that I myself was 
being irrationally ‘stubborn’ and ‘untrusting’ of what she could 
plainly hear with her own two ears – (203) 
If David Foster Wallace were to have written a situation comedy, this would 
be it – the story of an aging couple, whose daughter having left for college, 
become trapped in an intractable battle of wits, replete with parodic ‘horror’ 
effects: 
I essentially ceased, then, to do or say anything in the way of ‘in 
situ’ response or objection when she would suddenly sit violently 
up in the bed across the room (her face often inhuman and 
spectral in the bedroom’s faint light because of the white emollient 
cream she wore to bed during the cold, dry months of the year, and 
distorted unpleasantly by vexation and choler) to accuse me of 
‘snoring horribly’ and demanding that I roll over at once or be 
exiled once again to Audrey’s former bed (203, emphasis mine) 
‘Oblivion’ carves out a claustrophobic and claustral atmosphere of dread 
around the plight of Hope and Randall, culminating in the couple’s 
commitment to sleep therapy and medical intervention. This dread is built on 
iterative conflict, and premised on the impossible bedtime ritual of the couple 
in question – by posing this empathetic and interpersonal paradox at the heart 
of the text, Wallace leverages the uncanny sitcom-dimensions of marital 
conflict to heightened metafictional effect.  
As Wallace deepens and distorts the central conflict of the text, 
‘Oblivion’ expands its ontological treatise on sleep, waking and dreaming, 
most vividly captured in the dream-like presentation of its narrative and 
narrator. Having not slept for months, Randall experiences vivid 
hallucinations throughout the text, unearthing an array of shifting and 
oblique narrative signifiers. Recalling ‘Smithy’, one of these hallucinations is 
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described as an “associative tableau”, “the whole brief tableau an interior 
‘vision’ or shot so rapid and incongruous it can only be truly, as it were, ‘seen’ 
in retrospect” (197). These insistent visions incorporate the various main 
characters around Randall and Hope, including Hope’s step-father (variously 
named as “Father”, “Greatfather”, “Edmund”, and “Dr Sipe”) and Randall’s 
step-daughter Audrey, who has recently left the Napier home for college: 
Then an extremely brief and strobe-like associative tableau in 
which Hope’s stepfather and herself, at some past or distantly 
prior point in time, are seated together, in an unfamiliar coupe 
or sports car which is speeding along a rural or markedly under-
maintained inland State route […] and of a younger and 
noticeably more lissome and voluptuous Hope applying facial 
products in the small, inset mirror of the sun shade or visor as 
‘Father’, posture erect and distinguished and gazing stolidly 
ahead at the road, insists that it isn’t so much dislike or 
‘disapproval’ of the fellow per se […] (197) 
Elaborating on this tableau, Randall’s testimony betrays deep-seated 
ambivalence towards Dr Edmund Sipe, which is also on vivid display in 
‘Oblivion’s opening scenes, where our narrator attempts to divest himself to 
the Dr at a local golf course. Randall’s hallucinations are on vivid display as 
well, as the narrator reports that the “19th Hole’s respective colors seemed 
suddenly to brighten uncontrollably and become over-saturant” (191), 
described variously as a “pulse or throb” in the visual field, a paradoxical 
recession from and zeroing-in on “individual objects” (191).  This effect is 
repeated throughout the text itself, for example through Randall’s obsequious 
‘scare-quoting’ of names and phrases and his hyper-specific accounts of 
various interpersonal and transferential conflicts.  
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As in ‘Philosophy’ and ‘Smithy’, Wallace embeds crucial narrative 
details at the periphery of the text, including the narrator’s vivid desire for his 
step-daughter “Audrey”, whilst withholding any resolution to these narrative 
threads or their implications. In these accounts, the figure of stepdaughter 
Audrey plays a complex and uneasy role – her “leaving the nest” (p203) for 
college is nominated as a potential cause of Randall and Hope’s ongoing 
conflict. Yet ‘Oblivion’s narrative exposes a more troubling array of subtexts 
at stake, particularly in terms of the relationship between narrator Randall 
and his stepdaughter. Inside the sleep technician’s studio, Randall avers to the 
reader: 
My heart had, as it were, sunk several inches; I missed our 
Audrey terribly; I wanted now to go alone to help her pack and 
Withdraw and be borne back home [notwithstanding my foot’s 
by now being almost numb or ‘asleep’, I could not and would not 
uncross my legs] […] to storm the out-of-State dormitory or 
‘castle’ or ‘enceinte’ or machicolated banishment’s donjon’s 
fortification and to pound, smite or ring its massive, oaken front 
door’s bell […]  (231) 
As the hallucinatory, confessional interlude plays out, Randall envisions 
himself rescuing his stepdaughter from college, and his plans to ”loudly say, 
avow or cry aloud what may and must never even be remotely thought or 
‘dreamt of’ [unlike, it went without saying, ‘Father’]. (231). This ambivalent un-
announceable, once more reprising the kinds of dark contexts witnessed in 
‘Philosophy’ and ‘Smithy’, with more than a little Twin Peaks thrown into the 
mix. In a nod to Lynch’s Fire Walk with Me, Wallace embeds an almost 
pornographic, Laura Palmer-esque character, aptly named ‘Audrey’, at the 
periphery of the text, playing on his narrator’s overt desire to possess and 
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“Withdraw” his own stepdaughter (recalling the vivid performances of Ray 
Wise as Frank Silva as ‘BOB’). This desire, exposed inside Wallace’s hyper-
ironic sitcom framework, again betrays the key influence of David Lynch on 
Wallace’s storytelling, touching everything from themes and their 
presentation to the anodyne-but-not naming of characters – “Randy”, “Hope”, 
“Audrey”, “Dr Edmund Sipe” and so forth. Taken to its extreme, this influence 
becomes an engine for ironic and parodic extensions of the Lynchian aesthetic 
– in another of many telling hallucination, Randall reports to a colleague that 
“our Audrey’s chest on Parent’s Weekend at Bryn Mawr’s two breasts will go 
up and down in her sweater like pistons and her head is surrounded by a halo 
or, as it were, ‘nimbus’ of animated Disney characters” (p212).  
Buoyed by the narrator’s hypnogogically Lynchian accounts, ‘Oblivion’ 
implicates the reader in a narrative space which is at once incestuous and 
aporetic. Randall’s uneasy apprehension of his own desires comes towards the 
end of his ‘sleep therapy’:  
At this juncture, the Somnologist – […] averred (meaning the 
sleep specialist now averred) that, yes, technically speaking, my 
wife’s accusations as to ‘snoring’, while based on (in his terms) 
‘interior, dreamed experience’ as opposed to ‘exterior sensory 
output’, nonetheless were, in a Medical or scientific sense, 
correct (232, 233) 
This jargonistic non-answer to the text’s central narrative question – who is 
asleep and who isn’t? – is quickly expanded into farce, as the technicians 
proceed to play video tapes from the sleep therapy sessions themselves, in 
order to “empirically verify the Somnologist’s diagnosis of Hope’s accusations 
ultimately unreal, oneiric or ‘Paradoxical’ content” (234). At this point the text 
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begins to unravel. Randall’s narrative is punctuated by parenthetic, 
fragmented voices – exclaiming things like “only hurt a tiny”, “Please!”, 
“dreaming” and “or hurt you if” (pp. 234-236) – while the scene inside the sleep 
therapy office become distorted and hallucinatory.  
The net result of this strategy is an uncanny synthesis of the mundane 
and the downright bizarre, particularly in the text’s final decompressive 
moments, as our narrator (who may in fact be Randall’s wife Hope) appears 
to ‘wake’ from their own narrative, and into a highly-ambiguated situation 
indeed. Randall and Hope watch “in rigid fascination” (236) as a sleeping 
Randy mouths “involuntary” words and noises on the video. As he reports: 
Signifying or ‘meaning’, in other words, that the distinctive, 
alternating shapes of my image’s mouth’s slack lips […] signified 
undeniably that sounds and noises of which I had no voluntary 
awareness were in fact escaping my mouth and throat (236) 
This revelation triggers an almost literal meltdown of the protagonist’s 
situation – the unearthly whispers of our sleeping narrator, their “involuntary” 
and involuted presentation within the text, inform the text’s sudden turn 
towards the nightmarish, borrowing once more from the author’s 
Expressionistic toolkit. As with the various whispers and moans canvassed 
above, ‘Oblivion’s spectacular stylistic meltdown is delivered parenthetically.  
as the video’s camera’s focus tightened or closed further on  my 
wholly unfamiliar, inhuman, unconscious visage, I either way 
saw, hallucinated, ‘imagined’ (Hope at this juncture still rigidly 
or foetally ‘frozen’, open mouthed and saucer eyed, as both the 
forbidding technician and Latin executive began to peel their 
respective faces off in a ‘top down’ fashion or manner, beginning 
at each temple and pulling downwards with sharp, emphatic, 
peeling or ‘tugging’ motions, the Cuban’s foreign wristwatch and 
hands a mass of amber lesions) (236-237) 
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From the ‘open mouthed and saucer-eyed’ sitcom wife to the image of the 
“Cuban’s foreign wristwatch”, Wallace’s tableau reprises his estranging 
performances of David Lynch, William Burroughs and the like throughout his 
work, and mirrors the chaotic and nightmarish atmosphere created 
throughout ‘Oblivion’. As the text itself continues to confess to ambiguous 
crimes, the words on the lips of our narrator are presented as a kind of unreal, 
oneiric or paradoxical content, resulting in the text’s literal performance of a 
rude awakening.  
The text’s final image is that of Randall’s own recorded face, beginning 
“to distend in a ‘grinningly’ familiar and sensual or even predatory facial ex” 
(p237) – pression, the text appears to say… except we have literally ‘woken’ 
onto a peculiar narrative horizon. The text’s final, withheld revelation of 
Randall’s ex-pression – the look on his face, the words on his lips – is 
interrupted by a minimalist series of spoken lines, seemingly part of a 
conversation yet ambiguously juxtaposed with one another. This concluding 
section is worth quoting in its entirety, as it represents one of Wallace’s 
crowning bait-and-switch reversals of generic expectation: 
“up. Wake up for the love of.” 
“God. My god I was having.” 
“Wake up.” 
“Having the worst dream.” 
“I should certainly say that you were.” 
“It was awful. It just went on and on.” 
“I shook you and shook you and.” 
“Time is it.” 
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“It’s nearly – almost 2:04. I was afraid I might hurt you if I 
prodded or shook any harder. I couldn’t seem to rouse you.” 
“Is that thunder? Did it rain?” 
“I was beginning to really worry. Hope, this cannot go on. When 
are we going to make that appointment?” 
“Wait – am I even married?” 
“Please don’t start all this again.” 
“And who’s this Audrey?” 
“Just go on back to sleep now.” 
“And what’s that – Daddy?” 
“Just lie back down.” 
“What’s wrong with your mouth?” 
“You are my wife.” 
“None of this is real.” 
“It’s all all right.” (237) 
This insane reversal of scope on the part of the text – from the hyperbolic 
equivocation of ‘Randy’ to an ambiguated almost-dialogue between two 
indistinct interlocutors – echoes the parenthetic exclamations and oneiric 
explosions preceding it, creating an atmosphere of maximal ontological 
ambiguity within the text.  
From its obsessions with time, to its clipped and uncertain delivery, 
this script is a thoroughly Lynchian invention, eerily prefiguring or borrowing 
from the narrative experiments in films such as INLAND EMPIRE (vis the 
leaden, ambiguated discourse of the ‘rabbit room’) and Mulholland Drive (in 
the literalistic ‘waking’ from one text to another). At the same time, Wallace’s 
self-reflexive reversal has all the hallmarks of a classic network sitcom – 
342 
 
namely Newhart, whose 1990 television finale saw actor Bob Newhart awake 
from a “dream”, that dream being, of course, the preceding sitcom Newhart.  
Building on the text’s own disavowals of authority (in the conflict 
between Randall and Hope) and Lynchian obsession with the sitcom form, 
‘Oblivion’s ending explodes the possibilities set up by its narrative of 
psychoanalytic reading. Are we to assume that ‘Hope’ has woken from a 
horrible dream, without knowledge of her daughter, the “wife” of someone she 
calls “Daddy?” Or are these dull, sitcom-esque lines perhaps spoken aloud by 
Randall himself, captured on the sleep technicians’ recordings? The script, a 
substitute for the narrator’s own distended, predatory “ex-pression”, calls the 
entire ontological basis of the text into question. To paraphrase comedian and 
fellow sitcom-writer Jerry Seinfeld: “Who are these people?” And who are they 
within the textual and generic conflicts which precede them? Without a 
doubt, this ending accomplishes the effect of what Wallace deemed capital-L 
Lynchian: 
Refers to a particular kind of irony where the very macabre and 
the very mundane combine in such a way as to reveal the 
former’s perpetual containment within the latter (1997: 161) 
From the sitcom narrative of snoring to the more unconscious and incestuous 
ironies unleashed thereby, ‘Oblivion’ harnesses this Lynchian mode to full 
effect, creating maximal uncertainty around the roles and authority of 
narrator, speaker and reader. Meanwhile, ‘Oblivion’s closing script plays like 
credits over an oblique end to a bizarre family show. In this dream-like textual 
game, Wallace’s reversal of generic expectations leads us to wonder aloud: 
Who is dreaming here? And what is being dreamt? 
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Conclusion: Performing the Negation and Enclosure of the ‘Reader’ 
In Oblivion, the idea of fiction as “an act of communication between 
one human being and another” (Wallace 1997: 144) becomes a truly estranging 
proposition. The psychologically-fraught and stylistically-freighted 
dimensions of such acts, and the estrangement they provoke, have been 
examined to some detail in the preceding chapters of this study. In these 
readings, we have seen the repetition, re-imagination and re-abstraction of 
‘readers’ as an estranging case in point for Wallace’s work and reception, 
whilst providing our own case studies (close readings) of ‘readers’ who 
identify, critique and narrate in Wallace’s early-middle fictions and essays. In 
each of these readings, the concept of acting-out retained a unique and 
productive significance, representing, at different points: a return to 
literalistic ideas about ‘reading erotically’ (Chapter 3), the re-imaginative 
diagnoses of such ‘reading’ in Wallace’s own fictions (Chapter 4), and the 
abstract typologies and pathologies of the ‘reader’ canvassed in his essays on 
Expressionism, David Lynch and psychobiography (Chapter 5; See Above).  In 
Oblivion, moreover, we have discovered the extent to which post-Freudian 
reading, specifically a post-Freudian reading of the transference-neurosis as 
textual performance, acting-out, figures productively into Wallace’s later 
metafictional works. As demonstrated in this chapter, Wallace’s final 
collection of short stories presents a circumspect revival of the author’s key 
literary, thematic and aesthetic concerns, through sophisticated games with 
the ‘reader’s empathies, critical reconstructions, abstracted intentions, and so 
forth. Nevertheless, with the full admission of Wallace’s transferential-
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neurotic style, we have seen the extent to which acting-out (repeating, re-
imagining and re-abstracting the ‘reader’) displaces the idea of “another” 
human being onto the idea of another text, another response, another layer of 
difficulty and complication.  
In this sense, Oblivion makes a complex game out of an essentially 
transferential-neurotic author-reader relationship, successfully drawing on 
the breadth of Wallace’s own stylistic engagements with ‘reading’ and ‘readers’ 
in the process. And yet, in Oblivion, the transferential (because repetitive) and 
neurotic (because self-reflexive) dimensions of this discourse become visible 
as discourse. By exhausting and displacing these early-career strategies onto 
bizarre and hyperbolised Freudian reading-tropes, Wallace effects one final 
escalation of his metafictional problematic, bringing the ‘reader’ of Oblivion 
into fraught negative contact with themes such as empathetic identification, 
suspicious critique and critical abstraction. We can see this sort of contact 
occur towards the conclusion of ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature’, which 
contains this collapsed and estranged account of its narrator’s guilt (vis a vis 
that narrator’s culpability in his mother’s disfigurement): 
That with my size and distinctive mark that I have kidnapped 
this horror-stricken middle-aged female or behaved in a 
somehow threatening manner toward her saying, Ma’am is there 
some problem or, Why don’t you just leave the lady alone as she 
sinks lower in her knitted scarf in the self-discomfort over their 
reaction but my own evolved response is to calmly smile and 
raise my gloves in puzzled bemusement as if to say, Why who 
knows for certain why anyone wears the face they do my good 
fellow let us not leap to conclusions based on incomplete data! 
(2004: 188, emphasis original) 
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This characteristic and estranging return to Freud – to the “puzzled 
bemusement” and “evolved response” of a psychoanalytic interpreter – is a 
sound enough point at which to conclude our investigations of the Wallace 
‘reader’. As we can see, this sort of sentence represents a kind of interpretive 
game, whose chief symptom remains the fraught repetition of ‘readers’, 
‘readings’ and reading-positions. This game began when Wallace’s early texts 
declared their love for readers who identify, yet quickly escalated to encompass 
new layers of self-reflexivity and rhetorical complexity: between antagonistic 
narratives of readers who critique and mediating narratives of readers who 
narrate, we have witnessed peculiar evolutions and deviations in Wallace’ 
writings about reading, which have consistently brought us back to the idea 
of transferential-neurotic acting-out.  
Meanwhile, in the italicised and an almost totally ironic voice of a 
classical Freudian analyst, Wallace’s narrator declares: “Why who knows for 
certain why anyone wears the face they do my good fellow let us not leap to 
conclusions based on incomplete data!” Yet as we know, Wallace’s texts do leap 
to such conclusions – about the respective intentions of readers, writers, 
critics and texts – as a matter of principle. The distinguishing thing about 
Oblivion is that it appears to recognise the risks of such an approach. At the 
margins of the texts considered here, we have witnessed the estranging 
consequences of such a performance of narration, and the extent to which 
Wallace appears to refute (or at least drastically reconfigure) his earlier 
sentiments about love, reading and “human beings”. To posit the ‘reader’ as 
lacking empathy, desiring suspicion and suffering abstraction is, in the 
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transferential-neurotic terms set by Oblivion, to engage in a kind of acting-out 
– it is to attribute intentionality to “some person, some other psychodynamic 
structure” (Brooks 1986: 2).  
Yet by incorporating this level of transferential-neurotic self-
awareness, and indeed applying it to his own early-middle works, Wallace 
appears to have effectively worked-through the rhetorical caveats that he had 
set for himself within those works. Oblivion is no longer beholden to baggage-
claims about real human beings, talking-out, loving, reading and so forth, 
because these claims (and the readers, characters, authors or texts that make 
them) have themselves become the transferential-neurotic subject of the text. 
In this sense, Wallace’s idea of a “new kind of aesthetic agent, who makes 
stories out of stories” is not, as the author suggests, simply a collapsed 
distinction between author and reader (2004; see above). From the 
perspective of a psychoanalytically-informed reader who negates, Wallace’s 
dense, obscure and allusive ideas about ‘reading’ are the game which his 
transferential-neurotic texts perform.  
Having distinguished between and negotiated the first, second, third 
and fourth-order responses that this game might entail, we have thus been 
able to tender our own response to the question: Who is the ‘reader’ of David 
Foster Wallace? But as we have also seen, Wallace’s texts are not simply a 
game – they are also objects of decisive erotic significance, puzzles for the 
suspiciously-minded interpreter, and complex arguments for the status of 
‘readers’ in the wake of postmodernity. Nevertheless, it is precisely these 
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qualities that make reading the Wallace text such an estranging experience, 
and the question of the Wallace ‘reader’ all the more pertinent, particularly in 
relation to his late-phase metafictional works. 
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Conclusion 
Reading in the Fourth-Person 
 
 
It was only after Himself’s death that critics and theorists started 
to treat this question seriously. A woman at U. Cal-Irvine had 
earned tenure with an essay arguing that the reason-versus-no-
reason debate about what was entertaining in Himself’s work 
illuminated the central conundra of millennial après-garde film, 
most of which, in the teleputer age of home entertainment, 
involved the question why so much aesthetically ambitious film 
was so boring and why so much shitty reductive commercial 
entertainment was so much fun. The essay was turgid to the 
point of being unreadable, besides using reference as a verb and 
pluralizing conundrum as conundra.* 
(Wallace 1996: 947) 
 
 
Of all the possible reading-positions suggested in Wallace’s 
psychoanalytically-aware fictions, and adopted in influential interpretations 
of that work, certain ‘readers’ repeat. As we have seen, this repetition is no 
simple affair. Strangely enough, it appears to be predicated on an estranging 
performative rhetoric, which posits ‘readers’ in order to engage with questions 
about ‘reading’. Our close engagements with Wallace Studies and 
psychoanalytic literary theory have borne out the self-reflexive and repetitive 
dimensions of such a rhetoric, whilst allowing us to translate particular 
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difficulties at the margins texts such as Girl with Curious Hair (1989), Brief 
Interviews with Hideous Men (1999) and Oblivion (2004). This analysis wedded 
seemingly disparate aspects of Wallace’s fiction – that fiction’s propensity to 
declare love for the ‘reader’ (Chapter 3), its simultaneous problematising of 
erotic ‘reading’ (Chapter 4), and its oblique recovery of particular Freudian 
and post-Freudian reading strategies (Chapters 5-6) – through a 
psychoanalytically-informed reader-response theory, whose operative terms 
were repetition, re-imagination, re-abstraction and, collectively, acting-out 
(performance). This model allowed us to apply a more critical and exposure-
oriented perspective to the question of the ‘reader’ in Wallace’s short 
metafictions, which located that question’s significance in the author’s 
consistent, perhaps unconscious, return to classical metapsychological ideas 
about ‘readers’ and ‘reading’ within his short fictions. 
Who, then, is the ‘reader’ of David Foster Wallace? As is so often the 
case, we asked ourselves this question because Wallace’s fiction asked it of us. 
Nevertheless, it remains strange to observe how Wallace’s texts repeat this 
question in such precise terms. In a literalistic sense, it is of course pertinent 
to ask ‘who’ the empirical reader of Wallace might be, and whether they might 
simply be us. In his own search for common-sense and erotic definitions of 
reading, the author certainly appears to be doing to same thing. In an 
imaginative sense, however, we have also seen why the term ‘reader’ might 
appear in indefinite quotation marks. Put simply, Wallace’s texts define the 
author-reader relationship along so many narrative and characterological 
vectors that a return to ideal or common-sense ideas about ‘readers’ becomes, 
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if not impossible, then fraught with transferential-neurotic risks. Having 
negotiated these risks, we have even witnessed the extent to which Wallace 
frames the question in the third person – communication, in the terms 
Wallace set for it, is an act which tends to consist of the author, his reader, 
and a semi-acknowledged ‘other’ reader (of which we have encountered 
multiple estranging variations).  
But in repeating this question ourselves, and devising a language for its 
expression in Wallace’s most estranging short writings, we have discovered a 
fourth dimension to it – namely, we have exposed the performative 
relationship between this question and the activities of a psychoanalytically-
engaged interpreter, out of which a properly counter-transferential response 
has been formulated and exhausted at the margins of Wallace’s short fiction 
collections. In these first, second, third and fourth order responses to the 
question of ‘implied readership’ in Wallace’s texts, we have thus set the stage 
for a more psychoanalytically- and rhetorically-engaged reading of the 
author’s broader literary project.  
As our close engagements with and estrangements from Wallace’s 
fiction have shown, ‘reading’ is no simple exercise – in fact, the strangest thing 
about this exercise may simply be its tendency to operate in the fourth-person, 
hinting, in other words, at the relevant intersection between at least four 
structurally-significant perspectives, four reading-positions. This intersection 
can appear quite convoluted at times, particularly in the works considered in 
this study – as we have seen, Wallace’s concern for the ‘reader’ is conveyed 
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across numerous self-reflexive vectors, which repeat that ‘reader’ to varying 
(though at times startlingly consistent) degrees. Nevertheless, this unique 
attempt at fourth-person address has been investigated and even productively 
returned to throughout this study. The peculiarity of this address – the strange 
fact of a statement which implies an author (me), a reader (you), the activities 
of a ‘fiction writer’ and, finally, a ‘fiction writer’s reader’ to whom those 
activities are openly addressed – has been modelled as a term of transferential-
neurotic (because self-reflexive and self-repetitive) discourse, and observed 
the operations of this discourse throughout Wallace’s short fictions, essays, 
interviews and critical reception.  
While the consequences of such discourse are manifold in Wallace’s 
works, they are nevertheless describable as a kind of estranging textual 
performance. Under our psychoanalytic reader-response model, Wallace’s 
anodyne definition of fiction as “an act of communication between one human 
being and another” (1997: 144) began to take on strange new connotations, a 
strangeness which we have sought to reconstruct through a series of ‘close 
encounters’ with the author’s early, middle and late-period short fictions. 
These fictions identify and identify with ‘readers’; more to the point, they 
often appear in search of non-pathological or non-figurative way of expressing 
love towards their reader. But these expressions ultimately veer pathological. 
In escalating the stakes of their own erotic reading, and accommodating 
multiple suspicious and abstract trajectories for such ‘reading’ within a 
complex metafictional frame, Wallace’s texts read like a peculiar kind of 
transference-neurosis, whose object (or ‘subject’, if one prefers) is “not author 
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or reader, but reading, including of course the transferential-imperative 
operations that belong to reading” (Brooks 1986: 13-14).  
If there are particular transferential-imperative operations implied in 
Wallace’s fictions, then they are arguably indicated in that fiction’s treatment 
of the psychoanalytic ‘reader’, and the proliferative strategies by which 
Wallace repeats, re-imagines and re-abstracts his own post-Freudian 
inheritance. This marginal (yet strangely persistent) aspect of Wallace’s work 
may also provide an effective response to the neurological and narratological 
dimensions of Wallace’s novels, and to engage more directly with these 
dimensions in the works of  Stephen J Burn. Again, without pre-empting this 
analysis, I think it pertinent to raise this kind of novelistic reading of Wallace 
as part of this study’s conclusion: 
one way that Infinite Jest might function (in Wallace’s words) as 
an “anodyne against loneliness” – a loneliness that stems from 
our entrapment in the mind – is by simultaneously presenting 
the reader with two puzzles […] The emphasis on connection that 
underlies the puzzle reprises the web-like vision that underlies 
the book’s other obsessions – the endless links to earlier works, 
the biological pathways between the ‘webs and nerves’ that 
embody the self – and Infinite Jest’s thematic and narrative 
energies insistently foreground connection, even as the book can 
locate, but cannot replace, what the novel calls the “interior 
jigsaw’s missing piece” (Burn 2013: 80-81) 
Having canvassed the “endless” links between key texts in the Wallace corpus 
– whilst critiquing the idea of a book that “can locate, but cannot replace” the 
hypothetical reader – this study has put paid to the idea that Wallace’s 
metafictions connect with the science of mind in various, complex ways. I 
have simply pursued a different science of mind in this study, enthralled and 
estranged as I have been by the specifically transferential-neurotic aspects of 
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Wallace’s works, and the strategies by which those aspects are acted-out in 
those works. By engaging with these strategies, we have thus engaged with the 
broader question of a psychoanalytically-engaged metafiction, whilst locating 
the various ‘readers’ and reading-positions that such a metafiction might 
imply.  
This critical narrative, and its sophisticated elaboration in Wallace’s 
fictions and essays, provided the basis for our investigations of and with the 
Wallace text. We discovered it first in Wallace’s conflation of erotic love and 
“talk[ing] out the part of yourself that can love”, but soon found ourselves 
estranged by innumerable narratives of the transference-neurosis in action – 
whether through eroticised portraits of feminine performance or suspicious 
re-imaginations of a male anxiety, or the subsequent falsification and 
exhaustion of Freudian reading-positions in essays such as ‘David Lynch Keeps 
His Head’ and fictions such as ‘Here and There’, ‘Octet’ and ‘Oblivion’, 
Wallace’s fictions remain caught up in highly-specific ideas about acting-out, 
which we have reconstructed in literalistic, imaginative, abstract and 
performative terms. As we have also seen, this repetition is a key source of 
difficulty within Wallace’s short fictions.  
Whilst those texts’ return to particular ideas about ‘reading’ and 
‘readers’ have helped secure the author’s case for an empathetically-engaged 
metafiction, they inevitably presented us with a kind of pathological 
hyperbole, whose chief weapon (or symptom) was escalation – escalation of 
stakes, particularly when it comes to ideas about empathetic and erotic love, 
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critical and post-critical theories about erotic love, narratological and 
characterological accounts of ‘reader/lovers’, ‘true other[s]’, speakers, 
narrators, performers, et al etc. In our reading, this escalation happens for a 
reason – Wallace’s texts are specifically attuned to the activities of the engaged 
psychoanalytic interpreter, and return to precise ideas about ‘reading’ and 
transference-neurosis in order to estrange such an interpreter. This effect may 
be deliberate; it may be entirely inadvertent. Nevertheless, it reads like a 
transferential-neurotic performance – an acting-out of ‘readers’, a return to 
hyperbolic and symptomatic expressions of particular reading-positions.  
By tracing these positions at the margins of Wallace’s short fictions and 
essays, we gained a stronger sense of the estranging difficulty that such texts 
pose for empirical and hypothetical ‘readers’. Moreover, we have discovered 
the extent to which such difficulties escalate into one another, both within 
Wallace’s texts and across influential works within Wallace scholarship. 
Though we have provided an effective terminology for such difficulties, and a 
theoretical narrative through which to understand them, I do not claim to 
have exhausted the kinds of reading strategy implied by or even idealised 
within Wallace’s fiction. The wealth of scholarly material produced around 
novels such as Infinite Jest and The Pale King indicates the virtual 
inexhaustibility of such strategies in the author’s major works, and potentially 
invite further elaborations of the ‘four readers’ model canvassed in this study. 
Without pre-empting this further analysis, I would simply say that the 
intersection of particular reading-strategies in Jest is a topic of note in the work 
of Greg Carlisle – his work Elegant Complexity models this intersection 
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thematically, through the interplay of the psychologically-inflected terms 
‘between’, ‘around’, ‘under’ and ‘away’ (2007: 23). Given our structurally-
similar treatment of readers who identify, readers who critique, readers who 
narrate and readers who negate in Wallace’s short fiction, and the almost 
overtly psychoanalytic markers in Carlisle’s own expansive study, there is 
certainly a case to be made for new marginal readings of Infinite Jest, which 
would perhaps take a closer look at the ‘family Incandenza’ in Freudian and 
post-Freudian terms. 
But our point is not that such reader-positioning should occur, but 
rather simply that it does. Wallace scholarship to date appears to have 
organised itself around the assumption of between one and four reading-
positions, positions which repeat key reception-tropes from the author’s own 
statements about ‘reading’ and ‘readers’. The extent of this situation in 
relation to the author’s novelistic works is profound, but impossible to capture 
in the detail that this thesis demands. Nevertheless, with a marginal emphasis 
on difficulty in Wallace’s short fiction, we have successfully demonstrated 
how a term like ‘reader’ becomes repeated in our own critical writings about 
the author and his estranging metafictional works. From the erotic common-
sense of Girl with Curious Hair, to the self-reflexive vicissitudes of Brief 
Interviews, to the expressionistic (because transferential-neurotic) strategies 
of Oblivion, we have seen how Wallace anticipates particular reading-
positions, and investigated the extent to which this self-reflexivity estranged 
us from a wholesale identification with the Wallace text. While Wallace’s 
engagements with transference-neurosis appear to resolve neatly in the 
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analysis provided, this is only because we have distinguished between 
successive degrees of self-awareness in Wallace’s own psychoanalytically-
aware rhetoric. Whilst distinguishing between these different forms of 
expression in Wallace, we have also been able to provide a working account 
of themes such as empathy, erotic love, suspicious ‘readers’ and abstract 
‘reading’ as those themes appear in Wallace’s texts.  
Much of this narrative was hiding in plain sight, in the overt repetition 
of terms like ‘reader’ in Wallace’s work and reception; but this repetition is a 
game with the expectations of empirical readers, with the third-person ‘us’ 
implied in virtually every study of Wallace published to date.  Of course, this 
hypothetical rhetoric appears mixed up from the start in Wallace’s texts, as do 
the potential intersections between themes like identification/empathy, 
critique/suspicion, narration/authorship and negation/readership, to name 
but a relevant few. While Girl is an empathetic and indeed erotic kind of text, 
it also questions the existence of readers who identify, and treats this question 
like a transferential-neurotic game, foreshadowing the strategies pursued in 
Wallace’s middle and late-period fictions. At the same time, Brief Interviews 
and Oblivion retain the shockingly-literal impact of Wallace’s early works 
because they escalate its stakes.  
The sheer sophistication of these later texts is enough to warrant 
further attention to the strange literality of Freud in Wallace. The theatrical, 
dramaturgical and meta-rhetorical terminologies deployed in this study have 
also shed light on the author’s relationship to figures such as David Lynch – a 
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further application of this study’s methodology might consider ‘Lynch Studies’ 
(another heterogeneous field of enquiry) in relation to Wallace’s hyperbolic 
and expressionistic fictional project, and consider the Lynchian dimensions of 
texts like Infinite Jest in greater detail. Likewise, a characterological study of 
Lynch – informed by Wallace’s transferential-neurotic discourses of reading, 
readers and performance – thus remains a viable and relevant course of future 
enquiry.  
Having restricted our study of the ‘reader’ to a defined post-Freudian 
terminology – and indeed, having defined such a terminology through its utile 
deployment in Wallace’s metafiction – we have thus gained a better 
understanding of psychoanalytic ‘reading’ in Wallace’s texts, and traced those 
texts’ return to and exhaustion of particular transferential-neurotic tropes. 
Viewed on this basis, the search for the Wallace ‘reader’ and the effort to 
distinguish between various types of psychoanalytic ‘readers’ in Wallace’s 
texts are superimposable activities. In our terms, they both presuppose a 
transferential-neurotic framework, an “artificial illness” or “playground” in 
which particular ideas about readers, authors, characters, narrators and texts 
become repeated, re-imagined and re-abstracted.  
In reconstructing this discourse, and its pathological (because 
repetitive) and hyperbolic (because self-reflexive) vectors, we have arrived at 
something resembling Peter Brooks’ “rhetorical elaboration” of transferential 
reading: 
The text is conceived as a semiotic and fictive medium 
constituted as the place of affective investments that represent a 
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situation and a story as both symbolic (given the absence of 
situation and story except ‘in effigy’) and ‘real’ (given the 
making-present of situation and story through their repetition). 
The text conceived as transference should allow us to illuminate 
and work through that which is at issue in the situation of the 
speaker, or the story of the narrator – that is, what must be 
rethought, reordered, interpreted from his discourse. 
Transference and interpretation are in fact interdependent and 
we cannot assign priority to one over the other (1986: 13) 
If Wallace’s fictions do represent an “act of communication between one 
human being and another”, they do so in a transferential-neurotic fashion – 
in Brooks’ terms, they rethink, reorder and interpret this kind of “act”, whilst 
dramatising the “situation of the speaker” (and the concomitant situation of 
their respondent) in self-reflexive and repetitive ways. But this acting-out or 
talking-out of the ‘reader’ has allowed us to refine Brooks’ transferential model 
somewhat. Wallace’s metafictions have escalated this problem from generalist 
erotic concerns with transference to a more specified and specialised sense of 
transference-neurosis, which we have had cause to explore throughout this 
thesis. Despite strange claims to the contrary, Wallace’s texts do engage in 
reader-positioning; moreover, this positioning gives itself away through such 
claims, in the author’s most artfully self-reflexive strategies, to the extent that 
these strategies neurotically repeat particular reading-positions.  
With the benefit of a psychoanalytically-informed reader-response 
theory, we have thus seen the extent to which Wallace’s short fictions function 
as “framed tales” of ‘reading’, and effectively described this function in terms 
of transferential-neurotic performance – acting-out. When we are what we call 
‘readers’ of David Foster Wallace, we are at once analyst and object, applicand 
and figurant, detective and fugitive, performer and performed. The trouble 
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with all of this, as we have seen, is the fact that Wallace’s estranging critical 
rhetoric supposes that we can inhabit all of these positions all at once.  
  
360 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Booth, WC 1961, The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Boswell M and Burn SJ. 2013, 'Preface'. in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) A 
Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, ix-xii. 
Boswell M. 2009 [2003], Understanding David Foster Wallace, Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press. 
Boswell M. 2013, '"The Constant Monologue Inside Your Head": Oblivion and 
the nightmare of consciousness'. in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) A 
Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 151-170 
Boswell M. 2014, Author Here: The Legal Fiction of David Foster Wallace's 
The Pale King. English Studies 95, 1: 25-39. 
Boswell M. 2014, 'Preface: David Foster Wallace and "The Long Thing"'. in 
Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": Essays on the 
Novels. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, vi-xiii. 
Boswell M. 2014, 'Trickle-down citizenship: Taxes and civic responsibility in 
The Pale King' in Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long 
Thing": Essays on the Novels. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 209-225. 
Brooks, P 1986 ‘The idea of a psychoanalytic literary criticism’ in Rimmon-
Kenan S (Ed) Discourse in Psychoanalysis and Literature. London: 
Methuen, 1-18. 
Brooks, P 1992 [1984] Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative, 
London: Harvard University Press. 
Burn SJ. 2013, '"Webs of Nerves Pulsing and Firing": Infinite Jest and the 
science of mind". in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) A Companion to David 
Foster Wallace Studies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 59-86. 
Burn SJ. 2014, '"A paradigm for the life of consciousness": The Pale King'. in 
361 
 
Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": Essays on the 
Novels. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 149-168. 
Carlisle G. 2010, 'Introduction: Consider David Foster Wallace'. in Hering D 
(ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow 
Media 12-23. 
Cioffi FL. 2000, 'An anguish become thing: narrative as performance in David 
Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest.’ Narrative 8, 2, 161-181. 
Cunningham M 2012, ‘The Ironic Uncanny, Uncanny Ironies and David 
Lynch’, Consciousness, Literature & the Arts, Vol. 13 Issue 1.  
Cunningham M 2015, ‘Performing the Fiction-Writer’s Reader: David Foster 
Wallace and the ‘Reader” of ‘Octet’,’ in Writing the Ghost Train: Refereed 
conference papers of the 20th Annual AAWP Conference, 2015, Melbourne” 
Australasian Association of Writing Programs. 
Davis T, Womack K 2002, Formalist Criticism and Reader-Response Theory. 
London: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Den Dulk A. 2014, 'Boredom, irony and anxiety: Wallace and the 
Kierkegaardian view of the self'. in Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace 
and "The long Thing": Essays on the Novels. New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 43-60. 
Den Dulk A. 2014, 'Good faith and sincerity: Sartrean virtues of self-
becoming in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest'. in Bolger RK and Korb S 
(Eds) Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy. New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 199-220. 
Diakoulakis C. 2010, '"Quote unquote love... a type of scotopia": David Foster 
Wallace's Brief Interviews with Hideous Men'. in Hering D (ed) Consider 
David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 147-155. 
Elderon S. 2014, The Shaping of Storied Selves in David Foster Wallace's The 
Pale King. Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 55, 5: 508-521. 
Evans DH. 2013, '"The Chains of Not Choosing": Free will and faith in 
William James and David Foster Wallace'. in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) 
A Companion to David Foster Wallace Studies. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 171-190. 
Farley CJ. 2012 [2008], 'Introduction'. in Burn SJ (ed) Conversations with 
David Foster Wallace. Jackson: Mississippi University Press, 158-160. 
Felman, S 2012 [1977], ‘Henry James: Writing and the Risks of Practice 
(Turning the Screw of Interpretation)’ in Evans MN and Felman S (trans), 
362 
 
Writing and Madness (Literature/Philosophy/Psychoanalysis), Palo Alto: 
Stanford University Press, 141-250. 
Finn E. 2012, 'Becoming yourself: the afterlife of reception'. in Cohen S and 
Konstantinou L (Eds) The Legacy of David Foster Wallace. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 151-176. 
Fitzpatrick K. 2012, 'Infinite Summer: Reading, empathy and the social 
network'. in Cohen S and Konstantinou L (Eds) The Legacy of David Foster 
Wallace. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 182-207. 
Freud S 1997 [1901], The Interpretation of Dreams, Brill AA (Trans), London: 
Wordsworth Editions Limited.  
Freud S 1914 ‘Remembering, repeating and working-through (further 
recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis II)’ in Strachey J 
(Ed/Trans), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, Vol XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on 
Technique and Other Works. Accessed 5/31/16 via PEP Web [online 
database]. Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing, 145-156. 
Freud S 1924 ‘The dynamics of transference’ in Strachey J (ed/trans) The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Vol XII (1911-1913): The Case of Schreber, Papers on Technique and Other 
Works. Accessed 5/31/16 via PEP Web [online database]. Psychoanalytic 
Electronic Publishing, 97-108. 
Freud S 1937 ‘Constructions in Analysis’ in Strachey J (ed/trans) The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume 
XXIII (1937-1939): Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 
and Other Works, Accessed 5/31/16 via PEP Web [online database]. 
Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing 255-270 
Freud S 1966 [1932], Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Strachey J 
(ed/trans), New York: WW Norton and Company 
Freudenthal E. 2010, 'Anti-interiority: Compulsiveness, objectification and 
identity in Infinite Jest'. New Literary History 41: 191-211. 
Gilbert M. 2012 [1997], 'The "infinite story" cult hero behind 1,079-page novel 
rides the hype he skewered'. in Burn SJ (ed) Conversations with David 
Foster Wallace. Jackson: Mississippi University Press, 76-81. 
Harris CB. 2014, The Anxiety of Influence: The John Barth/David Foster 
Wallace Connection. Critique 55: 103-126. 
Hayes-Brady C 2016, The Unspeakable Failures of David Foster Wallace, 
London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
363 
 
Hayes-Brady C. 2010, 'The book, the broom and the ladder: philosophical 
groundings in the work of David Foster Wallace'. in Hering D (ed) Consider 
David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 24-36. 
Hayes-Brady C. 2013, '"...": Language, gender and modes of power in the work 
of David Foster Wallace'. in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) A Companion to 
David Foster Wallace Studies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 131-150. 
Henry CM. 2015, “Sudden Awakening to the Fact That the Mischief Is 
Irretrievably Done”: Epiphanic Structure in David Foster Wallace's Infinite 
Jest. Critique 56, 5: 480-502. 
Hering D. 2010, 'Editor's preface'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster 
Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 9-11. 
Hering D. 2010, 'Infinite Jest: Triangles, cycles, choices, & chases'. in Hering D 
(ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow 
Media 89-100. 
Holland MK. 2006, '"The Art's Heart's Purpose": Braving the narcissistic loop 
of David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest'. Critique 47, 2: 218-242. 
Holland MK. 2013, 'Mediated immediacy in Brief Interviews with Hideous 
Men'. in Boswell M and Burn SJ (Eds) A Companion to David Foster Wallace 
Studies. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 107-130. 
Horn P. 2014, 'Does language fail us? Wallace's struggle with solipsism'. in 
Bolger RK and Korb S (Eds) Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace 
and Philosophy. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 245-270. 
Hutcheon L 1988, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New 
York; Routledge.  
Iser W 1978, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. London: 
Routledge. 
Iser W 1990 [1974], The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in Prose 
Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Jacobs T. 2007, 'The Brothers Incandenza: Translating ideology in Fyodor 
Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov and David Foster Wallace's Infinite 
Jest'. Texas Studies in Literature and Language 49, 3: 265-292. 
Jacobs, T.J. 2013, The Possible Profession: Analytics and the Process of Change. 
New York: Routledge. 
Jenner P. 2010, 'Don't compare, identify: David Foster Wallace on John 
McCain'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. 
Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 199-208. 
364 
 
Kelly A. 2010, 'David Foster Wallace and the New Sincerity in American 
Fiction'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. 
Los Angeles: Sideshow Media 131-146. 
Kelly A. 2010b, ‘David Foster Wallace: the Death of the Author and the Birth 
of a Discipline’. International Journal of Irish American Studies 2. 
Kelly A. 2014, 'David Foster Wallace and the novel of ideas'. in Boswell M 
(ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": Essays on the Novels. New 
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 3-22. 
Konstantinou L. 2012, 'No bull: David Foster Wallace and postironic belief' in 
Cohen S and Konstantinou L (Eds) The Legacy of David Foster Wallace. 
Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 83-112. 
Konstantinou L. 2013, ‘The World of David Foster Wallace’. boundary 2 40: 
59-86. 
Korb S. 2014, 'Love, and what you will, do: An introduction'. in Bolger RK and 
Korb S (eds) Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and 
Philosophy. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 1-4. 
Laplanche, J & Pontalis, JB 1973, The Language of Psycho-Analysis, Khan 
MMR (ed) and Nicholson D (trans), The International Psycho-Analytical 
Library, 94: 1-497. Accessed 5/31/16 via PEP Web [online database]. 
Lear J. 2005, Freud, New York: Routledge. 
Leclair T. 1996, 'The prodigious fiction of Richard Powers, William 
Vollmann, and David Foster Wallace. Critique 38, 1: 12-37. 
Letzler D. 2014, 'Encyclopaedic novels and the cruft of fiction: Infinite Jest's 
endnotes'. in Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": 
Essays on the Novels. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 127-148. 
Levey N. 2011, 'To meet the maker: the influence of the author in the critical 
reception of David Foster Wallace'. COLLOQUY text theory critique, No 21, 
159-169. 
Levey N. 2012, '"Analysis-paralysis": the suspicion of suspicion in the fiction 
of David Foster Wallace'. M/C 15, 1. 
Lipsky D. 2010, Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself: A Road 
Trip with David Foster Wallace, New York: Random House. 
Luther C. 2010, 'David Foster Wallace: Westward with Fredric Jameson'. in 
Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: 
Sideshow Media 49-61. 
McCaffery L. 2012 [1993], 'An expanded interview with David Foster Wallace'. 
365 
 
in Burn SJ (ed) Conversations with David Foster Wallace. Jackson: 
Mississippi University Press, 21-52. 
McGowan T 2007, The Impossible David Lynch. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Miley M. 2016, ‘… And Starring David Foster Wallace as Himself: 
Performance and Persona in The Pale King’. Critique 57, 2: 191-207. 
Miller L. 2012 [1996], 'The Salon interview: David Foster Wallace'. in Burn SJ 
(ed) Conversations with David Foster Wallace. Jackson: Mississippi 
University Press, 58-65. 
Mullins RD. 2014, 'Theories of Everything and More: infinity is not the end'. 
in Bolger RK and Korb S (eds) Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster 
Wallace and Philosophy. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 221-245. 
Nadel IB. 2012, 'Consider the footnote'. in Cohen S and Konstantinou L (eds) 
The Legacy of David Foster Wallace. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
218-240. 
Nash W. 2015, Narrative Ethics, Authentic Integrity, and an Intrapersonal 
Medical Encounter in David Foster Wallace’s “Luckily the Account 
Representative Knew CPR”. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24, 1: 
96-106. 
Ramal R. 2014, 'Beyond philosophy: David Foster Wallace on literature, 
Wittgenstein, and the dangers of theorising'. in Bolger RK and Korb S (eds) 
Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 177-198. 
Ribbat C. 2010, 'Seething static: Notes on Wallace and journalism'. in Hering 
D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: 
Sideshow Media 187-198. 
Ricoeur, P 1978 [1970] in Savage D (trans), Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on 
Interpretation, London: Yale University Press. 
Ricoeur, P 1984 [1983] in McLaughlin K & Pellaur D (trans), Time and 
Narrative, Vol 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ricoeur, P 1984 [1983] in McLaughlin K & Pellaur D (trans), Time and 
Narrative, Vol 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Roiland J. 2012, 'Getting away from it all: The literary journalism of David 
Foster Wallace and Nietzsche's concept of Oblivion'. in Cohen S and 
Konstantinou L (eds) The Legacy of David Foster Wallace. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 25-52. 
Scott AO. 2000, 'The panic of influence'. The New York Review of Books 47, 2. 
366 
 
Severs J. 2016, “Blank as the Faces on Coins”: Currency and Embodied 
Value(s) in David Foster Wallace’s The Pale King. Critique 57, 1: 52-66. 
Smith Z. 2011, 'Brief Interviews with Hideous Men: The difficult gifts of David 
Foster Wallace'. Changing My Mind: Occasional Essays. London: Penguin, 
257-300. 
Staes T. 2010, 'Only artists can transfigure: Kafka's artists and the possibility 
of redemption in the novellas of David Foster Wallace'. Orbis Litterarum 
65, 6. 459-280. 
Staes T. 2014, The Coatlicue Complex in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest’. 
Explicator 72, 1: 67-71. 
Staes T. 2014, 'Wallace and empathy: a narrative approach'. in Boswell M (ed) 
David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": Essays on the Novels. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 43-60. 
Stein L. 2012 [1999], 'David Foster Wallace: in the company of creeps'. in 
Burn SJ (ed) Conversations with David Foster Wallace. Jackson: Mississippi 
University Press, 89-93. 
Streitfeld D. 2012 [1996], 'The wasted land'. in Burn SJ (ed) Conversations 
with David Foster Wallace. Jackson: Mississippi University Press, 66-69. 
Styhre A. 2016, What David Foster Wallace Can Teach Management 
Scholars. Academy of Management Review 41: 170-183. 
Tedesco A. 2015, Authority, Knowledge and (In)Humanity in David Foster 
Wallace's Infinite Jest’. Interdisciplinary Humanities 32, 2: 65-78. 
Thomas C. 2010, 'Infinite Jests: David Foster Wallace and Laurence Sterne'. in 
Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. Los Angeles: 
Sideshow Media, 123-131. 
Tracey T. 2010, 'Representations of trauma in David Foster Wallace's 
Oblivion'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical Essays. 
Los Angeles: Sideshow Media, 172-186. 
Tracey T. 2014, 'The formative years: David Foster Wallace's philosophical 
influences and The Broom of the System'. in Bolger RK and Korb S (eds) 
Gesturing Toward Reality: David Foster Wallace and Philosophy. New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 157-176. 
Tresco M. 2010, 'Impervious to U.S. parsing: Encyclopedism, Autism, and 
Infinite Jest'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: Critical 
Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media, 113-122. 
Turnbull D. 2010, 'This is Water and the ethics of attention: Wallace, 
367 
 
Murdoch and Nussbaum'. in Hering D (ed) Consider David Foster Wallace: 
Critical Essays. Los Angeles: Sideshow Media, 209-217. 
Wallace DF. 2004 [2003], Everything and More: A Compact History of ∞, New 
York: Atlas Books. 
Wallace DF. 2006 [1996], Infinite Jest, New York: Back Bay Books. 
Wallace DF. 2008 [1997], A Supposedly Fun Thing I'll Never Do Again: Essays 
and Arguments, London: Abacus. 
Wallace DF. 2008 [2005], Consider the Lobster and Other Essays, London: 
Abacus. 
Wallace DF. 2009 [1989], Brief Interviews with Hideous Men, London: 
Abacus. 
Wallace DF. 2009 [2004], Oblivion, London: Abacus. 
Wallace DF. 2010 [1989], Girl with Curious Hair, London: Abacus. 
Wallace DF. 2011, The Pale King, London: Hamish Hamilton. 
Wallace DF. 2012, Both Flesh and Not : Essays, Melbourne: Hamish 
Hamilton. 
Williams I. 2015, (New) Sincerity in David Foster Wallace's 'Octet'. Critique: 
Studies in Contemporary Fiction 56, 3: 299-314. 
Winningham T. 2015, “Author Here”: David Foster Wallace and the post-
metafictional Paradox. Critique 56, 5: 467-479. 
Wouters C. 2014, '"What Am I, a Machine?": Humans and information in The 
Pale King'. in Boswell M (ed) David Foster Wallace and "The long Thing": 
Essays on the Novels. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 169-186. 
Wright C. 2012 [1999], 'Mischief: a brief interview with David Foster Wallace'. 
in Burn SJ (ed) Conversations with David Foster Wallace. Jackson: 
Mississippi University Press, 101-103. 
 
 
